Mission for My Country

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by

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Shahanshah of Iran

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Preface

I have designed this book to fill a long-standing need. Some twentyfive hundred years ago our monarchy was born, yet so far as I know I am the first Persian sovereign to have authored an autobiography that could be called at all systematic. It is true that towards the end of the sixteenth century—when Persia's monarchy was already over two thousand years old—one of our kings, Shah Tahmasp I by name, wrote a somewhat sketchy autobiography. A couple of centuries later, after a second Shah Tahmasp had ascended the throne, a French abbe issued in that Shah's name a spurious autobiography which purported to show that the king was the son of a Frenchman! In the nineteenth century Nasir ad-Din Shah prepared pleasing accounts of his two journeys to Europe and of his imaginative and perceptive attempts to understand the secrets of Western progress. But still none of our sovereigns had methodically compiled his autobiography. After I had been on the throne for about sixteen years, I decided to undertake the task. But it was not just that I wanted to be first. I thought the book was sorely needed as a kind of preliminary guide to the present and the future. In recent centuries we in the Middle East have not excelled in objective self-appraisal; and too often we have slothfully neglected to make proper forward plans. Sometimes we

have been only dimly aware of what we have already achieved, we have failed candidly to recognize the administrative and other obstacles to further advance, and we have procrastinated in establishing ideals and goals and targets for the future. I thought it would be timely for an Iranian sovereign to help fill the void. Besides, I had long cherished the idea of writing more about one of the greatest in the long line of Persian sovereigns—namely Reza Shah Pahlavi, my father. In the two centuries before his accession, conditions in my country had come to resemble those of the Dark Ages in Europe. A gifted and individualistic people, we had disintegrated into lethargy and political and social anarchy. It required the strength and iron determination of a man of action like Reza Shah to lift us out of the morass into which we had sunk and set us upon the road to national regeneration. Awakening us to the necessities of modern times, he literally created a new Persia with the aspirations and willpower of a modern state and with a recognized position in the community of nations. I had already published a brief appreciation of my father, but I wanted to say more about his life and the secrets of his success. Accordingly the present volume was begun in 1958 and was finished towards the end of 1960. Naturally there were other competing demands upon my time; but from start to finish I managed to devote several hours every week to the task, except when travelling, and even then I was thinking about it. Now you will find that this book differs from the usual memoirs or reminiscences, for in a sense I have tried to write the story of a country and not only of its head of state. I start with a quick and no doubt inadequate survey of our wonderful historical tradition. Then follows my interpretation of my father's role as one of the towering figures in the recent evolution of the Middle East.

I discuss my own early life, including my schooling in Europe and the personal care that my father took to prepare me for my present responsibilities. I chronicle the crisis of the Second World War, when my country was overrun and, at only twenty-one years of age, I took over Reza Shah's work. This book gives my own account of the hectic years when a politician named Mossadegh steered the country in his inimitable way, when our great oil industry came to a standstill and our economy was largely prostrate, and when the lamps of freedom were almost extinguished. It tells about how we regained our liberty only to have my country chosen as the original location of the Cold War. It explains how, out of the crucible of those experiences, my philosophy of positive nationalism emerged.

You will find this book portraying something of the impact of the West upon Iran, and my hope for a new kind of interaction between East and West. It gives a sense of the scope and pace of my country's economic development. It sets forth my threefold idea of democracy, and the steps we have taken to help make true democracy come alive here. It speaks of land reform and other measures in aid of the farmers of our fifty thousand villages. It dwells for a little upon my view of woman's role in modern Iran. It takes up my philosophy of education in its fullest sense. It discusses the politics and economics and technology of Persian oil. It explains Iran's strategic position in the Middle East and gives my convictions on the conditions for peace in this part of the world and around the globe. Finally in this book I speak briefly of my own daily life and work and of the practical role of our age-old monarchy. Throughout this volume I have tried not to gloss over obstacles and difficulties. For example, the matter of personal honesty, not only within the Government but in business and

elsewhere in our society, still ranks among our formidable problems. My country's administrative system, although much improved in recent years, is still in some measure outmoded. Illiteracy, poverty, and ill-health have by no means been abolished here. But remember that we are successfully telescoping into a few years' time advances that in the developed countries took generations or centuries to achieve. During her long and eventful history, Persia has shown great powers of adaptation and assimilation. In spite of the many destructive invasions we have experienced, we have never lost our identity; and in this turbulent so-called scientific age we also seek to conform in our habits and ways of life to the needs of the day while keeping our national traditions intact. As we modernize the country, blind imitation of others often seems the line of least resistance; but whatever we borrow we try creatively to adjust to the psychology and national traditions and cultural heritage of Iran and of the region of the world in which she lies. It seems that everywhere you find a growing interest in the paradoxical Middle East, which on the one hand has contributed so much to world civilization and on the other hand has always been a hotbed of conflict and tension. In my opinion conditions are ripe for a Middle Eastern regenesis; and I see no reason why, as in the past, my country cannot help bring it about.

Chapter 1

My Ancient and Modern Homeland

I still clearly remember an incident when, as a young Crown Prince, I was at school in Switzerland. Our milkman asked me one day which country I came from, and when I told him Persia, he said: 'Oh yes, I have heard of Persia. That's in America!' Long afterwards, a young man in attendance at my court visited the United States, and told me of an odd happening while he was there. He had always wanted to see a genuine American Indian, and when he was in Arizona mentioned this to his host, who said that this was no problem and that they would visit a nearby Indian reservation. On their arrival the Iranian was at first disappointed, for no one seemed to be wearing the magnificent headdresses with which he was familiar in American films. But at last he was introduced to a warrior resplendent in feathers and war paint, who asked him in perfect English: 'What is your country?'

'I come from a far off place called Iran or Persia,' answered my young friend. Immediately, the Indian's face brightened, and extend-

ing his hand in salute, he said in excellent Persian: '*Salaam alaykum! Hal-e shoma chetore?*'—'Greetings! How are you?' My friend was astonished to learn that the Indian had served during the Second World War with the Persian Gulf Service Command, the American force that helped transport over five million tons of war materials across Iran to Russia and thus hastened Allied victory. He had not only learned Persian, which he had been teaching to his fellow tribesmen, but had gained some knowledge of our age-old culture. I wish that more people of the West knew something of my country, even as much as that Indian did, and that they realized how much Persia has contributed to the progress of mankind and how great, as I strongly feel, its future contribution can be. I sometimes think it curious that we are not better known to the West, for we have from an early date exported our culture, much as America today provides technical assistance overseas through her Point Four programme; but I am encouraged to find that the increasing role played by the Middle East in world affairs has made people everywhere more interested in learning about my country. On any map of the world or the Middle Eastern area Persia figures prominently, for it is larger than Alaska, over twice as big as Texas, and well over the combined areas of France, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland. Owing to our geographical position, we have been for thousands of years a world crossroads, and this is as true today in the age of jet aircraft and guided missiles as it was in the days of the great overland caravans. In terms of inhabitants per square mile our population is sparse, yet our twenty million people are twice the number contained in the Australian continent, and my capital is possibly one of the world's fastest-growing cities. Teheran has trebled its population (from half a

million to over a million and a half) since the Second World War, and though much of this growth is due to the drift to the city common to many countries, our population as a whole is increasing rapidly. Parts of Persia have an enormous annual rainfall, which supports rich forests and makes rice cultivation possible, but much of my country is quite dry, and relies for water mainly on the deep snow which collects on the mountains that ring the central plateau and cross it in many places. Except in the great deserts, you are hardly ever far from mountains in Iran, and their waters are systematically channelled to fields and villages. Lately, also, we have begun to drill deep wells. The experts tell me that we have ample water supplies for two or three times our present population. Our climatic range is quite large, both from place to place and season to season, and I suspect that this has contributed to the hardiness of our people. They excel in sports such as weight-lifting and wrestling, and have won far more trophies in these events in international contests than the size of our population would seem to warrant. They are also intellectually gifted, and now that education is making such strides within my realm, I think we can look forward to further impressive contributions by Persians in the arts and sciences, and in agriculture, industry and commerce. Of course, we are famous as one of the world's major oil producers. The Middle East oil industry was born in Persia, and recent surveys suggest that my country is figuratively floating on oil. But it is less well known that we possess commercial quantities of other minerals, especially coal, iron, copper, lead, manganese, chromite, precious stones, and many valuable chemical salts such as the borates, sulphates, and rock salt. These we have barely started to exploit. Our soil is almost everywhere fertile, except for the salt deserts which, as in Australia,

overspread large areas in the middle of the country. Wherever water is brought to our arable land, we grow a wonderful variety of crops, including wheat, barley, corn, rice, cotton, potatoes, millet, lucerne, sugar beet and sugar cane, tobacco, and tea, as well as our succulent Persian cucumbers and virtually every other kind of garden vegetable. Those who know my realm particularly prize our delicious fruits, including apples, peaches, apricots, grapes, cherries, plums, pears, pomegranates, oranges, grapefruit, tangerines, lemons, limes, dates, olives, and a variety of delectable melons. We have also a profusion of nuts, especially almonds, pistachios, and hazels. The livestock industry flourishes both among our picturesque nomadic tribal people and our settled farmers in the mountains and on the plains. Recently we have begun to mechanize our agriculture, and I shall later describe our pioneering programmes of dividing the land among individual proprietors.

Normally we import comparatively little food, and we export a good deal, particularly our fruits and nuts. We have large untapped fisheries, but even now most of the world's so-called Russian caviare comes from Iran; we export it to Russia as well as to the United States and other countries. (It has been jokingly suggested that the sturgeon have migrated to the southern end of the Caspian for ideological reasons; but I have to admit that long before the Russian Revolution they indicated their preference for the warmer waters at our end.) All this indicates that, although we produce much of value to my own people and to the world, we have only begun to harness our human and natural resources. According to a recent official British report, 'Iran is perhaps the country in the Middle East with the greatest potentialities for development'. For countless centuries we have provided

a place for the meeting of East and West (many forget that we are technically part of Asia). Caravans, following the famous Silk Route between China and Europe, came to Persia and were often headquartered here. Silks, spices, precious metals and gems, and other goods from the Orient were sold to the citizens of our own rich empire or sent onward, mostly to Europe. More important than the trafficking in goods was the exchange of ideas, It is no wonder that, under the patronage of our great kings, Persia became a centre of Eastern learning and culture. Many centuries before the discovery of the New World, Persians were using table utensils and decorated ceramic dishes while most Europeans were still eating with their fingers as they sat on the ground. Ours is the world's oldest continuous civilization except that of China, and perhaps I can be forgiven for thinking it superior to theirs in some respects.

Certainly no one can doubt that our culture is more akin to that of the West than is either the Chinese or that of our neighbours the Arabs. Iran was an early home of the Aryans from whom most Americans and Europeans are descended, and we are racially quite separate from the Semitic stock of the Arabs. Our language belongs to the IndoEuropean family which includes English, French, German and other major Western tongues. I recall my frank surprise on learning from the scholarly Netherlands cultural attaché in Iran that some of Holland's tulips originally derived from our wild tulips, and that their windmills had been copied from those seen by early Dutch traders in southern Persia. His opinion was the result of careful research, and I think he must be right. Equally unknown to most people is the fact that the pistachio nut is of Persian origin; that we developed the peach from wild strains found in China, and it was then introduced to the

Mediterranean area and Europe; and that we were the first to cultivate lucerne, using it as food for our fine horses. The rose, cherished for thousands of years in Persian gardens, was first grown here, and the lilac, narcissus, and jasmin are said to have originated in Persia and keep their Persian names. One of our contributions to Western tables is sherbert, a popular delicacy in our country many centuries since. Sherry is said to owe its name to Shiraz whence the technique of producing it was carried to Spain by the Arabs in the Middle Ages. In the field of sports and games, the world is indebted to Persia both for backgammon and for polo, the favourite sport of some of our kings. Among our achievements in the early scientific field were helping to develop the sundial, establishing one of the first observatories, and inventing a calibrated clock dial basically similar to those in worldwide use today. Avicenna, whose medical treatises were accepted authorities in medieval Europe and beyond, would seem to have advocated a thousand years ago the use of the bread-mould organism in the treatment of difficult open wounds. Sir Alexander Fleming was to re-study the antibiotic properties of this same penicillium organism and to open the way for its mass-production as penicillin, which has saved millions of lives. Most of the readers of this book will have studied Roman history, but our empire was flourishing centuries before that of Rome, and it was in fact we who showed that it was possible to govern and administer on such an extended scale. We established a system of provincial satraps, or governors, and the essential lines of communication through a network of post roads and a postal system. Royal couriers, using closely spaced relay stations with fresh horses ready at each, could span our empire within fifteen days, and chains of regularly spaced semaphore towers stretching for miles across the

countryside made even more rapid communication possible. Our coinage system was among the earliest, and the golden daric and silver siglos of Darius the Great, corresponding almost exactly in weight with the modern English sovereign and shilling, were the standards of the ancient world. This coinage, a uniform system of weights and measures, and advanced methods of accounting which were widely copied abroad, were pioneer measures in promoting trade within and beyond the empire and in facilitating the collection of the taxes with which public works and a well-organized army were maintained. In the sphere of religion, Persia was the cradle of Zoroastrianism in about the sixth century BC A.V.W. Jackson, an authority on comparative religion, has said that of the Avesta — the holy book compiled by Zoroaster — that: 'outside of Judaism and Christianity it is impossible to find in antiquity so true, so noble, so ideal a belief in the resurrection of the body, the life hereafter, the coming of a saviour, the rewards and punishments for the immortal soul.' Another important early Persian system is Manichaeism, a growth of the third century a.p. Mani set out to discover the common truths in the religions before his time, especially in the teachings of Zoroaster, Buddha and Jesus and formulated what was probably the first such synthesis in the history of religion. More recently we also largely developed the Shiah branch of the Moslem faith, in which I fervently believe. Apart from the strictly theological field, the poetic mysticism of Sufism, which reached its apogee in the Islamic period, has won tribute from Western scholars, who have admired the universal spirit of its parables. Our poets such as Firdausi, Hafiz, Saadi, Rumi, Omar Khayyam, and other masters are universally recognized and a scholar of the University of Cambridge has not been alone in declaring that Persia possesses the greatest body

of fine poetry in any language. The modern interest in archaeology has led to exciting discoveries. Men were living at this end of the Caspian Sea, in what is now modern Iran, in the Stone Age. Just outside Teheran there are remains of villages dating from 2,000 BC, and near Kashan, in west-central Iran, are vestiges of the settlement of Siyalk, believed to be at least two thousand years older still. Even then the early inhabitants of Iran had made the significant advance from the ways of nomadic hunters and food gatheres to village life and systematic agriculture, including animal husbandry. In 1958, American and Persian archaeologists discovered, near the present-day village of Hasanlu in Azerbaijan, a magnificently ornamented gold bowl, said to rank with the greatest of all finds. This, and the ancient fortress in which it was found, reveal secrets of a hitherto-unknown people who disappeared when their kingdom was invaded in the ninth century BC and are an indication of how much we have yet to learn of the early origins of our civilization. Beginning about 1500 BC, successive waves of Aryans moved in to join our forbears. Possibly coming from what is now south-central Russia, they gave my country its name, for Iran means land of the Aryans. The newcomers split into two main groups, the Medes and the Persians, both conspicuously mentioned in the Bible. The Medes settled principally in the north-west, while the Persians moved farther south. Of the two the Medes were at first the more civilized for they possessed horses, cattle, sheep, goats, wheeled wagons, military chariots, and watchdogs, and they knew how to write. In the seventh century BC, about 150 years after Rome was founded, they had established an empire which included the Persians and various other tribes as vassals, and had built a splendid capital at Ecbatana, the modern city of Hamadan.

The Persians, although tributary to the Medes, were ruled by their own kings, of whom Cyrus I (in Persian Koorosh) established the so-called Achaemenid (Hakhamanish) dynasty, named after the Persian clan to which he belonged. His son, Cyrus the Great, who reigned from about 559-529 BC, was one of the most dynamic men in history. He captured the Median capital, overthrew their empire and, having united all modern Iran under his own rule established one of the world's first nation-states — some would say the first. He then went on to create the empire which, during his own reign and that of his successor Cambyses (Cambojieh), became the greatest the world has ever seen. In fact, as the American anthropologist, Dr. Coon, has pointed out in his book Caravan, it 'was the earliest true empire in the world, in that it constituted a government of many different peoples under a single ruler. While kingdoms had existed during the Bronze Age, in Egypt, Sumeria, Babylonia, China, and elsewhere the technological facilities (such as the Persians developed) for rapid transport and communication needed by an imperial government had not yet been invented. In China this came about three hundred years later...'

The empire founded by Cyrus the Great was not based on territorial acquisition alone, but also on international tolerance and understanding. The rights of all the subject nations were upheld, and their laws and customs respected. Indeed, I see in our first empire something of the spirit of the United Nations of nearly 2,500 years later. Among the great kings who followed Cambyses were Darius I (Dariush) and Xerxes (Khashayarsha), both of whom showed the same genius for efficient and enlightened administration of unprecedentedly large areas. At its height, about 500 BC, the Persian Empire

covered most of the modern Middle East (apart from the Arabian Peninsula), extending from the Indus well up into southern Russia, and continuing in the opposite direction to include part of present-day Greece, all of Turkey and Cyprus, a large part of modern Egypt and some of present-day Libya. It is often forgotten that for nearly two hundred years the Egyptians were under Persian rule. Just as with the later Roman Empire (which reached its height about 115 BC), the boundaries of the Persian Empire fluctuated somewhat during its long life, but for centuries it included much of the then civilized world. Something of its spirit is contained in these words from the tomb of Darius I, who reigned from 521-458 BC: 'I am Darius, the great king, king of kings, king of the lands peopled by all races, for long king of this great earth, reaching even far away...'

In 331 BC came conquest by Alexander the Great, but upon his death eight years later, the Greeks were unable to hold their newly won empire together. Seleucus, one of Alexander's generals, succeeded in becoming king of one of its fragments, and established a dominion which included Persia and which lasted for nearly a century. In one sense this was a Greek occupation, but in a truer sense it was not, since the invaders adopted Persian customs and habits, relied on Persian administrators, married Persian women, and in the end were assimilated by the Persian culture. About 248 BC, the Parthians, a relatively less civilized Aryan tribe from what is now north-east Iran, ousted the successors of Seleucus. The Parthians ruled Iran for more than four centuries. But again our higher culture gradually transformed the newcomers. They adopted Persian manners, worshipped Persian gods, and perpetuated the traditions of the Achaemenid era, and there was a strong revival of Persian nationalism. Continuing intermittently for

nearly three centuries during this period were the wars between Persia and Rome. The Romans kept trying to expand eastward, but the Parthians resisted them, long enjoying a technological advantage over the Roman armies because of their development of heavily armoured cavalry, the predecessors by many centuries of the medieval European knights. Eventually the Romans were obliged to imitate this Parthian innovation. (It was not the first time that the Romans had copied Persian military technique, for Xerxes in his campaigns against the Greeks had pioneered the use of pontoon bridges, the prototype of those employed by Caesar and Hannibal several centuries later.) In general the line of demarcation between the two empires remained the Euphrates, which flows through modern Syria and Iraq. The Persians were the only people who were able to hold out indefinitely against the power of Rome which, in spite of more or less continuous campaigning, never succeeded in conquering us. In approximately AD 224 a local leader named Ardeshir, who was vassal king of the southern Persian province of Fars under the Parthians, revolted against them. He fought three great battles and achieved decisive victory in the third when in AD 226 he slew Ardawan, the Parthian monarch, in single combat. The Sassanian dynasty established by Ardeshir lasted for more than four hundred years — longer than the span of English history since the reign of Elizabeth I, or from the arrival of the Pilgrim Fathers in the New World until the present day. In this era the glories of Achaemenid times were revived. Persian art and culture reached their zenith, many of the inventions and discoveries for which we are famous were made, and Zoroastrianism, the virile and idealistic religion of the Achaemenids, was revived and became the state religion. The Sassanians built to last. In many parts of Iran the remains of their

splendid palaces, fire temples, and fortresses are still to be seen. Khosro Nushirwan (AD 531-579), one of the greatest of their kings, built roads, bridges, and great caravanserais (large fortified inns where caravans would spend the night) all over Iran and beyond. He developed the land by constructing dams and the unique underground irrigation systems later known as ganats, which distribute the mountain water. The Sassanians often defeated the Roman armies, and Shapur I actually captured the Emperor Valerian in battle and kept him prisoner; but the boundaries between the two empires on the whole remained about the same as in Parthian times. On the other hand Nushirwan extended Persia's borders northward and eastward well into what is now Russia and Afghanistan. He invaded Arabia, defeated the Arab armies, and advanced as far as present-day Yemen. Religion began to play a part in the duel between the two empires when the Roman authorities adopted Christianity in the fourth century A.D. Armenia furnished a continuing bone of contention between the two sides. In the end all three powers wore themselves out. The Persian administration, and even the Zoroastrian priesthood, became decadent and corrupt. The Arabs, fired with their young Islamic faith, swept over the land and in AD 641 the Persian armies were decisively defeated. The Arabs, like previous invaders, found the Persian spirit unconquerable. The Zoroastrian religion died out, except among small remnants which still exist, but otherwise the Persian culture triumphed for, as Arab scholars such as al-Masudi and Ibn-Khaldun have recognized, it was so clearly the higher that there is no wonder Persian administrators, scholars, and artisans continued to be employed. Even in their religion the Persians did not completely surrender. For patriotic as well as religious reasons they gradually adopted a new branch of the

Moslem faith known as Shiism, as distinguished from the Sunnism practised by most of the Arabs. The Shiahs refused to recognize the spiritual legitimacy of the first three caliphs, who were the Arab rulers supposed by the Sunnis to have inherited the mantle of Mohammed. The Shiahs claimed that the first true caliph was Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law. They also believed that Ali's son had married a daughter of the Persian king who had been deposed by the invading Arabs, and who was obviously not especially popular with them.

Even today the great majority of my people are Shiahs. But nowadays we tend to subordinate sectarian differences within the Moslem faith. We regard ourselves as part of a religious community of well over 400 million people—the largest religious family in the world except the Christian.

For some six hundred years, from about AD 651-1258 — that is, until forty-three years after England's Magna Carta—the Arabs nominally ruled Persia. But gradually the Persians had begun to revolt against their Arab overlords. They paid lip service to the caliphs, but showed increasing independence; in fact, the Arabs exercised effective control for only about two centuries. A number of small native dynasties made their appearance in various parts of Iran, and some of them enjoyed at least brief periods of considerable power and prestige; for example, the kings of the Ghazna (Ghaznavi) dynasty built up an empire which included parts of India. Some of the kings who reigned during those six centuries patronized the arts, and they encouraged the first revival of Persian literature since Sassanian times, so that poets such as Firdausi prospered. Towards the end of the period, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries — at about the time of the Norman conquest of England — the Seljuk dynasty, whose

kings were of central Asian origin, again united Persia. The Seljuks conquered Syria and Egypt and created an empire which bore some resemblance to the Persian Empire of old. They encouraged the arts and sciences, which flourished more than ever before, and among the many who received royal patronage was the poet and astronomer Omar Khayyam. Following the Seljuks another related dynasty ruled for about a century. Then came the Mongol avalanche. This was the greatest calamity that my country, as well as neighbouring lands in the Middle East, have ever known, and I often wonder why some people persist in regarding Genghiz Khan, the Mongol leader who swept into Iran around 1220, as a romantic figure. We cannot forget the ruthless, wanton destruction by his hordes. They literally exterminated our thriving cities, feeling no compunction in murdering hundreds of thousands of our women and children in cold blood. The Mongols dominated Persia for about a century. They were followed by Tamerlane, a central Asian Turk of Mongol origins, another supposedly romantic figure who followed the same policy of mass cold-blooded murder. He and his followers ruled Persia until just about the time that Columbus discovered America. These barbarians literally reduced our population by millions. But miraculously our culture persisted and we made further advances in science and the arts. Observatories were built, mathematics was developed, and our poets such as Saadi and Hafiz composed their verses. As in earlier periods, we civilized our invaders and, as if in remorse for their earlier deeds, they became patrons of learning and architecture, some of their splendid buildings still surviving. Our linguistic and literary influence even spread into India, where for the following five hundred years Persian was spoken as the language of culture and our literary classics

were widely read; indeed, India's Mogul emperors employed Persian as the standard court and administrative language almost until the advent of British rule. Urdu, as spoken today by millions of people on the Indian subcontinent, is in fact closely related to Persian. The Mongols and their successors presently declined and were replaced by an important Persian dynasty, the Safavi. Some scholars believe that the Safavis were related to the prophet Mohammed. In any case they promptly installed the Shiah school of the Moslem faith as the state religion. Shah Abbas the Great, who reigned from 1587 to 1629, or from just before the defeat of the Spanish Armada until just after the Pilgrims landed in America, was the most famous of the Safavi line. He brought Persia prosperity such as she had not known for centuries. His splendid capital at Isfahan became known throughout the civilized world, and today you can see it much as it was in those times. Shah Abbas assembled skilled artisans from at home and abroad. He expanded the famous Persian rug industry. The rugs, silks, velvets, and brocades, the metal work, the ceramics and glorious tiles, and perhaps most of all the architectural designs of the Safavi period, remain unsurpassed. Shah Abbas built roads and suppressed brigandage, just as Cyrus had done before him and my father did after him. He organized the first regular national Persian army, based no longer on the feudal pattern; and the English Sherley brothers helped him equip it with ordnance. Shah Abbas, so auspicious a ruler, was unfortunately cruel towards his own family, and his jealousy of his sons kept him from properly preparing them for the throne. In 1722, invaders from Afghanistan ignominiously defeated us, and although the Afghans were soon ejected, Persia passed through a period of temporary decline. In 1736 a great Persian general of simple origins, who had led the

campaign against the Afghans, overthrew the tottering Safavi throne and, as Nadir Shah, established the new Afshar dynasty. Often called the Napoleon of Persia, Nadir Shah defeated the Turks and forced the Russians out of some of our territory they had occupied. He established a strong central government and re-unified the country. His armies invaded India, marched to Delhi, and returned with fabulous treasures. Under the following Zand dynasty, which ruled briefly until shortly after the establishment of the United States of America, Iran enjoyed peace and tranquillity. In 1796, a Persian leader descended from Turkic tribes from east of the Caspian set up the Qajar dynasty. The Qajars, although they lasted until my father superseded them in 1925, were by far the weakest of the major Persian dynasties. They did little to resist foreign infiltration, and even encouraged outside interference in our internal affairs by their indecisive policies. The clergy were allowed too much influence in civil matters, brigandage was not suppressed, nor were the tribes controlled. Both by their aimlessness and personal excesses, including lavish trips abroad, the later Qajar kings brought Persia close to financial ruin; they then raised heavy foreign loans to cover their extravagances. The last but one of the Qajars tried his best, even if unsuccessfully, to stem the rising pressure for constitutional government. I do not want to seem too hard on the Qajars, as it might easily give the impression that I am biased in favour of my father's unceremonious treatment of them. Certain of them were outstanding men. For example, Agha Mohammed Khan, the first of these rulers, was an able soldier who re-unified the country. I must add, though, that he was known for his sadistic cruelty. Nasir ed-Din Shah was the first Persian king to visit Europe; his travels, of which he wrote amusing accounts, yielded valuable ideas that he put

into practice. When he saw his first locomotive, he thought it was propelled by a horse concealed inside; but he became so enthusiastic about railways that he had the Belgians construct a little five-mile line, still in operation, from Teheran to Rey. He decreed that his wives and the ladies of his court should wear ballet skirts such as he had seen in Europe; but unhappily the style ill became the more overweight among them. I notice that historians of both East and West agree that the Qajar dynasty was not outstanding, but it might be said in their defence that the Qajars were the first to have to bear the brunt of Russian and British imperialism. Yet one cannot help feeling that Reza Shah was later to show somewhat more imagination than they in dealing with this threat. Again one might admit that during the long period of Qajar rule Europe and America were forging ahead so fast that Persia, almost standing still, seemed by comparison to be moving rapidly in reverse. Yet this again is no compliment to the Qajars. What was needed was to catch the spirit of the new age of science and industry, and here they dismally failed. My father, the founder in 1925 of the present Pahlavi dynasty (called after the name of an ancient form of our Persian language), did catch that spirit. Economically, administratively, and socially he revolutionized Iran, and when I took over from him in 1941, I followed in his footsteps — but with some important differences that I shall describe later. Today my country is a show window of the blend of ancient and modern. When, about 330 BC, our splendid capital at Persepolis was burned (some say accidentally) while Alexander the Great and his troops were there, the first Persian Empire had already existed for centuries. When, in A.D. 476, the Roman Empire fell, we could already point to the antiquity of our civilization, and those who know both frequently speak of the

greater grandeur of the ruins of Persepolis when compared with those of Rome. But, side by side with these ruins, and with other fascinating reminders of our antiquity, are seen countless instances of modern progress. In Shiraz, the beautiful city in south-central Iran close to ancient Persepolis, you can sit amidst roses and orange blossom and read the immortal verses of Hafiz who lived there over five hundred years ago and whose poems are as fresh now as then. Under her velvet night skies you can still hear the nightingales of whom the poet sang. But also in Shiraz we have built and staffed what some consider to be the finest hospital in the Middle East, and the municipal water system is second to none in this part of the world. (I should add that we are deeply indebted for both to a private Iranian philanthropist.) And for that city we plan a new university which will draw its architectural inspiration from Persepolis and its educational philosophy from the universities of America. In Isfahan, the magnificent capital of Shah Abbas, you can still see grain being ground by camel-power. (As of old, the camels are blindfolded while they work, so that they will not become dizzy as they walk in a circle turning the mill.) You can admire the skill of artisans who still maintain the city's centuries-old fame in such crafts as silversmithing, and catch your breath as you survey the architectural perfection of the great square, flanked by its mosques in perfect colour harmony and by the venerable palace where from the verandah Shah Abbas used to watch his polo games. But, you can also find modern textile mills run by western-trained managers and engineers, and see lively experiments in local self-government and improved municipal administration. Just outside Teheran, you can still see camel caravans go by, bringing goods from afar into the city. (Lucky is he who can see a caravan, and hear its camel bells, as it passes

under a full moon.) You can rest in walled gardens, surrounded by fruits and flowers of every description, lulled by the sounds of birds and fountains and gently-sloping tiled water-courses, and catching glimpses of snow-capped mountains through the huge shading plane trees. But, at the University of Teheran, founded by my father, you can sit with some of its more than 11,000 students as they use closed-circuit television to watch operations in the university's hospital. And, as you go to meet a friend at Teheran's big new jet-age international airport, you pass along broad boulevards lined with modern shops, and ablaze with neon lights, where some of the women will be wearing the most daring Paris fashions, and others still be veiled. Later I shall explain my hope that we Persians may be able to merge, in a new and harmonious form, our antiquity and our modernity. My hope even extends farther. As I have said, our culture is the oldest continuous one racially and linguistically linked to that of the West, which itself owes much to us; and now that we are deliberately adding some of its most modern fruits to our own, it seems not unreasonable to imagine that we may help, as in days gone by, to produce a new East-West world synthesis. It is not only geographically that we stand at the crossroads.

Chapter 2

My Father and His Revolution

As I look back over my country's long and rich history, certain things especially stand out in my mind. For example, Persians have always been pronounced individualists. I won't dispute with those who claim to see Persian individualism in the wild and free tactics of Teheran's famed taxi drivers (when we had a taxi strike, the city's streets seemed by comparison as quiet as a mill pond); but for thousands of years our individualism has made itself felt in much deeper ways. Neither invasions nor foreign domination nor other adversities have ever quenched the average Persian's determination to express himself in his own way. In our individualism we resemble the French (whose taxi men in their wilfulness rate a close second to ours), and it is no wonder that Iran has often been called the France of Asia. As individualists we are also much like the Americans, and I am not surprised that Persians and Americans get on so well together. The hundreds of students we send each year to America almost invariably enjoy

their stay there, and Americans working in my country mix freely and naturally in our social life. We have always been famous for our hospitality. Anybody who is so minded can discover, in libraries that are rich in books on Persia (the British Museum or the U.S. Library of Congress, for example) accounts by earlier European travellers of the spontaneous and staggering hospitality they received here. Today you will find this tradition still alive not only in my capital city but even more in the smaller towns and villages. Iran resembles America in that for many centuries we have been free of any system of rigid castes or classes such as you find in some countries. It is true that we have had our over privileged and under privileged people, and there is still far too much gap between them. Still in Iran, as in America, it has always been possible for exceptional people to rise from the bottom to the top. My father provided a notable example of just that; but Iran's history abounds with other instances of outstanding kings, generals, administrators, scientists, and poets who rose from humble beginnings. We have never believed in discrimination based on race, colour, or creed, and have often provided a haven for oppressed peoples of backgrounds different from our own. For example, it was characteristic of Cyrus the Great that, when he conquered Babylon, he allowed the Jews, who had been exiled there by King Nebuchadnezzar after the conquest of Jerusalem in 597 B.C., to return to Palestine with their sacred vessels and rebuild their destroyed temples. These Babylonian captives, prominently mentioned in the Bible, actually received a grant from Cyrus's treasury to reconstruct the temples. In AD 409 our emperor Yazdegerd I issued a decree granting freedom of worship to Christians within the Persian Empire. Later Iran provided a haven for refugees from Armenia when the Romans penetrated there. More

recently, we welcomed many Russian Christians when they fled the Bolshevik terror during and after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Occasionally some of our less responsible citizens have in an excess of zeal oppressed certain religious groups; but on the whole, I think Western historians would agree with me that our record on racial and religious toleration surpasses that of most Western countries. In my view our tolerance of those of differing beliefs and backgrounds has enriched and strengthened our culture. I have already made clear that while for many centuries we were famous as warriors, we have been even better known as a nation of civilizers. The basis of this world leadership was our strong religious and moral spirit. Zoroaster anticipated some of the tenets of Christianity when he taught the immortality of the soul and the unceasing conflict between good and evil. He exhorted his followers to 'think good, speak good, do good'. Darius the Great repeatedly emphasized the importance of telling the truth and shunning the lie, and said: 'I love justice, I hate iniquity. It is not my pleasure that the lower suffer injustice because of the higher.' According to Ardeshir I, the first Sassanian ruler, 'There can be no power without an army, no army without money, no money without agriculture, and no agriculture without justice.' Although he was often unduly harsh, Khosro Nushirwan, of the same dynasty, earned for himself the title of 'The Just'. The story goes that he had a bell hung outside his palace which any citizen could ring if he felt that he had been denied justice. He would then be brought before the king, who would personally hear his complaint. One day a donkey pulled on the bell-rope. When the King's courtiers started to chase the beast away, Nushirwan reprimanded them and insisted that the donkey be brought for an audience. I should add that Nushirwan

welcomed to his court the Greek neo-Platonic philosophers who had been persecuted by the Roman emperor, and gave them hospitality for some time. It is said that Nushirwan then obtained from the Roman emperor a guarantee under which the philosophers could return to their homeland and be well treated there. He also showed great toleration to Christians. So I like to think that in our thousands of years of continuous civilization, we Persians have gained certain insights and exhibited certain characteristics that the world needs. But in all candour I think it must be said that in the period just before my father assumed power, we had fallen upon evil days. As a nation we no longer led in governance, or administration, or science, or literature, or art. We no longer cared much if the lower suffered injustice because of the higher. We no longer showed much patriotism, or courage, or religious spirit. We no longer told the truth and shunned the lie. To understand the enormous challenge that my father successfully met, it is well to glance back over the period preceding his assumption of power. Those years witnessed growing outside interference in our affairs coupled with vacillation and mismanagement by our own leaders. As early as 1807, Fath Ali Shah, of the Qajar line, had signed a treaty with Napoleon, who hoped this would pave the way for him to invade India overland by way of Persia. At the same time the treaty provided that we would receive French arms and military training to help us resist Tsarist Russia, which six years earlier had annexed our province of Georgia. Ever since Peter the Great, who ruled from 1682 to 1725, Russia had in fact been trying to expand southwards to obtain warm-water ports on the Persian Gulf. But Napoleon came to terms with Russia and also gave up his plan for invading India. Meanwhile, in an effort to recover Georgia, we launched a disastrous

campaign against Russia. In the Treaty of Gulistan, signed in 1813, we were forced to cede not only Georgia but also eight other provinces, and we were denied the right to operate warships along our Caspian coasts. The Russians had also been entertaining designs on India, and this concerned the British, who realized that Persia lay along Russia's natural invasion route. Accordingly in 1814 Britain signed with us a treaty creating a defensive alliance which was actually aimed primarily at Russia. Under the treaty Britain undertook to provide troops or financial aid in the event of unprovoked aggression against us. In 1826 we again went to war with Russia. Britain declined to give us much assistance, although she did help mediate between us and the Russians. As before, we were ill prepared for combat, and the war ended with another unfortunate treaty, that of Turkomanchi. Signed in 1828, the treaty handed over additional Persian territory to Russia, awarded her a large indemnity, and granted her special commercial and other privileges. Later in the nineteenth century, Russian policy became outwardly more conciliatory. We were encouraged to declare war on Afghanistan to regain control over our eastern provinces which lie along its borders, and this led to brief hostilities in 1857 with the British, who regarded Afghanistan as a buffer state protecting India. The succeeding years saw increasing encroachment by the Russians not only in our remaining northern provinces, but in the eastern as well. More and more we became the victim of Anglo-Russian commercial as well as political rivalry. Here again it was largely our own fault. The Qajar kings granted numerous commercial concessions largely to pay for the extravagances of their court, the most fantastic of these being that given in 1872 to Baron Julius de Reuter, a naturalized British subject. Under it de Reuter was to enjoy a monopoly of all

railways and tramways in Persia for the next seventy years, together with a privileged position in respect to roads, irrigation works, mines, factories, telegraph lines, and customs collection. The popular outcry, together with Russian pressure, were such that the Shah cancelled the concession. But to soothe de Reuter's feelings the Shah authorized him to set up, with British capital, a national bank which for a time had a monopoly on the issue of banknotes in Persia; in addition, though in the end this brought him nothing commercially, de Reuter received the right to exploit many minerals including petroleum.

The British also built and managed telegraph lines in Persia, and obtained a monopoly for the navigation of the Karun River, the only navigable waterway within the country. A tobacco monopoly granted to a British subject was cancelled when the people, especially the intellectuals and clergy, combined to oppose it. Meanwhile the Russians continued to infiltrate. In 1879 Nasir ed-Din Shah allowed them to form a brigade of Persian Cossacks commanded by Russian officers, hi effect under the control of a foreign power, this brigade soon became the most effective fighting force in Persia. In 1888 a Russian subject received a comprehensive concession governing fishing along the Persian shores of the Caspian. In 1891 a Russian bank was opened in Teheran; as with the British one, it received the right of note issue. The Russians further strengthened their grip on the country through a series of loans to the Shahs. Using these loans as leverage, they demanded and received additional special trade concessions. They, and later a number of other countries, extracted so-called capitulation rights under which the Persian Government was forbidden to try citizens of those foreign powers for offences committed within Persia. The irresponsibility of the Qajar rulers finally forced the people to act.

An organized, constitutionalist group developed. In August of 1906, some 10,000 merchants and other constitutionalists sought sanctuary in the grounds of the British Legation in Teheran. There they staged a sort of sit-down strike against the Qajar monarchy and its abuses. The city's economic life virtually came to a halt. At about the same time a group of the more enlightened Teheran clergy left the city and took refuge at Qum. The Shah was obliged to promise liberal reforms, and the following month he promulgated the Constitution of 1906. In addition to internal reforms, the constitutionalists had demanded an end to Russian intrigues and influence at the Persian court. Some argue that the British supported the constitutionalists solely because the latter were anti-Russian; but I believe that the British also were motivated by a sincere interest in fostering liberal democracy in Persia. Nevertheless, the constitutionalists were much discouraged when Britain and Russia in 1907 announced the signing of an agreement concerning their respective roles in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Although the agreement included a promise to respect Persia's territorial integrity and independence, it divided the country into zones of foreign influence. Britain pledged herself not to seek or encourage others to seek political or economic concessions in the northern part of the country, which was implicitly reserved as a sphere of Russian influence. Russia promised similarly with regard to a smaller area in the south-eastern part of the country, which by implication was to be the British zone. The agreement did not limit either party as to the territory between: their existing concessions (including the important oil concession which had in 1901 been granted to D'Arcy, an Englishman who had been engaged in gold niining in Australia) were maintained. In practice the British were more active than the

Russians in this so-called neutral area. Britain and Russia, who were to become allies in World War I, could already discern the threat to them both in the rising power of Imperial Germany. They hoped that the 1907 convention would reduce the rivalry between them and help them to counter their common foe. But to Persians the agreement seemed like a joint plan to plunder the country. Besides, the 1907 agreement largely failed in its objective, because Britain and Russia continued to compete within Persia. The Persian nationalists had meanwhile quarrelled with each other and had failed to support the new Parliament established in 1906. Muzaffar ed-Din Shah died in 1907 and Mohammed Ali, his ambitious son, took over as the next Qajar ruler. If the father had been lukewarm towards the Constitution, the son was bitterly hostile. With Russian support, he decided he would attempt to restore an absolute monarchy, and made no less than three attempts to do so. The initial attempt, in 1907, collapsed at the first sign of armed resistance from the constitutionalists. In the second, in June of 1908, the Russian commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade had his force bombard the Parliament building, and the Shah dissolved Parliament. But the Shah and his Russian colleagues had again underestimated the people; the constitutionalists in the following year defeated the Persian Cossack Brigade. The Shah fled to Russia, and Ahmad, his eleven-year-old son, was named his successor. In 1911, in his third and final effort, Mohammed Ali's supporters invaded Persia from Russia by way of the Caspian, but again he was unsuccessful. The constitutionalists had momentarily triumphed. But the Russians now behaved just as they did later after the Second World War: their troops remained in the northern part of the country. In 1911, in an attempt to remedy the chaotic state of the finances, the

Persian Government engaged an American named Morgan Shuster to serve as Treasurer-General. Sinister won the people's confidence and was making real progress when, later in the same year, the Russians issued an ultimatum which among other things demanded that the Persian Government dismiss him: he recorded his experiences in *The Strangling of Persia*. It was evident the Russians did not want an efficient Persian administration which might be less dependent upon them. Russian troops meanwhile attacked several cities in northern Persia, causing considerable loss of life. Although Parliament rejected the Russian ultimatum, the Cabinet accepted it. Although Persia declared her neutrality in the First World War, the Germans, the Turks, the Russians, and the British were all active in my country. In support of the Germans, the Turks advanced towards Teheran until the Russians defeated them. German agents roamed the country, stirred up the tribes, and made an abortive effort to recruit forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. In southern Persia, Major Percy Sykes, who as Sir Percy Sykes later wrote a two-volume history of Persia, organized a force called the South Persia Rifles which controlled that part of the country. After the war conditions became more chaotic than ever. The Russian Revolution had of course taken place in 1917, and large bodies of Russian troops were now stationed in northern Persia, where a British expeditionary force unsuccessfully attacked them. In 1919 the British offered us a treaty under which among other things they would lend us money, provide administrative and military advisers, arms and equipment, and construct roads and railways. But popular feeling ran high against the proposed treaty on the grounds that it would lead to further foreign domination. It was approved by the Persian Government but never ratified by our Parliament. Our

national sickness was now graver than ever. My father was one of our many patriots who burned with anger and sadness at the pass to which our great nation had come. My father had been born in 1878 in the province of Mazanderan near the Caspian Sea. Unlike the Qajars, who as I have mentioned were of Turkic origin, my father was of genuine Persian stock. Both his father and grandfather had been officers in the old Persian army. His grandfather had distinguished himself for gallantry in one of our wars against the Afghans, and his father had been commanding officer of a regiment usually stationed in Mazanderan province. When Reza Khan, as my father was called in his early days, was only forty days old, his father died. His mother decided to bring her infant son to Teheran, but on the way the baby almost perished in the intense cold of the mountain roads in winter. When my father was only about fourteen, he enlisted in the Persian Cossack Brigade, which had been formed the year after his birth. At that time he was completely illiterate, for in those days education in Persia was the monopoly of the leisured classes and of the clergy, who kept this privilege to themselves, preventing it from spreading among the common people. They intended the public to remain in ignorance, so that they themselves might do whatever they wished. When later my father was crowned, he became known, in the style of our ancient royal nomenclature, as ShahanShah (King of Kings), Shadow of the Almighty, Vice-Regent of God, and Centre of the Universe. But when as ruler he received foreign visitors or when he talked with me, he still referred to himself as a simple soldier. By force of character and his dominant personality my father rapidly advanced. The Persian army had no non-commissioned officers in those days, so that at a certain point he had to make a great leap from private

to the officer ranks. Although normally that didn't happen in the Persian army, in my father's case his personality could not be ignored. Broad-shouldered and tall, he had prominent and rugged features, but it was his piercing eyes that arrested anybody who met him. Those eyes could make a strong man shrivel up inside. I have been told that the Russian officers in command of the Persian Cossack Brigade were in awe of him, perhaps actually frightened of him. One thing that helped my father forge ahead was his habit of study. As a grown man he felt no shame in starting from the beginning. Each day at the end of his army duties, he would sit patiently at his studies in his barracks, learning to read and write with the help of one of his friends. He prepared his lessons by the dim lamps, and when he was tired, he would come out of his tiny room and stand gazing at the twinkling lights of Teheran in the distance. The Persian military life was not an enviable one in those days. Since the Government had no real authority in the country, it couldn't collect taxes to pay its employees. Soldiers often sold eggs or chopped wood or found other odd jobs just to get a little pocket money for themselves and their families. If and when they were paid anything, it might be in bricks or other construction materials, for the Government was regularly out of cash. My father told me how one day the Foreign Ministry was to give a dinner for a distinguished foreign visitor. Since the ministry had no funds, it had to borrow some money from the shops in the bazaar in order to be able to honour its official guest. The army's organization was obsolete, its equipment was ancient (the entire army possessed only a handful of cannon, all out of date), and its morale was low. But much worse, as my father saw it, was the terrible knowledge that foreign officers commanded the force to which he belonged. Imagine how

galling it was to him to realize that he marched under orders that were often dictated from the Russian rather than the Persian capital. I think he developed his intense feeling of patriotism and nationalism because he knew so well the meaning of foreign domination. Both as a private and as an officer my father fought many campaigns, especially against the rebellious tribes who were playing havoc with our towns and villages in many parts of the country. Throughout our history, whenever the central government has been weak, tribesmen have pillaged, robbed, and raped as they chose. But when the central government has been strong and could control them, the tribes have played a constructive role in our society. In addition to such expeditions against the tribesmen, many of whom are fierce fighters, my father and his troops engaged other bands of marauding brigands, some of whom were organized into small armies terrorizing the countryside; and after the Russian Revolution he fought the Bolsheviks who had invaded the country. I remember the moving story my father told me of his feelings in one engagement against brigands. Suddenly he was so consumed by disgust at the whole condition of Persia that he deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire. Mounted on a white horse at the time, he provided a stationary and conspicuous target, but none of the enemy's bullets found its mark.

Why was my father in such a state of mind? I can visualize him now as he sat astride his horse, a man whose regal bearing yet revealed the shame he felt for his country. Really it was not a country, for this once-proud land now possessed no central government worthy of the name. Much of Persia was in the grip of local chieftains paying nominal allegiance to the king, thereby allowing him to save face; actually they were doing whatever they pleased in their own regions

thus compounding the miseries of the people. There was no modern army, and none that owed true allegiance to Persia; there was no law and order; there were no Persian courts save those of the clergy and the tribes. In most of the country it was the law of the stronger that prevailed. The pillagers pillaged, and the common people suffered. Even in the capital city of Teheran, people normally did not leave their homes after dark except for an emergency such as getting a doctor, if and when one could be found. They knew that cut-throats might set upon them at any moment. From the great days of Darius our communications had deteriorated to the point that to travel from Teheran to Meshed in north-eastern Persia, you had to go by way of Russia, to avoid the decrepit and bandit-infested roads. To go from Teheran to the south-western province of Khuzistan, you had to pass through Turkey and Iraq. Under the system of capitulations, as I have said, foreigners (including the Bolsheviks who were now infiltrating the country in great numbers) could not have been tried by us for crimes they committed in Persia—if, indeed, we had had any effective courts in which to try them. (Our lack of proper courts was of course the persuasive reason why foreign powers insisted upon continuing the capitulations.) We had no real economic sovereignty because of all the concessions the Qajar kings had granted. Foreign armies, as well as domestic insurgents, roamed the land. The people festered with poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, and lack of hygiene. They were consumed with frustration, discontent, and misery. And in the midst of their desolation the then Shah preoccupied himself with his lavish trips to Europe and his other self-centred luxuries. How could a true patriot have felt otherwise than filled with shame? It seems that the era, the people, and the necessities of a nation demand that at a certain

time the right man be found in a particular position: such a man as will profoundly affect the fate of a country and modify the course of history. Already there had been ample signs that my father might be such a man. At the beginning of 1920, Russian officers still commanded the Persian Cossack Brigade. They were nominally all White Russians, but some of them had sold out to the Bolsheviks. When the brigade went into action against Red Russian units which had invaded northern Persia, the Bolshevik officers were guilty of outright treachery to us. My father's nationalism convinced him that he must get rid of all Russians in the brigade. In August of 1920, my father acted as his conscience required. He engineered the dismissal of the Russians in the brigade and he himself became commander. The Iranian Government soon confirmed and endorsed his action. My father made no secret of his desire eventually to minimize all foreign influence in Persia. From that point my father rose rapidly to supreme power. He allied himself with a crusading young journalist named Seyed Zia ed-Din Taba-Tabai. This man, who was the son of a mullah (as we call our Islamic clergymen), had courageously been writing about the sad state of governmental and other affairs in Persia. He was a kind of revolutionary, and was well equipped to bring political pressure to bear in the capital while my father applied military force. Setting out from the north-western city of Ghazvin, my father now staged his famous march on Teheran. On 21 February, 1921, in a virtually bloodless coup, he overthrew the weak and tottering Government. Zia ed-Din assumed the premiership, while my father became Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Persian armed forces. Zia ed-Din, instinctively the radical reformer, was soon promoting measures that alienated the wealthy conservatives of the country. I think

my father disagreed with him more as to tactics and timing than the substance of his political and economic ideas. About three months later Ahmad Shah appointed a new Prime Minister, and my father didn't oppose this move. My father remained as Minister of War in several successive cabinets, and meanwhile it had become clear that he was the paramount influence in the Government. In 1923 he became Prime Minister. Before long the vacillating Ahmad Shah departed for an indefinite stay in Europe. The year before my father became Premier, the Turks had abolished their archaic caliphate; and soon afterwards they established a republic under the dynamic leadership of Kemal Ataturk. Some Iranian circles, influenced by these events, leaned towards the idea of setting up a republic in Persia, too. I am sure that my father for a time preferred the concept of a republic. But the tide of opinion now shifted back towards the idea of continuing the monarchical system which after all had for thousands of years been our tradition. Most of the constitutionalists all over the country had always been firm supporters of the monarchical principle. On 31 October, 1925, Parliament deposed the still-wandering Ahmad Shah, who later died in Europe. On 13 December of that year, Parliament proclaimed my father Shahanshah of Persia. On 25 April, 1926, the actual coronation took place, and at the same ceremony I became Crown Prince.

It is interesting to compare our situation in those days with that of neighbouring Turkey, which my father visited in 1934 to observe the remarkable progress made and to strengthen the political and cultural ties between the two countries. At the time the caliphate fell, the Turks, being nearer to the West and in constant contact with it, had travelled much farther along the road to Westernization than we.

They had an established army on German lines, military academies and arsenals, and cadres of well-trained officers; and in the First World War they fought bravely and often victoriously facing the best armies the Allies could put against them. In contrast with our own feudalistic system in the days before my father took over, the Turks had a strong central government that actually controlled the country. They possessed railways, ports, factories, and other appurtenances of modern civilization, whereas we had almost no such facilities. Clearly we had much farther to go. For my father, caution did not mean procrastination; his speed of action depended upon the exact circumstances of the case, which he always examined with cool care and detachment. For example, within five days of his coup d'etat, Persia and Soviet Russia signed an unprecedented treaty of friendship. The treaty had already been in preparation, but final action on it was as speedy as were many of my father's military campaigns. In the treaty Russia cancelled all the debts we still owed; gave up all her concessions; and handed over various installations in my country, such as the Russian-owned Discount Bank, a short railway running from Julfa on the Russian border to the city of Tabriz, facilities at our port of Enzeli (now called Pahlavi) on the Caspian, a highway, and telegraph lines. She also gave us equal commercial navigation rights on the Caspian, something we had not enjoyed since the Treaty of Turkomanchi. And she denounced the hated system of capitulations. At the time, the treaty seemed to many Persians to mark a complete reversal of certain policies followed by the Tsars and later by their Soviet successors. My father and his Government at the same time denounced the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919. As I have mentioned, the treaty had been signed but never ratified by the Persian Parliament. Not only military

but also other advisers were already in Persia pursuant to the treaty, and under it a group of British engineers had come to make surveys for railway construction. But Persian nationalists showed much antagonism to the treaty, and it was thereupon repudiated. The last British troops were evacuated in May of 1921. Some Soviet forces still remained against our will in the northern part of the country, and Soviet infiltration and military intervention were by no means finally ended; but that big subject I shall consider in a later chapter. Meanwhile my father turned his main energies to internal reform. His chief aim had long been the re-unification of Persia and to achieve this he needed a strong army. From the moment he became Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief, he was busy welding the Persian Cossack Brigade, the South Persia Rifles, the gendarmerie or rural police, and other elements into a single unified force. He fed the men properly, paid them regularly, gave them modern military training, boosted their morale, and made them proud to be Persians. By 1924, our ground forces comprised five principal divisions, one independent brigade, and a separate blue-uniformed highway patrol to bring security to the bandit-ridden roads. (My father built blockhouses at strategic points on highways all over Iran, and at each blockhouse he stationed a small garrison to police the roads and help travellers in need.) Subsequently he created a small navy and air force. A conscription law was passed in 1925 and revised and improved in 1926 and 1931. My father also established two officers' training schools in Teheran, sent military students to France for advanced training, and employed French military advisers. One day shortly after my father had marched into Teheran, a friend heard him exclaiming aloud to himself, 'If only I had a thousand rifles of the same calibre!' He had been thinking

how much they would have helped him bring law and order to the country, and the remark well illustrates the deplorable state of our military preparedness. It is no wonder that my father built factories for producing rifles, machineguns, and small-arms ammunition; these as well as other arsenals and munitions plants he constructed are still in operation. Meanwhile, my father was launching field campaigns to pacify the country. He sent an expedition against one Kuchik Khan, a sporadically pro-Communist leader who had been dominating and terrorizing the Caspian province of Gilan for years, and who had, until the treaty of 1921, been openly supported by Soviet Russia. My father's forces defeated Kuchik Khan's rebel army and dispersed his followers. Stern treatment was also meted out to other rebel chiefs who, often with British support, had been ruling Fars, Khuzistan, Baluchistan, and other entire provinces in open defiance of the Government. As an officer in the old Persian Cossack Brigade, my father had on one occasion set out with his regiment from Teheran to Hamadan. The party had only one horse, and that had to be used as an ambulance. The roads were in such deplorable condition that even on foot they were almost impassable. When my father, a seasoned campaigner, arrived at his destination, he had to take to his bed to let his injured feet recover. It is no wonder that when he became Shah his zeal to improve Persia's transport and communications system was second only to his determination to enforce law and order. In fact he knew that realization of the latter goal largely depended upon achievement of the former. Engineers concede the Trans-Iranian Railway, which my father began in 1927 and finished in 1939, to be perhaps the most remarkable single feat of railroad construction ever completed. As an engineering achievement it even surpasses the famous Swiss railways. The line

crosses some 4,100 bridges, and has 224 tunnels of an aggregate length of fifty-four miles. One tunnel is two miles long, and several twist around inside mountains so that their loops are superimposed above each other within the solid rock. The original nine-hundred-mile line (it has since been much extended in various directions) was financed entirely within Persia through special taxes on sugar and tea. The taxes bore heavily on the peasants (who spend much of their small cash income on these items); but my father was suspicious of foreign loans, having seen the trouble his predecessors had created through borrowing abroad. On the other hand he impartially employed foreign engineers of a number of nationalities to expedite the building of the railway. My father also constructed many important highways, built the nation's major ports on the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, and established the first air links with foreign countries and between the major Persian cities. In 1931 he took over the facilities within Persia of the Britishmanaged Indo-European Telegraph Company. To assure Persia's monetary and financial independence, my father nationalized the issue of bank notes and established a large and efficient national bank, with splendid offices, an employees' club and restaurant, a swimming pool and other sports facilities, a hospital, and the country's best-equipped printing plant. Branches were set up in many parts of the country. My father instituted Persia's first systematic budget. To help reorganize our public finances an American expert, Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, was employed; he stayed for some five years, later returned for a second mission, and wrote two books about his experiences. When my father came to power, Persia possessed little modern industry except for a few electric power plants, some match factories, and the foreign-owned oil refineries. He was in-

tent upon making the economy more self-sumcient in manufactured goods. During his reign factories were established to produce cotton, woollen, and silk textiles, boots and shoes, buttons, rice, sugar, tea, cigarettes, vegetable oils, canned fruit, cement, brick, glass, chemicals, and a number of other items, not to mention the munitions made in the factories that I have already referred to. Some of these plants were Governmentowned, others were set up with a combination of state and private capital, and still others were privately financed. Largely to counteract the dumping of goods in Persia by the Soviet Union at subsidized prices, my father created a system of Government monopolies to handle Iran's foreign trade. For the first time in our modern history, he rationalized and standardized Persia's units of money, weights, and measures, which before that time even a scholar could scarcely work out. My father even decreed that in all foreign relations, Persia should be known only as Iran. I remember that during the Second World War Winston Churchill told me, grumpily but with a twinkle in his eye, that he, Churchill, would never be intimidated into speaking of Persia in any way except Persia. Recently, in response to a petition from a group of our statesmen and scholars, I have approved the use of both names interchangeably for all purposes. Because of my father's background, you might think that he would have overlooked social and educational reforms, but the opposite is the case. Introducing a judicial system based upon western European (primarily French) concepts, he set up new courts and took many legal functions away from the clergy. He formally abolished the capitulations. In spite of a desperate shortage of qualified teachers, he launched a plan of compulsory Government-sponsored primary education comparable with that found in Western countries, and he built hundreds of new

schools.

In 1934 he established the University of Teheran, which he provided with splendid grounds and spacious modern buildings. Before my father's reign, just a few Iranians had gone abroad to study, but now, spurred by a programme of Government scholarships, hundreds went each year.

I have barely sketched the far-reaching changes that my father made. He laid a firm foundation for my later work. Needless to say, this does not imply that during his reign he never made any mistakes. Every man, being human, is fallible. Every statesman, especially if he is a man of action like my father, is bound to commit at least a few major errors. For example, some of those who most respected my father felt that he promoted agriculture less effectively than he fostered industry. Again, from the time of his coronation my father continued to dominate Parliament, although he had the wisdom never to abolish it.

But in appraising Reza Shah's contribution, it must be remembered that the situation in Iran was very different from what it is now. If my father stressed industrial more than agricultural development, it was because there were then scarcely any factories, whereas our farmers had for thousands of years gone about their daily work. If my father made little use of democratic processes, it was because the large-scale literate electorate necessary to effective democracy had not yet emerged. It was in fact my father who, by dramatically expanding our entire educational structure, paved the way for the growth of popular government.

It must be remembered, too, that my father possessed a very different personality from mine. His nature admirably qualified him for

the task he had to perform, but it would have been ill-suited to the conditions of today.

In both cases the circumstances and the need helped shape the individual. Yet we know that man is more than the product of his environment. As I shall presently show, my father was himself part of the environment that powerfully moulded me. But even that strong influence could not make us alike. If I had been born when he was (perhaps as his twin brother) and had lived under identical conditions, I feel sure that our personalities would still have been different. Here a curious and happy accident of history played its part. My father's inborn characteristics served his country better then but, notwithstanding my admiration for him, I think that mine are of greater service to it now. Were he alive today, I believe he would agree.

In any case, it was under my father that we finally faced the modern world, rather than trying to escape from it through an inertia that led straight towards national oblivion. It was my father who led us Persians into the new age. And it was my father who, by the very revolution that he wrought, transformed the responsibilities of Persia's millennia-old monarchy.

Chapter 3

My Unconventional Childhood

All over the world, the father helps shape the character of the son. In my case, my father influenced me more by far than has anyone else. I do not mean that I am the image of my father; I have already suggested that I am not, and this will presently become more apparent. My father nevertheless influenced me in so many ways, both positively and negatively, that I must begin this chapter by describing some of his personal traits and habits. Everybody, even among his enemies, agreed that my father possessed a most amazing personality. He could be one of the pleasantest men in the world, yet he could be one of the most frightening. As I have already said, strong men often trembled just to look at him. He had an almost devastating ability to assess human nature. As though he possessed some secret electronic ray, he could almost instantly size up a man's strengths or weaknesses, his integrity or his slipperiness. No wonder many men feared to look him in the eye. Yet contrary to what many believed,

my father was kind and tenderhearted, especially towards his family. His forbidding sternness seemed to melt into love, kindness, and easy familiarity when he was with us. Especially with me, his acknowledged successor to the throne, he would play lightheartedly. When we were alone together, he would sing me little songs; I don't remember his ever doing this in front of others, but when only the two of us were there, he would often sing to Especially remarkable was his simplicity of taste and of personal conduct. Many a self-made man tries to impress others with an ostentatious display of material wealth. Moreover, Oriental monarchs have not generally been known for the simplicity of their habits. But my father proudly shunned the Qajar tradition of lavish luxury. Even after he became Emperor, he usually wore a simple army uniform tailored in the Russian Cossack style. His home-made stockings were not of very good quality, and he preferred well-worn short boots, which I remember were often in very poor condition. Besides a handkerchief, he carried in his pocket a silver cigarette case containing Persian cigarettes. He was meticulous about personal cleanliness. In part because of a digestive complaint, his food was of the simplest. For breakfast he had only tea; usually he took none of the fruit or cheese or bread or eggs that most Persians then enjoy. For the other two meals he normally ate rice and boiled chicken, the same thing day after day. In his office he used to drink more tea at regular intervals from a common glass tumbler with a saucer. His office contained a beautifully inlaid desk which I still use, a chair, a sofa for visitors to sit upon, a rug, and a large map of Persia. At home he always slept on a mattress which was placed directly on the floor; he never used a bedstead. As a matter of fact, although the furnishings in my palaces might suggest otherwise, I really wish I could sleep in

the same way. My father's daily routine was simple indeed. Usually he arose at 5 a.m. After hurrying through his washing and shaving, he sat down to breakfast (if you can call it a breakfast) and began to read the news of the day and any reports that had been sent him up to that hour. Exactly at 7.30 he would go to his office, where he received those who had business with him, starting with his chief secretary. Conferences with ministers and other officials continued until 11.30, when he lunched. About 2 PM he started his afternoon work, which consisted chiefly of inspecting the army and new civil projects and institutions. The Council of Ministers, as our Cabinet is called, often held afternoon meetings in his presence. Then from 6 to 8 PM, after all his other work, he would study the reports he had received during the day. Exactly at 8 PM he took his supper, and he retired at 10 PM However, he used to say that even in bed his plans were revolving and forming in his mind; thus he was never entirely idle. As this work schedule suggests, my father's outstanding characteristic was his observance of order and care in everything that he did. I remember that after I had gone abroad to school, my father required me to send him every week my Persian lesson, completed under the direction of my tutor. He wanted regular evidence of the progress I was making. Once the mail was delayed, and my father was so annoyed that he immediately cabled my unfortunate tutor and censured him. Apart from relaxation with his family, my father almost never devoted any time to recreation. Perhaps once or twice a year he would go hunting for two or three hours. Mainly he got his exercise through walking. In my memory it seems as if he were always walking, either pacing up and down in his office or inspecting troops or projects on foot or, in the late afternoon, taking long walks in his garden. Often he would

hold audiences while walking; those whom he received were on such occasions expected to pace up and down with him. And whenever Reza Shah was walking he was also thinking. My father's simplicity carried over into his religion. Because he was always hounding certain sections of the clergy, many people thought that he was not religious; but I know that is untrue. He pushed the clergy into the background because at that time many of them were hindering the country's progress and interfering too much in affairs of state. If he had not treated them somewhat roughly, it might have taken three or four times as long as it did to carry out his programme of modernizing the country. But that does not mean that he had no use for priests or for religion. He always respected the more progressive and enlightened clergy, and he named all of his sons after the Imam Reza, whom he esteemed highly as one of the descendants of our sainted Ali. Naturally his sons received additional names to distinguish them from each other; but as one of his given names each had that of Reza. My father often visited the shrine at Meshed where the Imam Reza is buried. Also, when he desired success in some project, he would swear, earnestly and never profanely, in the name of God or of one of our saints. This is our way of requesting divine assistance. Surely no man ever believed more in his country than did my father. He was patriotic almost to excess, for sometimes he took a provincial view of accomplishments outside Iran. So complete was his dedication to his country that he believed the Persian culture surpassed all others in every respect. No man was ever more zealous in seeking to modernize his country. This might seem contrary to his unqualified love for our existing culture, but he didn't regard it so. My father admired Persia's great past, and he wanted to keep those of our ancient ways

of living which were not incompatible with modern progress. But he was convinced that Persia's national integrity, as well as the welfare of her people, demanded rapid modernization. Although his travels abroad were so limited, my father was always filled with visions of modern factories, power plants, dams, irrigation systems, railways, highways, cities, and armies. Just how he did it I don't know, but he always seemed to know of the latest industrial, economic, and military advances abroad. It must have been a combination of his hard-won reading habit, plus his penchant for asking searching questions. My father was not only sober and hard-working, but more than intelligent. He spoke very little, but his terse sentences contained all the pertinent facts and were always to the point. Although he was not, by our modern standards, by any means an educated man, it was amazing how easily he could grasp the essentials of any problem, whether an engineering impasse on the Trans-Iranian railway construction project or a matter of foreign policy. He was notable for the earnestness of his utterances. He had confidence in himself and in what he said, and his words expressed a conviction and belief which came from his heart and which almost invariably moved his listeners deeply. He possessed amazing selfcontrol. Contrary to common opinion, I think that during his entire reign he never really lost his temper. He was often angry when he thought it necessary, but he never lost control. Equally significant was his marvellous sense of political timing. He possessed the great statesman's knowledge of when to do, or when to avoid doing, any particular thing. In less than one minute he could decide upon a major action, or he could if necessary wait ten years before acting. Many of his thoughts and ideas were turned over in his mind for a long time before he gave them practical expression; in an

uncanny way he always seemed to know just when the time was ripe. In his energy and endurance my father surpassed the ordinary man. He hurled himself unstintingly into the work of modernization, and he expected others to do the same. He totally reorganized the Government's administrative departments, and his spirit of discipline and selfless service began to pervade the whole structure. Often he would appear unheralded at some Government office just at the opening hour. Woe betide any functionaries who arrived late! For example, on one occasion Reza Shah arrived at our Ministry of Finance just after opening time and ordered all the doors closed. A number of sleepy officials, including the minister, found themselves locked out; they were all promptly sacked. That was just one of many blows my father struck at slothfulness and procrastination. It was Reza Shah who not only pioneered our railway system but had the trains running on time; it always delights me to see the photograph of him aboard a Persian passenger train, looking at his watch and wearing the pleased expression which indicated that the train was arriving exactly on schedule. For the first time in modern Persian history he awakened the people to the importance of punctuality. Proverbially, to get things done in Persia, one must both reward and punish. My father relied more on punishment than he did on reward or even encouragement. In his view there was no reason to wax sentimental about a man who was doing something well, because that was his duty. On the other hand if my father learned of a man who was doing something poorly or dishonestly, he would live to regret it. Oriental psychology in these matters differs from that of the West, and my father's methods for getting things done showed no little realism in the light of our authoritarian tradition. But in recent years, as our society has become more

democratized, other techniques for motivating people have begun to yield better returns than the means my father used. To inspire his people to ever-greater efforts, my father relied essentially upon his own force of character. This appeal was by no means wholly negative. Persians dedicated themselves to his projects because they believed in him, respected him, and feared him. In the early part of his reign he had the love of his people, but later, after he had been obliged to apply much coercion as the price of progress, love gave way to respect and deference. Throughout his reign he had a tremendous hold upon his people. My father did much to revive interest in Persia's great past, and he appealed to the people to modernize their country in a manner worthy of its ancient glory. On the other hand, although he carried out so many ambitious and progressive projects, he never promulgated any comprehensive development programme such as our present Second Seven-Year Plan or the third plan, to run for five years, which we are now drawing up. Without benefit of any overall plan or system of priorities, he would plunge enthusiastically into one new project after another. The marvel is that his headlong modernization drive added up to such a rational pattern of national progress.

Granted that some of his projects were more wisely conceived than others, and that his methods for marshalling his people behind his schemes were a bit too rough and ready, still he achieved phenomenal results. And results he was determined to have. When one surveys his work and his impact upon the country, it is hard to believe that he reigned only some sixteen years; indeed, it seems incredible that the tremendous advances I have described in the last chapter could have been achieved in a period so brief. To know the character of a man, it is well to examine his sense of humour, if he has one. I am sure that many



My father and (left to right) my sisters the Princesses Shams and Ashraf, and myself.



The coronation of Reza Shah at the Gulistan (Flower Garden) Palace.



The Throne Room, with the Peacock Throne used for the coronation at the far end.

Persians, recalling my father's reign, would tell you that he possessed no sense of humour whatever. But that is not true. He would joke with me in the most informal and affectionate manner. And even outside his family circle he would often laugh uproariously. I think the thing that amused him most was the ridiculous attitudes of pomposity and of hypocritical fawning respect often assumed by his subjects. I have mentioned that he was one of the greatest mind-readers. He knew by the looks and attitudes and gestures of people exactly what they were thinking. He couldn't easily be fooled, and when he perceived hypocrisy or sham deference in his officials or courtiers he would laugh in their faces. He derived great, even if sardonic, amusement from that sort of thing. I think his scorn of pretence gave my country a tonic it badly needed, for court etiquette and even the exaggerated courtesies practised here by ordinary people had too often become hollow phrases and meaningless gestures. Form rather than substance was stressed. In Persia we had badly overworked our poet Saadi's proverb which says, 'Well-meaning falsehoods are better than a truth which leads to a quarrel.' My father was too blunt and honest to put up with that sort of thing, and it tickled him immensely to see others found out when they tried it. You might think that my father's military career would have given him a taste for off-colour stories. But I never heard him tell such tales. In fact, except with me, I don't think he ever indulged in any informal, easy-going humour. Those who came in contact with him either were trembling before him or looked up to him in a way that ruled out that kind of rapport. Except with me, his mental dominance and force of personality made light-hearted humour impossible. The same applied to friendship. Of course he had many acquaintances, and I recall his being quite friendly with

one of my uncles. But such an imposing personality as his virtually shut the door on close friendships, for people wouldn't dare think of approaching him on an equal footing. I think that was his problem. I have often wondered if he felt lonely. I don't think so. I think his nature was such that he did not need any close friends. His ideas and his work were his constant companions, and they were all he required. Yet it is possible that later, when his circle of advisers became ever narrower, a few intimates might have helped him to keep in touch with the world. Some five years ago I wrote a short appreciation of my father which was published in several languages. In that little book I expressed the view that what I had said might 'serve to make the Iranian nation and those who love this country—especially the younger generation think about this great man who dedicated his life freely to the progress and welfare of his countrymen.' They should, I added, 'try to follow the example set by this man and learn the lesson of love for country and nation. It is every man's duty to prefer manliness and perseverance to fear and timidity; not to choose untruthfulness and meanness in place of truth and courage; to confront difficulties fearlessly and overcome them and take pleasure in so doing; to realize the shamefulness of idle habits and to regard work as his highest goal; to know that work. . . is the highest attribute of a man and gives him justifiable pride.' These central values characterized my father, and he in turn did his best to instil them in me. From the very beginning of my life his pervasive influence played upon me, and I can therefore say with confidence that you know something about me even before I describe the circumstances of my own birth and childhood. It was in a small and modest house in one of Teheran's older residential districts that I was born on 26 October, 1919. At that time Teheran

was still a walled city surrounded by a dry moat. The only entrance was through the city gates, which were closed at night to keep out robbers and cut-throats. But the walls were not destined to stand much longer. When my father became the leader of the country, he had them razed, an action symptomatic of his determination to modernize Iran. Because my family moved from that house when I was still quite young, I have no distinct memories of it, but from my early years I do recall the beauty of the mountains of the mighty Elburz range which loomed above the city and have always inspired me. Looking out to the north-east on any clear day, I could see the majestic cone of Mount Demavand. That mountain, in its upper reaches eternally snow-clad, enraptured me; but of course I did not learn until some years later that Demavand, at some 18,600 feet, towers above any of the mountains of Europe (Mont Blanc included), and is about half as high again as Japan's famous Mount Fujiyama. Another early memory is of the large and imposing figure of my father, who was then Minister of War, as he was driven to and from work each day in his carriage. Playing on words one could say that while the mountains moved me, my father, who was at that time about to become Prime Minister and then Shah, was in the process of moving mountains. As a young child I was not considered strong. I remember that one day I fell in my bath and struck the back of my head. I think I was less shocked by the blow than by the look of grave concern which I can still see on the face of Mr. Hashem, my equerry or guardian. Always faithful, Mr. Hashem died only recently. A vivid recollection is that of the double ceremony that I have already mentioned, in which my father was crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi, Emperor of Persia, and I became Crown Prince. The coronation took place in the great

hall—containing the Peacock Throne — of the Gulistan Palace in Teheran. The ceremony lacked nothing in pomp and circumstance. You can imagine the awe it inspired in a six-year-old like me. Until I was given the title of Crown Prince, I had lived with my mother and my brothers and sisters. (Since my father possessed more than one wife, I also had a number of half-brothers and half-sisters, but I shall go into that later.) After the coronation, however, I was separated from them, and my father directed that I should receive what he termed 'a manly education'. He therefore enrolled me in an elementary military school. Actually he had the school established on my behalf and that of four of my brothers and half-brothers. I was in a carefully selected class of twenty-one students, while my brothers and half-brothers, who were younger, were in a smaller class. The other students were mostly sons of Government officials and army officers. We wore uniforms, and the curriculum was a fairly rigorous one. My life at that tender age was centred in my studies and in military drilling. My father also engaged a French governess to take charge of my life at home. To her I owe the advantage of being able to speak and read French as if it were my own language; and beyond this, she opened my mind to the spirit of Western culture. She also introduced me to French food. I shall always remain indebted to Mme Arfa, as my governess was called (she was married to a Persian). She died in Paris in 1959.

I may not have been strong in those days, but I was certainly lively. In fact I rarely stood still. I was always running and jumping, climbing trees, playing with mud, and doing all the things that normal small boys anywhere seem to do. I began to enjoy wrestling (a major sport in my country), and I remember being reprimanded for violating the principles of health by having wrestling matches just after meals. In

winter we had fierce snowfights. Especially I liked to build things. Beautiful mountain-fed streams flowed through the grounds of the summer palace at Saadabad (in Shimran, a suburb of Teheran), and across the streams my companions and I used to build dams that in their way were miniature prototypes of dams Iran is now constructing for irrigation and hydro-electric power. Alongside, we would build small houses of bricks and pieces of wood, In winter, particularly, I would spend long hours making mechanical models with my Meccano construction set. Each day there was a two-hour recess between the morning and afternoon classes; but although in Iran it is common for both adults and children to take a nap in the middle of the day, I never wanted to sleep except at night. Instead, some of my classmates and I would play noisily and strenuously, no doubt keeping our elders from their accustomed rest. One of my favourite games was 'cops and robbers', when we would range all over the palace grounds and down into dark and mysterious cellars and underground passages. I am afraid our crimedetection techniques were rather elementary! As I became more mature, I began to spend much time on horseback, riding and hunting. My adult companion was usually Mr. Atabai, who is now Keeper of the Royal Stables. I also took up association football and learned to box. Oddly enough my boxing teacher wore pince-nez glasses, and I remember that once in a demonstration bout I knocked them off. I picked up the glasses, restored them to him, he placed them again upon his nose, and the bout continued. We also played a game which we called bicycle polo. We used standard bicycles but specially designed short mallets, and you can imagine the excitement when the opposing teams came charging at each other. So far as I know we were the first to play it in Persia. Although there

might be danger that a Crown Prince would do so, I think I showed no aloofness or snobbishness in those days. I hope I maintain the same reputation today. My special friend was a boy named Hossein Fardoust, whose father was an army lieutenant. Later Hossein and I went to school together in Switzerland; subsequently, as Colonel Fardoust, he was an instructor at the Military College in Teheran, and now he is attached to my Imperial Guard. After I became Crown Prince, my father spent an hour or more a day with me. In addition, when I was about nine years old, I began to lunch with him. He wanted to make sure that I was well acquainted with everything that was going on. Soon after my investiture as Crown Prince, I had fallen ill with typhoid fever, and for weeks I had hovered between life and death. This had been a dreadful ordeal for my devoted parents. Until now I have never publicly revealed it, but it was during that acute illness that my religious life began. I then had a dream about Ali, who in our faith was the chief lieutenant of Mohammed (much as, according to Christian doctrine, St. Paul was a leading disciple of Jesus Christ). Ali was the husband of Mohammed's daughter and one of his bravest followers. In my dream, Ali had with him his famous two-pronged sword, which is often seen in paintings of him. He was sitting on his heels on the floor, and in his hands he held a bowl containing a liquid. He told me to drink, which I did. The next day, the crisis of my fever was over, and I was on the road to rapid recovery. Although I was still only seven, in my childish way I recognized that the dream and my recovery were not necessarily connected. But this experience was within the same year followed by two other events which were also significantly to influence my life. Almost every summer my family and I made an excursion to Emamzadeh-Dawood, a lovely spot in the

mountains above Teheran. To reach it one had to follow a steep trail on foot or on horseback; and since I was so young, a relative who was an army officer placed me in front of him on the saddle of his horse. Some way up the trail, the horse slipped, and I was plunged head first on to a jagged rock. I fainted. When I regained consciousness, the members of the party were expressing astonishment that I had not even a scratch. I told them that as I fell, I had clearly seen one of our saints, named Abbas, and that I had felt him holding me and preventing me from crashing my head against the rock. My father was not present, but when he later heard the tale of this vision, he scoffed at my story. Knowing my father to be a very strongwilled man, I did not argue with him, but I never doubted that I had seen Saint Abbas. The third event occurred while I was walking with my guardian near the royal palace in Shimran. Our path lay along a picturesque cobbled street. Suddenly I clearly saw before me a man with a halo around his head — much as in some of the great paintings, by Western masters, of Jesus. As we passed one another, I knew him at once. He was the Imam or descendant of Mohammed who, according to our faith, disappeared but is expected to come again to save the world. I asked my guardian, 'Did you see him?' 'But whom?" he inquired. 'No one was here. How could I see someone who was not here?' I felt so certain of what I had seen that his reply did not bother me in the least. I was self-confident enough not to be bothered by what my guardian, older and wiser though he was, might think. I see no reason why I should have deceived myself or my guardian by inventing such a vision. I am still sure that I saw it as clearly as one can see anything. Some of my Western readers may dismiss it as an illusion, or put forward some psychological explanation. But remember that a faith in non-

material things has always been characteristic of the peoples of the East. I have found that this is also true of many Westerners. Before now I had never had any intention of telling people about this third incident — certainly I never want to boast of it. Very few people have known about it, and I never even told my late father, close to him though I always felt. After the third occasion, I had no more visions, although I was to undergo further serious illness. Soon afterwards I contracted whooping cough, and for several weeks I was gravely ill. Following that came diphtheria and several other ailments: I had not yet developed much physical stamina, nor were the medicines of today available. Worst of all was malaria when I was eight years old, from which I barely recovered. One might think that if I were going to be blessed or afflicted with visions, they would have reappeared amidst all this illness. They did not. Nevertheless, from the time I was six or seven, I have felt that pethaps there is a supreme being who is guiding me. I don't know. Sometimes the thought disturbs me because then, I ask myself, what is my own personality, and am I possessed of free will? Still, I often reflect, if I am driven — or perhaps I should say supported—by another force, there must be a reason.

I know that some supposedly sophisticated people would be much irritated by such a notion, but it seems to me that God has saved me from dangers and perils. Englishmen are not ashamed to say, 'God save the Queen!' and Americans inscribe on their coins, 'In God We Trust'. Long after I had emerged from childhood fantasies (if any among my readers feel more comfortable to call them that), there occurred four other incidents which may help explain why my childhood faith has continued strong within me. The first was when in 1948 I went to visit a place called Kuhrang, near Isfahan, to inspect the site for an irrigation

dam. When I was ready to return, I climbed into my plane at the small airstrip; with me was the general in command of the area. I was at the controls, for I am a licensed pilot and enjoy flying my own planes or indeed any plane. Because the airstrip was so small, we were using a light single-engined plane, and some ten minutes after we took off the engine went dead. We had to make a forced landing in a mountainous region in a ravine full of rocks and boulders. As every pilot knows, a plane has a stalling speed below which it will go into a spin. With the engine gone I had no throttle, nor could I manceuvre within the narrow confines of the ravine; the only thing was to maintain my speed by going down then and there. Just before we struck, I pulled on the stick to raise the plane's nose and avert a head-on collision with a barrier of rock lying directly in front of us. The plane had barely enough speed left to clear the barrier, and could not surmount a big stone lying just beyond. When we collided with it the undercarriage was completely torn off, but at least that helped to reduce our speed. The plane started to slide on its belly over the rock-strewn ground, A moment later the propeller hit a large boulder, and the plane turned a slow and deliberate somersault, coming to a halt with the fuselage upside down. There we were, hanging by our seat belts in the open cockpit. Neither of us had suffered so much as a scratch. I remember that the scene amused me so much that I burst out laughing, but my upside-down companion didn't think it was funny. Was that narrow escape good luck, or was it good luck bolstered by something else? Perhaps the reader can judge more dispassionately than I. Today, I should add, the dam is completed and is providing water for farmers in the surrounding villages. The second incident was the wresting of our rich Azerbaijan province from alien control. I shall presently tell

this wonderful story of Persian nationalism, reinforced, as I maintain, by divine guidance.

The third incident was when, in February of 1949, I was attending the annual commemoration of the founding of the University of Teheran. In military uniform, I was just about to enter the Faculty of Law building, where the ceremony was to be held, when suddenly shots rang out, and bullets came in my direction. Fantastic though it may seem, three of them passed through my military cap without touching my head. But the gunman's fourth shot penetrated my right cheekbone and came out under my nose. My would-be assassin—who had been posing as a photographer was within six feet of me. He was now aiming his revolver at my heart. Both he and I were sufficiently apart from the crowd for me to know he had a good clear field of fire. At such point-blank range, how could he miss? I can still remember my reactions at that instant. I thought, 'What should I do? Shall I jump on him? But if I approach him, I shall become a better target. Shall I run away? Then I shall be a perfect target to be shot in the back.' So I suddenly started shadow-dancing or feinting. He fired again, wounding me in the shoulder. His last shot stuck in the gun. I had the queer and not unpleasant sensation of knowing that I was still alive. The man then threw down his gun and tried to escape, and in their fury at this assassination attempt, some of my young officers unfortunately killed him. He must have been a curious character. We discovered that he had been friendly with various arch-conservative religious fanatics, yet in his flat we found literature of the Tudeh or Communist party. His mistress was the daughter of a gardener at the British Embassy in Teheran. I was bleeding like a young bull whose throat had been slit. I recall that I wanted to proceed with the

ceremony, but those in my entourage overruled me and took me to the hospital. My blood-stained uniform was placed on display at the Iranian Officers' Club in Teheran, where it may still be seen. Perhaps I may be forgiven for thinking that this incident seemed to fit into the pattern, which had so early taken shape in my mind, of God's support. I know that many will deny that God supports anything or anybody. But now, as in my childhood days, my reliance on God affords me a firm foundation for thought and for action. The fourth incident, which I shall refer to again later, was the miracle, as today it still seems to me, of how we in Persia recovered from Mossadegh. Here, in Dr. Mossadegh, we had a man who might have been a great leader but who, near the end of his rope, became a prisoner of himself, of his entourage, and indirectly of a foreign power. I defy anybody to prove that the overturn of Mossadegh was not basically the work of the common people of my country—people whose hearts held a spark of the divine. I am convinced that I have been able to accomplish things which, unaided by some unseen hand, I could never have done. I make no apologies for my religious faith. But that does not mean that I consider myself as an indispensable instrument of God or anything of that sort. I want to make it perfectly clear that I do not. I have known since early childhood that it was my destiny to become a king, and to preside over a land whose ancient and often magnificent culture I venerate. I want to improve the lot of my people, especially the common folk, and feel that my faith supports me in this difficult task. Indeed, I should consider it arrogant to believe that I could accomplish my life-work without God's help.

Chapter 4

A Royal Tutelage

Since my father was so determined to Westernize Iran, no one was surprised when he decided to send me to school in the West. He wanted the heir to his throne to become more familiar with Western civilization and perhaps absorb some of the secrets of Western progress. But he hesitated for some time as to which country to send me. He was that odd combination of a man who admired the fruits of Western civilization, yet distrusted foreigners in general and Westerners in particular. Finally he made up his mind to send me to Switzerland. I think he based his decision largely on the idea that my studying there could carry no political implications, since it was a small and traditionally neutral country. Also, although he had never visited any part of Europe, his advisers told him that Switzerland would offer a good atmosphere for serious study. I had graduated from the elementary military school in Teheran in May of 1931; so, after a summer's vacation, it was time for me to leave for Switzerland in September. My father had determined to send with me a Dr. Moadeb Nafici, who was to be both my guardian and my personal physician. An excellent

doctor, he had cured me of my most serious childhood diseases, and he was now to be responsible for my well-being and for my entire programme in Switzerland. Mr. Mostashar, my professor of Persian, was also to go with me and continue his teaching. In addition, my father thought it would be wise for my brother Ali Reza and a couple of friends from the military school to accompany me. I suggested Hossein Fardoust, the good companion I have already mentioned, as one and for the other I proposed Mchrpour Teymourtach, a son of my father's Minister of the Imperial Court. My father approved these nominations. (Later, however, my father had a serious disagreement with his Minister of Court, and to my regret Mehrpour had to return home.) In Pahlavi, on the shores of the Caspian, I said good-bye to my father, my mother, and other members of my family who had come to see me off. Boarding a ship, Dr. Nafici, Mr. Mostashar, my brother, my two other friends, and I sailed to Baku in southern Russia. From there we travelled by rail through Poland and Germany and into Switzerland. You can imagine how exciting the trip was to us four youngsters, none of whom had ever set foot outside of his Asian homeland. In Geneva we stayed for two or three weeks at our consulate. Then we youngsters entered a private school in Lausanne. My brother and I lived with a Swiss gentleman named M. Merrier, who had quite a family, including three sons and two daughters. I enjoyed my informal relationship with M. Merrier and his wife and children. My two other young Iranian friends meanwhile lived at the school. The following year my brother and I and our two friends transferred to Le Rosey boarding school, at Rolle, between Lausanne and Geneva. I think my father and Dr. Nafici decided to move us mainly because they wanted to enroll me in a regular boarding school instead of one

primarily for day students. The first school had had perhaps 150 students, including some girls; Le Rosey at that time had perhaps half as many, with no girls. It was arranged that four of my half-brothers would in the following year also come to Le Rosey. I was to stay in Switzerland about four years, a tremendously important period in my life. The democratic Western environment moulded my character to an extent that was second only to my father's influence. My physical development amazed everybody including me. Even before going abroad I had overcome my original frailty, but in Switzerland I grew fast and developed real muscular strength. I was very proud of winning prizes in a number of individual sports events, such as throwing the discus, putting the shot, throwing the javelin, the high jump, the long jump, and the 100-metres. I became the captain of the school association football team and of our tennis team. I learned the importance of sports in the education of youth. I don't know why I developed so fast physically. It wasn't the food, because thanks to my French governess in Teheran, I had enjoyed French cuisine there, and my food in Switzerland was similar. The Swiss climate is certainly healthy, but so is that of Teheran. Possibly my physical progress must somehow have been related to the intellectual and social growth fostered by a new environment.

My marks in Teheran had been excellent. Even now I don't really know whether this was due to my own merits or to my position. But in Switzerland I also had excellent marks, except in plane geometry, which I never liked, I don't know why, for I enjoyed other technical subjects; for example, I liked algebra, trigonometry, and analytical geometry, as well as natural science studies such as chemistry and physics. I managed to win several prizes for scholastic achievement.

My chief interests were in geography, history and natural science; but my French was quite good by that time, and I especially enjoyed French literature. My teachers were excellent, but none of them stands out in my mind as having particularly influenced me or as having been a particular friend. We were afraid of some of them. But socially I was developing fast. The other boys at the school tended to judge me by my own merits and not according to my position; and that had a stimulating effect upon me. My room became a meeting place for the boys, who often filled it to capacity. I enjoyed the free-and-easy openness of my social relations, which I associated with Western democracy. This experience of making good friends and learning the meaning of comradeship inspired, I am sure, greater zeal in attacking my work. In study, sport, and friendship, I began to grasp the spirit of discipline with freedom, or discipline with democracy. Gradually I realized that discipline without democracy is authoritarianism , Yet, my life at the school was in some ways set apart from that of the other boys. For one thing, I had to study more, because in addition to my regular academic programme, Mr. Mostashar worked me hard on Persian, as my father felt that this was of great importance. More serious was the way in which Dr. Nafici limited my activities. He is no longer living, and I have never known whether his behaviour was the result of my father's direct instructions or his own over-zealousness in safeguarding me. I was like a prisoner and, except occasionally in Dr. Nafici's company, I was never allowed to leave the school grounds. When my comrades had free time, they would go merrily into town, but I was not allowed to accompany them. During the Christmas and New Year holidays they went to parties and balls in some of the hotels, but I could not go. My friends were having fun, laughing,

and dancing while I was sitting alone in my room. I had a radio and gramophone to keep me company, but what fun were they compared with the festivities my friends enjoyed? I think it was quite wrong, and now that I have been blessed with a son I won't bring him up that way. I suppose this isolation helped to make me serious, maybe too serious. My temperament today is actually very much the same as it developed in those years. I find that by nature I am calm, whether in the face of danger or at any other time, and seldom lose control of my temper. I fondly imagine that I have a sense of humour, but it is both quieter and more reserved than is the case with some. I like a good joke, and I derive much pleasure from political and other cartoons. I obtain great satisfaction and enjoyment from conversations with ordinary people. I like children, and I consider it a privilege, for instance, to be able to visit one of our elementary schools and talk informally with the little boys and girls there, who in turn are quite candid in their conversation with me. During my stay in Switzerland, I naturally thought rather often of my future responsibilities. My father and I exchanged letters every week, and I wrote less frequently to my mother and brothers and sisters. I think my desire to reign wisely in the future motivated me to study harder than I otherwise might. The same desire also somewhat influenced my choice of studies. For example, I realized that my work in natural science would later help me to understand the problems of developing the resources of my country. In the previous chapter I have already described my earlier religious development. During my first two years abroad, with so much to digest in my new environment, I did not think much about religion. But then, with more interest than ever, I returned to it. I started to recite the Moslem daily prayers, and during my last three years in Switzerland I said them with real

fervour and conviction. I was determined that when later I came to the throne, my conduct would always be guided by a true religious sense. I also began to think about specific policies that I might adopt when I became king. Already I had acquired a special concern for the common people of my country, and especially for the peasants. In my young mind the idea now evolved that when I assumed the throne I would for two or three years declare a moratorium on receiving any proceeds from the labours of the thousands of peasants who worked our royal estates. I would let each peasant family amass a little fortune which it Gould use to build a house or buy new cattle or do other things which were usually difficult with their meagre incomes. This youthful thinking and dreaming eventually led to my present plan, which I shall later describe, for partitioning my lands among the peasants. Another idea that came to me in those days was that when I became king I would establish a public complaint box. If anybody had any complaint, no matter of what kind, he could write it and put it in that box, to which I would have direct access, and so know about the real needs and troubles and worries of the people. I think the idea was partly inspired by the story of Nushirwan the Just and his bell. Later, when my reign began, I tried to put this idea of my schooldays into practice. At first my impulse was to improve on it by trying to put most of my time at the disposal of ordinary people, so that almost anybody could come and tell me his problems or difficulties himself. But then I realized that seeing very many people in person would be impossible. Persia is less subservient to the clock than some other lands, but even here there are no more than twenty-four hours in a day. I should require some eight hours for desk work and official conferences, would remain for interviews; and unless I were discour-

teous, I could give no more than ten or fifteen a day. Since this put the plan out of the question, I developed a system by which anyone, whatever his position or station, can write to me through my personal secretariat even about his own affairs. Every letter or petition which is addressed to me, whether by a peasant or a prime minister, is brought to my desk; and each month I receive several hundreds. I go over them all, in every case reading either the actual document or a summary prepared by my staff and attached to the original. We answer every letter; and where it brings up a matter in which I or one of my Government Departments can help, we arrange this. We ask each department to let us know afterwards what it has actually done, and we try to see that everyone gets satisfaction if it can possibly be given. As I shall explain later, I also have set up my own Imperial Investigating Organization, one of whose tasks is to look into the complaints of ordinary citizens. In the spring of 1936 I was awarded my diploma and the time came for me to return home. Again my family were at Pahlavi, this time to welcome home a son who had changed so much that his father might have had difficulty in recognizing him. But an even greater change had come over the port of Pahlavi (named, of course, after my father's dynasty). When I left, it had resembled a Persian village; but when I returned it seemed like a modern European town. That was merely one instance of the vibrant process of change that had been going on while I was away. After a summer holiday and the renewal of family ties, I plunged into my work at the Military College in Teheran. My father wanted me to take military courses and meanwhile understudy him in his role as emperor. His wish was not distasteful to me, because I have always had an interest in military affairs, and it seemed sensible, too, that I should be learning more about his responsibilities.

At that time we had French military advisers in Iran, and the Military College was a copy of St. Cyr. Today we have American military advisers, and our Military College is run on the lines of West Point. The two-year curriculum of my student days has been extended to one of three years. Concurrently, at the Military College, I took the standard course in the spring of 1938 as a second lieutenant, and immediately took up my duties as inspector in the army. Both mornings and afternoons I would go out to the field to observe our troops, assist in their manoeuvres, and direct their operations and training. We also had many night manoeuvres. I had much routine work, and in some ways it was an uneventful life; but I was very much interested in the army, Meanwhile I had married an Egyptian princess. I shall tell about that in a later chapter. In addition to my military duties, I saw more and more of my father. In the morning we usually met a half hour before lunch for a discussion which continued during the meal. In the afternoon we would generally meet again for an hour. Our discussions ranged over every aspect of Iran's domestic and foreign policy. They were continued on field trips, for my father took me to the different regions and provinces of the country to show me the people, the geography, and the special problems found in each place. Yet the word 'discussion' is really a misnomer. I, and all the officials of my father's Government, had such respect for him and were so much in awe of him that 'discussion' with him had none of the give-and-take the word implies. I advanced my views and made hints and suggestions, but discussion in any usual sense was out of the question.



Myself as Crown Prince when I was about six years old.



With my father when I was a military cadet in Teheran.



My father reveals something of his insatiable curiosity as he inspects new industrial facilities.



Playing association football as a student at the Military College: I am kicking the ball.

Nevertheless, I, a young man of only some nineteen years of age, frequently spoke my mind to the Shah; and the amazing thing was how willing he was to listen to me, and how seldom he rejected my proposals. For instance, at my urging my father released many people from prison. Possibly I should regret it, but one of them was Mossadegh, the man who later nearly bankrupted the country and almost ended the dynasty established by my father. Although he subsequently chose most peculiar ways of thanking me for it, Mossadegh repeatedly declared in public that I had saved his life. My father had ordered his arrest on charges of intriguing against the Government and acting as the tool of a foreign power. I don't know whether it was a complex or not, but my father regularly accused his opponents of being tools of foreigners, especially of the British. My father had Mossadegh sent to an unsavoury prison in an isolated part of the country. Already old and in uncertain health, Mossadegh would probably

not have survived long there. But I pleaded for him and only a few months later he was set free. In the next chapter I shall describe how he used his freedom. Perhaps it is understandable that I often wonder whether I did right to plead Mossadegh's cause. But in the case of most of the other prisoners whom I persuaded my father to release, I am proud that I was able to help them. I remember another interesting episode in my relations with my father during that period. This time he was clearly right and I was wrong. We were visiting a place called Kelardasht in a beautiful valley some one hundred miles north-west of Teheran. My father and I were conferring while we paced up and down inside a large tent. My father said that he wanted to improve the Government's administrative machinery to such a degree that, if he should die, the day-to-day process of administration would operate almost automatically without the need of continuous supervision from the top. I was still rather young and perhaps not very mature; and I took his remark as an insult. 'What does he mean?' I thought. 'Does he think that if he were gone I couldn't take over and continue his work?' Although naturally I didn't say anything, his remark really nettled me. Yet only a short time later, when he was obliged to abdicate and the Government and country were plunged into chaos, I remembered his foresight and regretted that his wish for a self-operating administrative system had not been fulfilled.

There have been many misleading statements about the events that led up to the Allied occupation of Iran in the Second World War. By way of background, it should be realized that my father had deliberately fostered very close economic and cultural relations with Germany. By 1938, Germany had reached first place in Iran's foreign trade, with Russia (mostly because of her proximity) second; Ger-

many supplied mainly industrial machinery and railway materials and equipment, and purchased chiefly raw wool and cotton. Many German engineers and other technicians were assisting in the development of our ports and railways, erecting and helping initially in the running of factories which were mainly German-equipped, and even the transmitters at Teheran radio station had been installed by them. Many German manufacturers and trading concerns had representatives in Iran. Some of our people were studying in Germany, several German professors were lecturing at the University of Teheran, and Germans headed the university's agricultural and veterinary colleges. The Germans had presented a large collection of pro-Nazi and other books to Iran's National Library, were beaming many propaganda broadcasts to us, as well as distributing material to our press through their official news agency, and had established a propaganda centre amongst us. It is not surprising that my father had cultivated close economic ties with Germany. Her technicians and equipment were well and favourably known throughout the world, and she offered very good trade terms. Germany had no conspicuous record of imperialism in Iran; she had seldom interfered in our internal affairs, and she was opposed to the two big imperialist powers who had for so long plagued us. The Nazis made much of the common Aryanism of the two peoples. Persians were already accustomed to an authoritarian system, was denying the most basic human liberties. Besides all this, my father urgently needed German technicians and imports of German equipment and materials in order to continue his national modernization programme and strengthen the armed forces. When Allied command of the seas drastically reduced the flow of German goods to Persia, Britain granted us a large loan to finance purchases

from Allied sources; but our Ministry of Finance repudiated the loan when it found that the goods we most wanted were in short supply. Until the Allied occupation, we continued to receive some German goods overland. On the other hand, and contrary to the claims of some historians, my father had Little use for Hitler. When Reza Shah visited Turkey in 1934, he heard stories of the arrogance of her German allies in the First World War, and as the 1930s advanced he perceived the same sort of behaviour in Hitler and his henchmen. Moreover, Hitler's occupation policies in Europe showed my father the dangers of ever allowing Iran to become a German satellite. Finally, as a leader who himself had authoritarian tendencies, my father resented another dictator such as Hitler. When the war started in Europe, Persia promptly proclaimed her neutrality. My father wanted no entanglement of any kind in the war. Iran, he announced, was both ready and able to maintain her neutrality in the face of provocation from either the Axis or the Allies. His declared policy, in a word, was one of neutrality backed by strength. Only a few days after Hitler's attack of 22 June, 1941, on Russia, Iran again affirmed her neutrality. Germany's massive onslaught against the Russians soon proved that the Soviet Union could survive only with quick assistance from Britain world globe will show, was by what route to send help. Vladivostok navy (a special hazard since Japan had joined the Axis in September 1940, although she had not yet entered the conflict against the Allies), The western Allies sent some assistance by way of the Soviet Arctic port of Murmansk, but the route was difficult, the convoys proved an easy prey to German submarines lurking off German-occupied Norway, not readily be improved. In theory the Mediterranean-Black Sea route might have been practicable, but the Mediterranean had be-

come increasingly hazardous for Allied shipping. In addition, Turkey, in an effort to preserve her own neutrality, had closed the Dardanelles. Any attempt to force that narrow waterway, which at some points is less than a mile wide, would have met strong Turkish resistance; and no doubt the Germans, who now occupied neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria, would have intervened. So the Allies chose the only feasible route, through the Persian Gulf my father's beloved country; but to add insult to injury, they were to put the newly completed railway, his pet project of them all, to their own almost exclusive use! British and Russian propagandists of that time argued that the Allies entered Iran because my father failed to maintain the country's neutrality when he refused to eject the Germans. But that amounts to gross over-simplification. In the first place, there were numerous British and other Allied citizens in Iran at the time, and my father had not thrown them out either. And secondly, it is clear from the background I have already given that the Allies had much larger stakes in view. Everybody would now agree with me that if the Allies had not needed a supply route, they probably would not have invaded Iran in the Second World War. There is of course one qualification. If the Germans had broken through Russia's Caucasus defences—and they very nearly did so in their great spring offensive of May 1942—they would no doubt have penetrated into Persia. It was well known that as a part of their so-called Rosenberg Plan the Nazis were aiming at the conquest of the Middle East as far as the Persian Gulf. This would place them within easy reach of India. Moreover, they had very practical reasons for wanting to reach southern Persia. Just as they sought to take over the Caucasus oilfields for their own purposes and deny them to the Russians, so they wanted to win the great oilfields and

refinery in southern Persia and deny them to the British. The Germans knew that the British navy and the Allied ground and air forces were largely powered with Persian oil. In addition, they were determined to disrupt the last feasible supply route by which the Western Allies could aid Russia. There was a curious chain relationship here. If the Allies had not sent huge quantities of war materials through Persia in aid of the Russians, probably the German spring offensive of 1942 would have succeeded, and just as probably the Germans would have invaded my country. Some Persians might have welcomed a German victory, believing that it would finally end Russian and British influence in Iran. I think living under Hitler would soon have disillusioned them; but in any case those Persians completely changed their minds when they heard rumours of the secret Russo-German agreement conceding to the Russians the right to dominate Iran. This was even worse than the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. In 1941, as the Russians were reeling under German blows, the British seriously considered the possibility that the Germans might break through the Caucasus and drive southwards, thus imperilling India, the Suez Canal, and the Middle Eastern oilfields. But, towards the end of that year, the Russians were able to launch a winter offensive that disorganized the German time schedule. Some months later, they also succeeded in stopping the great German spring offensive to which I have already referred. Yet Churchill afterwards wrote: 'Even in August 1942, after my visit to Moscow and the conferences there, General Brooke, who had accompanied me, adhered to the opinion that the Caucasus Mountains would be traversed and the basin of the Caspian dominated by German forces, and we prepared accordingly on the largest possible scale for a defensive campaign in Syria.' The

Allies rightly or wrongly believed that the Germans were 'softening up' Persia in preparation for invasion. As a result of experience in their numerous conquests in Europe, the Nazis had perfected the technique of infiltrating countries and weakening them from within; they generally relied on the blitzkrieg only to bring about the final collapse. The Allies could plainly see the effects of Nazi propaganda in Persia. They likewise thought that German saboteurs could easily damage the Trans-Iranian Railway, with its many big bridges and long tunnels; the demolition of a single large bridge or the massive obstruction of a single major tunnel might put the railway out of action for months. Oilfields and refineries are notoriously attractive targets for saboteurs, and the Allies felt that the vital oil installations of southern Persia might well tempt the Nazis. Eight Axis freighters were interned at our Persian Gulf port of Bandar Shapur. These ships, although guarded by two Iranian gunboats, still had their own crews on board. The Allies feared that one of the freighters might elude its guard and scuttle itself in the Shatt-al-Arab, the narrow channel of which provided the sole entrance to the docks serving the great refinery at Abadan. Some of the ships were thought to be carrying explosives for this very purpose. In fact, when British forces later entered southern Persia, the crews of two of the German vessels blew up their ships, one of which exploded so violently as to be completely destroyed, although the wreckage was so positioned that it did not block navigation. The British Government had since mid-1940 become increasingly apprehensive about such Nazi activities in Iran. They had gone so far as to give the Persian Government several friendly warnings, suggesting a reduction in the number of German technicians and other nationals. My father, however, pointed out the difficulty of

replacing the technicians and the certainty that the Germans would interpret such a move as a violation of Iran's neutrality. He added that his Government was fully able to cope with any improper acts the Germans might attempt. In retrospect, I think the fact must be faced that, at least so far as I am aware, there was during the entire Second World War not a single effective case of sabotage on Iran's railways or in her oil industry. By no means do I claim that my father and I and our Governments deserve all the credit for this; but the record is nevertheless significant. Yet in all honesty I must add that until the Allied occupation the Germans had probably postponed any sabotage plans in the hope that they themselves would be able to break through in the Caucasus and take over our supply routes and oil installations. On 26 June, 1941, only four days after Hitler invaded Russia, the Russians added their protests to those of the British. Russia claimed among other things to have evidence that the Germans were planning a coup d'etat. On 19 July, the British and Russians sent a joint note of protest, followed on 16 August by a stronger one. They received what they regarded as a half-hearted response to these notes. Unfortunately, my father's cabinet, with whose members the Allied authorities had been in frequent consultation, lacked the courage to tell my father that the Allies were prepared to back their warnings with force. On 25 August the British and Russians, in new notes to our Government, said that they were now obliged to take more direct action; and Persia was simultaneously invaded by the Russians from the north and by the British from the south. Later in the same day, my father told the British and Russian diplomatic representatives in Teheran that he would comply with their Governments' wishes, but the Allies replied that their troops would continue to advance. Our

forces had been taken completely by surprise. Our soldiers had been bombed in their barracks, and our slender naval forces had been sunk without warning, with considerable loss of life. No wonder my father and so many other Persians felt that the Allies had betrayed us. Indeed, to my father it seemed absolutely unbelievable that the Allies should so flagrantly transgress our independence and sovereignty. He knew that they possessed the technical means, but to the end he thought that, for moral reasons and from respect for international law, they would stop short of invading his beloved country. On the other hand, except in a few isolated engagements, the resistance of the Iranian armed forces was completely ineffective. After receiving the shock of a surprise attack, our troops realized that they were confronted with overwhelming superiority; indeed, in the north many of our soldiers had nothing more than drill rifles. Within three days the Prime Minister had resigned and his successor had ordered our forces to end hostilities; but by that time virtually all resistance had ceased.

On 9 September the new Prime Minister obtained Parliament's consent to accept the Allied demands. The Allies had halted their forces some distance from the capital; but a few days later the Allied authorities, who claimed that the Persian Government was procrastinating in keeping its promises, gave notice that their troops would on the afternoon of 17 September enter the suburbs of Teheran. On the morning of the 16th, it was announced in Parliament that my father had abdicated. On that same day I succeeded to his throne. Thus the Allies had attained their objectives of eliminating my father Frankly I think theirs was a pretty sorry performance, which was to plant the seeds of many future difficulties. In retrospect, what should the Allies have done? I believe the answer is clear. First I must quote

the following statement in which, in his history of the Second World War, Churchill summarizes the Allied point of view: The need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Government, and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with future strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. I was not without some anxiety about embarking on yet another new campaign in the Middle East, but the arguments were compulsive. The Persian oilfields were a prime war factor, and if Russia were defeated we would have to be ready to occupy them ourselves. And then there was the threat to India. The suppression of the revolt in Iraq and the Anglo-French occupation of Syria, achieved as they were by narrow margins, had blotted out Hitler's Oriental Plan, but if the Russians foundered he might try again. An active and numerous German mission had installed itself in Teheran, and German prestige stood high. On the eve of my voyage to Placentia [Placentia Bay, in Newfoundland, where on 9 August, 1941, Churchill had his first meeting with Roosevelt] I had set up a special committee to co-ordinate the planning of an operation against Persia, and during my absence at sea they reported to me by telegram the results of their work, which had meanwhile been approved by the War Cabinet. It was clear that the Persians would not expel the German agents and residents from their country, and that we should have to resort to force. On August 13 Mr. Eden received M. Maisky at the Foreign Office, and the terms of our respective Notes to Teheran were agreed. A joint Anglo-Soviet Note of August 17 met with an unsatisfactory reply, and the date for the entry of British I could take issue with Churchill on some of his alleged facts, but the main point is that even if everything he says were

true, the Allies in my opinion followed the wrong path. In the first place, they should have been more honest with my father. Recently I took from my archives and re-read the Allied notes of protest to my father's Government. I found them almost childishly fragmentary. They dwelt exclusively upon the question of the Germans in Iran, and made no mention of larger issues such as the supply route to Russia or the German military threat to the Middle-Eastern oilfields or to India. My father was not stupid, nor was he unfamiliar with military strategy. If the British and Russians had explained to him the real issues as they saw them, he would have understood. Instead, they confined themselves to an endless reiteration of the one point. I have already explained the constructive purposes that most of the Germans were serving, and our figures showed that at its height the German colony numbered only about 470 persons plus their families. Granting that some others might have entered illicitly and without residence permits, it is still no wonder that my father resented Allied pressure to expel the Germans. The Allies knew that he was sensitive on this point, deception: it seems that the Allies may have been less interested in reaching a settlement than in finding a pretext for invasion. Reza Shah realized that the Allies were not giving him the full picture. Forgetting his dignity as a sovereign, he went so far as to request his minister in London to ask the Allies if they would please explain their real wants and needs. But by that time it was too late. My father had also notified the German minister in Teheran that Iran planned to expel all the remaining Germans. Arrangements were made for their transit through Turkey and their repatriation; but those plans were also too late for the impatient Allies. Besides being more candid with my father, the Allies should have proposed an honourable diplomatic

alliance with him. Some may scoff at this idea, believing that Reza Shah's political convictions would have prevented it. But before violating my country's independence and sovereignty, the Allies should at least have made the effort. I have reason to believe that Reza Shah would either have accepted the Allied overtures or that, by resigning his throne to me, he would have allowed me to do it. I think it has not hitherto been revealed that several years before he actually did so in 1941, my father had already considered abdicating in my favour. He never spoke of his plan directly to me, but one of his most trusted advisers later told me of it. My father expected to hand over his throne to me, relegate himself to the position of elder statesman, and stand ready to give me the benefit of his knowledge and experience whenever I might call upon him. Quite honestly, now, I find it difficult to visualize the voluntary retirement of a monarch so strong early 1940s. I am not suggesting that the Allies should have been able to read my father's secret thoughts. What I am saying is that before invading my country in Hitlerian style, and thereby violating some of the cardinal principles for which they professed to be fighting, the Allies had the responsibility of trying to arrange an honourable alliance with Reza Shah or, barring that, with his son. After all, we were to enter into such an alliance only a few months after the invasion; I maintain we could just as well have done it before, and without spilling blood and creating bitter rancour between my people and the Russians and the British. Indeed, I can go further. If the Allies were so much concerned about the possibilities of a German breakthrough, why didn't they request our military assistance under some sort of military as well as diplomatic alliance? Some will think this a fantastic proposal in view of Reza Shah's neutrality. I can only reply that my father was a

reasonable man who held his country's welfare ever uppermost. If the Allies had abandoned their circumlocution and had given Reza Shah an honest picture of their strategic predicament in its relation to Iran's interests, I think he would have seen the point. Again it is my opinion that my father would either have accepted the Allied proposal, or would have stepped aside so that I could do so. The Allies would have avoided having to send into Iran forces which they badly needed elsewhere, we would have been spared the humiliation and chaos of the invasion and occupation, and we would have joined earlier in the common battle against Hitler's tyranny.

After proposing a diplomatic and military alliance, and whether or not they were able to negotiate it, the Allies should have taken up the supply problem in a manner in harmony with their declared war aims of upholding freedom and the independence of small nations. Responsible Allied leaders should have told my father (or me if I had taken his place) something like this: 'We need to send large quantities of supplies to sorely-pressed Russia, and for reasons of geography and logistics your country offers the only feasible route. For the use of your ports, your Trans-Iranian Railway, and your highways we shall pay you fairly, and we shall not otherwise infringe your neutrality or independence. We shall send no regular troops into your country, but with your permission we shall bring in transport specialists who will expedite shipments and help guard key points along the supply route. It is vital to us to pass goods across your country, but we prefer to do it under an agreement peacefully arrived at with you as head of a sovereign state.' It must be remembered that Hitler had understandings with Sweden For whatever reason, Hitler in fact upheld their neutrality to the point that he did not demand the right

to send in either guards or transport technicians. Could not the Allies have shown a comparable respect for our neutrality? If I had by that time come to the throne, I would have accepted such a proposal as I have outlined. If Reza Shah had still been in power, I think he would have too. From my knowledge of my father's psychology, I think he would have had misgivings about the plan, but that he would have found it much preferable to a military occupation. The Allies' own interests would also have been better served since they would have avoided the necessity of stationing large forces among us. But the event was different. It has sometimes been suggested that my father abdicated in order to save the throne for his son; but that is misleading. It is true that the care with which he had trained me showed that he had it ever in his mind for me to inherit the throne. But his abdication came chiefly because he was not the man to stay and see alien forces occupying the country and mixing in our affairs. In vivid language he told me that people had always known him as an independent monarch, respected and strong, representing only the interests of his country as he saw them. He said it was humanly impossible for him, who had such prestige and such a hold over his people, to act as the nominal ruler of an occupied country. He wanted to know how he, a reigning emperor, could take orders from, as he put it, 'some little British or Russian captain'. I should add that later, when I had assumed the throne, I refused to deal with any Allied representatives other than their heads of Government or their ambassadors.

The foreigners knew perfectly well that they couldn't work with my father, and he knew that he couldn't work with them. It is true that they put pressure upon him to abdicate and depart the country; but paradoxically enough their wish and his were in this matter identical.

You might say that Reza Shah was exiled by mutual desire and consent.

The last sight my father had of his native land was from a British ship as he sailed from southern Persia. He had asked to go to South America, but instead he was taken first to Mauritius and then to Johannesburg, where he died in 1944. Some have suggested that during his exile my father became despondent and embittered; but that, as I can testify, is false. Of course we corresponded regularly, so I know, I think better than anybody else, his state of mind during that period. He did not advise me on particular affairs of state; instead, his constant message was for me never to be afraid of anything. Several times I urged him to write his memoirs. But he insisted that this he would never do, because he did not want to risk the chance that he might inadvertently say something that, even indirectly, could bring some harm to his country. I think he realized that my colleagues and I were re-orienting Iran's whole foreign and domestic policy, and he did not want to prejudice our prospects of success. Until my end of my fathers life his country's interests came before all else in his heart and mind.

Nevertheless, when I took the throne at the age of twenty-one, I found myself plunged into a sea of trouble.

My first task was to develop a new foreign policy for Iran. My father's official neutrality had dismally failed. I felt clear in my own mind that cooperation with the Allies was not merely inevitable but also highly desirable; and I was lucky in that Mohammed Ali Foroughi, my able and scholarly new Prime Minister, whole-heartedly shared my views. He deserves most of the credit for negotiating for us the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance which we, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia signed on 29 January, 1942. In the treaty the two Allies

stated that the presence of their troops on our soil did not constitute a military occupation, although I must add that all Persians continued to call it so. The Allies promised to respect our territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence and to withdraw their forces within six months after the end of the war with the Axis. They also pledged themselves to ease Iran's economic difficulties arising from the war, and we in turn assured them of transit, communications, and other facilities needed to move supplies to Russia. In keeping with our new foreign policy, we then severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. On 9 September, 1943, we declared war on Nazi Germany. Internally, the Allied occupation coupled with the sudden termination of my father's dictatorship brought all sorts of new dangers and tensions. The Allies seemed intent upon weakening my authority; apparently they thought that they could then more easily dominate the country. Their continual interference in our political life and affairs thoroughly disgusted me and my people. Perhaps one incident will illustrate the point. Regardless of the inflationary consequences, the Allies announced that large amounts of Persian currency must be issued for the convenience of their troops. Finding that such action was contrary to existing Persian law, the Allies told Qavam, our then Prime Minister, to find some way to bypass the laws. He said that was impossible. The Allies then urged him to push fresh legislation through Parliament. He told them he doubted Parliament would approve it. So one day the British ambassador came to see me. Stating that he was speaking on behalf of both his country and the Soviet Union, he said that they trusted Qavam but that Qavam couldn't work with the existing Parliament. He then asked me to dissolve Parliament. What a proposal by the representative of a foreign

power! I told the ambassador that I and my people would alone decide when and if Parliament were to be dissolved, and that we would not be dictated to by any outsiders. Categorically I refused his request. Later that year some people fomented riots in Teheran; the British brought their troops (who soon after the invasion had evacuated the capital proper) back into the city ostensibly to quell the disturbances; and thus they intimidated Parliament into meeting their demands. Meanwhile some of the tribes, which for years my father had kept disarmed, smuggled weapons from the arsenals or bought them from members of our disorganized forces and began to pillage the countryside again. Rice, sugar, and other necessities were rationed and when the Allies allocated ration coupons to the tribal chiefs for distribution among their people, many of the chiefs sold them instead, and used the money to finance their armed depredations. Extremist religious elements, whom my father had pushed into the background, now reappeared; apparently some British political agents thought that the priests would help stop Communism. In other respects, however, the British occupation forces behaved well. The Soviet authorities fostered and largely financed a mushroom growth of Communist-oriented political parties and trade unions; the most dangerous group was the Tudeh or 'Masses' party. The Russians refused to cooperate with our civil administrators in the northern provinces, which they completely dominated not only militarily but also politically and economically; the Soviet zone of occupation in fact became almost a separate country and, as later events showed, the Soviets planned that much of it would remain so. In Parliament, charges and countercharges were made; but no coherent programme emerged. Instead, Parliament interfered in executive and even in judicial affairs, upset-

ting due process of law. Morale in the civil service fell to a new low. One of my first acts as king had been to affirm the rebirth of constitutional democracy. Yet such chaos had come to the country's political life that perhaps it would have been understandable if, at that juncture, I had become permanently disillusioned with the democratic process. Fortunately for the country and for me, my political convictions had by then become firmly rooted, so that threatening developments could not easily scare me into abandoning the principles of such men as Thomas Jefferson, principles I was determined to follow. Economically the country faced a spiral of rising prices; and between mid-1940 and the end of 1942 this disastrous inflation increased the cost of living nearly 400 per cent. Allied expenditure in Persia put money into circulation which increased the competition for scarce goods. Wheat and rice from the northern provinces had normally helped feed the rest of the country; but now the Russians refused to allow these foods to be shipped south, diverting them instead to their own uses. Allied requisitioning of lorries and railway goods wagons prevented transport of food and other items, thus forcing up prices. Taking advantage of the price increases, various irresponsible wealthy Iranians engaged in much hoarding and speculation, thereby making themselves richer and the poor poorer.

Fantastic though it may sound, the Allies even tried to requisition our munitions plants and armaments. The Russians demanded the right to dismantle the munitions factories my father had built, and to remove the machinery and equipment to the Soviet Union. The British were determined to take away our 105 mm. artillery for their own use. I managed to prevent these and other attempted confiscations. During the occupation I was full of sorrow and had many

sleepless nights. I opposed it both in principle and practice, for to me it seemed a wholly needless infringement of our independence and sovereignty. On every side I saw the miseries and sufferings of our citizens brought on by the economic and other policies adopted, and at the same time I was revolted by the way in which some wealthy Persians became yet more bloated, in utter disregard of the welfare of their country. During this period the Allies were successfully expanding the flow of supplies through my country to the Soviet Union. The British handled the transport of such goods from the Persian Gulf ports of Bandar Shapur and Khorramshahr all the way up to Teheran, where the Russians took over. Late in 1942 the British were joined by America's Persian Gulf Service Command, which ultimately consisted of some 30,000 men. The British and Americans imported many new locomotives and much new rolling-stock for the railways, as well as hundreds of lorries for road haulage. By May of 1943 they had multiplied more than ten times the mid-1941 capacity of the Persian rail and highway systems. I have said that the Western Allies sent via Persia to the Soviet Union over five million tons of goods, almost half of America and Canada's aggregate overseas war shipments during that period. The Trans-Iranian Railway carried slightly over half of this total, the remainder going by road. The British, Russian and American armies all had huge numbers of lorries operating in Persia; but it is interesting that a fleet of over 4,000 lorries, owned and operated by Persians under the direction of a small staff of British civilians, carried a larger total of supplies than did any of the fleets operated by the three military forces. Although improvements were made to the railway and highways during the war, they suffered much wear and tear from the ceaseless, round-the-clock flow of war consignments.

The supply line was run under unbelievable hardships. Freighters were unloaded at the southern ports when the temperatures in their holds was frequently 140 degrees Fahrenheit. The heat in railway tunnels was so intense that crews sometimes had to set their throttles at low, dismount from their locomotives, and walk alongside, where it was at least cooler than in the cabs. In the mountains, both trains and lorries had to fight their way through blizzards and biting cold. But three, and sometimes four, nations collaborated in a way that seemed auspicious for the future. Meanwhile, the British and American governments had begun to extend aid to Persia's faltering economy. In the first two years of occupation, Britain sent us some 70,000 tons of grain to alleviate the near-famine conditions. The Middle East Supply Centre—a most interesting regional assistance organization established by the British technical advice. Under the Lend-Lcase programme, America sent some food and other civilian supplies, and we benefited from the work of American military, police, agricultural, health, finance and other advisers. It was in the summer of 1942, when he was on his way to Moscow for his first encounter with Stalin, that I first met Winston Churchill. He stopped for a couple of days in Teheran and we had a good discussion when at my invitation he came to lunch. I think I should record an interesting moment in the course of our talk. We were speaking of the Allied intention of invading Europe to crush Hitler's armies. I suggested to Churchill that the Allies should strike Italy first, consolidate their position there, and then stage a massive invasion through the Balkans. As Churchill sat reflecting upon my proposal, I saw a strange light come into his eyes. At the time he made no comment upon my idea, but it was not far removed from his later well-known plan for invading Europe by way

of the 'soft underbelly'. No doubt it was a conincidence that our minds had met in th esame broad strategic conception. Had the plan been followed, the subsequent history of central Europe would clearly have been very different.

In November 1943 came the historic Teheran Conference, attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. During the conference Roosevelt for some strange reason stayed at the Russian embassy, where Stalin was also residing. Churchill lived at the British legation (it became an embassy immediately after the conference). Roosevelt's physical disability of course made it difficult for him to move about, but it seemed a curious situation that I had to go to the Russian embassy to see him, while Stalin came to see me. All the conference sessions were also at the Russian embassy, except for a birthday party which Churchill gave at his legation.

Although this was a three-power conference and my country was not officially represented, I had discussions with each of the principals. Stalin was particularly polite and well-mannered, and he seemed intent upon making a good impression on me. He went so far as to offer me a regiment of T34 tanks and one of fighter planes, and in view of our desperate shortage of modern arms I was most tempted. But a few weeks later, when his offer was stated in more specific terms, some onerous conditions were laid down. Russian officers and NCOs would have to come with the gifts. The Russians alone would decide where the tanks and planes would be located, the tanks to be based only at Ghazvin, and the planes in Meshed. Until the end of a training period whose duration was not specified, both the tanks and planes were to be under the direct command of the Russian General Staff in Moscow. It was as if the American military advisers, who are today

helping us strengthen our army, were to tell us, 'Your army must be under our command, or we shall give you no aid!' Of course, I could not accept old Joe's offer, any more than I could approve a similar proposal from any other country. I declined with thanks. During one of his conversations with me, Roosevelt said that when his presidential term of office was over, he would like to return to Iran as an adviser on reafforestation. His interest in this field was of course well known, and the earnestness of his tone suggested that he really meant it. Roosevelt gave me the impression of being in the long tradition of distinguished Westerners who have become enraptured with my country and its culture. While I profoundly disagreed with him on some aspects of foreign policy, I admired him in other ways; up his welcome suggestion. When my people read the communique issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at the conference, they were filled with joy. Millions had been suffering because of our economic plight and had been apprehensively wondering whether their homeland would regain its independence after the war; but now their fears were set at rest. The Teheran Declaration of 1 December, 1943, was so important in the light of later events that I quote the following key excerpts from it:

The Governments of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they agreed [sic] to make available to the Iran Government such economic assistance as may be possible . . .

[...]

The Governments of the United States of America, the USSR, in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment ofinternational peace, security, and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have continued to subscribe.

In the light of such auspicious words, and of the approaching victory of the united Allies, there seemed reason to believe that my country's travail was nearing its end. But what had gone before was as nothing compared with what was soon to come. My tutelage, instead of being finished, was soon to become a more rigorous course of study.

Chapter 5

Tumultuous Years

A man called Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was, a few years ago, the subject of more sensational world newspaper headlines than any other Iranian in recent history. It is understandable, but unfortunate, that some people abroad have judged Persia and Persians by Mossadegh. Let me hasten to assure my readers that he was not representative of the genius of my country or its people. I have already mentioned that my father imprisoned Mossadegh, when Mossadegh was convicted of treason, I wrote to the court saying that I forgave him for all wrongs he had done to me. Because of this letter and of his advanced age, he escaped the death penalty which in this and most other countries is normal for proved traitors, Thus for the second time my intervention helped save his life. When he was released in 1956, he retired to his country estate near Teheran, for he is a wealthy man. As this book is published, he is still living a peaceful and uneventful life at home with his family. Whether I wanted to or not, I was forced to make a serious study of Mossadegh's personality. I was obliged to gauge his character as revealed in his words and acts and their impact upon my

country. Particularly while he was Prime Minister, I observed him at close range. On paper much of Mossadegh's career sounds eminently respectable. He was born in 1881 (but some give earlier dates) of an old landowning family, and studied law and related subjects in France and Switzerland. He held a number of responsible civil service and cabinet positions, the latter including Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The British engineered his appointment as governor-general of the province of Fars, and later he held the same post in the province of Azerbaijan. He first served in Parliament as early as 1915, and remained a member most of the time until his final downfall. With one brief interruption he was Prime Minister from April 1951 to July 1953, and it was during this period that he was his most spectacular self. Most people admit that Mossadegh was personally honest (but as I shall explain later, that depends upon your definition of honesty), and agree that he himself was never a Communist. On the surface he continued to dissociate himself from the Communists, but he relied on their support and was a ladder for their rise. There is a story that as a young man, when he headed the finance department of the province of Khorasan under the old Qajar dynasty, he fabricated some papers, falsely giving himself the ownership of some lands. According to this account, he was convicted of embezzlement and, in accord with traditional Islamic law (still practised in Saudi Arabia for the punishment of thieves), he was sentenced to have his hand cut off. But I have never heard any certain confirmation of this conviction; and obviously no such sentence was carried out, for nobody could forget his later wild oratory, when he gesticulated most vigorously with both hands. I suspect that as a youth he may have become involved in dishonest financial

practices, but that he learned his lesson. What did Mossadegh lack that a true statesman needs? For one thing, his dearth of general knowledge always astounded me. Although he had studied abroad, he knew almost nothing about other countries. His special weakness seemed to be in economics. I am in no sense a professional economist, yet somehow I have managed to learn the more common facts and principles of national and international economics. As Shah I have dealt with countless officials of varying backgrounds and political persuasions; but in all candour I must say that rarely have I met anyone in a responsible position who matched Mossadegh's ignorance of the elementary principles of production, trade, and other economic factors. This was to me amazing. Since Mossadegh was not stupid, and indeed was something of a scholar, I can only account for his economic naivete by assuming that he was so wrapped up in his emotions that he had become incapable of objectively studying any economic question.

Much more serious, though, was Mossadegh's basic negativism. Hitler railed against the Treaty of Versailles; but he also had a definite programme, ill-advised though it was. But, oddly, Mossadegh's philosophy and stated objectives, which had temporary popular appeal, were almost exclusively negative. In point of fact, Mossadegh preached a definite doctrine of what he called 'negative equilibrium'. He began by asserting, plausibly enough, that Iran had long suffered from the influence and domination of foreign powers. From this observation he leapt to the conclusion that Iran's best course lay in granting no concessions to any foreign power approach seems to resemble the political isolationism that prevailed for a time in some parts of America before the Second World War, but Mossadegh's negativism went far beyond that, extending into domestic as well as

foreign policy. One example was his opposition to the construction of railways. I remember one day Mossadegh told me to my face that my father was a traitor. I asked why. He said because my father had built the Trans-Iranian railway just to please the British, who wanted to use it to invade Russia. Then I asked if, according to his theory, my father should have built the railway in a different direction. His answer was that my father should have built no railways whatsoever, that Iran didn't need them, and that she was better off without them. Warming to his subject, Mossadegh went on to declare that before my father's time Iran had no railways or ports worth mentioning, you could scarcely call the roads by that name, and in Teheran people had to walk in the dirt and mud because there was no pavement. But at least, said Mossadegh, Iran was independent. Pointing out the error in his logic, I reminded him that before my father's reign Iran was still under the yoke of the capitulations. In that period half the country was dominated by the Russians and the other half by the British. Law enforcement was then so ineffective that even in early evening a wise man kept off the streets of Teheran, which were infested by thieves. In what way, I asked Mossadegh, were we then independent? He had no answer. But I could see that my arguments had not altered the conclusion to which his weird reasoning had brought him. On another occasion the dean of the University of Teheran medical faculty told me of a conversation with the old man. Mossadegh asked him what he had been doing lately, and the dean replied that he had just returned from a trip to Ramsar on the Caspian. Mossadegh inquired how the trip had gone, and the dean replied that it had been good except that the highways were in deplorable condition and certainly needed repair. Mossadegh, irked, retorted that there was no need for the dean or

anybody else to go on such a trip; he could more comfortably remain at home. Some people, aware of Mossadegh's lack of logic on such questions, have asked me if perhaps he was merely looking back nostalgically to the so-called good old days before Western science and technology began to re-make the world. Maybe, they have suggested, he was merely a romantic who wished he could turn the Persian clock back. But I don't think you can condone Mossadegh's behaviour in that way. For one thing, that kind of sentimentality, while harmless if espoused by an armchair philosopher, is dangerous when practised by a responsible official of a contemporary state. But, more to the point, Mossadegh's negativism did not concern foreign technology alone; it spread into every field. For example, when Mossadegh later became Prime Minister, he stopped my programme of distributing royal lands to poverty-ridden peasants. This project was a practical means of helping the common people of my country to raise their standard of living, but Mossadegh couldn't tolerate such direct and positive action. The social welfare aspects of my programme seemed not to interest him at all. I think, too, he was jealous of the popularity of my land distribution scheme; and he, a wealthy landlord who was hanging on to his properties, felt shamed by the precedent I established of dividing my holdings. Fortunately Mossadegh was overthrown before he could fritter away my lands. In a later chapter I shall describe how, after his fall, I was able to revive my land distribution programme and to expand it greatly. Mossadegh's negativism extended also into the fields of national defence and domestic security. Repeatedly he told me that Iran, having suffered from the incursions of big powers, should in the future make no attempt to defend herself. He didn't propose to advertise this policy abroad; he merely wanted it understood within

the country that if anybody invaded Iran we should offer no resistance. He not only preached but also practised the same doctrine with regard to riots and civil disturbances at home. During his premiership in 1952 and 1953, when Tudeh and other mobs increasingly terrorized the capital and other of our leading cities, Mossadegh did virtually nothing to stop them. During these outbreaks he usually posted tanks and well-armed troops throughout Teheran, but restrained them from effective action. Riots, looting, and pitched street battles went on under the very eyes of the security forces which, under Mossadegh's orders, were reduced to the role of spectators. Eventually, many of Mossadegh's firmest supporters refused to countenance his apathetic handling of the spreading disorders. His own people realized that, intentionally or unwittingly, he was handing over the country to the Communists.

Some observers have wondered if Mossadegh's negative position on defence and security matters arose from his having the convictions of a philosophical or religious pacifist. I don't believe this was the answer. He didn't espouse non-violence as a way of life. He was no Gandhi. After all, gangs of toughs under his control or the control of his supporters for many months roamed Teheran, beating up innocent people and terrorizing the citizenry. Incidentally, it should be remembered that Gandhi's followers have never since India's independence interpreted the doctrine of non-violence as a principle condoning irresponsibility in security matters. India maintains a powerful army, navy, and air force. When riots have occurred in Indian cities, the security forces have not hesitated to take strong measures for restoring law and order.

Mossadegh's irrational streak led him to most curious acts. I first

became impressed with this tendency during the occupation period in the Second World War. At that time I became thoroughly irritated and disgusted with the way the Russians and the British were influencing our elections and determining the membership of our Parliament. Officials of those countries would actually prepare the list of candidates for Parliament, and then would instruct whoever was our Prime Minister to see that only their candidates were nominated and elected. Finding that unbearable, I thought of consulting Mossadegh. Our relations were good at that time, for he was a respected public servant, The idea occurred to me that if, in accordance with the provisions of our Constitution, I were to appoint him as Prime Minister and ask him to form a government, he might then call for a fresh general election, making certain that it was held without alien influence. So I summoned him and put the proposition to him. He said certainly, he was prepared to accept the responsibility, but only on two conditions. I asked what those might be. First, he said, he would need a personal bodyguard. I readily agreed to that. His second proposal was prior approval of the British to the whole plan. I was astounded. 'What about the Russians ?' I asked him. 'Oh, they don't count,' he replied. 'It is the British who decide everything in this country.' I remonstrated with him, pointing out that my father was never in the habit of obtaining British approval for his actions. This did not move him. He answered that I was young and knew little of politics. He insisted that he would cooperate only with British approval. I found this attitude disturbing and dangerous. Yet I had to take into account the delicate situation in my country, at the mercy of occupying forces able to intervene in any domestic clash. In a crisis Mossadegh's patriotism and popular appeal could be invaluable. For

these reasons I reluctantly told him that I would send a representative to consult the British ambassador in Teheran. But in order not to comply with Mossadegh's demand that I consult with the British alone, I told him that I would also have to send somebody to check with the other occupying power. Next day my emissaries reported on the results. The British ambassador had declined to endorse the plan. He claimed that it would be upsetting to hold new elections at that time. I must admit that the Soviet ambassador offered no objection. His attitude was in pleasing contrast to some later Russian actions. I telephoned Mossadegh, greeted him, asked how he was, and reported that the British answer was no. 'Thank you very much,' he replied, and there ended the conversation and his interest in holding new elections; and for the time, any idea of making Mossadegh Prime Minister was also ended. Not many months later there came another incident that contrasted strangely with Mossadegh's supposed anti-foreign attitude. At that time our Parliament was governed by a troublesome rule which required a two-thirds quorum for conducting any business and a three-fourths quorum for voting on legislation. Taking advantage of this rule, a minority bloc of some forty members regularly deadlocked Parliament by absenting themselves and preventing the necessary quorum. Mossadegh was in charge of these obstructionists. Becoming thoroughly tired of such unpatriotic actions, I summoned Mossadegh and his minority group for an audience. I asked Mossadegh why he and his people were sabotaging the Government. To my astonishment he replied that it was because the Russians didn't approve of our then Prime Minister. I asked him why in these matters he should conduct himself just to please the Russians. Suppose, I said, it were some small power who objected to our

Prime Minister—would Mossadegh oblige that power in the same way? Mossadegh had no answer. Meantime American and British oil companies had been interested in obtaining additional oil rights in southern Iran, and the Soviet Union had demanded a concession in the north. Mossadegh considerably enhanced his prestige when, in 1944, Parliament passed his bill forbidding the Government to negotiate any oil concession without Parliament's approval. The bill was a timely one, but it again illustrates Mossadegh's preoccupation with negative action. After the war Mossadegh busied himself with organizing a group of extreme so-called nationalists known as the National Front. He attracted a varied assortment of followers, including some religious fanatics, students, bazaar merchants, and socialists. Superficially, these groups were bound together by a common hatred of foreigners and foreign influence. They readily cooperated on negative anti-foreign programmes; but later, when they could no longer evade the nation's need for some positive and constructive action, the coalition was doomed to fall apart. In 1949 came the attempt on my life that I have already described. The moment the people of my country heard about this, they rallied to my support. The Communist Tudeh party was outlawed, and my people's loyalty enabled me to strengthen my constitutional position. The Constitution of 1906 had provided for the establishment of an upper house or Senate as well as the lower house or National Assembly; but because of the opposition of the National Assembly, the Senate had never actually been created. The Senate was finally established in 1949 and first met in 1950. At about the same time I obtained the constitutional power, possessed by the head of state in Britain and in virtually all other parliamentary democracies, of dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections.

In late 1949 I went to America to plead for increased economic and military aid for my country. I received a friendly reception, but returned home completely empty-handed. President Truman had in 1947 proclaimed the doctrine of containment of Communism, and American aid under this doctrine had enabled Greece and Turkey to maintain their independence. But America had not yet evolved any real policy for the Middle East. The failure of my mission was certainly in part our own fault, because the Americans realized that we were not yet handling our internal affairs with the necessary firmness. America had been shocked by the collapse of Nationalist China earlier in the same year, and she was determined to aid only those countries which showed a desire to clean house at home. Immediately upon my return I redoubled my efforts at reform. I dismissed a number of officials who had proved to be corrupt, and I initiated my long contemplated programme for the partition of royal lands among the peasants.

Meanwhile, the United States established its Point Four programme and General Ali Razmara, whom I had appointed Prime Minister in June of 1950, negotiated an agreement under which America began to give us modest assistance. Soon afterwards I created an Imperial Anti-Corruption Commission whose work, however, later bogged down in controversy. I pushed economic development under the first Seven- Year Plan, which had been drawn up with the advice of American consultants and approved by Parliament early in 1949. I was determined to show America and the world that Iran would make good use of any additional aid that could be granted. However, our requests for large-scale help were again refused. Instead of granting adequate funds, the American Government allocated atoken amount of Point Four money, and the Export-Import Bank of Washington

tentatively offered us a loan of $25 million—a small fraction of the minimum necessary to rehabilitate our occupationdevastated economy. Such a serious setback to our hopes convinced many of my people that the United States had deserted them, and anti-American sentiment developed, with a corresponding strengthening of the National Front party. The shortage of funds brought a curtailment of work under Iran's Seven-Year Plan. The American economic development advisers left for home. At the same time negotiations dragged on inconclusively with the huge British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, from whom we had asked for increased royalty payments. In desperation, to augment the insufficient American grant, we accepted a Russian offer of a $20 million trade agreement, which was signed in November 1950. All these events favoured Mossadegh's plans. In the years leading up to nationalization of oil, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company showed an amazing indifference to the trend of Iranian public opinion. As events were to prove, the company thus worked against its own interests, just as Mossadegh as Prime Minister later worked against his own interests and those of the country. The company knew very well that Saudi Arabia and various Latin American countries had lately received more favourable terms from major Western oil concerns than those afforded by our agreements. The company knew of our irritation due to the high percentage paid in corporation taxes to the British Government; these taxes in fact greatly exceeded the royalties to Iran. The company knew we were galled by its practice of using much of the lush profits it earned here to expand oil output in other parts of the world. By ignoring our protests the company was systematically imperilling its huge investment in Iran; and the British Government, which might have prevailed upon the

company to follow a saner course, failed to sway it. The company and the Government both fanned the fires of Iranian nationalism and strengthened Mossadegh's demagogic hold over the people. He and his National Front began to agitate in favour of nationalizing the oil industry. Prime Minister Razmara opposed this, hoping for an amicable settlement. Mossadegh and his followers then launched wild demonstrations against the Prime Minister and the foreigners. On 7 March, 1951, a member of the Crusaders of Islam, one of the xenophobic groups supporting Mossadegh, foully murdered the Prime Minister while he was attending a ceremony in a mosque. Only a few days later Parliament overwhelmingly passed a bill, which I fully endorsed, nationalizing the oil industry. To succeed General Razmara as Prime Minister I appointed Hussein Ala, a respected statesman with a long career behind him. Mr. Ala supported a compromise settlement under which the oil industry, although nationalized, would be kept going with the help of foreign technicians. But the extremists wanted no such agreement. Agitators were sent into the southern oil fields to inflame the workers. They were aided by the Communist Tudeh party which, although still officially outlawed, now reappeared in force. A number of people, including three Britons, were killed. The worried company closed down its operations. Royalty payments to the Government ceased. Mossadegh had already promised the people a new era of prosperity legitimately entitled. He shouted that he would wring £300,000—nearly $ 1 million—a day from the company. In fact, how could anyone be against Mossadegh? He would enrich everybody, he would fight the foreigner, he would secure our rights. No wonder students, intellectuals, people from all walks of life, flocked to his banner.

With such promises Mossadegh carried everything before him, and Mr. Ala was forced out after less than two months in office. I appointed Mossadegh in his place; at that moment no one could stand against him.

Now was Mossadegh's great opportuniy. His success had exceeded his own fondest dreams as well those of his followers. Two wonderful years of opportunity lay ahead of him. He was to enjoy my full support for a year and my toleration—agonizing though it was for me—during many months thereafter. What would he do? What he did was catastrophic. At about this time Britain announced that she was ordering paratroopers to Cyprus, and it was rumoured that they were for possible use in Iran. The British cruiser Mauritius already lay at anchor off Abadan, and there were rumours of further British naval movements in our direction in the Persian Gulf. I took occasion to tell the British ambassador that if his Government tried any violation of our sovereignty, I personally would lead our forces to resist the aggressors. My stand may or may not have had something to do with the fact that the rumours never materialized. Mossadegh might have shown equal firmness in seeking a constructive oil settlement, but instead he let the oil company call the tune. He spent his entire tenure of office fighting the company in an amateur fashion and regardless of the effects upon his country. When he was deposed he was no nearer a settlement maintaining our rights than when he had started. The United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the World Court, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and numerous other agencies and officials tried to help bring about an understanding, but to no avail. A prisoner of his advisers and even more of his own stubborn self, Mossadegh let his negative emotionalism rule out any chance of

agreement. Instead of spending his time on reform and reconstruction, he devoted himself to bickering. We shall see later the lengths to which he was ready to go in order to stay in power. In his dealings with the company and with the British Government, Mossadegh made two fatal miscalculations. For one thing, he was convinced that the world could not get along without Iran's oil. Therefore, he reasoned, the company and all those who supported it would be forced to their knees. But when Iranian output virtually ceased, production elsewhere was readily expanded to make up the deficit. With so many oil-producing countries in the world today, no one of them enjoys a position of monopoly. In fact, the difficulty turned out to be the very opposite of the expectations of Mossadegh and his advisers. When, following Mossadegh's downfall, the flow of Iranian oil was again resumed, world markets faced a temporary glut, and a number of countries had to make downward adjustments in output. Mossadegh and his people displayed such a provincial economic outlook that I think they honestly believed that Iran possessed a corner on the world's oil supplies. Mossadegh's second big miscalculation lay in his stubborn insistence that he knew how to market our oil with no help from the foreigners. Yet at that time we possessed not a single tanker, nor did we have even the beginnings of an international marketing organization. Later I shall describe the practical arrangements my Government and I are making to establish an Iranian tanker fleet and our plans for our own distribution and selling facilities abroad. But Mossadegh, who had alienated all the big companies and yet had made no effective preparations for doing without their services, forced himself into an untenable position. When our oil industry had been nationalized and Mossadegh had first come to power, the

British Government and the company had quickly seen the writing on the wall. Completely reversing their former policy, they formally accepted the principle of nationalization. Soon afterwards, when the British Government sent the so-called Stokes mission to Teheran, the British agreed on a fifty-fifty sharing of all oil revenues. Think of the economic miseries and the political perils that the people of my country would have been spared if Mossadegh had been willing to enter into rational negotiations. I still fondly imagine that, in spite of his disastrous stubbornness, he at least had some desire to reach an agreement; but in the case of some of his advisers I am sceptical. I suspect that some of them fervently hoped there would be no settlement; for that would mean economic collapse and, in turn, the imposition of alien political control. That type of perverted nationalism I shall discuss in the next chapter. When Mossadegh repudiated the proposals of the Stokes mission, the company and the British Government filed separate petitions with the International Court at The Hague. The petitions referred to the 1933 agreement which my father's government had signed with the company; that was the agreement under which operations had been carried on up to the time of nationalization. The agreement provided for an arbitration procedure in case of dispute. The International Court was asked to request adherence to the arbitration clause and to nominate an arbitrator. Mossadegh, however, declined to recognize the International Court's jurisdiction. The British Government thereupon referred the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations. In October 1951, after considerable debate, the Security Council decided it should wait to consider the case until the International Court had ruled on its own jurisdiction. It was while Mossadegh was in New York to present our

case to the Security Council that I sent him a cable of encouragement. I received this cable in reply: New York, 21 October, 1951. To His Imperial Majesty, Teheran. I received your Imperial Majesty's cable which was a great honour and a source of great joy to me. I always pray God to bless his Imperial Majesty with health, a long life, and ever-increasing success. I would like to state that all our successes wherever and in whatever connection they are obtained are due to your Imperial Majesty's attentions and assistance in always strengthening and guiding the Government. As your Imperial Majesty has already been informed by his Excellency the Minister of Court I am leaving for Philadelphia on Monday and for Washington on Tuesday morning wherefrom I shall report to your Imperial Majesty. I would like to ask permission to express once again my gratitude for the assistance and attentions of my noble Emperor. Dr. Mossadegh.

As to the sincerity of his sentiments, I leave it to the reader to judge in the light of later events. At the end of 1951 and early in 1952, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, acting in the role of a friendly intermediary, made an earnest effort to settle the dispute. At first it seemed that the negotiations might succeed, and Mossadegh himself favoured the terms proposed by the IBRD. But for reasons of their own some of Mossadegh's advisers made him reject the terms, and soon the negotiations broke down completely. Mossadegh, meanwhile, ordered the closing of all British consulates in Iran.

After the opening of the new session of Parliament, Mossadegh, still riding the wave of popular acclaim, had been renamed Prime Minister. On 13 July, 1952, he stated that he could not continue in that post unless he received extraordinary powers. Apprehensive be-

cause of rising Parliamentary and public opposition to his policies, he demanded authority to govern for six months without recourse to Parliament. He also declared that he must assume the post of Minister of War, a position which he hoped would enable him to undermine my power, provided in our Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. I refused these demands because I was certain that they would lead to further Communist infiltration. As you will see, I was to be proved right. On 17 July I accepted Mossadegh's resignation. Against my better judgment I appointed Ahmad Qavam, who had earlier served in the same post, as Prime Minister; some circles thought he could take a strong stand against the leftists. Immediately the Tudeh party, joined by Mossadegh's people, launched riots and demonstrations. Mob rule prevailed, and Qavam's government seemed powerless to cope with it. Qavam in fact inflamed the situation by making a broadcast in which he sought to contradict the strong popular sentiment for oil nationalization. Qavam was an old man, and his health was poor; in fact, he often fell asleep in the midst of policy meetings of the highest importance. It is true that he favoured strong measures, but in conscience how could I let one of such faltering abilities attempt them? After only four days in office he resigned at my suggestion. Again it was clear that no one could stand against Mossadegh. On 22 July, 1952, the danger of civil war forced me to agree to his conditions and re-appoint him. By an irony of history it was on that same day that the International Court handed down its decision that it had no jurisdiction in the oil dispute. The British member of the tribunal voted in support of Iran's case. The Russian member, on the other hand, abstained; in fact he failed to appear during any of the Court's proceedings in the case.

We were all pleased by the court's ruling; but by itself it had of course solved nothing, and Mossadegh had merely scored another in his chain of negative triumphs. The crowds went wild with enthusiasm. Mossadegh was marching towards some sort of great negative victory. The American Government had by now become much alarmed by Iran's steady political and economic deterioration. On 30 August, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill sent a joint note to Mossadegh outlining a broad formula for settling the oil dispute. Mossadegh rejected the proposals, and on 22 October he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. During all this period, the great works at Abadan—both then and now the world's largest refinery—remained virtually idle, and Iran received no royalties. Mossadegh tried to sell oil to small foreign companies that were willing to run the risk of legal claims against them by the British for dealing in allegedly stolen property; but the total sales from these attempts brought in less income than one day's royalties in the period when the refinery had been running full blast. President Eisenhower had now taken office, and he and Churchill made further proposals for settling the dispute in order to restore the flow of oil and oil revenues; but Mossadegh rejected these proposals as he had all previous ones. Further negative triumphs followed. Scarcely two weeks after I inaugurated a new session of the Senate, Mossadegh directed the lower house to dissolve it. He allowed the National Assembly to continue functioning, but only because it automatically supported all his wishes. By an overwhelming majority and with my consent, Parliament, in January 1953, granted Mossadegh an extension of his emergency powers. I wanted to give him every opportunity to develop a constructive oil policy.

Unfortunately, from then on Mossadegh found these powers more and more convenient to his personal ambitions. He muzzled the Press and arrested newspaper editors. Because some of its members now had the courage to criticize him, Mossadegh reduced the National Assembly to impotence, not only by relying on his plenary powers but also by ordering his followers to stay away from the Assembly, thus depriving it of a quorum. Dissenting legislators were also threatened in their homes and on the streets by Mossadegh's hoodlums. Mossadegh, who had always preached about the danger of depreciating the currency, did that very thing when he printed paper money of a nominal value of millions of dollars, without any increase in the gold or foreign exchange backing of the currency. He appointed military commanders personally loyal to him, and he allowed—many would say encouraged—the further infiltration of the army by Tudeh Communists. He extended martial law. He had Parliament set up a seven-man committee of his henchmen to study ways and means of curtailing my powers as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The committee actually prepared a detailed report on the subject, which Mossadegh demanded should next be brought before the whole Parliament. But Parliament refused to pay any attention to the report or to Mossadegh's request; even Kashani and other of Mossadegh's former supporters in Parliament refused to countenance his behaviour. Mossadegh dissolved the Supreme Court. He suspended elections for the National Assembly. Further angered because some members of the latter body had been brave enough to oppose him, he announced a national referendum to decide if the current National Assembly should be dissolved. Its members could not help recalling that at the opening of that same session Mossadegh

had made a little speech in which he said that 80 per cent of them were true representatives of the people. And for the referendum Mossadegh, the great champion of free elections, arranged that those in favour of dissolution and those against it should vote in separate plainly-marked booths! Everyone understood that if a man had the courage to vote against dissolution he would probably be beaten up by Mossadegh's toughs or by those of the Tudeh—actually the two groups by this time were almost indistinguishable. The results were all that Mossadegh—or Hitler before him—could have desired. Dissolution won by over 99 per cent of all votes cast. In one provincial town where the entire population was about 3,000 people, 18,000 votes were announced as favouring dissolution. Both in that and in other towns, it seems that the dead had voted! But in another and grimmer sense many of the dead had voted or tried to vote; for in this and other of Mossadegh's rigged elections literally hundreds of people were killed. During all his years in Parliament, Mossadegh had posed as a champion of constitutional principles, representative government and due process of law. He had railed against the idea of martial law and had eulogized free elections and freedom of the Press. But now Mossadegh had in a few months abolished the Senate, dissolved the highest court of the land, and claimed a mandate from the people to eliminate the National Assembly. He had stifled the Press, in effect abolished free elections, extended martial law, and tried his best to weaken my constitutional position. What had become of our hard-won Constitution of 1906? But Mossadegh could not realize his ambition to become an absolute dictator unless he found means to overthrow the Shah. In spite of my having saved his life, and in spite of my initial full support, it had become plain to me soon

after his appointment as Prime Minister that he wanted to destroy my dynasty. Mossadegh had relatives of Qajar blood, and he himself had bitterly resented my father's coming to power. His policy was clearly to do everything possible to discredit the Pahlavi dynasty and to advance slowly, a millimetre a day, towards exterminating it. You may ask, if I knew this why didn't I act against him? The answer is that I wanted to give him a full chance to succeed in securing the national aims. As the threat to the dynasty increased, I also watched Mossadegh's progressive surrender to the agents of a foreign ideology; and my heart burned within me. In February 1953 he suggested that I temporarily leave the country. In order to give him a free hand to try out his policies, and to have a little respite from his intrigues, I agreed. He proposed that we should keep the plan a close secret, and said he would arrange for Fatemi, his Foreign Minister, personally to issue the necessary travel documents for me, my wife, and our entourage. Amusingly enough, Mossadegh advised against our leaving by air; with more than usual acumen he remarked that crowds of people opposed to my departure might block the airport runway and prevent the plane from taking off. He proposed that instead we should travel incognito to the frontier and thence through Iraq to Beirut. I agreed. But somehow the people had learned the secret of our planned departure. The ensuing mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for the time being. The Tudeh party, no doubt in consultation with some of Mossadegh's followers, immediately called for a united front against the monarchy, but this only seemed to rally the Persian people in support of me and of the position I symbolized. In retrospect I realized that my decision to leave may have been a hasty one and indeed a big mistake

on my part; but God had turned it into a stroke of good fortune. By mid-1953 there was apparent a definite change in the temper of the nation. Many of Mossadegh's followers had deserted him. They saw that his anti-foreign policy had in actual practice become selective; the real objective was apparently to throw out the British but let in the Reds. The march of events forced upon the people the alarming realization that the country was sliding, not gradually but at break-neck speed, towards political and economic ruin. Even Mossadegh's effective liquidation of Parliament could not stifle the opposition. Braving Press restrictions and the threat of retaliation by Mossadegh's policies. Many religious leaders, students, and merchants, whom he had formerly numbered among his supporters, now turned against him. But it was clear that power and decisive action would be required to overturn him. American policy throughout the Mossadegh regime had revealed increasing concern coupled with uncertainty as to effective procedures for promoting Iran's stability and development. For the American fiscal year 1950 (1 July, 1950, through 30 June, 1951), the U.S. Government had made a small allotment of $500,000 to Iran under the Point Four technical assistance programme. For the fiscal year 1951 this had been increased to a still modest $1.6 million. But for 1952, after Mossadegh had come to power, the allotment was increased to $23.4 million, most of which was required to make up Iran's foreign exchange deficit arising from failure to reach an oil settlement. In June 1953 Eisenhower warned Mossadegh that unless the oil controversy was settled, the United States could not increase the amount of aid to Iran. He did agree, however, to continue the allotment already promised at about the level then prevailing. At the same time he urged Iran to cease denying herself the use of her own

great resources. For the fiscal year 1953, the allotment dropped only slightly, to $22.1 million. Evidently the Americans, though less and less anxious to finance Mossadegh's follies, nevertheless feared that to cut off all aid might help drive Iran further into the arms of the Communists.

It is amusing to recall Mossadegh's attitude towards the American aid programme. In 1951, because of his anti-foreign bias, he refused to sign with the U.S. ambassador the standard form of technical assistance agreement which America was using in dozens of countries. Instead he demanded and received a note from the technical assistance director in Iran proposing that America continue to supply aid; this he merely accepted. Yet in 1953, when his followers were fast dropping away, he repeatedly boasted that the United States supported his regime. He warned American officials that unless they aided him, Iran might fall to the Communists; but at the same time he followed his passive policy towards the Communists and allowed them daily to increase their strength. I think the American authorities were fully aware of these inconsistencies, but naturally felt that it was up to us Persians to solve our political problems. That is exactly what we proceeded to do. Mossadegh had reinforced the armoured and other forces guarding his town house in Teheran, but he had withdrawn most of the tanks which had stood watch around my summer palace at Saadabad where Queen Soraya and I were then staying. In fact twelve US-built medium tanks now guarded his house while the large Saadabad estate, protected by only four tanks, was plainly vulnerable to Tudeh attacks. Therefore the Queen and I had gone to the northern part of the country, where we stayed alternately at the villa my father had built on the shores of the Caspian near Ramsar, and at

a hunting lodge he had constructed at Kelardasht, the lovely spot I mentioned earlier. On 13 August, 1953, at Ramsar, I signed decrees dismissing Mossadegh as Prime Minister and naming General Fazlollah Zahedi in his place. To Colonel Nematollah Nassiry, commander of the Imperial Guard, I assigned the ticklish task of delivering the decrees. Major-General Nassiry (as he subsequently became) later gave me a detailed account of what happened. His adventures during the next few days remind me of some of the episodes in Dumas's The Three Musketeers. But that was fiction, whereas this was real history in the making. After returning from Ramsar to the palace at Saadabad, Colonel Nassiry first set out to deliver my order addressed to General Zahedi. I should record that General Zahedi had been a close associate of Mossadegh, and had in fact served for awhile as his Minister of the Interior. Earlier he had been Chief of Police in Razmara's Government known to be in the vicinity of Teheran, but his exact whereabouts were a closely guarded secret, divulged only to a handful of trusted associates. Actually, General Zahedi usually remained no more than a day or so at any given address. Because he had fearlessly criticized Mossadegh's methods, he had been obliged to seek sanctuary in the Parliament buildings, and later was forced into hiding. Under cover of darkness he would move on to a different place to escape capture or death.

Colonel Nassiry, aided by intermediaries, found General Zahedi and delivered my order to him. The General agreed to shoulder the job.

Colonel Nassiry now prepared to deliver my order to Mossadegh. First, on General Zahedi's order, Colonel Nassiry arrested three of Mossadegh's closest advisers from whom we gained some indication

of Mossadegh's probable attitude. General Zahedi warned Colonel Nassiry if possible to deliver my order to Mossadegh personally, to forestall probable denial of its receipt. I had earlier instructed Colonel Nassiry to see that no harm came to Mossadegh. About 11 PM, on the night of 18 August, 1953, Colonel Nassiry secluded spot in the city near Mossadegh's house. The Communist newspapers had already published banner-headlined articles warning that Colonel Nassiry might attempt a coup d'etat, so the three officers had to watch their step.

Approaching Mossadegh's house, they found it surrounded by tanks and troops. These forces had been instructed not to allow troops of the Imperial Guard to approach the house in any circumstances.

Ignoring this order, Colonel Nassiry and his two officers coolly walked past the muzzles of the tank cannon right to Mossadegh's front door. The Colonel had judged correctly that the tank crews and other troops knew him so well, and were so accustomed to respecting his authority, that they could not bring themselves to shoot him down. Colonel Nassiry asked for a personal meeting with Mossadegh on urgent business, but of course his request was denied. Addressing himself to one of Mossadegh's officers in whom he had a certain amount of confidence, the Colonel then obtained a promise that the officer would deliver my order and obtain a receipt for it. For an hour and a half he waited. Finally the receipt came. (He later lerned that the delay was caused by Mossadegh's telephone consultation with his advisers as to what action to take.) Recognizing Mossadegh's handwriting, he knew that the receipt was genuine. It was now about 1 AM

But before Colonel Nassiry could withdraw from the house, he

was informed that General Riahi, the chief of the army's general staff under Mossadegh, had ordered him to be brought to his office a few blocks away. Colonel Nassiry thought this would provide a good opportunity to inform General Riahi that the latter was out of a job. Arriving at the big War Ministry building, which had been erected by my father, Colonel Nassiry was escorted to the General's office. As the door opened, General Riahi was in the act of removing an automatic pistol from his desk drawer and concealing it behind his back. Evidently he thought his guest might try to shoot him. General Riahi accused Colonel Nassiry of acting in a barbaric manner by planning a coup d'etat. Colonel Nassiry replied that he had merely been delivering my order to Mossadegh. He showed his signed receipt. General Riahi asked if it was customary to deliver such orders in the middle of the night. Colonel Nassiry asked if it was any better etiquette for conferences like the present one to be held in the small hours of the morning. General Riahi declared that he would never forgive Colonel Nassiry for what he had done. He told the Colonel that from that moment he was a prisoner, and shortly afterwards he was stripped of his uniform and put behind bars. When the Colonel's brother heard of his arrest he sent to him his pyjamas and a toothbrush ingeniously wrapped in a copy of the newspaper which had contrived to print the texts of my orders to General Zahedi and to Mossadegh. The next morning the army's Judge Advocate General, naturally a Mossadegh appointee, interrogated Colonel Nassiry. He charged that I had never issued an order dismissing Mossadegh, and that the Colonel had forged the document. Colonel Nassiry unfolded the smuggled newspaper. The interrogation ceased. Back in his cell Colonel Nassiry learned from a radio spirited in by a fellow-prisoner

that a revolution was in progress—report dramatically confirmed by the sounds of shouting and gunfire from without. Shortly the prison commander arrived and ordered the Colonel to put on his uniform. His reason for this order was immediately apparent; the prison was being evacuated. Once outside his cell Colonel Nassiry quickly learned the cause of the evacuation command. The people, the ordinary people of my country unarmed or carrying only sticks, had stormed the prison. The guards had ordered them to halt but they had pressed on. The guards then had opened fire, but still they came. An old lady and a number of young people had been shot dead and many others wounded. The guards had then fled. In the prison courtyard Colonel Nassiry witnessed a scene of joy and exultation. Hundreds of prisoners, loyal to me and incarcerated by Mossadegh, had been released and the people were escorting them to freedom. When they spied General Batmangelich, whom I had appointed as General Riahi's successor but whom Mossadegh had imprisoned, they raised him on their shoulders and carried him in triumph down the street to his own office. Thus the people expressed not only their loyalty to me but their joy at being freed of Tudeh and Mossadegh terrorism. Mossadegh's General Riahi had already fled.

Colonel Nassiry, joined by some of his officers and men now released, set out for the military base in eastern Teheran, where a number of other Imperial Guardsmen were still imprisoned. To reach this base they had to pass through various residential streets. Everywhere, instead of the planned demonstrations of the regime that had finally crumbled, they saw spontaneous expressions of joy. The day was hot, and all along the streets doors were thrown open and women brought out food and cool drinks for the revolutionists. Meantime a crisis

had that morning developed at the Military College. An eye-witness account of events at the college and in the city was given by Major Khosrodad, who is now adjutant to General Nassiri in my Imperial Guard. First Lieutenant Khosrodad, as he was then designated, was an instructor at the college, and he had gone that morning as usual to meet his classes. He learned that all the staff and cadets, as well as a number of officers stationed elsewhere in Teheran, had been ordered to assemble at 10 a.m. to hear an address by General Riahi on the subject of the Shah. Disturbed by this announcement, the 90 per cent of the officers and students who had become anti-Mossadegh formed a plan before the meeting; they agreed that if (as they felt sure he would) General Riahi said anything derogatory concerning me, they would kill Riahi. They were convinced that he must be eliminated if the army were to function in its proper role as the politically non-partisan national military force subject to the Shah's orders.

It was fortunate for General Riahi that he decided not to come to the Military College; he had heard rumours that the students planned to bring him to account. His non-appearance resulted in the proclamation of a college holiday.

Lieutenant Khosrodad, starting for home, entered one of the largest of the city squares. There he saw Mossadegh's armoured forces and machine gunners firing into the crowds which everywhere pressed towards them. Most of the people were unarmed, but they kept on advancing. There were many casualities. Commandeering a taxi, Lieutenant Khosrodad rushed home for his automatic pistol and ammunition. In the distance he could hear heavy gunfire. Speeding back, the lieutenant met a battalion of tanks. One company of the battalion was commanded by a friend of his who had now turned

against Mossadegh. That officer and the battalion's pro Mossadegh commander, both of whom had dismounted from their tanks, were arguing furiously. Lieutenant Khosrodad's friend wanted to attack Mossadegh's tanks, but his commanding officer was determined to take his force back to its base. The commander pulled out his automatic and threatened to shoot his subordinate. Unarmed civilians then seized and disarmed the commander, who fled. Immediately the tank company went into action against Mossadegh's forces. The major struggle was now focusing on Mossadegh's house. This was guarded by tanks and by infantry equipped with bazookas and anti-tank guns. All the surrounding buildings had been occupied by Mossadegh's forces, who were firing from the windows at the advancing crowds. This attacking force represented an amazing cross-section of our nation—students, artisans, manual labourers, professional men, policemen, members of the gendarmerie, and soldiers. Most of the men in uniform had mutinied against their Mossadegh-appointed superiors and were acting on their own. These men knew that if captured they would be liable to court-martial and execution. Most of them, like the great majority of the civilians, were armed only with sticks or bricks. Many women and children were among them. Mossadegh's forces believed they had disarmed and imprisoned all of the Imperial Guard; but oddly enough they had overlooked one detachment. As soon as these men had learned of my decree dismissing Mossadegh, they had joined with the populace to fight his supporters. The guardsmen, though only lightly armed, now launched an attack against the tanks stationed in front of Mossadegh's house. Additional members of the Imperial Guard, released by Colonel Nassiry and his men, streamed from the prison as reinforcements, hurling hand grenades at the tanks

and forcing them to close their hatches. This grenade attack was invaluable as well as gallant, for it probably prevented the tanks from interfering in another crucial situation developing only a block away, behind Mossadegh's house. To protect the approach to the house, tanks and anti-tank weapons had been concentrated on the street at the front, while the street one block behind, to the east, was guarded only by infantry. A narrow east-west alley bisected the block as far as the rear of the Mossadegh compound. On the street to the east, the populace were attacking Mossadegh's well-emplaced infantry, and one very brave woman was exhorting the people to advance. She cried out to them that she was only a woman, but if they were men they would charge the defenders. The attackers in spite of many casualties did push on until Mossadegh's infantry became demoralized.

Down that same street there now rumbled a tank which dealt the deciding blow. It was commanded by a pro-Mossadegh non-commissioned officer. That is, he *had* been pro-Mossadegh; but he, along with thousands of other ordinary people, had changed his mind when he realized that Mossadegh was surrendering to the Communists and was trying to topple our age-old monarchy. He manoeuvred his tank into the entrance of the narrow alley and advanced through heavy rifle and machine-gun fire; but Mossadegh's forces somehow failed to bring into action any of their tanks or anti-tank weapons. Through the alley the tank now commanded a clear field of fire to Mossadegh's house. One shot from its cannon did the job. Mossadegh's house was half-wrecked and Mossadegh himself fled over the garden wall, only to be captured within forty-eight hours. General Zahedi had originally planned to go to Isfahan to marshal forces there, and he had arranged for other loyal troops to advance

towards Teheran from Kermanshah. But, first in our city of Rasht ordinary people had already taken matters into their own hands. So General Zahedi instead climbed aboard a tank, sent by the revolutionaries to the house where he was hidden, and started for the Teheran radio station. But again the populace had preceded him. Aided by hundreds of taxi and bus drivers, a long column had already reached the outskirts of the city and had captured the station. Mossadegh's men, taken by surprise, had little time to sabotage the transmitters before they fled. The equipment was soon repaired and over the radio the new Prime Minister declared the success of the revolution. However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Teheran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiances, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion. Thus, while I was absent from the scene we would in effect have a real referendum—one in which dead people would not vote. Pursuant to this plan we had established radio communication between Saadabad palace and my temporary headquarters at Kelardasht and at Ramsar. When Colonel Nassiry was imprisoned, his driver managed to reach Saadabad with a message from Colonel Nassiry which was radioed to me at Kelardasht. That, as you remember, was in the small hours of the morning, but for some reason the message was delayed in transmission. I vividly recall that for two nights I hadn't slept. Well before dawn Mossadegh's radio came on the air, proclaiming that my plan to supersede him had failed. Only a few minutes later Colonel Nassiry's radio message arrived, telling of

his imprisonment. Kelardasht had only a small airstrip suitable for light single-engined planes, so the Queen and I flew to Ramsar, about twenty minutes away by air, where we could board my twin-engined private plane. I flew the plane to Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities, startled at our unheralded arrival, nevertheless gave us a cordial welcome. Our ambassador in Baghdad went so far as to try to have me arrested; but a few days later, as I was on my way back to Teheran, that same ambassador was to be the first to meet me at the airport in Baghdad! Two days later we flew on to Rome. I recalled that my personal car was at our embassy. Our then charge d'affaires actually refused to give me the car keys! But a trusted long-time embassy employee brought them to me on the quiet. On 22 August, 1953, three days after General Zahedi had assumed control, I returned to Teheran and to a heart-warming, tumultuous welcome. I was greatly moved and touched by this expression of affection, a spontaneous ovation in such contrast to the regimented demonstrations in which Mossadegh and the Tudeh party had excelled. The trials which followed illuminated some shadowy operations of the Mossadegh period. When Mossadegh became Minister of War in 1952, our armed forces contained about one hundred officers who were members of the Tudeh party. In the period of only about a year before his final downfall, this subversive group had increased to over six hundred; even the commander of the most trusted battalion of my Imperial Guard was a hard-core Communist. The testimony of these men revealed their plan to kill Mossadegh as soon as he had overthrown the Pahlavi dynasty, then to establish their own Communist regime following the pattern in other countries. But the mass uprising of ordinary people in my favour had unnerved the Tudeh forces. They were frankly astonished and did not know how

to cope with it. The Tudeh, last remaining bulwark of Mossadegh's support (although for obvious reasons he never acknowledged them as such), deserted him. Ironically, the strength of the opposition to Mossadegh probably saved his life. In addition to preparing detailed transcripts of the trials, we made other investigations. We discovered extensive stocks of arms and ammunition secreted by the Tudeh for use in the final uprising. American and other news correspondents published pictures and descriptions of these finds. We also learned more about the methods by which the Tudeh perverted indigenous nationalism to serve their own ends and those of their foreign masters. Aided by the Communists, Hossein Fatemi, Mossadegh's Foreign Minister, remained in hiding for seven months. When he was caught we had to give him strong police protection so that he would not be killed on the spot by the people. He was later tried and executed for treason. Mossadegh and the remaining members of his cabinet were also tried, and most of them imprisoned; all are now free. A number of Tudeh party members, including those who had tortured and murdered non-Communist citizens, were executed or imprisoned. I later extended clemency to those among the prisoners who showed a clear desire to become loyal citizens. Such ex-Tudeh members are not permitted to hold regular government posts, but the Government does help them find other employment; for example a number of them are now working for our semi-autonomous Plan Organization. The Free World felt deeply concerned over the crisis that developed in my country prior to the fall of Mossadegh and his Tudeh allies. I have, therefore, sometimes been asked if America or Britain helped finance the movement that overthrew Mossadegh. Of course it was well known that a foreign power helped establish the Tudeh party,

and that from the beginning it was aided with foreign funds; so it was easy to believe that those who were opposed to the Tudeh and to Mossadegh were also subsidized. Rumours flow unusually freely in my country, some instances received American dollars or (according to another version) British pounds for their help. Although I was abroad at the climax of the uprising, I was in constant touch with the situation during those days, and of course lived with it before and after my short absence. I do not deny that payments could in some cases conceivably have been made. I frankly have no firm evidence either way. But I think this is certainly true: it takes much more than money to impel people to do what Iran's loyal citizens did during those days. In overturning Mossadegh and the Tudeh, they staged a revolution that was inspired by indigenous nationalism. I have told how many of them advanced unarmed against the fire of tanks and machine-guns. Women and children as well as men gave up their lives in that way. I doubt if those brave people expected or received payment for their patriotism. I credit them with ideals of a nobler sort. Besides, it always amazed me that some who talked most loudly about alleged foreign payments seemed to have no objection to them when they came from Communist sources. What kind of hypocrisy is that? How many are fooled by it? When Prime Minister Zahedi took office, he immediately set about putting Iran's house in order. The Government was by this time virtually bankrupt. In September 1953 President Eisenhower announced an immediate allocation of $45 million in emergency economic aid (as distinguished from Point Four help) to make up deficits in our Government's budget. Economic aid to support the budget averaged about $5 million a month for three years following Mossadegh's fall. Point Four technical assistance

funds remained for the next two years at about the same level as when Mossadegh was in power, but in 1956 they dropped off rather sharply, following resumption of oil revenues. Later I shall take up the scope of American aid in Iran and what it has meant to our country. Iran's budgetary plight arose mainly, of course, from the continued stagnation of the oil industry under Mossadegh. Prime Minister Zahedi, moving to get the oil flowing again, first re-established diplomatic relations with Great Britain; some extremists criticized this move. Negotiations were then opened for the creation of an international consortium which would take the place of the all-British company. American, British, French, and Dutch companies eventually joined together for this purpose, and in September 1954, a final agreement was drawn up. In the following month Parliament ratified the agreement, I approved it, and tankers began to load at the ports serving the great refinery at Abadan. With the revenue from oil sales, plus the generous American help I have mentioned, Iran's development programme was resumed. But even more important than this economic reconstruction was the country's political and moral regeneration. Mob rule ceased. Parliamentary government was restored. Iran again placed her faith in the countries of the Free World, and outspokenly said so. Later I asked myself this question: as Prime Minister, what positive steps had Mossadegh taken to help the common people of his country? I tried honestly to fmd the answer. The only significant thing I could think of was his much-publicized rural improvement decree. Mossadegh had ordered the landlords to pay from their share of farm profits an additional twenty per cent to the peasants. Half the increase was to go to the individual peasant sharecroppers, while the remainder would be credited to a council elected by the villagers. Each council

would use its funds on projects designed to improve the community in which the peasants lived. Actually this decree merely copied a law passed in 1947 while Qavam was Prime Minister. Landlord-peasant relations follow so many different patterns in Iran, and agreements are so often merely verbal, that it was obvious the decree would be difficult to enforce. In practice it was very poorly administered. In terms of actual benefits to the peasants, it amounted to little. Moreover, as early as October 1950 Prime Minister Razmara had joined with Point Four to establish a Rural Improvement Programme calculated to have a much more direct impact on the life of the peasant. Projects were established to demonstrate modern agricultural methods, sanitation, and public health control. Much of the work that Point Four is doing in Iran today stems from that initial programme. William E. Warne, who directed Point Four in Iran from almost the beginning until after Mossadegh's collapse, has recorded an incident that I think throws light on the stature of Mossadegh. When Mossadegh came to power, he refused to honour the agreement with Point Four which had established the Rural Improvement Programme. Evidently he wanted his predecessor to receive none of the credit for work done in the villages. Point Four had to continue the programme under a different agreement (one signed by Mossadegh) until after Prime Minister Zahedi was installed. Zahedi then re-validated all previous agreements with Point Four, including the one originally negotiated by Razmara. Perhaps passions have cooled sufficiently for the world to view Mossadegh's record in perspective. Mossadegh was caught up in events much larger than he could comprehend. A born showman, he knew his lines well and he spoke them shrilly, but he didn't know what they meant. He was like an automaton which, directed

by forces that it cannot understand, goes through certain motions and makes certain sounds. Yet in a strange way Mossadegh filled a temporary need. In my country after the Second World War, circumstances almost seemed to demand a person of Mossadegh's irrational, emotional temperament. After the chaos of the war and domination by foreigners in our midst, we in Iran felt a resurgence of nationalistic fervour. We were in the irrational phase, and you could discern in Iran during those years the same immature nationalism to be seen elsewhere today. In fact, if you want to understand the real meaning of the new wave of nationalism that is now sweeping over some countries you can do no better than to look at Iran in Mossadegh's time. Mossadegh showed no diffidence about accepting the role that events thrust upon him. As Prime Minister he raved, he ranted, he wept, he fainted, he wore his famous pyjamas at public meetings. On the slightest provocation he feigned illness and took to his bed. I remember that on one occasion Mossadegh swooned in the midst of a speech to our Parliament. When a hastily summoned doctor started to loosen his clothes, Mossadegh instantly revived enough to clap his hand over his wallet. The old hypocrite had not been unconscious at all; he was merely pretending in the hope of impressing his audience. I think this incident, observed by many, illustrates one of Mossadegh's cardinal characteristics—namely, his insincerity. I am sorry to have to say that Mossadegh did not merit the confidence of those who thought he was honest; for gross insincerity in a man deprives him of any right to be called honest in the broader sense of that term. Those who knew him at close range, as I did, will long remember Mossadegh with pity as somebody who lacked integrity as well as manliness and statesmanship. His three main characteristics were his negativism, his

hypocrisy, and his egotism.

In the beginning he had served his country well. In his negative way he had crystallized our people's anti-foreign sentiments; with his own interests at heart he had jumped on the bandwagon of xenophobia. Oddly enough, his real usefulness to the country ended with his appointment as Prime Minister. In any country a head of government to be effective must do something positive. Mossadegh, let us hope unintentionally, betrayed the common people of Iran by promising them a better deal and then sabotaging his own promises. The people lived for a time on these promises. Then they realized that no matter how dramatically promises are put, you cannot feed your children upon them. They also saw that their native country was disintegrating before their eyes. So the people, especially the common people, rebelled. While Mossadegh was Prime Minister, his colleagues in other oil-producing countries were using oil to finance national development. Mossadegh did nothing. His own obtuse stubbornness (for which he was known long before he came to power), his own psychological need to be forever in the limelight, prevailed at the expense of his country and of those who sought to serve it loyally. When we later reached an oil settlement, we did it strictly within the terms of the nationalization law. Some of Mossadegh's apologists went out of their way to overlook that point. We reached agreement under the terms of the same law that was already in force when Mossadegh came to power. Later we went on to make other contracts that opened a whole new era in the relations between oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. I shall presently describe those pioneering agreements.

Possession of power tests a man. Some men rise to its moral challenge and become greater; others become smaller. Tested by the

results of his possession of power, Mossadegh became a very small man indeed. Every country makes mistakes. If the Mossadegh experiment taught us how not to run a country, perhaps in the long run it will have proved worth while. On 19 August each year, my country celebrates Nation Day, commemorating the fall of Mossadegh and the routing of alien forces that came within a hair's breadth of extinguishing our independence. I hope we never forget its significance.

Chapter 6

My Positive Nationalism

After the fall of Mossadegh, and especially after my visit to Moscow in 1956, Soviet Russia for a time behaved in an exemplary manner towards my country. In 1958 certain persistent misunderstandings developed, but as this book is published my hope is that these will be resolved in the spirit of the United Nations and of world opinion. Since 1954, Britain, the other of the two big powers that in the past so often interfered in our affairs, has shown absolutely correct behaviour towards us. The imperialistic activities of these two powers have in the last fifty or sixty years caused us much hardship, but they have also provided us with an intensive schooling in the meaning of true and false nationalism. The more thoughtful of us have learned how to identify genuine and counterfeit patriots. We think we have discovered something about the methods of imperialism and how to cope with them. I have already sketched the role of Russian and British political and commercial influence in my country, and described the forceful steps my father took to eliminate foreign interference in Iran's affairs. In effect he proved that it was Iran's own fault if she submitted

to foreign intrigue and infiltration; he showed that she need not if she were sufficiently determined. The earlier phase of British political, military, and economic imperialism in Persia virtually ended with the defeat of the 1919 treaty already mentioned. Britain and other powers for a time continued to operate under the capitulations system, and they enjoyed various commercial concessions; but eventually my father abolished the capitulations and either eliminated the concessions or placed them under the firm control of the Iranian Government.

The Second World War saw a temporary revival of British interference in our internal affairs, but Britain kept her promise to withdraw all her military forces by the time stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942; and direct British political interference ceased when the troops left. Any unwarranted British influence remaining now revolved mainly around the matter of oil, with its political as well as economic overtones. I have said that my father had in 1933 negotiated a new agreement with the former Anglo-Persian Oil Company under which the Iranian Government gained larger revenues and fuller control. The 1951 nationalization law further confirmed Persia's sovereignty over her own oil industry. Paradoxically enough it was under Mossadegh, who so constantly delivered tirades against foreigners, that British interests gained almost unprecedented influence inside Iran. This was because his negative policies allowed the British to call the tune. From first to last during his premiership, Mossadegh's almost every act represented an emotional response to some British move in the continuing oil crisis. He was like an unskilled boxer who, falling into panic, lashes out blindly at his opponent and never seizes the initiative which will alone enable him to win. Intentionally or not, the British showed Mossadegh what to do by the simple pro-

cess of letting him react emotionally to whatever they did. But after the exposure of Mossadegh's policies and his fall from power, the oil agreement of 1954 ushered in a new era in Persian-British relations. The agreement greatly increased the scale of payments to Iran; but its most important result was the termination, once and for all, of the British monopolistic hold over Iran's oil industry. No longer could a giant private corporation, or the Government behind it, dominate a large sector of our economy. The agreement symbolized the fact that Persia and Britain now dealt with each other on the basis of full equality, and paved the way for the neighbourly relations which have existed between the two countries ever since. Presently-unforeseen circumstances might again bring tension between my country and Britain, but given calm and wise statesmanship in the spirit of equality, I see no reason why that should happen.

My country has for many years enjoyed excellent relations with France, who has never shown any imperialist tendencies towards us and has contributed much to our culture and to our economic development. Many leaders in Iranian life have had their training in France, French is widely spoken among Iran's intelligentsia, a French-language daily newspaper is published here, and our bookshops abound in French publications. In Teheran we value the Franco-Iranian Institute, an active cultural organization which enhances our knowledge of France's unique civilization. In 1959 the French mounted an elaborate exposition of science and industry in Teheran; the buildings in which it was housed, along with much of the scientific equipment, were afterwards given to the University of Teheran. French engineering commonly completing their projects well ahead of schedule. We also maintain friendly relations with many other of

the free nations. I shall later describe the role of the Americans, particularly in regard to technical assistance, and explain the participation of Italian interests in our oil industry. In 1958 the Italians staged an industrial and trade fair in Tehran, and in the same year I went on a state visit to Italy. We maintain active and growing trade relations with America, Britain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and numerous other countries.

Relations with Soviet Russia have proved more complex. When the Russian revolution came in 1917, many people hoped that it meant the end of Russian imperialism. Iran was one of the first countries to give diplomatic recognition to the new Soviet regime. Lenin had declared that all small nations should be fully independent; and the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, which I have already mentioned, seemed to be in harmony with this view. But the hope was doomed to disappointment. Living as we do next door to Russia, which long has had territorial ambitions in Persia, we provided an obvious proving ground for the Soviets to try out their techniques. In 1920 negotiations were in progress on the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship which, as I have said, was signed the following year immediately after my father's coup d'etat. In the midst of these friendly discussions, the Soviets committed an astounding act of aggression; they landed troops at Iran's Caspian port of Enzeli (later renamed Pahlavi by my father) to support Kuchik Khan, the rebel Iranian leader. They enabled him to establish, within our territory, what with amazing impudence was called the Soviet Republic of Gilan. That was our first significant experience in dealing with Communist imperialism. Our protests were at first ineffective, but notwithstanding Russia's brazen act of imperialism, we went ahead with the treaty-negotiations.

When it was signed, the Russians promptly deserted Kuchik Khan. My father then had no difficulty in defeating him and liquidating the Soviet Government's initial attempt to seize part of our territory. The Communists are generally quick to recognize when their policies are unprofitable. Lenin, and after him Stalin, apparently concluded that the Russian-sponsored Soviet Republic of Gilan had indeed been an amateur experiment. The Russians thought that they could serve their own interests much better through a treaty of friendship, and as long as my father was in power, they made no further overt attempt to nibble away pieces of our territory. In fact it was not until twenty-five years later that they tried again. During the Second World War, Russia again infiltrated Iran. Then, following her success in building up the Tudeh party, she became very confident of her ability to subvert our people. In 1945 she sponsored the formation of not one but two puppet governments within my country. One of these regimes was known as the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, while the other was styled the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan. The former lay in western Iran in an area occupied chiefly by Kurdish tribesmen, while the latter included mainly our north-western province of Azerbaijan, adjacent to the Russian border. Both regimes were proclaimed in December of 1945. Each collapsed after about a year. But that year was one of the most critical in our recent history, and it taught us a great deal about the methods of the Communists. The so-called Kurdish Republic had its origins in a Kurdish tribal nationalistic movement which was fostered by the British in the First World War and then taken up by the Communists in the Second World War. The Kurds live in Iran and some adjacent countries, and both ethnically and linguistically they are Iranians. The Communists infiltrated the Kurdish groups in

my country; they desired to convert north-western Iran into a Soviet satellite, and they regarded the establishment of a puppet Kurdish state as a means to this end. They hoped later to expand their puppet state to embrace the Kurds resident in Iraq and Turkey, a move which they expected would facilitate Communist access to the Arab world and to Africa.

The Kurdish insurgents openly flouted the Government at Teheran and took their orders from outside. Under Soviet protection and tutelage the Communist puppet regime established the usual instrumentalities of government. The Kurdish tribesmen, suspicious of the puppet rulers, for the time being remained quiet because of the presence of foreign troops; but soon the tribesmen were to help us re-establish control. First, however, it was necessary to liquidate the adjacent Azerbaijan puppet regime. That presented a much tougher problem. I have already said that the Soviet Union, as a signatory to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, had promised to withdraw all her military forces from Iran within six months after the end of the war with the Axis. I have also quoted from the Teheran Declaration in which the United States, Russia, and Britain affirmed 'their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran'. I think virtually all Iranians assumed that Stalin was sincere in these declarations, and that he would keep his promises. It was on 2 March, 1946, that six months had elapsed since the end of the war with the Axis and all foreign troops were due to have left Iran; and by that day all British and American forces had already departed. Imagine our disappointment when Stalin refused to live up to his solemn promises. Far from withdrawing, the Russians behaved in a manner that shocked the world.

In August 1945 the Tudeh party had forcibly taken over several government buildings in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. Our troops stationed there were confined to their barracks by the Russian army, and when we sent relief forces from Tehran to quell the uprising, the Russians stopped them before Ghazvin, some 300 miles from Tabriz. The Tudeh party in Azerbaijan was now reorganized and given the innocuous name of the Democratic party. By November the Democrats completely controlled the province. They set up a legislative assembly which on 12 December proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. For Prime Minister of the 'autonomous' republic the assembly chose Jafar Pishevari, a Communist agent who had spent many years in the Soviet Union. With the aid of Russian arms, equipment and personnel, he proceeded to establish a police state that embarked on a reign of terror.

When the Russians had flagrantly violated our sovereignty by halting the troops we had sent to quell the Azerbaijan uprising, strong protests were sent to Moscow by ourselves, the United States, and Great Britain. The question also came up for discussion at the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers held in December 1945. We likewise protested before the newly-established Security Council of the United Nations, lodging the first complaint ever to come before that body. The Russians, however, went ahead as if nobody cared. On the evening of 3 March, 1946, Soviet forces started moving out of Tabriz, but not in the direction of the Russian border. Instead they divided into three columns which marched respectively towards Teheran and towards the Iraqi and Turkish frontiers. In the next few weeks hundreds of tanks with auxiliary units and supporting infantry poured into Iran from Russia, fanning out in the same three directions to

follow the earlier troop movements. At the same time another Soviet army deployed along Turkey's European border, and the Russians launched a big diplomatic and propaganda offensive against Turkey, whom Russia obviously hoped to intimidate.

Qavam, the Prime Minister of Iran, now responded to Russian pressure by offering several concessions if the Soviets would evacuate their forces from Iran. He agreed to recommend to Parliament the establishment of a joint Russian-Iranian oil company (the Soviets to hold 51 per cent of the stock) to exploit the oil resources of northern Iran; to grant three cabinet posts to Tudeh party members; to recognize the rebel Azerbaijan Government; and, finally, to withdraw Iran's complaint against Russia before the United Nations. Ambassador Ala, who now serves me as Minister of the Imperial Court and who was at that time our delegate to the United Nations Security Council, decided forthwith to defy the Prime Minister's instructions, and he refused to withdraw our complaint from the Security Council agenda. He knew that I wanted the complaint to stand, and he realized that it was because of Soviet pressure that Qavam had requested its removal. When the new session of the Security Council convened on 21 March, Mr. Ala made what has been called 'one of the most brilliant and dramatic presentations in the annals of the Council'. Five days later, at another Security Council meeting, Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, dramatically announced that all Soviet forces would be out of Iran 'in five or six weeks if no unforeseen circumstances occur'. By 9 May they were all gone. Qavam displayed a peculiar attitude at this time. He seemed to be under the influence of the Russians. One day he told me that he wished I would either make all decisions or give him a completely free hand. It was obvious that he wanted

the latter. The people meanwhile were chafing under his soft policy toward the Communists, and in southern Iran the tribes revolted, demanding that Qavam dismiss the Tudeh members of his cabinet. Qavam even wanted to take back into our army the traitor officers who had deserted and gone to join Pishevari as well as other officers Pishevari himself had commissioned. Qavam begged on his knees that I should accept this request, but I replied that I would rather have my hand cut off first. Qavam was naive enough to think he could compromise in such ways and still maintain his own position and the nation's integrity. So one day I summoned Qavam and ordered him to form a new Cabinet without any Tudeh members. At the same time I issued a royal decree calling for new nation-wide elections. When I ordered new elections throughout the country, that was exactly what I meant—and the country plainly included the province of Azerbaijan. The 'autonomous' Azerbaijan regime naturally took a dim view of our holding elections in 'their' province. The Russians found themselves in an awkward position; they wanted to support their puppet state, but at the same time they wanted to keep on good terms with Teheran in hopes of getting oil. At this juncture I followed my conscience. I ordered my troops to Azerbaijan to put down the rebellion once and for all. At the same time I personally flew over the rebel positions to ascertain their strength. The Russians now completely deserted their puppets, and the rebel government collapsed as our forces triumphantly entered Tabriz on 15 December, 1946. The insurgent leaders fled to Russia. It was the ordinary people of Tabriz and Rezaieh—always known in our history as freedom-loving cities—who really led in the routing of the puppet government. Their inhabitants liquidated many of the Communist soldiers, and as a matter of fact

our army had to intervene to keep the people from exterminating the Communist prisoners. Concurrently our forces, assisted by Kurdish tribesmen and the local population, overthrew the companion Kurdish puppet regime. I shall always remember an incident of those eventful days. The Russian ambassador in Teheran sent word urgently requesting that I grant him an audience. When he appeared he began to speak in threatening tones, protesting that our military moves in Azerbaijan were endangering the peace of the world. In the name of his Government he demanded that I, as King and Commander-in-Chief, should withdraw my forces. I told him that on the contrary the situation until then prevailing in Azerbaijan had been endangering the peace of the world, and that I was refusing his demand. I then produced a telegram I had just received from the puppet regime's designated Governor-General of Azerbaijan, informing me that the rebel forces offered their unconditional surrender. The ambassador was stunned; apparently he had not yet received the news. Unable to think of anything to say, he departed. The Soviet Union still hoped that Parliament would ratify Qavam's oil agreement, but the newly-elected Parliament was in no hurry to do so. On 22 October, 1947, Parliament unanimously rejected it. The Azerbaijan affair was truly a landmark in modern Middle East history. It was in Azerbaijan that the post-war intentions of Stalinist Russia were first exposed. What the Soviet Union did in Azerbaijan, as related in the dramatic debates of the United Nations Security Council, shocked the Free World. It was then that free men everywhere first began to awake to the threat of Communist imperialism. I think historians of the future will say that the Cold War really began in Iran. There were of course signs of it elsewhere as well, but the lines were first clearly drawn here. It was

in the course of the Azerbaijan affair that America for the first time in history began to play a leading role in the Middle East. Azerbaijan led straight to the Truman doctrine which saved Greece and Turkey from Communist imperialism. It also paved the way for the later Eisenhower doctrine. These events will make clear why, every year since 1946, we have celebrated Azerbaijan Day as a national holiday commemorating the recovery of that province and the restoration of our territorial integrity. But I think not only we Persians, but also free men everywhere, should remember that day. After the battle for Azerbaijan, Iran felt a resurgence of true nationalist sentiment. All over the country my people seemed to sense the larger meaning of what had happened. Everywhere they went out of their way to express their loyalty to me. The local Communists bided their time. They were waiting for any new signs of instability and potential chaos which could be exploited to their advantage. Their patience was rewarded. They found their golden opportunity under Mossadegh. I have already related how miraculously—with God's help, I insist—we escaped from the catastrophe which then threatened us. Stalin died on 4 March, 1953, and Mossadegh fell on 19 August of that same year. Stalin's death marked the beginning of a new era in Russia, and Mossadegh's elimination heralded the dawn of a new day in Iran. As I have said, relations with the Soviet Union soon began to improve. Russian propagandists declined to offer any further support to the discredited Tudeh party, and Russia showed every inclination to cooperate with me and with my new Government. In 1956, on the Soviet Union's invitation, Queen Soraya and I made a state visit to Russia. We were received very hospitably and had a chance to see a good deal of the country. The visit afforded me an opportunity for a frank ex-

change of views with Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues, including Voroshilov, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Shepilov. The Russians claimed that their policy was one of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Then why, they asked, had we joined the Baghdad Pact? I told them that they could find the answer to that question in the history of relations between our two countries. I reminded my hosts that the Russians had for centuries been trying to advance southwards through Persia; that in 1908 they had invaded Iran in an effort to check our rising tide of constitutionalism; and that in the First World War they had again been guilty of aggression against us. I told them not to forget that in the Second World War they had invaded my country in spite of the treaties of friendship which existed between us, and that in 1946 they had created a puppet government as a front to try to take over control of Azerbaijan. Khrushchev and his colleagues replied that they were not responsible for these aggressions, which had been committed before they assumed leadership. Khrushchev admitted that his country had made mistakes, but said that Iran should trust the benevolent intentions of him and the other Russians sitting there in the room. I assured Khrushchev that we Persians had the most friendly sentiments towards him and his countrymen; however, I added, it would be folly to learn nothing from our experience. Krushchev wanted to know how we could be fellow members in the Baghdad Pact with the British, when they too had been guilty of invading Iran in the Second World War and had in fact first proposed the aggression. I replied that at least the British had left the country when they had promised, whereas the Russians had refused to leave. Khrushchev spoke of what he considered to be the aggressive and militaristic implications of the Baghdad Pact. He said that ear-

lier he had received the impression that the pact was non-military in nature, but had then been rudely awakened. I explained that we and our partners in the pact had from the outset made it clear to all who cared to listen that the pact had an important military character, but only in the sense of strengthening collective defence against aggression. I told Khrushchev that I looked forward to the day when there could be universal disarmament and all defence pacts would become unnecessary and could be relegated to the archives. But, pending that happy day, we as a comparatively small nation had to protect ourselves by banding with our friends. The Baghdad Pact, I pointed out, was scarcely the only such defence agreement in the world; for example, the Russians had taken the initiative in negotiating the Warsaw Pact, they had a military alliance with Communist China, and they seemed able to tolerate such pacts as NATO and SEATO. I suggested it was senseless to think of the Baghdad Pact as aggressive; and I reminded Khrushchev that in pact meetings the discussions of defence were concerned with the Zagros and Elburz lines, which are in Iran, not in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev finally agreed that Iran had no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, but he suggested that some big power might compel us against our will to make our territory available for an attack on Russia. He intimated that perhaps we had been forced into the Baghdad Pact for that very purpose. I emphatically answered that we had joined the pact solely on our own volition and had entered into it as an equal partner; nobody had forced us to participate, and we would have resisted any such pressure had it been applied. Certainly, I said, we would never allow either the pact or our territory to be used in furtherance of aggressive designs upon the Soviet Union. I gave Khrushchev my pledge as a soldier that as

long as I reigned Iran would not in any way countenance or take part in any aggressive schemes against his country. Khrushchev and his colleagues generously replied that they believed completely in what I had said. At their suggestion we then issued a joint communique which spoke of the friendly atmosphere of our discussions and of our determination to strengthen relations between the two countries. My talks with the Soviet leaders paved the way for a whole series of subsequent agreements. In a mutually advantageous manner we settled our border disputes. We worked out transit arrangements which, among other things, permit us to send our exports and imports through the Soviet Union on their way to Western Europe. We agreed on joint utilization of the waters of two rivers, the Aras and the Atrak, which flow along our common frontiers and which can eventually be made to irrigate some 200,000 acres of arable land. We expanded our trade with the Soviet Union. We arranged friendly competitions with the Russians in various sports. We exchanged parliamentary delegations. We strengthened the cultural ties between the two countries. Since the 1917 Russian revolution relations between Iran and the Soviet Union had perhaps never before been so cordial. The same applied to our relations with other Communist countries. Two years later, however, the Russians returned to a policy of provocation. For example, their Marshal Vershinin made a declaration in which he threatened that Iran and Turkey might be destroyed by missiles. His statement seemed to cast some doubt upon Khrushchev's assurances that in its foreign policy the Soviet Union had turned over a new leaf. In fact, how can the Russians expect us to believe their soothing talk about peaceful co-existence when they allow their responsible officials to make utterances like that? Similarly the Russians dared to reproach

us for completing our Teheran-to-Meshed railway line, which they said had strategic implications. Speaking as if they fancied they were rulers of the world, they went on to criticize us for building airports, which they argued could be used for military planes, and seaports, which they charged might be employed as naval bases. Obviously these wild allegations violated established international ethics and offended against our independence and sovereignty. We know that the Russians have been building railways, airports, and seaports within their country, not to mention abroad, but do we attack them for it? Do the Russians think that among the countries in this part of the world only they are entitled to have the means of modern communications? Do they wish us to go back to the Middle Ages? They are perfectly correct that our railways, airports, and seaports might be used for military purposes; and so might theirs. Are the rules of the game to apply to everybody but themselves? After the Iraqi coup of 1958, when the remaining members of the Baghdad Pact met, we urged the United States to join the pact. She declined for the moment, although she was already a member of most of the pact's committees. Instead she offered to sign purely defensive bilateral agreements with Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, providing for American help in case any of these three countries were attacked by the forces of international Communism. We, along with our Turkish and Pakistani friends, decided to sign the proposed agreements with America. When the Russians heard of this, they sent us a note registering violent objections. They violated proper diplomatic usage by broadcasting their protest before it was officially delivered to us, and by instructing or allowing their ambassador in Teheran to make personal overtures to members of the Persian Parliament. We frankly told the Russians that they were

in danger of repeating the same mistakes they had made a few years earlier, which had so seriously marred the friendship between our two countries. We pointed out to them how ridiculous it was for them, with their huge armed forces, to fear our modest defence establishment. We reminded them that it was in the best interests of both our countries to pursue a policy of friendship between us. In a manoeuvre to prevent us from signing the bilateral agreement, the Russians then made some overtures and through intermediaries held out promises of a long-term non-aggression pact and tremendous economic help. The bilateral agreement in the form first presented to us lacked the significance that we wanted, and we felt it was not giving us the necessary guarantees. The supply of military equipment to my country was also falling short of our requirements. Feeling militarily ridiculously weak, and without such guarantees as, for example, NATO countries have, we allowed ourselves to enter into negotiations with the Russians on the subject of a non-aggression treaty. The Russians made the mistake of delaying two weeks before sending a mission here; in the meantime the terms of the draft bilateral agreement were changed in a manner that was satisfactory to us. When the Russians came they made another mistake: as a first step in the negotiations they asked us to get out of the Baghdad Pact. Although they dropped this demand when they saw our violent reaction, they insisted upon our not signing the proposed bilateral agreement. By then it had become clear to us that in return for a treaty of nonaggression the Russians wanted to separate us from our allies. Not only did they insist upon our repudiating the agreement with America, but also the draft non-aggression treaty itself contained clauses that would have weakened our ties with our friends. It was apparent to us that even though we were not happy

with the state of our military strength and preparedness, or with the help that our allies were giving us, it was nevertheless better to stick with our friends than to submit to anything that might cast a shadow over our independence and sovereignty. That is why we could not reach any agreement with the Russians. They left abruptly.

Soon they started a campaign of radio aggression against us. Their Government-owned broadcasting service sent out Persian-language diatribes containing all sorts of distortions and lies about my country, my Government, and my own family. A few months later a station calling itself the National Voice of Iran started broadcasts of an even worse nature. Through triangulation we readily determined that the station was located in southern Russia; and the Soviets knew that we knew it was there. Not satisfied with disseminating a continual stream of obnoxious, vulgar, and sometimes obscene propaganda, this station tried every day to incite the people of my country to revolt against their Government. Some weak-hearted cynics thought that these broadcasts would demoralize us. But instead they served to unite us. We felt sufficiently confident so that our Government re-broadcast the Russian broadcasts over our own radio so that more of my people could hear them in all their absurdity. At the frontier city of Julfa, the Russians started another campaign of propaganda aggression, this time using loud-speakers placed on their side of the border. It is amusing to recall how completely this plan misfired. We immediately retaliated by setting up loud-speakers on our side, and disseminating some painful truths. The Russian rulers prevent the common people from hstening to foreign broadcasts by spending huge sums on jamming them and by seeing to it that the ordinary man's radio can tune in only on certain state-assigned wavelengths.

But anybody on the Russian side could hear our loud-speakers—even ordinary citizens who had never in their lives enjoyed such freedom. The Russian authorities didn't like this a bit. Soon they shut down their loud-speakers and called off the campaign entirely, so we also turned off ours. But why should the Soviet Union have engaged in such actions against us? They knew that what they were doing was contrary to the provisions of existing treaties between our two countries. They knew that even if there were treaties which allowed such behaviour, they would be invalidated by the United Nations Charter; for Article 103 of the Charter declares null and void all provisions of international treaties or agreements which conflict with any part of the Charter itself. I must remind the Russians that in 1947 they themselves introduced into the United Nations a draft resolution condemning types of propaganda likely to endanger world peace. A related resolution, unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, condemned every kind of propaganda, wherever conducted, which was either intended or likely to lead to any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or aggression. Have the Russians forgotten the stand that they then took? Or are they themselves unwilling to follow the rules of conduct which they urge upon others? I am very sorry about this needless tension between the two countries. Actually I like the Russian people very much; but it is my duty to protect my country's independence. I see no necessary reason for friction between us and the Russians; if, for instance, they treated us as they do Turkey, the strained relations between us and our northern neighbours would disappear. Everybody, including our Soviet friends, should recognize that the world is becoming steadily more unwilling to tolerate aggression from any quarter. I can illustrate by the change even since 1946,

when I acted to save Azerbaijan. At that time our case before the United Nations was not making the headway we expected, and the American ambassador in Teheran frankly told me that his country would not fight to save Iran. Nevertheless, I thought to myself, if I do not attack now, the forces of national disintegration will strengthen themselves and attack us. The odds seemed against us and I was far from sure of success; but I thought it was better for us to die in honour and dignity than to lose our birthright. Once again God supported me.

Now my countrymen and I feel much less alone than we did in those critical days of 1946. World opinion has learned to focus quickly and tenaciously upon any threat to peace; and in this nuclear age people sense that aggression against any country can endanger all countries. The United Nations has become stronger; and the idea of United Nations police forces has gained world acceptance both in theory and in practice. At the same time my country enjoys the added protection of mutual defence agreements with powerful and vigilant friends; and these agreements are completely in harmony with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

So you can see that our foreign policy has evolved in the light of very practical experience. In two world wars we learned the fallacy of neutrality for a country so strategically located as Iran, for in neither case did it keep us from being overrun. And after both great conflicts we became a happy hunting-ground for foreign interests. Under Mossadegh, our weakness and our negative foreign policy allowed us to become the victim of widespread infiltration and subversion directed from outside our borders. So gradually we have evolved a new policy, one of greater national virility. I call it positive nationalism.

It seems that these days one hears more and more of nationalism and imperialism, so it is important to grasp the full implications of those terms. To start with I find an ordinary dictionary definition of nationalism adequate for my purpose: 'Devotion to, or advocacy of, national interests or national unity and independence.' An everyday companion definition of imperialism would be: 'The policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking to extend the control, dominion, or empire of a nation.' Then how may one define positive nationalism and what kind of action does it suggest? Positive nationalism, as I conceive it, implies a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of one's country. On the other hand, it does not mean non-alignment or sitting on the fence. It means that we make any agreement which is in our own interest, regardless of the wishes or policies of others. We are not intimidated by anybody who tries to tell us whom we should have for our friends, and we make no alliances merely for the sake of alliances or of vague principles, but only in support of our enlightened self-interest. We cultivate the friendship of all, and are prepared to take advantage of every country's technical skills if to do so does not prejudice our interests or our independence. This gives us great freedom of action—much more than that enjoyed by any dogma-ridden state. At the same time we resolutely stand for the ideals and principles of the United Nations. We place no reliance on supine passive neutrality; we are outspokenly friends to our friends, and we count on them to be friends to us. If some countries occasionally irritate, insult, or threaten us, we nevertheless refuse to become negative in our thinking or our action towards them. We are not like the owl hooting among the ruins; by that I mean we refuse to shout abuse from the housetops (or over the international

radio) and condemn everybody and meanwhile remain miserable, poor, and weak. On the contrary, we daily become stronger and more prosperous, we are building a new country, and at the same time we are maintaining the truest nationalist sentiments.

Imperialism is by no means new; I have mentioned that the Persian Empire was the world's first true empire. Neither is nationalism, which inspired us Persians at the time of Cyrus the Great. Many centuries later, nationalism spurred on the colonists who created an independent United States of America; and still more recently, a new wave of nationalism has been sweeping over the Middle East and other politically and economically less developed areas. Nationalism, like imperialism, is a tricky notion. In its true form, nationalism can lead a country to greatness. For example, it is this spirit which unquestionably underlies much of America's notable progress, and my father's amazing achievements were due in no small degree to his having given expression to the pure spirit of nationalism instinctive to our people.

On the other hand, the same spirit, cleverly used by local traitors or by an outside power, leads to imperialist infiltration and subversion and is the prelude to national suicide. When Mossadegh and his followers cried like women and indulged in hysterical tirades against the British, many sincerely thought at first that this was nationalism. But as time went by, patriots realized that Mossadegh was in fact opening wide the door for imperialist subversion. His negative policies led straight to the sort of political and economic chaos which foreign agents found ideal for their purposes. Whereas my father had eradicated imperialism, Mossadegh provided it with an ideal spawning ground of which it was not slow to take advantage. There is nothing

more dangerous for a man or for a nation than to be a prisoner of one's personal sentiments and a captive of one's egotism. After all, I had more plausible personal grounds than Mossadegh for being angry with the British. Had they not been instrumental in getting rid of my father? Had they not helped welcome the Russians into my country during the Second World War? While Mossadegh stewed in his emotions, I tried to think of the larger national interest. I have already explained that Mossadegh's negative nationalism not only provided the Communists with their ideal opportunity but, paradoxically, allowed the British more influence over Iran's national policies than ever before. If Mossadegh's conduct could be defined as nationalism, then obviously a new term for real nationalism must be invented. Mossadegh's policy was of course one of negativism, not nationalism in any valid sense; nevertheless, the term positive nationalism I think helps distinguish between his conduct and that of the true patriot. In the many countries where nationalism is seething today, people face the task of deciding which purported nationalists are genuine and which are counterfeit. Conditions vary greatly from country to country and in any case I would not wish to express opinions as to the affairs of others; but I do think the study of our experience may be helpful to patriots elsewhere in making such decisions. Certainly one lesson we have learned is that those who preach negative nationalism are automatically suspect. Anybody can tear down; fewer can build up. By a strange and yet almost universal weakness, human nature responds more easily to shouts against alleged devils and demons than it does to calls of nation-building. To destroy is spectacular and emotion-rousing; construction is a quieter process. Some who talk in this way think they are sincere, while others are conscious tools of

alien subversion; their supposed nationalism is equally counterfeit. By this I do not for a moment mean to oppose legitimate criticism; but that is very different from negative demagoguery. Secondly we have found that any pretended nationalist who attacks only one kind of imperialism is again automatically suspect. Mossadegh cried out against those devils the imperialist English; but during the latter part of his regime, as he snuggled closer to the Tudeh, he always forgot to mention another even more lethal kind of imperialism. Intentionally or not, he diverted people's thoughts and emotions away from the greater danger by focusing on the lesser. Thirdly, much can be learnt about supposed nationalists by comparing their pronouncements with those of various foreign groups and powers. Here the familiar party line may be discerned. If a hundred newspapers in different parts of the world mimic each other day after day, showing always the same attitudes and prejudices, then it can be safely assumed that they follow orders from a central headquarters. If one of those newspapers is in your own country, you can be certain that it stands for false rather than genuine indigenous nationalism. Finally, purported nationalists may be asked how they propose to develop their country. If they have no positive programme, or if it consists of vague phrases, or if they have a plausible one but refuse to concentrate on practical arrangements for its execution, then you must suspect their vaunted nationalism. But if they have positive plans, with sound ideas on carrying them out, and exhibit the quiet, tough determination which builds a nation, then they can be trusted. It is well known that subversive groups are active in every free country today. Taking advantage of the rights and privileges afforded by a free society, their members tirelessly seek to destroy freedom. Commonly masquerading as de-

voted indigenous nationalists, they are actually skilled specialists in the technique of bringing about national suicide. How can they be dealt with? We have found it best to control such organizations firmly, while at the same time allowing maximum freedom for individual expression. America and many other free nations have under modern conditions found it necessary to prohibit, or at least curtail the activities of, groups devoted to the overthrow of the democratic order by unconstitutional means. But control must not mean denial of basic rights. After Mossadegh's downfall, interesting evidence was given in the subsequent trials as to the oath that the Tudeh party administered to our army officers who were party members. They all had to swear that they were against their King and the Western powers, but friendly to the Soviet Union. Any organization requiring that kind of oath could hardly be called a supporter of true Persian nationalism, and, particularly since Russia is a near neighbour, it would be an act of extreme political irresponsibility to allow such groups to flourish. Not only are subversive organizations themselves regulated or prohibited in many free nations, but their individual members automatically lose certain privileges in the society. For example, in America as in Persia, a known Communist may not ordinarily hold a government post. On the other hand, I consider it wise to place as little restraint as possible upon the views expressed by ordinary citizens. To allow people to speak their minds not only provides a valuable cathartic; it also may serve to uncover abuses. We sometimes forget that martial law was in force throughout Mossadegh's term of office. I was determined to abolish such restraints; and after Mossadegh's fall I was able to relax martial law and in due course to end it.

In Iranian bookshops and in the daily Press you can find material

that is sharply critical of some of the Government's policies. We deliberately allow such things to circulate, realizing as we do that it is in the interest of democratic self-expression and self-criticism. In Persia one can likewise attend university and public lectures in which direct criticisms are made of the Government. Occasionally you will hear one of my countrymen proclaim that there is 'no freedom' in Iran, but there is significance in the fact that he is at liberty to say such things without fear of punishment. I think impartial observers agree that in our universities we have remarkable academic freedom. Many people abroad may be interested in the way we have dealt with proved ex-Communists.



My father and I show our satisfaction when a train arrives on time.



I broadcast to the nation immediately after the assassination attempt in 1949.

Those who have killed fellow citizens or have otherwise flagrantly betrayed their country have been punished. But many of our former Communists have repented and have begged for an opportunity to serve their country and their king. So why, we asked ourselves, shouldn't we give it to them? If they have genuinely repented, it is worthwhile to add a few more people to the wholesome population of the country, and even if they have not they can no longer do any harm, because we know them and they know that we know them. Many are now making useful contributions to Iran's development, and for some time they have also been publishing a monthly magazine which carries articles describing their experiences, while in the party, and telling why they decided to repudiate it, and the new significance that has since entered their lives. I consider it vitally important, then, for the citizens of this or any other land to enjoy every sort of constitutional liberty save one—the liberty to betray the country. I believe in



An Azerbaijan peasant girl sifting grain.



I distribute ownership deeds to farmers at the Marble Palace, Teheran.

balancing toughness towards subversive organizations with leniency as to expressions of individual viewpoint. I am convinced that any free society will find that policy in its long-term best interests. In counteracting subversion we have also found that the main emphasis should always be placed on social justice rather than on coercion and control measures. It is true that, especially in a country as strategically placed as we are, there may be a need to act quickly and decisively to combat attempts to topple the Government by unconstitutional means, particularly those which are foreign inspired. Today every free country needs a political security agency which, in cooperation with other Government departments, can detect and neutralize attempts of that kind. In present-day conditions, any other course would be reckless. But nothing could be more short-sighted than to think that police measures alone are enough. To combat Communist subversion or any other evil, a Government must enjoy the backing of the majority of the people, and in the long run it will only have this if it provides

adequate social justice in the broadest sense. I shall later show that this implies participation by the people in their Government, equitable legal processes, adequate economic standards, and much else. Police measures might by themselves succeed for a month or a year or two years in limiting subversion, but eventually the presence or absence of social justice would tell the tale. Even if a country were to exterminate all known Communists within its borders, the prevailing social conditions might breed new ones as fast as the old ones were liquidated. I firmly believe, then, that in social justice lies the one fundamental key to combating internal Communism. In our many contacts with alien imperialisms, I think it fair to say that we have learned something about how to deal with them. It is true that we have never been an actual colony of a modern imperialist power, but in some ways ours has been a harder fate. Such powers generally try to keep their competitors out of their colonies and to maintain stability within them, and though exploitation has been common, there has also been constructive development. We, however, have served as a battleground for rival imperialisms, the great powers trying to control us and exploit us at each other's expense. Occasionally, as under the agreement of 1907, they would divide the labour of domination between them. Always they either forgot entirely about Persian national interests or left them well in the background. I have mentioned that British imperialism has ceased in Iran, but we know that that is part of a larger change in the old imperialist pattern. Within the past fifteen years Britain has granted independence to literally hundreds of millions of people, most of whom have voluntarily chosen to remain within the Commonwealth. The old French empire is moving rapidly towards a commonwealth pattern. Everywhere you find that the out-

moded capitalistic imperialist exploitation of less developed peoples is giving way to new cooperative relationships symbolized by the work of the United Nations technical assistance agencies and the Colombo Plan. Some extremists claim that the United States has revived the old imperialist tradition of exploitation. They argue that American military advisers, Point Four missions, and commercial interests operate in many countries today, and that they must be up to no good. They maintain that the sole purpose of the United States in sending such missions and aid is the establishment of military bases and economic domination. I must frankly say that this has not been our experience. We demand and receive complete equality of treament. We welcome American Point Four and military assistance, but only because it helps us to develop and strengthen Iran and to help ourselves and the wider cause of freedom. We welcome American business and commercial interests, but only where their presence in our judgement contributes to the same end. America has never tried to dominate us as the old imperialists did, nor would we tolerate that; and the same applies to our relations with all other countries.

I think we have reached two main conclusions on how to cope with imperialism. The first is not new but, especially in the less-developed countries, it is worth emphasizing over and over again. It concerns the question of where the greater danger lies. In our experience it is the new imperialism—the new totalitarian imperialism—that the world's less-developed countries today have most to fear. Advancing under false colours, the new imperialism pretends that it supports the genuine nationalism of each newly-developing country; works its way into native nationalist movements; and then proceeds to subvert them. It concentrates on negative, destructive

nationalism and thrives on the chaos that follows. This is the process of 'softening up' in preparation for absorption. We all saw this happening in my country, right under our noses, in Mossadegh's time. Under him, Iran lay at the mercy of the new imperialism. Not a few other less fortunate countries have lost their birthright in the same way. The second conclusion is that in dealing with imperialisms old or new, timidity and kowtowing do no good. I believe both our own experience and that of others has shown the need to maintain firmly the spirit of equality among the community of nations. Today the smaller countries must have courage in dealing with their neighbours, no matter how big the latter may be, and, going further, join with their friends in collective security arrangements in harmony with the spirit of the United Nations. Later I shall explain my ideas on the defence of my country and of the Middle East, but I must record here my conviction that imperialism must always be confronted with the strength which comes only from unity—national unity and international unity among staunch friends and allies. All over the world, freedom-loving people today face grave dangers. Any courageous nation can today find the stimulation that goes with perils jointly shared with friends. With our policy of positive nationalism—rooted in our glorious past yet very new—we Persians find stirring opportunities both at home and abroad. We are gratified by the current cordial relations between Iran and almost every other country. Just as a man has some friends upon whom he would especially rely in any crisis, so too have we. We remain always ready to enlarge the circle of those most trusted friends; at the same time we remain vigilant to join with our friends in resisting any form of imperialism.

Chapter 7

Westernization: Our Welcome Ordeal

When I travelled to the Far East in 1958, I was reminded of a sagacious remark by Mr. Lester Pearson, Canada's former Minister of External Affairs. 'Coca-Cola,' he said, 'is no substitute for Confucius.' I think that suggests the dilemma of many of the world's economically less-developed countries. Persia is only one example of a land with a culture much older, and in some respects more mature, than those of the Western nations themselves. In some ways Western countries can civilize us, in other ways we can perhaps civilize them. Iran possesses spotless modern soft drink and other such plants, but perhaps I shall not sound irreverent if I maintain that these are but the frills of modernization. As I see it, the essence of my country's Westernization is something like this: Formerly, as I have already pointed out, Persia was a world leader in science and technology. But under the long period of Qajar ascendancy our science and technology tended to stagnate, while in these fields the younger Western nations forged rapidly ahead.

Today we have far to go to catch up, and it is not enough merely to 'catch up'. Conditions in my country differ considerably from those in the West, and we need also to adapt. We are both adjusting the technology to our culture and our culture to the technology. And here lies a clue to a new kind of pioneering. With our great scholarly tradition and our thousands of university-trained young men and women, I foresee that my country may help provide leadership in the world-wide quest for a fresh synthesis of East and West, old and new.

Now as you might expect with a culture as old as ours, our contact with the West is by no means recent. Alexander the Great came from Macedonia, a land that is part of what is now called 'the West', when he conquered Persia in 331 BC When we captured the Roman Emperor Valerian in battle in AD 260, he provided us with a bit of what you might call Western technical assistance. He and many of the soldiers taken with him were settled by our Emperor Shapur in Khuzistan in southern Persia; there they built many irrigation dams. The ruins of a number of these are still to be seen, and some were in use until quite recent times. Detailed accounts survive by soldiers, adventurers, travellers, traders, and missionaries who in succeeding centuries came from the West to visit Persia. In 1271 Marco Polo, the Venetian who is often called the father of modern geography, spent some time here and is said to have spoken the language fluently. He wrote that 'Persia is a great country which was in old times very illustrious and powerful, but now the Tartars [Mongols] have wasted and destroyed it.' He also described Persian island of Hormuz where, he said, 'Merchants come from India with ships loaded with spicery and precious stones, pearls, cloths of silk and gold, elephants' teeth, and many other wares which they sell to the merchants of Hormuz.'

No doubt inspired by his account, other Venetians also journeyed to Persia. In the fourteenth century Tamerlane, whose dominions then included Persia, wished to exchange letters with Henry IV of England. As an intermediary he chose John Greenlaw, an English friar who lived in Tabriz. In the same century Henry III of Castile dispatched Ruy Gonzalez di Clavijo to Tamerlane's court, where the ambassador marvelled at the gorgeous royal tents, one of which 'was so large and high that from a distance it looked like a castle'. Referring to Tamerlane's mode of dispensing justice, the Castilian said, 'When a great man is put to death, he is hanged, but the meaner sort are beheaded.' In 1507 the Portuguese, attracted by the commercial importance of Hormuz, captured the island. About half a century later an English trader, Anthony Jenkinson, reached Persia after crossing Russia from the Baltic Sea. His object was to establish trade connexions by that route, and he was especially attracted by the silk of our Caspian province of Gilan. Some trade was done, but transport costs proved too high and the Russians were not encouraging. In the later sixteenth century Robert Newberry, another English trader, landed at Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf and made his way through Persia and Asia Minor to Constantinople. I have already mentioned the brothers Sir Anthony and Sir Robert Sherley and their assistance to Shah Abbas. Shah Abbas granted many important privileges to Christian merchants who desired to trade with Persia, and the friendly attitude of Persia towards foreign traders is still noticeable today. In 1617 the British East India Company established a factory (as trading stations were called in those days) at Shiraz. Five years later we and the British recaptured Hormuz from the Portuguese. This dealt a great blow to Portuguese prestige in the Persian Gulf, and enhanced Britain's trade there. In the following

year Shah Abbas gave Dutch interests permission to establish a trading station at Bandar Abbas, and soon afterwards the French established stations there and at Isfahan. The Dutch and the French later withdrew as Britain's power and trading ascendancy continued to grow. In the seventeenth century Sir Thomas Herbert, an Englishman, and Sir John Chardin, a Frenchman in the service of the English king, separately visited Persia and wrote excellent accounts of their travels here. The first recorded Russian diplomatic mission to Persia was in 1664, when the Emperor Alexis sent two envoys here along with some eight hundred followers. In 1708 Peter the Great dispatched an embassy to the Persian court at Isfahan, and another mission was sent seven years later. I have already described subsequent Russian incursions into Persia and recent relations between the two countries. In the early nineteenth century numerous Western scholars and diplomats visited Persia. They included such men as James Morier, the author of Haji Baba of Isfahan and Sir John Malcolm, who wrote a standard history of Persia. They popularized Persian literature in Europe and stimulated there a deep interest in my country. American Christian missionaries pioneered the development of Iranian-American relations. The first of them arrived here as early as 1829, and soon they established a school; this was followed by numerous other missionary schools and hospitals and by the famous Alborz College of Teheran, where many of Persia's present-day leaders were trained. British and other European missionaries have also for long worked here; I have mentioned that John Greenlaw was here in the fourteenth century, and by early in the seventeenth century a considerable number of Western missionaries were making their influence felt.

1883 the initial American diplomatic mission was established in

Iran. The first minister, S. G. W. Benjamin, wrote two books about my country, and during the nineteenth century and onwards to the present we have developed ever closer and more friendly relations with America. I should add that in 1909 Howard Baskerville, an American missionary school teacher in Tabriz, gave his life in one of the battles to maintain our 1906 Constitution against the forces of reaction. Now in order to understand the Western impact upon Persia, one must remember that 'Westernization' in its present-day sense is new to the Western nations themselves. For example, life in America has been radically transformed over the past fifty years, and it even shows big changes over the past ten years. I visited America in 1949, 1955, and 1958, and on each of the last two trips I noticed major developments and innovations that were not to be seen when I first went. The explosive stimulus for such rapid change is not far to seek: American expenditures on scientific research and development have multiplied many times since just before the Second World War, with commensurate returns. So you might say that America's own 'Westernization' programme is proceeding at an unprecedented rate. To greater or less degree I have observed the same phenomenon on my visits to Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and other countries. Some American and European economists and engineers have peculiar ideas on how you should go about Westernizing an economically less-developed country. They claim that such countries are unprepared for modern techniques, and that therefore you should reach back into history and encourage them to use those employed at, say, the time of the American Civil War. For example, some point out, in Persia you still commonly see villagers working with crude ironshod wooden ploughs. It is argued that the thing to give them is the type

common in the mid-nineteenth century. Don't waste time thinking about tractors or modern implements, because the villagers wouldn't know how to operate them, still less to maintain them. In the same way, such economists and engineers assert, the less developed countries should avoid the temptation to meddle in such complex modern fields as antibiotics, electronics, or aviation. The economically backward countries should learn to walk before they try to run. At least as concerns my own country, I profoundly disagree. I think some examples will show why. Near the Teheran International Airport camel caravans can still be seen bringing goods from remote villages to the city, yet the airport itself, which was completed in 1958, is considerably more modern than most of those I have seen in America and Europe. It is appropriate that it should be so, for Teheran has become a major stop on the inter-continental runs between Europe and the Far East, as well as a focal point in our internal air network. Because of popular demand, the traffic carried by our airlines increased tenfold between 1953 and 1958. For reasons of economy, safety, and speed, we have found it expedient to introduce the latest turboprop planes on some of our passenger routes. And of course we use jet planes in our air force, for everybody knows that the piston-type fighter planes of the Second World War have become obsolete. Teheran today possesses one of the most modern milk-pasteurization plants in the Middle East. I am told that, for its size, it is as modern as any in the world. We could rely on plants of older design, but the new one is more sanitary, more efficient, and more in keeping with the society we are building. Our Nemazee Hospital in Shiraz is one of the most up to date in this part of the world; and an American expert in hospital administration has declared that it is unquestionably the best-run in the Middle

East. Persia, the home of the great physician Avicenna who lived so many centuries ago, could have reached back into her earlier history to design a hospital of ancient style; but certainly that is not what would serve my people best. Again, we could employ primarily the earlier kinds of medicines; but instead, the Imperial Social Service Organization is distributing the latest antibiotics and other drugs to doctors in remote towns and villages all over my country. Even as recently as during the Second World War, horse-drawn carriages provided the main means of getting about in Teheran. Today Teheran has no fewer than ten thousand taxis. During 1958 the biggest double-decker buses, similar to those used in London, began to appear in large numbers on the streets of Teheran. My capital city is growing so fast that we, one of the so-called economically less-developed nations, are seriously considering building an underground railway system. In the rural areas, a common means of transport for thousands of years has been the patient and whimsical donkey. I recall once seeing a man reading a book as he rode along; that is something you never could do while driving a car! In a way I'm sorry to see the donkey depart from the scene, yet rural people have understandably taken a fancy to the jeep. An assembly plant has been built in Iran, and it is turning out hundreds of those agile vehicles; and though initially all the parts are being imported, gradually more and more of them will be made here. Jeeps of the latest model will eventually be produced from start to finish. One of the European car manufacturers may also establish a car factory in Persia, and we already have a modern tyre factory as well as Facilities for tyre re-treading. In Teheran, we could rely, as formerly, upon servants to carry messages from office to office or house to house; instead we use dial telephones. We think it's more

efficient. We could, as in earlier generations, employ the telegraph as the sole means of fast communication between cities. Instead we built land telephone lines across mountains and deserts. But that didn't satisfy us either, for we saw better possibilities in the latest electronic developments. As you travel by train through the Zagros Mountains of south-western Iran, you can see antenna towers perched on top of precipitous ridges. These are part of the expanding microwave radio-telephone system of Iran. The steel girders and delicate transmitting apparatus have been hauled by the back-breaking efforts of men and animals up to the seven- and eight-thousand foot heights. The radio-telephone system not only provides clear, efficient voice communication between the major cities of Iran, but also permits improved contact with foreign countries. Now when I say that I want my country to have the most modern available technology, that does not mean we should embark on uneconomic ventures. For example, I have no desire to see us imitate some other countries by establishing a steel industry purely for the sake of national prestige. Such a project requires large amounts of water, as well as basic raw materials such as iron ore, coal, and limestone. It demands managerial, technical, and labour skills. It necessitates electric power, transport facilities, and markets. We think we have proved the economic soundness of a well-planned modern steel industry in Iran, and it is for that reason, rather than for prestige, that we are planning one. It requires lively insight and imagination to transplant Western technology effectively to a country like Persia. As I have said, much adaptation is necessary, and we largely rely for this upon the young men whom we send abroad for post-graduate study and who naturally encounter the problem of using their new knowledge in home conditions. Many of these adap-

tations are almost instinctive or unconscious, but others may require extended research. For example, one young man, the son of a prominent business man, studied at the Harvard graduate school of business administration. While there he wrote a thesis on the possibility of adapting modern television broadcasting to Persia's particular needs. When he returned, he became a pioneer in establishing Iran's new television industry. Again, I have in mind another young man who for seven years studied agricultural engineering in England, where agriculture has now become more mechanized than anywhere else in the world. He paid careful attention to adapting what he was learning to the needs of his country. He also acquired an English wife. When he returned, he very successfully applied his work to conditions on the large farm he established some fifteen miles outside of Teheran. There, using the latest techniques, he has been producing bountiful harvests of long-staple cotton, fruits, and market garden produce, as well as the most advanced type of American chicken. In modernizing a nation, just as in conducting a military campaign, you need a plan of action. In 1948, as soon as we had begun to recover from the chaos of the war, my Government called in an experienced firm of American consulting engineers. These technicians were asked to survey Iran's potentialities, and to recommend ways of using our large oil revenues to speed our modernization. A preliminary report was issued in that year. Meanwhile, we broadened the planning effort by combining the talents of a number of well-known U.S. firms organized as Overseas Consultants, Incorporated. That group drew up a five-volume report which outlined a tremendous national development programme to be carried out over a seven-year period. Every major field of our economy was covered; programmes in health, education, agriculture, industry,

mining, oil production, and so forth were put forward. Parliament quickly adopted these recommendations, and passed legislation promulgating the First Seven-Year Plan. A relatively independent agency called the Seven- Year Plan Organization (it is now usually known simply as the Plan Organization) was set up to administer it, and it was specified that virtually all the Government's oil revenues were to be used for this purpose rather than for ordinary Government operating expenses. The plan was to cost about 140 million or $400 million, an average of $58 million for each of the seven years. Of this annual sum, about $40 million was expected to come from oil royalties, while the remainder would be obtained by borrowing at home or abroad. The First Seven-Year Plan proved almost a complete failure. First, unexpected administrative bottlenecks appeared; in retrospect it is clear that the formulators of the plan had not given sufficient thought to the problem of administering it. Then it became difficult to carry on the Government's ordinary functions without the benefit of oil revenues. In spite of Parliament's original intentions, the Plan Organization received far less than its agreed share of oil royalties. For example, in 1949, when oil revenues amounted to some $38 million, it received only about $15 million, and in the following year, when oil revenues were $45 million, only $32 million. It was Mossadegh, however, who spelled the doom of the First Seven-Year Plan. By his oil policy he made certain that the plan could not succeed and the common people could not receive its benefits. Oil revenues fell to nothing (in effect less than nothing, because the Government had to go on meeting wage and other obligations in the stagnant industry), and oil money was available neither for ordinary Govermnent purposes nor for national development. After Mossadegh was overthrown in

1953, and oil revenues began to revive, we strove to get the First Seven-Year Plan moving again. The Plan Organization was reorganized and expanded, morale was restored there and in the other Government agencies, and projects began to be completed. Meanwhile, a new plan was being drawn up. In March of 1956 my signature made into law the bill promulgating the Second Seven- Year Plan. My father was never satisfied with the pace of modernization, and neither am I. But under the Second Seven- Year Plan we are making progress. Some of our most basic advances remain largely unseen, because they consist of economic and engineering plans carefully drawn up with the help of foreign experts. In other cases the physical construction of projects is under way or has been completed. It is often forgotten that the wise planning of a project may take fully as long as its material realization in steel and concrete, machinery and equipment. In these last few pages I have given some fragments of my philosophy of nation-building. But this is only the beginning of what I have to say on this subject. And here I want to be very frank. Some people, especially news correspondents, seem more interested in the colour of my tie or the decor of my office than in my social convictions. In fact I have given audiences to a number of accredited correspondents who, utterly failing to grasp my deeply held beliefs, have with suave confidence written accounts composed of the most banal superficialities.

For some reason the Americans have specialized in such reporting. I marvel at the many instances I have seen of naive, even childish, reporting by big, well-dressed, self-assured, impressive-looking American correspondents. Sometimes I wonder if they have received the right training for overseas work. Happily there are exceptions, but it would help the Free World's cause if the exception could become the

rule. I suspect, too, that the trouble arises partly from the assumption by some American advertisers and television producers that you have to treat an adult American like a child to keep his interest. Judging by the dedicated men engaged in Point Four and other work in my country, that assumption is false. And I understand that even in American corner drug stores you can today find paper-bound editions of scholarly works on history, science, and philosophy. Americans may not be so immature as some of their own 'experts'—including some well-known newsmen who have made flying visits to this part of the world—would like to have you believe. An Oriental court, backed by thousands of years of tradition, naturally abounds in romance and pageantry. But if you want to know me, you must kno w my convictions as a man and head of state in this seething part of the world. And the plain truth is that I derive my chief satisfactions from grappling with complex economic and other problems. Myself as Shah cannot be separated from myself as a man fervently interested in economic development, agricultural reform, and educational advance. No man in my position could be unconscious of the temptations of power, but luckily I find my main motivations and raison d'etre elsewhere. To me there is nothing drab about, let us say, an intricate question of expanding agricultural productivity. To me it comes absorbingly alive just because even a slight advance in solving it can mean so much to thousands of ordinary citizens here in this part of the world.

I won't go so far as the Englishman who remarked that he would rather share a bed with a copy of The Economist than with a woman. But I do find most of my chief rewards in wrestling with difficult problems and issues that, I suppose, might bore some people to extinction. Indeed, I notice that my appetite is whetted by any reasonably coher-

ent account of the trials and rewards of nation-building. I hope that my readers feel the same. Now it is perfectly true that much writing about economic development in the newly-emerging countries has dealt in troublesomely vague abstractions. But on the other hand the fact must be faced that in building a nation you cannot measure the importance of a given project by what I shall call its coefficient of glamour. For example, effective collection of fair and just taxes is essential to the running of a modern state. Some people bitterly allege that my Government has not been collecting all the taxes it should, and unfortunately their complaint is well-founded. Administrative confusion and inefficiency, and especially careless handling of tax files, has accounted for many of our tax-collection difficulties. Recently our Ministry of Finance, with the aid of foreign experts, prepared a most attractive pamphlet to help cure this situation. As I pick up this guide I notice that it has a four-colour cover, plastic ring binding, numerous photographs, and well-drawn work-simplification charts that even a layman can easily follow. Applied to urban land taxes, the principles contained in the guide led to a reduction of about 40 per cent in the number of procedural steps in handling cases, and a cut of 60 per cent in the volume of active files needed. In its way this is a dramatic, as well as thoroughly practical, little pamphlet; yet I am sure that many who complain about inefficient tax collection would be thoroughly wearied by it. In nation-building, fine talk is never a substitute for systematic, dogged work. Even in order to understand the reform and advancement problems of the newly-emerging countries, one must do a little cerebral exercise. I claim this can be painless, pleasant, even fascinating. How can I best show the pace and process—to me so thrilling—of national growth that is under way in my country?

How can I describe my philosophy in action? Perhaps one way would be to list some typical events in a brief representative period. Here, for example, were some of the economic and social developments in Iran in the second half of our Persian year 1338, the year which fell in 1959-60.

First Month ˘ A new school for the blind was opened. Telephone communications were inaugurated to three towns in southern Iran. I distributed thirtyfour of my villages to small farmers, each of whom received a title deed. Mobile courts were established in Azerbaijan. An anti-tuberculosis centre was opened in the city of Resht. A new deep well was completed in southern Teheran.

I officially opened Iran's new bureau of standards. Radio-telephone communications were inaugurated between Iran and Italy. Drilling began in the Persian Gulf on Iran's first off-shore oil well. Government land was given to 582 civil servants in Abadan for building houses. The Industrial and Mineral Development Bank of Iran was officially established. A new school was opened in the Yezd area. A new factory in Karaj began turning out concrete sleepers for the railways. Construction was completed on anti-tuberculosis clinics in the cities of Meshed, Isfahan, and Babol. In Isfahan a textile industry school was officially opened and began admitting students.

Second Month

On the outskirts of Teheran I dedicated a newly-completed orphanage for 2,000 children. One of my sisters opened a clinic and a canteen. On the occasion of my birthday, twenty-eight new schools were opened in various parts of the country. New power stations went into operation in fifteen provincial towns. Street-paving was completed in seven towns. Installation of electric signals was finished

at twelve railway stations in south-central Iran. A mechanized agriculture centre was opened in the province of Kurdistan. Work started on a gas pipeline from one of the southern oil fields to Shiraz, to serve both the city and the new fertilizer factory under construction there. In Khorasan province construction was finished on a fuel-oil depot, and pumping was started to fill the tanks. A clinic was finished in one town and a sanatorium in another. Construction began on the Shahnaz dam, named after my daughter.

Third Month

A women's wing was opened at a hospital in Kurdistan province, and a new dental clinic started operations there. Wireless telephone communications were established between the cities of Fars and Isfahan. Enlargements were completed at oil storage depots at five different cities and towns. A large irrigation canal was dedicated. Five elementary schools and nine technical and vocational schools were opened in various towns and cities, and construction was finished on five other elementary schools. A new sugar factory, our first privately-owned one, started experimental production. The Government finished building 250 rural houses. One of our new 33,000-ton oil tankers completed her maiden voyage from Europe and loaded her first cargo of oil. A factory for making olive and sesame oil went into production. I cut the ribbon at newly-completed extensions to a hospital in Teheran. Output at one of our oil fields was doubled as three new wells went into production, and engineers struck oil at another field. A bread factory and two new telephone exchanges were opened in Teheran. A diversion tunnel was finished at the Sefid Roud dam. Ten experimental deep irrigation wells were drilled. A new hospital, named after Queen Farah, was opened.

Fourth Month

A new post and telegraph office started business in Gilan province. Construction of a veterinary station in Isfahan was completed. A power station, a clinic, two schools, and a mosque were opened in one town; a power station and two schools commenced operations in another; and two more power stations went into service in other towns. A nursery, sponsored by Queen Farah, was inaugurated in Kerman. Isfahan's new radio transmitter went on the air. The laying of water mains was completed in two cities. Construction of a laboratory was finished in Abadan. I opened a new section of a Teheran hospital.

Fifth Month

Construction was completed on a clinic and a veterinary station, and the Queen opened another clinic. Work was finished on laying out the new grounds of Tabriz University. The construction of a weaving factory was completed in Kerman, a flour mill was opened in Azerbaijan, and a new carton-making plant commenced operations at the Government cigarette factory in Teheran. Radio transmitter-receivers were installed at five of our customs houses. The Queen and I gave title deeds to 1,607 farmers who were receiving distributed royal lands.

Sixth Month

A 250-bed hospital wing was opened in a low-income district of Teheran. In other parts of the country construction was finished on five clinics serving railway towns, and on a 100-bed hospital. Ground was broken for a sanatorium and for a clinic. Construction was completed on two more orphanages. At the town of Karaj a small industrial research laboratory was dedicated. Three new power stations

started operations in as many different towns. A new water system began serving another town. Direct radio-telephone communications were established between the cities of Zahedan and Meshed, and between Teheran and the town of Fasa. I dedicated a new water system in the town of Rey, and I handed over title deeds to farmers receiving distributed Government lands. I opened a new sugar refining-plant at Ahwaz. I dedicated a major bridge at Khorramshahr and a television station at Abadan. I inaugurated the first regular maritime passenger service between Iran and Europe.

Yet we have projects galore besides those I have just mentioned. Consider for a moment our Khuzistan development scheme: here we have employed as our advisers a firm headed by David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp, known for their earlier work with America's Tennessee Valley Authority. Their task here is somewhat similar, for they are preparing plans for the integrated development of an entire region that is rich in resources. The province of Khuzistan, in south-western Iran, is about the size of the American state of North Carolina. Many centuries ago the province produced lush harvests of sugar cane, wheat, and other crops required by the great Persian Empire. But largely in consequence of invasion, most of the extensive irrigation works of those days (you can see plenty of remnants of them, and a few are still in use) were destroyed or fell into disrepair. Meanwhile, through erosion and percolation of water up through subsoil deposits of salt, the land gradually became too saline for some of the crops. Agriculture dwindled, and the region became depopulated. Khuzistan possesses rivers, mountains, vast plains, and tremendous oil resources (the huge Abadan refinery, and the wells which supply it, are located there). But the water, and the hydro-electric power it

represents, are largely wasted. Wasted, too, are tremendous quantities of natural gas, for there has been no provision either for its use on the spot, or for storing and transporting it. Instead it has till now simply been burned, as was formerly the case in American fields—a shocking waste of our precious resources. The better to use Khuzistan's gas and other resources, we have put in motion five preliminary plans, each of which will contribute to the region's fundamental economic development.



A student hostel at the University of Tabriz.



The Sefid Roud dam under construction.



A view of the world's largest oil refinery, at Abadan. In the foreground is the Shatt-al-Arab River.



A bridge on the Trans-Iranian railway.

One involves the use of natural gas as a natural raw material in making polyvinyl chloride, the flexible plastic that finds use in so many household, automotive, industrial, and other applications today. The plastics plant to be constructed will, in addition to turning out products for the home market, demonstrate to investors the feasibility of industrial development in Khuzistan. A second plan also depends on natural gas as a basic raw material. Full development of the region's agriculture demands large quantities of fertilizer. To determine exactly what kinds are needed, we have started experimental fertilizer programmes in nearly three hundred villages in the area, and have meanwhile been drawing up plans for what may be one of several fertilizer factories in Khuzistan. A third project is based on the revival of the region's once-great sugar-cane harvests and cane-sugar industry. Near the city of Susa (Shush), which many centuries ago was a capital

of the Persian Empire, we have acquired some twenty-five thousand acres of good land, upon which we are establishing an immense experimental plantation. You can gain some idea of its scale if I mention that the main irrigation canal—which is being constructed by a Dutch firm experienced in building dykes—is big enough to float canal boats. Nearby we are constructing a crushing mill and refinery geared to produce some thirty thousand tons a year of top-grade white sugar. As a fourth project we decided to distribute for regional development some of the electric power available from the Abadan refinery. So we built, from Abadan to Ahwaz, Iran's first modern cross-country high-voltage transmission line. That marked the beginning of an adequate power supply in the centre of the Khuzistan region. The fifth undertaking is the most spectacular of all. On the Dez River, near the town of Andimeshk (on the Trans-Iranian Railway north of Abadan), we are constructing one of the highest dams in the world. The Dez dam will be over six hundred feet tall, or two-thirds the height of the Eiffel Tower in Paris. It will be located in one of the most amazing canyons ever surveyed for the purpose; at the chosen site the sides are so deep, so straight, so parallel, and so close together that even matter-of-fact experts agree that God must have intended that man should build a dam there.

I remember an amusing comment made by the project's resident chief engineer, a big weather-beaten Swede. An important part of the work consists of drilling access tunnels along the solid rock of the cliff face, and for this purpose a rig called a jumbo is used. It consists of a heavy lorry on the back of which are mounted a battery of pneumatic drills which recalls a multiple anti-aircraft gun. The lorry is backed up against the working face of the tunnel, and all the drills are started.

As you can imagine, the din is terrific. When the chief engineer was asked where he recruited the men to run the drills on the jumbo, he pointed to some peaceful villages lying drowsily on the canyon floor far below. 'Right down there,' he said. Asked if the men were satisfied to work under such trying conditions, he smiled and replied, 'Yes, they like the noise!' The Dez is scheduled for completion towards the end of 1962, and we shall then fill the newly-created basin as though it were a giant bathtub. Flowing through turbines in an underground powerhouse, the water will ultimately generate 520,000 kilowatts of electricity. Stored water will at the same time eventually irrigate some 360,000 acres. Since the flow will be regulated, flood damage now averaging about a million dollars a year will be prevented. The Dez dam will be followed by a number of others on the Karun River, into which the Dez flows. Millions of kilowatts of energy are today being wasted in the upper tributaries of the Karun and in the main stream itself. Possible dam sites have already been marked by ground and aerial survey, and preliminary geological tests on several have been made. Little doubt remains as to the potentialities of the area. Tremendous energy resources are characteristic of Khuzistan. Perhaps nowhere else in the world is there such a generous combination of potential hydroelectric power, reserves of oil and gas and other mineral resources, and rich agricultural possibilities. Naturally it will take many years fully to develop all these, and I can only hope that I shall live to see these hopes materialize. Since I am forty-one as these lines are written, perhaps I shall. I recall what happened at one of Winston Churchill's birthday celebrations after he had passed the ripe age of eighty. A youthful photographer, having taken Sir Winston's picture, said that he hoped he would be privileged to do the same thing again in each of the next

ten years. Sardonically eyeing the photographer, Churchill replied he saw no reason why not; the young man looked in good health to him. But Khuzistan is not alone in possessing such wealth. Iran's mountain ranges offer many ideal sites for the construction of dams for irrigation, flood control, hydro-electric power, or combinations of these purposes. In hundreds of places throughout the country, the mountains rise abruptly to form steeply-walled canyons, so that most dams can be comparatively narrow and built as high as necessary for the required storage capacity. Nature herself has in effect already largely constructed the dams and the reservoirs behind them; it only remains for man to complete the job. However, since to the casual observer most of Iran looks so arid (it is only in the Caspian area that we enjoy really copious rainfall), people abroad may wonder if in our zest for dam-building we may not resemble a man with extensive wine-cellars and nothing to put in them. For example, I could not restrain my amusement when an American magazine article criticized our Karaj dam project as a wasteful, expensive way to generate electric power that could be produced more economically by a steam plant. The article missed by a mile the main point, which is to supply water for our mushrooming capital city lying only about thirty-five miles away. The article suggested that in summer the Karaj River is a mere trickle, and that building a dam across it was therefore a waste of time and money. Its author should have seen a friend of mine try to swim across the Karaj River in the driest part of the year. The current was so strong that he was swept quite a distance downstream before he succeeded in reaching the opposite shore. Where it flows near Teheran, the Karaj River is never a trickle, but even if it were, that is beside the essential point. Great quantities of mountain snow feed the Karaj

and most of our other rivers, even in the hot southern parts of the country. In the spring those snows melt and for a few weeks make raging torrents of the rivers, in which men and animals often perish while trying to make a crossing. Most of the great volume of water carried in springtime by each river is wasted; in fact it is worse than wasted, because it regularly causes extensive flood damage as well as loss of life. The aridity of our plains sets up a vicious circle; on the one hand the lack of vegetation makes the water run off all the faster, thus causing further erosion, and on the other hand we need to hold the precious water so that we may have vegetation. We break that circle by building dams which store the mountain water, apportion it throughout the year, prevent floods, and into the bargain generate power. Pouring of concrete for the Karaj dam started in late 1958, when, for luck, I threw coins into the first bucket. We expect the work on this 550-foot-high dam to be finished towards the end of 1961. The stored water will be reserved primarily for Teheran's water-supply system; but before it serves that purpose, it will turn generators eventually producing 120,000 kilowatts. Later we plan to build additional dams on the Karaj River. Construction has also started on the Sefid Roud Dam near the city of Resht. This will be over 300 feet high and will irrigate as much as 450,000 acres when connecting irrigation canals have been built. It will also generate about 64,000 kilowatts of electrical energy. Several smaller dams have already been completed. In mid-1957, work was finished on one across the Bampour River, west of Iranshahr, which irrigates some 3,700 acres. In Sistan province, near the Pakistan and Afghanistan borders, we have built two dams which together irrigate some 50,000 acres. A system of small dams and canals in north-eastern Azerbaijan irrigates about 45,000 acres. A

dam near Golpayegan, in west-central Iran, irrigates about 5,000 acres. Surveys are under way on a number of other large and small schemes. Even more important to Persia's development than her multipurpose dams are modern means of transport and communications. Recently we have entered a challenging new period of railroad pioneering. I have already mentioned that before my father's reign Iran possessed virtually no railways, and that he and his engineers overcame many tough problems to construct the north-south Trans-Iranian line. Of course that merely marked the beginning of an adequate railway system for Iran; for most of the world's developed countries rely on their railways for hauling the biggest share of their bulk freight. Nineteen fifty-seven and 1958 were years to remember in Iran's railway development, for it was then that two major new lines were completed. One of them runs from Teheran to Tabriz in northwestern Iran, a distance of some 400 miles, the other from the capital to the north-eastern Iranian city of Meshed, about 560 miles away. I take after my father in my enthusiasm for railways, and I must say that the economic and cultural importance of these new lines has been tremendous. My country has been bound together as never before. I can illustrate this by an experience of a former Minister of the Interior. When in office he had tried very hard, but with not too much success, to bring down the retail prices of staple foods such as potatoes, cabbages, and onions. Recently, after the new railway lines had been finished, he happened to notice, while walking by a Teheran grocery store, that the prices of these foods had dropped to well below the levels prevailing when he was in office. He asked the store manager why this was so. 'The reason is obvious,' said the manager. 'The new railwaylines have done it.' Food and other items can now be brought to the capital from much

greater distances, arriving not only faster but more economically than ever before. Even more important is the added mobility which the new railways have given the common man. On the Teheran-Meshed route, for instance, the railway authorities had planned one express train and one local train daily. But thousands besieged the ticket offices, and additional trains had to be laid on. I find it inspiring that so many people who had never before been to our great capital city are now able to come, and that so many Teheran citizens can become acquainted with the rich culture of our provincial centres, which are the real heart of my country. Oddly enough Isfahan, Iran's principal industrial city, still has no railway connexions with the rest of the country. We have therefore started construction on a new line which will reach Isfahan and eventually push on southward to Shiraz. Here again one finds momentous economic implications. And culturally it will be a marvellous thing for Isfahan and Shiraz, each with its own rich and ancient heritage, to be joined by links of steel to the rest of the country. To illustrate the pace of our railway development, we recently purchased 850,000 concrete railway sleepers, put into service 400 new goods wagons and ordered nearly 1,000 more. To speed the mails we put fifteen railway post-office cars into service, and on the entire rail network we have been modernizing the signalling systems for faster, safer travel. Iran is the first country in the Middle East to have entirely replaced her main-line steam locomotives with modern diesel engines to allow quicker, more efficient service. I feel a sentimental attachment for the old steam locomotives which have pulled so many hundreds of trains over tough mountain grades in Iran, but they are now for sale to the highest bidder. The new diesels, like many of the old engines, were built in America. Incidentally, I am told that, of the

diesel engines used by the Americans here during the Second World War, a number are now in service in Alaska, where one may still see their Persian markings. We are also developing international rail links. In 1958 we finished rebuilding the line from Tabriz to Julfa on the Russian frontier; an old Russian-built wide-gauge line had existed there, and we modernized it and converted it to the gauge of 4 feet 8.5 inches which is standard in most parts of the world. Our goods can now be reloaded into Russian wagons at Julfa and, with another reloading, reach Western Europe; there is also a passenger service. We are working on two additional schemes for promoting international rail traffic. For years one has been able to board the famous Orient Express at Istanbul and travel straight through to Victoria Station, London. Only some 210 miles now separate the Iranian and Turkish rail systems, and we and our Turkish friends plan to close that gap. Then, for the first time, you will be able to drive down to Teheran's big main-line station, which my father constructed, and board an express for Paris and London. The possibilities are of course even more exciting for freight than for passengers. Goods from Europe, instead of coming by ship through the Suez Canal, around the Arabian Peninsula, and up the Persian Gulf to our southern ports, can then go direct by rail. The second scheme will provide a connexion with the Indian subcontinent. Already a line runs from Zahedan, in south-eastern Iran, to Pakistan, and in a few years we shall have completed a line from Teheran to Zahedan. You will then be able to travel by rail from, let us say, Calcutta to Karachi, Teheran, Istanbul, Paris, and London. Freight can be carried to and from any points over this long route with its many branches. I have mentioned the spectacular increase in the traffic carried by our airlines. Since I am a pilot, perhaps my

pleasure in our progress in civil air transport may be forgiven. Our foreign air advisers tell me that our principal airline may within the next five years triple the length of its routes and double its staff. So often have I been told that our big Teheran international airport is among the world's most beautiful that I am beginning to believe it; I must admit that in my travels I have never seen a handsomer one. Instead of four international airlines, as on its completion in 1958, there are now twenty using it, and although it already handles the biggest jet transports, we are expanding it to take the still larger planes of the future. The international airport at Abadan, in operation for some years now, is also being much enlarged, as are four of our main domestic airports—at Isfahan, Shiraz, Yezd, and Kermanshah—and a number of smaller ones.

Because of Persia's steadily growing economy and her rich historical and cultural attractions, more and more businessmen, scholars, and tourists are coming to Iran. The expanding air network will enable these welcome visitors, as well as my own people, to reach every part of the country. Since Iran has thousands of widely-dispersed towns and villages, and since at most of them it would never be economic to build conventional airports, there may be a big future here for the new vertical take-off airliners. These planes, which can rise like a helicopter but fly like an ordinary propeller-driven plane, have already proved their ability to operate on regular services without the need of any orthodox airfields. In our enthusiasm for the air we have not forgotten the sea. We have big port expansion projects on the Persian Gulf at Khorramshahr, Bandar Shapur, Bushire, and Bandar Abbas, and also on the Caspian at Bandar Pahlavi. From almost the beginning of our history we have been seafarers; but in recent decades

we have neglected our merchant marine. While ships of all nations are welcome at our ports, and most of our imports and exports are carried in foreign botttoms, we do not want to be entirely dependent upon other people's ships for our ocean commerce. Accordingly, in 1954, I fostered the establishment of the Iranian National Shipping Company. The company has so far taken delivery of two 32,000-ton oil tankers and two small passenger-cargo vessels, all built to its order in Holland. To secure the necessary officers and crew to man them we have sent young Iranians to Holland for training in modern seamanship. On our through roads you can see some of the biggest tanker and dry-cargo diesel lorries in the world. Driven by redoubtable fellows, they carry enormous loads across mountains and deserts. As our railway system develops, many of these lorries can be diverted to newly built routes. We have some 15,000 miles of roads and 100,000 motor vehicles in Iran—nowhere near enough of either for a country of this size. Although Persia's rugged terrain makes highway-building a slow and costly business, we are rapidly mechanizing both construction and maintenance methods. To supplement our railway and highway systems, we have been building oil pipelines, and recently we completed ahead of schedule one running nearly 600 miles from Ahwaz to Teheran. The pipeline itself is underground, but in crossing remote deserts and mountains, you may come upon its pumping stations, control points, and the radio communication towers; and to find these man-made structures in such out-of-the-way places is to be reminded of the footprints that Robinson Crusoe saw in the sand. It can carry up to two million tons of petroleum products a year, as much as many hundreds of lorries or railway tank cars could move. To this main pipeline we have added a number of branches, including

one to highly-industrialized Isfahan; and we are building others to Resht and to Meshed. To facilitate the international movement of our oil, we have signed an agreement with Turkey to build a 1,300-mile pipeline, to cost some 180 million or $500 million, from our Qum and Sarajeh oilfields (not far south of Teheran) to a Turkish Mediterranean port. This plan depends on our finding adequate commercial quantities of oil at those promising fields. Then, with the pipeline completed, it would be possible to load directly the new super-tankers that are too big to pass through the Suez Canal and now have to go round the Cape in order to carry Persian oil to Europe or North America. The pipeline could save most of the cost of transporting oil from here to the Mediterranean. In a newly developing country such as Iran, you have to achieve fast changes in the cultural as well as the physical environment; this makes telecommunications especially important. In 1957 there were only about 50,000 telephones in the entire country; but we bought 180,000 more and have been rapidly installing them. I have spoken of the expanding radio-telephone system which will eventually blanket the whole of Iran and supplement our thousands of miles of telegraph and telephone lines. We use many teleprinters, most of them operated by Persian girls. We now have radio-telephone and radio-telegraph links with Pakistan, Europe, and America via Europe. With our CENTO partners we are building an international microwave communications system that will carry up to 120 simultaneous messages between Ankara, Teheran, and Karachi. In the past few years we have inaugurated telephoto services, for transmitting pictures and facsimiles of documents, with Britain and Japan. For internal radio broadcasting we operate numerous transmitters in Teheran and the provinces. In 1958 I inaugurated a powerful new

transmitter for international broadcasts, and our short-wave broadcasts can now be heard in most countries. We are planning another highpowered short-wave transmitter and four more medium-wave ones. Again in 1958 I dedicated Iran's first television broadcasting stations, which serves the Teheran area. We now have two television stations in Teheran and one in Abadan, and we are planning others. I look forward to the day when many of our villages will have at least one community television receiver. In a later chapter I shall discuss Iran's rapidly changing pattern of agriculture; our industry and trade are also growing fast. I have described how, chiefly through Government initiative, my father expanded Iranian industry. Because of the shortage of technicians and managers and because private investors were timid about entering the industrial field, the Government had to do much of the pioneering. This was true in my father's time, and in some fields it is still the case today. For example, only the Government can launch Iran's new steel industry. The Government owns and operates industrial enterprises in many parts of the country, and I shall mention only the more important. For instance, cement is vital for national development, and recently we have opened two new Government plants with a combined capacity of more than 300,000 tons a year of finished cement. These factories have more than quadrupled the national output as compared with 1954, thus reducing expensive imports; and at the same time private production is increasing. In other factories the Government makes firebrick and fire-clay, which in turn serve other private and public industries.

Iran's total annual consumption of textiles runs about 325 million yards or, to visualize it better, over 20,000 miles. Of this total we have been importing about half. The Government operates a number of

large plants for making cotton and woollen textiles, others are under construction, and we are extending loans to private interests to enlarge their plants and build new ones. This expansion programme will reward us with a one-third increase in total textile output by 1961. As an aid to the farmer and to textile production, the Government operates cotton gins in many parts of Iran, and more are under construction. Other Government factories produce silk textiles (the march of science is such that we may soon convert to synthetics), jute bags, thread, and rope. The Government also operates a copper refinery and several plants for making hydrochloric acid and other heavy industrial chemicals; produces in its factories vegetable oil for food and for soap-making, and oil-cake used as a highly nutritious cattle food; and runs large soap factories whose products you can find on sale in towns and villages all over Iran. In a number of agricultural centres Government-operated factories turn out canned meat, fish, fruits, and other foods, and the Government has built two sorting and packing plants for dried fruit for the home and export market. In the Caspian region the Government runs about two dozen tea factories, most of them constructed during the past five years. The Government buys all its tea leaves from private growers, and it is helping them to improve the quality of their crops. Persian tea is already well established in foreign markets. As you travel about my country you will find over a dozen large Government-owned sugar factories, mostly processing beet: the beet seed is given free to each participating farmer, mobile teams are sent out to spray his fields with insecticide, and the harvested crop is bought and transported to the mill. The Government operates a very lucrative tobacco industry, practically doubled in capacity through a big plant expansion

completed in 1960. Every working day we now turn out about fifty million cigarettes—enough to keep even quite a few chain-smokers busy—plus about ten tons of pipe tobacco. In any Persian village you can see farmers smoking inexpensive cigarettes from our Government factories. Lately we have followed the Western trend by starting the manufacture of filter-tip cigarettes packed in crush-proof boxes. We do a brisk export trade in cigarettes, and now we are opening up a new market by embellishing the boxes with lavish Arabian scenes and sending them to the Persian Gulf sheikdoms. We, along with most Westerners, rely heavily upon wheat and other grains for food, and we have been taking steps to assure ample reserve grain supplies at all times. In Teheran, Ahwaz, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Meshed, Shiraz, Tabriz, and other centres we have large mechanized grain elevators, and we are building more. The Government railways operate a factory that prepares wooden sleepers by the hundreds of thousands, and, as I have said, we are starting to make them of concrete also. Earlier I explained my father's determination that our armed forces should not have to rely entirely upon imported munitions, so it is natural that we produce rifles, light machine-guns, and ammunition. A few miles west of Teheran, in as beautiful a setting as a university, is the Government-owned Razi Institute, named after one of our great scientists who died in AD 1209. Here large quantities of vaccines and other biologicals for use against both human and animal diseases are produced, biological research and testing is carried on, and one of the best medical libraries in Iran is maintained. In a typical year the institute manufactures about forty million doses for treating a wide variety of diseases. Our Government-affiliated Pasteur Institute—which, with the Razi Institute, was established in my father's time—carries on

a somewhat similar programme. The two organizations are known for their original research and their high scientific standards, and together they make Iran almost self-sufficient in biologicals. Later in this book I shall describe the steps my Government is taking in the field of petroleum science and technology. Another milestone in the fostering of scientific and industrial research in Iran was the creation of our national Bureau of Standards, which I opened in 1959. Initially it is concentrating upon developing standards and quality controls for our export products. Unfortunately a few short-sighted Persian exporters have tarnished the reputation of our products by sending abroad carpets with cheap synthetic dyes, packages of dried fruits containing foreign objects, and bales of cotton artificially weighted with bricks and stones. We intend to put a stop to that and to see to it that foreign buyers of our products smile rather than frown when they open their shipments. It is curious how many educated people, both at home and abroad, have remained unaware that we possess Government factories and research establishments such as I have just described. If you want to understand basic trends in the Middle East, certainly you should know what we Persians have been achieving in industry and science. But my account of Government enterprises should not give the impression that Iran lacks private industry; far from it. Yet here again I have found that many of our own people as well as the majority of those in other countries are ignorant of the range of minerals our private entrepreneurs already mine or products they already manufacture. No complete mining or factory census has yet been taken, but it is estimated that over sixty per cent of our industry, covering a wide variety of fields, is in private hands. Such concerns are extracting at least the following minerals from our mines:

antimony
arsenic
bauxite
chromite
coal
silica
sulphur
cobalt
copper
graphite
iron oxide
kaolin
tin
tungsten lead
magnesium
manganese
quartz
salt
turquoise
zinc

And among the great many products of our privately-owned factories the following are representative:

alcoholic drinks
animal food
batteries
bricks
canned food
cement
chemicals
chrome plating
clothing
cooking stoves
dried fruit
drugs
electric motors
electric power
fibre-board
glass
glue
ice
industrial alcohol
ink
leather
lumber
matches
metal castings
metal furniture
milled flour
milled rice
nails
neon lights
nuts and bolts
office equipment
oxygen gas
paint
paper
plastic goods
pumps
rubber goods
safes
shoe polish
soap
soft drinks
space heaters
sugar
tea
textiles
tiles
vegetable oil
water heaters
wooden furniture

To take a single example of such initiative, that I am particularly

pleased that two companies now operate well-equipped plants for turning out modern steel filing cabinets and other office equipment and furniture. Up-to-date office equipment is so important to economic progress that sometimes I think one index of a country's stage of development is whether, as in our case, it makes such equipment itself. The managing director of one of these concerns started out some years ago with a hammer in his hand, as the lowest grade of metal-worker. To me he represents Iran's rising middle class, upon which our advancement so largely depends. Incidentally, his company also makes heavy safes for banks and offices. One day he pointed out that so far none of his safes had been broken into, and he added with a grin that Iran is not yet sufficiently Westernized to have skilled safebreakers. The foregoing lists are I think impressive, and for two reasons the proportion of private industries and mines to the total will be increasing.

In the first place, it is our policy gradually to hand over the Government's existing factories to private concerns. Accordingly we have employed an American management consulting firm to study the factories, suggest all necessary improvements in efficiency, and advise on preparing them for sale to private interests. In the second place, we are taking vigorous steps to encourage domestic and foreign capital to establish new industrial and commercial enterprises. Our Constitution and subsidiary laws clearly set forth our industrial policy. With regard to minerals the Constitution and our recently revised Mining Law serve the public interest by regulating exploitation. The Mining Law divides all minerals into three classes. The first includes limestone, marble, building stone, and gypsum. Where these are found on privately owned land, the proprietors may exploit them by paying

the Government a royalty of five per cent of the value of the quantity mined or quarried. The second class includes most metallic minerals, solid fuels, salts, and precious minerals and gemstones. Here the owner of the land must obtain a licence for survey and exploitation and must pay the Government four per cent of the value. The third class includes petroleum and radioactive materials such as uranium. Here the Government reserves sole primary right of exploitation regardless of the ownership of the land; however, the Government may lease such deposits to private interests. Private groups may exploit mineral deposits if they obtain official approval, but in the case of foreign concerns Parliament must ratify the arrangements. The opportunities are I think well illustrated by our new agreements with American and other oil companies, to be described later. In other branches of industry, the Government again sets certain limits but leaves a wide field for private initiative. Such basic industries as the railways, the telephone and telegraph systems, radio broadcasting, and munitions manufacture are solely Government-operated, but private concerns manage, although they do not own, a large part of our giant oil-refining industry, and own and operate most of our road haulage. A flourishing private airline runs side by side with our quasi-public Iranian National Airways, and private companies produce many of our films. In 1955, Parliament passed, and I signed, a bill for attracting and protecting foreign private capital. It stipulates that foreigners who invest money in Iranian enterprises may take out reasonable profits, and later withdraw their investment in their own currency, and it provides for just compensation in the unlikely event of nationalization. In 1957, American investors received added encouragement when we signed an agreement with their Government guaranteeing

private American capital investments in Iran. Both the Americans and others have increasingly shown, by deeds as well as words, that they consider it profitable to invest in this expanding economy. Our own investors are also showing a growing keenness to put money into our mines and manufactures. Here our industrial loan programme has provided a powerful stimulus. Iran has a tradition, which in general I applaud, of conservative public finance. Our currency has usually had much more backing (including not only gold bullion and other conventional security but also the Crown jewels) than was actually required. In 1957 I had the idea of promoting development by revaluing our monetary reserves, and a law was passed to this effect. The revaluation showed an appreciation of about £36 million or $100 million, and I decided that we should devote half this amount to promoting industrialization and half to agricultural development. Some of my advisers feared such a move might prove inflationary; but I pointed out to them that while it would certainly be so to pour thousands of millions of rials into unproductive purposes such as land speculation, putting money into early-maturing projects to increase industrial or agricultural production would powerfully counteract such a tendency. The industrial loan programme was launched in the latter part of 1957, and already it has yielded striking results. With its help, Iranian private investors have poured their own funds into the creation of a variety of new mining and manufacturing enterprises. A great deal of money formerly tied up in useless land speculation has now shifted to productive industrial purposes. Capital formerly sent abroad has now in many instances returned to play a useful role at home. Industrial interest rates, which had previously reached such exorbitant levels as 24 per cent per annum or even more, have under

the influence of the Government's yardstick action now dropped tremendously. Foreign investors have been encouraged to join hands with Iranians to pioneer new industrial projects in Iran. The Ministry of Industries and Mines and the National Bank of Iran (Bank Melli Iran) together administer the industrial loan programme. The Ministry investigates the technical feasibility of proposed projects while the National Bank checks the credit of the applicants. Apart from the latter's personal and business qualifications, the main tests for each project are whether it will increase production in a needed sector and whether it will expand national income. With these criteria in mind the High Economic Council—which in Iran is the top authority for co-ordinating economic development—reviews each proposal. As proof of their serious intentions private investors are required to put up at least 30 per cent of the cost of each project, a further 50 per cent may be advanced by the Ministry of Industries and Mines, and the remainder is often borrowed by the applicants from other sources. Thus with a comparatively small investment they are enabled to start an important industrial project, gaining confidence from Government backing, yet knowing that the Government will not interfere in management. The loan is repaid in instalments as construction on the work progresses, and a Government inspection precedes each repayment; but this helps private enterprise just as much as it safeguards the Government's interest. For the first five years the new industries are completely tax-exempt and on their necessary imports they pay no customs duties. Interest on our Government industrial loans is no more than 4 to 6 per cent per annum. We charge 4 per cent for projects in such major industries as textiles and sugar and for all mining projects, and in other cases the rate is 6 per cent. I am determined

that exorbitant interest rates will never again strangle our economy by enriching the parasitic type of investor at the expense of those with the spirit of productive enterprise. In its first year the loan programme was instrumental in starting some 150 new industrial projects in textiles, sugar, construction materials, chemicals, food processing, plastics, paper and fibre-board, general manufacturing, and mining. Although construction of some of the aided plants had started earlier with money from other sources, it is significant that fifteen of the plants went into actual production within the first year. Among the products flowing to the market from the new plants were: shrimps, vegetable oil, cotton textiles, cotton yarn, penicillin, other drugs, fabricated aluminium, cast-iron pipe, concrete blocks, ice, and mineral ores. And in each successive year the programme has contributed further to the building of my country. Our new industrial pioneers are showing again that Persians can not only adapt and adopt the techniques of the West; they can do it with dispatch. In this chapter I have barely sketched the panorama of dynamic development in my country today. Visitors from overseas can sometimes appreciate what is happening better than we, because they see us more objectively than we see ourselves. Experienced observers often tell me that in few other countries of the world can one find such an amazing tempo of physical and cultural change. When they return to Persia after an absence of say five years, or even only two years, they are astounded at the differences. Their exclamations are no mere flattery; from my travels abroad I think I can confirm what they say. Especially in a country with such venerable traditions as ours, rapid change naturally brings its strains and stresses. These are the price we must pay for Westernization and modernization. But I do not propose that we

abandon our great heritage. On the contrary, I have every confidence that we can enrich it. Religion and philosophy, art and literature, science and craftsmanship—all will prosper more as we develop our economy so that the common people of this ancient land can enjoy all the essentials of life. Instead of the few flourishing at the expense of the many, they will do so with the many. Selective and judicious Westernization can help us towards the goal of democracy and shared prosperity; that is why I refer to it as our welcome ordeal.

Chapter 8

Democracy as I See It

The story is told that in a European town behind the Iron Curtain, a group of university students was listening to a lecture by a well known professor of physics on the possibilities of space travel. Within a few years, the professor was saying, missiles would be landing intact on the moon, and not long after that men would be travelling to distant planets. 'But what I want to know,' one student interjected, 'is when we can travel to Vienna.' It is no accident that year after year thousands of people have fled from Communist East Germany through the Iron Curtain to free West Germany. They have known what freedom means, and have been prepared to risk life and limb, as well as all their property, to gain it. Prominent among these fugitives have been intellectuals and professional people who had keenly felt the denial of freedom. Men could have 'fled' from West Germany to Communist East Germany had they wished to, but virtually none has done so. Any of my readers can think of other examples in Europe where people have risked all to cross the heavily guarded borders and gain freedom. Again, hundreds of thousands have fled from Communist

China through Hong Kong or the Portuguese colony of Macao on the China coast or by other routes; almost no one has shown any desire to 'escape' from the Free World to Communist China. Through much painful experience men have found that genuine individual freedom can be attained only through the democratic system, which allows ordinary people actually to control the society in which they live. But some people have perverted the word 'democracy'; for example, by 'democracy' they may mean a so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. In examining any dictatorship, there are two good tests. Firstly, what is the relation between the rulers and the proletariat or common people? Are the rulers members of the proletariat, as they would have you believe? Do they even identify their interests with those of ordinary citizens? The truth seems to be that, no matter where you find them, the so-called proletarian dictatorships are actually controlled by a small elite who ordinarily lose little sleep worrying about the rights of the common man. Secondly, have the proletariat any effective say in what the rulers do? In the proletarian dictatorships I am familiar with, ordinary people enjoy little or no control over their Government or over their own lives and futures. Communist dictators resemble Fascist ones in that they enjoy holding elections. They hope to give the ordinary working man the idea that he has a voice in the Government of his country. But the Communist rulers allow only one political party; anybody who tries to start another, or who speaks against the ruling party, is likely to be liquidated. In the elections (if you can call them by that name), the voter has no choice, for the only candidates listed are those of the ruling party. Purely as a matter of form, the citizen is urged or ordered to go and vote; the authorities then triumphantly announce that, let us say, 99.9 per cent of the votes

cast were for the ruling party. I wonder how many intelligent people are fooled by that sort of thing. In former times, free men thought of democracy as something primarily political. Thus John Locke, the great seventeenth-century exponent of the rights of the individual, wrote chiefly about political rights. The eighteenth-century American Declaration of Independence also stressed the political rights of the common man. In those days, men thought that if they were politically free and equal, then through individual initiative they could meet their economic and social needs. That view made sense at a time when technology and economic organization were comparatively simple. The family was the main unit of production, and families with their own hands produced most of what they needed. But then modern science and technology changed the way men lived and worked. Big factories were established, and even on the land large investments in agricultural machinery became necessary or at any rate made possible more efficient output. The ordinary man seemed to be losing control over his economic activities. So I think he was fully justified when lie began to demand guarantees of economic as well as political rights. Science transformed not only the conditions of living and producing things but also the ways in which ideas were spread. The telegraph, the railway, the daily newspaper, the telephone, radio, the automobile, air mail and air travel, and the cinema—these were among the scientific innovations that linked the minds of men living continents apart. For the first time in human history, it became possible quickly to communicate powerful ideas and emotions to millions of people who had never heard of them before. As might have been foreseen, the process meant that new social tensions often replaced former stable relationships. Earlier, poverty and well-being might exist side by

side for centuries without causing much consternation. But with the new communications, knowledge of plenty at one end of the world and want at the other soon created tensions and deep resentments. Men in poor countries envied the prosperity and well-being of their 'neighbours' thousands of miles away. Hundreds of millions of people acquired new desires and new levels of expectation that bore little relationship to their immediate surroundings. Admittedly the growing impatience of the common man was dangerous, but it was also hopeful. Thoughtful people realized that political freedom would mean little where men continued to live in dire economic want. Citizens of rich countries recognized that, for their own good as well as for reasons of altruism, they must share their bounty with their neighbours. They saw that gifts of food and clothing offered no more than a temporary answer; people of the economically less-developed countries wanted to be helped to help themselves. In short, the less-developed countries wanted to learn the secrets of the new science and technology which alone could enable them to raise living standards to a decent level. The United States of America took a bold and far-reaching step when President Truman first proposed the world-wide programme of technical assistance that came to be known as Point Four. I have already mentioned that Iran was the first country to benefit from Point Four aid. The United Nations launched a similar large-scale technical assistance programme, and the British Commonwealth inaugurated the Colombo Plan. Later I shall describe what Point Four, United Nations, and other kinds of foreign aid have meant to my country. But then a painful new lesson had to be learned. Experience in the past few years has shown that political stability doesn't necessarily follow economic development.

Paradoxically, static and undeveloped societies—some of the South Sea islands, for instance—may show much more political stability than do those which are achieving rapid economic advance. On the other hand we all know of certain Middle Eastern countries that have shown remarkable economic progress in recent years, but nevertheless have experienced grave political difficulties. They have had no political programmes comparable with their plans for economic development. The lesson seems to be that planned political and economic evolution must go hand in hand or serious trouble will ensue. Fortunately, however, democracy is not without roots in Persia, and it is in harmony with the spirit of my country that we now have a planned programme of democratic development. For many centuries, and in fact until about fifty years ago, our formal system of government was that of an autocratic state. But at the same time our society in significant ways demonstrated the democratic virtues of tolerance and respect for the individual. For example, wherever Cyrus the Great conquered, he would pardon the very people who had fought him, treat them well, and keep them in their former posts. Even high administrators were often drawn from among the former enemy. Refusing to use these officials as puppets, our king would delegate real responsibility to them and at the same time encourage them to maintain their people's cultural and religious traditions. While Iran at that time knew nothing of democratic political institutions, Cyrus nevertheless demonstrated some of the qualities which provide the strength of the great modern democracies. I have already said that many of our great kings, soldiers, and statesmen arose from humble origins, and that we Persians have never tolerated rigid systems of class or caste. Our society has always been sufficiently open and flexible for men of hum-

blest backgrounds to be able to aspire to positions of leadership. They might face severe economic and educational handicaps, but at least our political and social structure never relegated them permanently to the bottom rung of the ladder. One has always been able to find a sort of elemental democratic spirit in Persia. I find it hard to put into words, yet it is very real. We Persians are individualists, and each of us generally senses and takes account of the individuality of his fellows. For example, a servant will consider himself almost a member of the family, and you are likely to reciprocate this feeling. He will discuss things with you and even have friendly arguments with you about the way you are running your house or your land. Persians have for long taken that as normal and natural. But, as I have said, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that Persia began in earnest to develop democratic political institutions. Our revolution of 1906 retained the ancient tradition of the Persian monarchy but modified it in keeping with what had become a world-wide trend towards representative government. While at the time of the revolution most of the people of Persia had little if any conception of the meaning of representative government, they were desirous of a change from the tired Qajar dynasty and clamoured for something new. The common people realized that the Qajars of that period were largely devoid of any feeling of moral responsibility for the Persian people or for the welfare of the country, which had been reduced to the status of a puppet of foreign powers, and especially of Russia. Many ordinary people had become the victims of arbitrariness and excess, and they welcomed the revolution of 1906 because it placed a check upon the autocracy of the Qajars. However, the leaders of our revolution, who were mostly educated men, had broader reasons

for backing the revolt. They wanted to liberalize and Westernize our political system. They knew that only in this way could Persia maintain her independence and prosper economically and socially. Most of the Persian revolutionists believed that political Westernization could be harmonized with the principles of Islam. For instance, one of the greatest contributors to our revolution was Sayid (an honorific term meaning descendant of the Prophet) Jamal ed-Din, a staunch pan-Islamist. He stressed the possibility of infusing the liberal, democratic, and nationalist concepts of the West into the philosophical framework of Islam without compromising such basic ideas of our religion as the unity of Church and State. Some of the greatest pioneers among the constitutionalists were progressive Persian clergymen such as Sayid Behbehani and Sayid Tabatabai, who denounced tyranny from the pulpit. But when it came time for the victorious revolutionaries to agree upon a constitution, quarrels broke out among them. The ideals of patriotism, democracy, tolerance, the rule of law, and personal freedom had sounded glorious as abstract principles placed in opposition to the tyranny, corruption, laziness, and treachery of the pre-revolutionary regime. But the high ideals, when translated into specific clauses for incorporation into the constitution, appeared to a few ultra-conservative clergymen as blasphemous and as a threat to the exalted position of Islam in Iranian society. But the merchants, students, intellectuals, and other backers of the constitution won their case. In October 1906 the first meeting of the new National Assembly convened in the presence of the Shah. It was the National Assembly itself winch, through a committee of its members, drew up our Constitution of 1906. MuzafFar ed-Din Shah then ratified and signed the Constitution. We Persians had taken a great step forward.

For the first time in our history, we had blended the Western principle of parliamentary democracy with the Persian monarchical tradition. I have already spoken of the unsuccessful Russian-supported attempts of Mohammed Ali Shah, Muzaffar ed-Din's son, to destroy the Constitution. Some of the ultra-conservative clergymen continued to oppose our democratic reforms, and the constitutionalists themselves split into quarrelling factions. Worst of all was the incompetence, slothfulness, extravagance, and lack of dedication of the Qajar rulers themselves, and their subservience to foreign influence. As the country steadily deteriorated, it was my father who finally took action. As Prime Minister and then as founder of the new Pahlavi dynasty, he tended, as I have said, to subordinate the role of Parliament; but in other ways he contributed greatly to the total cause of democracy in Iran. For the first time he established in my country a working compromise between Church and State that was appropriate to modern conditions of life. My father did not dispossess the clergy; on the contrary, under him Iran remained an Islamic state, as our Constitution provides. But, again in harmony with the Constitution, Reza Shah saw to it that the clergy turned over their former judicial role to the Government. Likewise under my father the Government took over from the clergy the bulk of the job of educating our citizens, and conservative clergymen were persuaded to give up their former opposition to the emancipation of women. My father made the clergy confine themselves primarily to religious matters which, by definition, constituted their basic function.

Reza Shah also fostered democracy through administrative reform. In pre-revolutionary days, the monarch was aided by his Grand Vizier or chief minister, who spent most of the time sitting on cush-

ions at His Majesty's feet. The Grand Vizier was likely to be a great flatterer, and if the king asked after the state of the army, his Grand Vizier might assure him that the imperial armies could defeat the forces of all other nations combined; actually, however, there was no organized army worthy of the name, and the State relied mainly upon the tribes to defend the frontiers. The higher military posts, mainly honorific in nature, were hereditary; a newly born boy might carry the rank of major-general. Under the Grand Vizier were a few other ministers, such as those in charge of finance and foreign affairs. Nominally a minister would receive a salary; but when he was appointed, a ceremonial robe of office was bestowed upon him, and for this he had to give the king a present the value of which might exceed his salary. The ministry would be the minister's own home, and his cook might become his chief secretary. The minister also would commonly recruit the remainder of his staff from among his retinue of servants; one reason for this was that the ministry staff received no salary from the state, and the minister himself had to pay the salaries. The minister was also obliged to feed needy people at his home, and beggars, soothsayers, and other nondescript characters would each day turn up by the scores or hundreds to be served from the minister's necessarily large kitchens. The king appointed governors-general to administer the provinces and governors who separately administered the major cities. The office of governor-general or governor was often hereditary, or the king might sell the office to the highest bidder. A wealthy man might pay a great deal for such a post because, while he had to remit a stated amount of tax collections to Teheran, he could keep for his personal use any surplus he could collect. He would spend little or nothing for public works, which in later Qajar times were almost

unknown. The common aim of the provincial governor-general or the municipal governor was to extort all the taxes he could from the poor and to use most of his revenues for his own enjoyment and that of his retinue. Often special strong-arm squads would be organized to terrorize the common people and keep the revenues coming in. The governors-general and governors, along with their secretaries and scribes, were likely to end as owners of most of the lands in their areas. Needless to say, the whole system bred large-scale corruption; farmers, tradesmen, and landowners alike would bribe tax-collectors and strong-arm men in order to escape with a lighter tax levy or to retain ownership of whatever belongings they had. The Constitution of 1906 had little to say about administrative reform, but the legislature it created brought about certain improvements. French advisers mapped out a plan, accepted by the National Assembly and the Qajar king, for the creation of organized ministries housed in government offices. Upon the urgent recommendation of foreign powers whose loans to Persia were in default, Belgian customs officers started collecting revenues which had been slipping through the fingers, or into the pockets, of the previous collectors. The American Shuster mission began to organize the totally chaotic public treasury. But it remained for my father to set up the first efficient system of public administration that Iran had enjoyed for centuries. He extended unified control over the entire country, abolishing the municipal governorships and doing away with the arbitrary powers of the provincial governors-general. He centralized tax collection and forbade the old system of farming out taxes. He organized the ministries along well-defined functional lines, and created new ministries in the same likeness. He discharged and punished corrupt officials, and he sent honest ones (as well as

hundreds of students who aspired to the public service) abroad for training. Perhaps most important, he infused the entire public service with a sense of nation-building and of dynamic economic and social development. I have already described the amazing economic and social progress Reza Shah achieved. He freed my country from a centuries-old lethargy. He laid the indispensable foundations for the forward steps that my people, my Government, and I are taking now. My own thinking about democracy represents a further development of my father's philosophy. For example, largely because of the rapid spread of education in my country, I can give more emphasis to representative government than he did. Also I place much stress upon harnessing the fruits of modern science, which has not only shown new ways for helping ordinary people everywhere, but at the same time has given them the desire for its benefits. For example, science has shown men how to control malaria; in addition, through the media of films, radio, and demonstrations in classroom and clinic, science has made men want to control malaria, for the sake of their families and themselves. My programme of democracy involves making the best use of science. For convenience I define modern democracy—the kind we want in Iran—as consisting of three parts. First, there is political and administrative democracy. Second, there is economic democracy. Third, there is social democracy. I shall explain just what I mean by each. What about political democracy in Persia? Our Constitution is patterned after that of Belgium. It provides for constitutional government within the framework of our monarchical tradition. The Constitution of today consists of the original document of 1906 plus a number of amendments, the latest passed in 1957. The Constitution provides for a Parliament composed of a National Assembly or lower

house and a Senate or upper house. The National Assembly has 200 members called deputies (there is provision for more as our population increases), who sit for four-year terms; among them are a special deputy elected by the Jewish community, another by the Zoroastrians, another by the Assyrians, and two by the Armenians. I am proud that as a symbol of tolerance these minority groups actually enjoy proportionately more representation than does our population at large. The National Assembly's deputies are elected from the seventy-eight constituencies into which the entire country is divided. All male citizens twenty-one years of age or over may vote, with certain exceptions such as members of the royal family, military personnel, and convicted criminals. Of course a great many men do not vote, but with the spread of civic and other education the number of voters is steadily increasing. The Senate consists of sixty members, half representing Teheran and half the provinces. I nominate half of each group and the others are elected. Senators are initially elected or appointed for six years, but after the first three years half the members are eliminated by drawing lots. Replacements are then either elected or appointed. All bills must be approved by both houses of Parliament, except for those dealing with budgetary and tax matters, which are the province of the National Assembly. For any bill to become law, it must have my signature. Under the Constitution I have the power of vetoing financial bills by sending them back to the National Assembly for revision, but my veto can be over-ridden, for if three-quarters of the members present vote for passage of a returned bill, I am obliged to sign it. The Constitution also gives me power to dissolve either or both houses of Parliament; but I must state my reason for doing so (the Constitution says I may not give the same reason twice), and I

must immediately call for fresh elections so that the new chamber or chambers may convene within the space of three months.

The Prime Minister and his ministers constitute the Council of Ministers or Cabinet. In Iran all ministers except the Minister of the Imperial Court are members of the Cabinet. The Cabinet supervises the running of the Government; in fact, following the terminology in most parliamentary countries, it is the Government. But unlike the situation in most of the English-speaking parliamentary democracies, neither the Prime Minister nor any of his ministers is a member of Parliament. Yet the Prime Minister and all other ministers are individually and jointly responsible to both houses of Parliament, which frequently call upon them to appear and answer questions. In addition to its executive task, the Council of Ministers issues subsidiary decrees which must be compatible with statutory law. These resemble executive orders as issued by the President in America or orders-in-council as promulgated by the Privy Council in Britain. The Government operates through the office of the Prime Minister and the following ministries: Agriculture; Commerce; Customs and Monopolies; Education; Finance; Foreign Affairs; Health; Industries and Mines; Interior; Justice; Labour; Post, Telephone, and Telegraph; Roads; and War. A number of the ministries have semi-independent agencies under them; for example, the Community Development Organization is under the Ministry of the Interior, the Tobacco Monopoly is under the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies, and the University of Teheran is under the Ministry of Education. In addition there are some more or less autonomous agencies, such as the Plan Organization, winch do not fall within the jurisdiction of any ministry but are nevertheless under the Government's general supervision. The Gov-

ernment administers the provinces mainly through the Ministry of the Interior, but other ministries have also set up offices in the provincial capitals. Iran's judicial system is inspired chiefly by that of France. Before my father's time, the priests held almost all legal functions in their own hands. Reza Shah completely revolutionized Iran's concept of jurisprudence, and some experts maintain that our Westernization programme has taken longer and faster steps in the legal field than in any other. Relieving the priests of nearly all their judicial powers, my father issued modern civil, criminal, and commercial codes, and codes of civil and criminal procedure. He also established a complete hierarchy of courts. Today the lowest general court is the justice of the peace in small towns and groups of villages, with jurisdiction over all petty cases and misdemeanours. In larger towns the district court is the court of first instance. Then come the courts of appeal, or courts of second instance, winch are located in the larger cities. At the top is the Court of Cassation or Supreme Court, which (except for rare cases involving the impeachment of ministers) hears only appeal cases. There are also special administrative, commercial, and military courts. Our Constitution also gives the Crown a number of prerogatives in addition to the dissolution and veto powers already mentioned. As King I appoint the Prime Minister. I also appoint the other ministers, usually with his advice; likewise I sign the decrees appointing governors-general, higher judges, ambassadors, military officers, and certain other officials. I serve as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, both declaring war and concluding peace. I foster the country's general development along the lines described in this book. Perhaps most important, as King I promote Persia's unity and solidarity. It was twenty-five hundred years ago that Cyrus the Great established

the first unified Persian nation and empire, and ever since then the monarchy has helped to bind us together. I am now encouraging the growth of an important political institution that is comparatively new to Iran—namely, the political party. After our National Assembly was created in 1906, certain so-called parties came into being. But internal quarrels and concentration upon personalities rather than issues soon made them ineffective. My father experimented with the establishment of a single majority party, but it soon disintegrated. It seems that the country still lacked the maturity needed for a working party system. By so rapidly expanding our educational system, my father laid the groundwork for our later party development. During the Second World War and the occupation by foreign powers, several parties sprang up. The most tightly-organized of them was the Communist Tudeh party to which I have already referred. It was established in 1941 with Russian support by a small group of men most of whom my father had imprisoned as suspected Communists. With foreign support the Tudeh elected some members to the National Assembly and successfully infiltrated the trade unions and the armed forces. The Tudeh members of the National Assembly were notorious for their negative tactics, and I am sorry to say that some negative-minded non-Communist politicians cooperated with the Tudeh to block any kind of constructive legislation. It is amusing to recall that although the Tudeh party and its supporters favoured the taking over of the British oil concession in southern Iran, they actually opposed our plans for nationalizing Iran's oil resources as a whole. The Tudeh influence continued strong in my country until after Mossadegh's fall. In 1957, after political stability had been restored and the nation's economy had had a chance to move forward from the Mossadegh period of

stagnation, I began intensively to promote the two-party system in Iran. It is important to remember that the two-party system, as it has so successfully operated in America, Britain, and other free countries, does not imply only two parties. Instead it normally means that there are two major parties plus a number of minor ones which are always striving to become major parties. Under the two-party system, the party polling the largest vote runs the Government, while the next largest party forms the loyal opposition. The criticisms of the loyal opposition are very valuable in keeping the majority party alert and exposing any deviation by the majority group from the path of the public interest. Smaller parties sometimes align themselves with one or other of the two major parties, but that does not alter the general principle of the two-party system.

We have now achieved a situation comprising two active major parties plus a number of minor ones. Anybody who desires can, without fear or hindrance, form additional parties so long as they do not serve foreign masters. One of our two major parties is called the National Party, while the other is known as the People's Party. While we follow a policy of non-partisanship in foreign affairs, the parties can and do dispute with each other on many internal matters. Such disagreements are in the best tradition of the two-party system. In a democracy the people must share in deciding their own destiny, and in most matters the best way to choose the wise path is through public discussion and argument. I am happy to say that Persia's modern parties are gradually setting aside our traditional weakness of thinking in personality rather than policy terms. People sometimes criticize our new parties by saying that they have been imposed from the top rather than rising from the rank and file of the people. Some cynics

even claim that the parties are mere puppets of the Government or the Crown. That of course misses the whole point about how you can foster parties in a newly developing country such as Iran.

Here, in spite of my father's best efforts, and of the hundreds of new schools that have been opened during his reign and since, the majority of our people are still illiterate. Moreover, the Western concepts of parliamentary democracy and political parties remain new to us. In a country where tradition still weighs heavily, nothing could be more unrealistic than to suppose that locally-based parties will spontaneously appear and nourish. So I consider that my role as King requires that I encourage parties. If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organized or such as you find today in Communist countries. But as constitutional monarch I can afford to encourage large-scale party activity free from the strait-jacket of one-party rule or the one-party state. As a symbol of the unity of my people, I can promote two or more parties without directly associating myself with any. Are the new parties puppets? Consider for a moment. Let us suppose that one is established by leaders who have ties with the Crown or Government, and that its membership grows to ten thousand, which after all is not large. The party's rank and file will read the pronouncements of the leaders and hear their speeches, and will support the leaders only if they agree with what the latter stand for. If they do not agree, then they will express their dissatisfaction in various ways. Perhaps they will persuade the leaders to change their attitude; or they will desert the party or become inactive in it; or they will install new leaders. If the ordinary members wish, there is no reason why they should not entirely displace the original organizers of

the party and rebuild it according to their own preferences and with new leaders of their own choice. Some people have the naive idea that a political party of 10,000 or 100,000 members can spring into full-blown existence without the aid of any leaders. But in what country has that ever happened? A moment's reflection will show that, in free countries everywhere, parties must be created by leaders who enjoy support. But the need for party leadership in no way contradicts the principle that a party should develop strong local roots; on the contrary, successful parties in all free lands work night and day to nurture vigorous local affiliates. In Iran our major parties are busy developing local participation throughout the country. In addition to its national organization, each party is organizing on the basis of provinces, counties, and smaller units. I am proud to say that the party spirit, in its true civic sense, is rapidly spreading in Iran, and that all over the country you find both men and women with enough pioneering spirit to engage in modern democratic party activity. Among intellectuals as well as uneducated people, you still find some who do not understand the true meaning of free parties, or who think that they are 'above' partisan political activity; some indeed are too timid or too negative to take a constructive stand on matters affecting the nation's destiny as well as their own. But I find that patriotic Iranians more and more are giving their attention to these activities. In addition to establishing parties, we are making other moves to further the cause of political democracy in Iran. One of the lessons of good government is that laws are useless unless they are put into practice. In the past our Parliament often passed good laws which for lack of execution remained worthless pieces of paper. Although Reza Shah westernized our administrative system, much remained to be done to improve

its efficiency; and corruption and bribery have unhappily not been totally lacking in my country's civil service. In 1957 my Government installed administrative under-secretaries in each of the ministries. These officials, who will ordinarily remain even when ministers are replaced, have the task of promoting administrative reform. A number of them have been trained abroad in modern methods of public administration, and many of their assistants are also foreign-trained. The administrative under-secretaries are also formed into a high administrative council which promotes and coordinates administrative improvement throughout the Government. In 1958, after more than two years of study, my Government prepared a comprehensive set of reorganization recommendations comparable to those of the Hoover government reorganization commission in the United States. These were presented in the form of a bill which Parliament passed in 1959 and I immediately signed. The law establishes the basic organization of most of the major ministries and agencies of the Government. At the same time another group of experts made studies which led to internal rearrangements in the Plan Organization, the body which plays such a vital role in our economic development programme. Our ministries and agencies are now for the most part organized along modern lines, comparable with the American pattern, and in logical relationship with each other. We plan to continue improving the organization in the light of new knowledge and changing needs. But even a beautifully organized ministry will not be well run by men with antiquated ideas. Besides, if you keep old-timers on the rolls for ever, the younger men will be denied opportunities and will become frustrated. That is exactly what was happening in Iran in recent years; so, again in 1958, I decided that we must retire all those who had reached sixty years of age

or had completed thirty years of service, with certain exceptions such as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and under-secretaries. We have retired thousands of these men, giving them pensions which compare favourably with their former salaries. Many of them are already contributing in other ways to their country's development—especially in private industry. And young people, a large proportion of whom have had university training here or abroad, are stepping into their places in the Government. We have also been encouraging what I consider to be a very desirable movement towards more provincial and municipal autonomy. When the people of a province, or of a city within a province, are forced to refer all their problems through the local bureaucracy to Teheran, two evils result: routine administrative operations are reduced to a snail's pace, and the people's civic spirit is stifled because they don't decide their own affairs. Accordingly we are delegating more authority to provincial officials, and are encouraging city officials to assume more direct control over schools, hospitals, orphanages, public utilities, and general municipal affairs. Here the Iranian Municipal Association has already rendered great service. Using Isfahan as a pilot city, it has introduced many ideas for improved municipal government in Iran. It has done considerable research on adapting modern municipal methods to Iranian conditions, and it has held a number of provincial and national conferences to acquaint Iran's city officials with the new techniques. There is still another reason why I am pushing local self-government and self-determination. Experience in all the great democracies shows that effective political parties find their real strength locally. Local civic action provides ideal training for constructive national party work, and vigorous local party units can steer their national party organizations according to

the wishes of the people. So I am not exaggerating when I say that the best way to ensure powerful, patriotic parties in Iran is to develop local civic initiative. As I have pointed out, we had to start our parties before local initiative had a chance fully to develop, but vigorous local support will strengthen the parties and help them follow in the path of the people. I also favour another kind of decentralization. In our rush to get development projects under way, we have concentrated too many functions in the Plan Organization, often at the expense of regular ministries which could handle them as well or better. The regular ministries have also been discriminated against in the matter of salaries. While the Plan Organization has done good work, in the future many of its functions will be decentralized. The execution of development projects and the operation of government enterprises will more and more be entrusted to regular ministries and agencies. To stamp out corruption in the public service and related pursuits, we took drastic action in 1958-59. We obtained passage of two anti-corruption laws comparable to the conflict-of-interests statutes found in America, Britain, and other democracies. The first of these bars Government civil or military personnel (including employees of factories and other organizations owned predominantly by the Government or whose profits go primarily to the Government) from any business dealings with the Government or affiliated agencies. To prevent a related sort of abuse, the statute also bans the private practice of law by members of Parliament. Although the statute nowhere mentions members of the royal family, I separately proclaimed that it would apply to them. For violators, the law carries a stiff penalty of two to four years of solitary confinement. The second law requires all Government employees (again including employees of related organizations most of

whose capital or profits belong to the Government) to make detailed annual declarations of the sources of their wealth and income. We inquire further into any suspicious-looking variations from year to year. Any Government employee who fails to file such a statement, or who includes false or misleading entries in it, is subject to discharge from his position and must pay the additional penalty of confiscation by the Government of all his undeclared wealth or income. We call this the 'where-did-youget-it-from', law.

Again in 1958, I established, as part of my Court, the Imperial Investigation Organization. I have already described the development, from the germinal idea I had as a young man in Switzerland, of my system for welcoming and giving sympathetic consideration to complaints and petitions from ordinary citizens anywhere in the country. Although I had been in the habit of personally reading all the letters addressed to me, or at least abstracts of them, I naturally had to refer them to appropriate authorities for action. Increasingly I noted one serious short-coming in the way the complaints or petitions were disposed of. Let us suppose that a villager writes that he has been mistreated by a member of the local gendarmerie post. Perhaps I ask the Minister of the Interior to look into the matter and punish whichever gendarme may have abused his powers. The minister, conscientiously trying to get to the bottom of the case, asks for a report from the local gendarmerie commander in the area. The local commander's first impulse may be to cover up both for himself and for his men. In extreme cases some of the local gendarmes may punish the villager for having written in the first place. Although the gendarmerie as well as our other agencies of Government often handle internal self-discipline very well, experience showed the need for an independent investigat-

ing authority. That is what my Imperial Investigation Organization provides. Its staff can go anywhere and without fear or favour or red tape investigate any alleged injustice. Citizens can with complete confidence bring their grievances or their pleas directly to me and my personal staff. Through the efforts of the Imperial Investigation Organization and our other anti-corruption agencies, over 4,000 civilian Government employees (including governors, mayors, and other high officials) and some 200 members of the military (including five generals) were fired, otherwise punished, or brought to trial during 1959 and 1960. I must mention yet another change in our administrative system which is directly affecting ordinary people throughout my country. In Iran, as in so many parts of the world, the peasant and other humble citizens until recently knew the Government mainly through the tax-collector or members of the police or the military. In earlier years, as I have said, the tax-collector would commonly extort all he could from the peasant, and at the same time gendarmes and soldiers might demand bribes of money or agricultural produce from him. No wonder the peasant took a dim view of Government functionaries! But more recently, and for good reason, the peasant's view of Government officials has been changing. Suppose the Government establishes a free school in his village to which he can send his children, sprays his house with D.D.T. to control malaria, and drills a deep well from which he and other villagers can get pure water. Suppose the Government establishes a free clinic that serves him and his family, and dramatically demonstrates through an agricultural extension agent, under the eyes of the peasant himself, the benefits a new seed variety can bring. These things are actually happening now in my country, and in each case the peasant cannot help sensing new relationships

between Government and people. Our public servants, for their part, are in their relations with the people showing a new awareness of the meaning of direct democracy. Our bringing of young blood into the Government service, and our educating the rising generation along the lines I shall indicate in a later chapter, will hasten this process. I hope that face-to-face democracy between Government servants and people will in my country more and more complement democracy at the parliamentary level. Political democracy can never operate like an electric refrigerator; you cannot just turn it on and let it run. Effective political democracy needs intelligence; voters must have some idea of the merits of candidates and issues. It needs maturity and tolerance; the rich man must be content with the same single vote that the poor man possesses, and the party which loses at the polls (maybe by only a few votes) must peaceably bide its time and meanwhile furnish loyal rather than destructive opposition. It requires honesty; politicians and civil servants must resist the human temptation to deceive or cheat the people. It makes necessary eternal vigilance; political or administrative negligence, procrastination, or double-dealing must be detected by patriotic citizens and fearlessly punished. Finally, effective political democracy demands a sense of mission; a positive, dynamic spirit must power the whole enterprise. For these reasons I am not endorsing such a system as something easy to achieve or maintain. I am merely pointing out that, as we Persians see it, the human values inherent in true political democracy merit whatever price we have to pay for it. I turn now to the question of economic democracy. Here, as well as in the political and administrative realm, I think Iran has been charting a course that is somewhat new in the Middle East. It is not something we want to boast about, but rather an accomplishment

we want every interested person to see for himself. Nothing is more welcome to me than to have comparisons made between our methods of progress and those of any other countries in this part of the world. I have already described our broad programme of economic development, but here I want to relate it to the idea of democracy. America produces more goods and services, both in absolute terms and per head, than any other country in the world today or any other country the world has ever known. But to me the most significant thing is not how much is turned out by those hard-working people, but the democratic way it is distributed. Perhaps the most conspicuous sight when you visit any large American factory is the hundreds or even thousands of cars parked round it. Most of them belong to the ordinary workers, even the lowliest of whom are likely to own and drive their own automobiles. The vast majority of Americans eat well, dress well, and live in well-built homes containing modern labour-saving household appliances. Some people naturally have more than others, but America's output is so vast that almost everybody has his real needs and to spare. Indeed, America produces such mountains of goods that with no economic strain she operates a world-wide foreign aid programme. Pure capitalism is not the secret of America's productivity and economic democracy. As early as the Civil War of 1861-65, America was moving away from the orthodox capitalistic system, and by the end of the First World War she had left it far behind. America today has many thousands of private industrial and commercial establishments, and hundreds of thousands of private farms. But the American economy is a mixed one, part capitalistic and part socialistic. The Government assists private enterprise with technical advice, loans, and in other ways, and regulates it in the public interest;

and the Government itself operates many kinds of enterprises ranging from hospitals to hydro-electric plants, and from arsenals to the world's largest publishing house. But again the most important point is that the products of all America's labours are widely distributed among the people. In Iran as in America, the Government not only assists private industry and commerce, but also regulates them in the public interest. For example, under our labour laws we regulate the conditions of work in factories. We also regulate prices in certain cases; for example, the Government fixes maximum retail prices for bread and meat in Teheran, and in 1958 the Government cut down the retail prices of imported drugs so that most of them actually sell for far less here than they do in retail outlets in the country of origin. Besides regulating commerce and industry for the general welfare, the Government, as I have already made clear, does not hesitate to go into these fields on its own account when that will benefit the people as a whole. At the same time, as I have said, we give wide scope to private initiative in industry, commerce, and agriculture. In my opinion economic democracy in my country implies a great many independent entrepreneurs engaged in a wide variety of industry and commerce. The same point applies with even more force in agriculture, as I shall explain in the next chapter. In Iran we want none of the Chinese Communist 'ant-hill' society under which millions of peasants live a regimented live which prevents them even from calling their married and family life their own. Economic democracy in agriculture means agriculture organized to serve the rights of free men. In Iran we don't yet possess comprehensive economic democracy in agriculture, but we are moving steadily towards it—not away from it as in some countries. My philosophy of economic progress, then,

carries with it two basic principles. The first is ever greater material prosperity ever more widely shared. The second is an economy so organized that the individual rights of workers, farmers, managers, scientists and engineers, and everybody else productively engaged, are protected and enhanced. I could have no patience for a society in which the people, living in blissful ignorance, produced little and stood still while the world moved forward. Still less could I countenance a society which, as in so many instances today, produced many things but under conditions of human oppression. I know that the overwhelming majority of my people agree with me. Economically we are determined to advance; but we Persians, with our individualistic tradition, refuse to do it under conditions of regimentation. How can we mobilize ourselves to march even faster towards economic democracy? Here a first principle is planning on comprehensive lines. The world has seen sad examples of countries that have built factories without enough power or raw materials to feed them, or without roads or railways to bring the raw materials to the plants and transport the finished products. A country may produce something for which there is little market and fail to manufacture something, quite within its capabilities, for which there is widespread demand. A country may invest much money in gleaming modern machinery, while failing to train anybody to operate it. I know of a case of something like half a million pounds' worth of heavy earth-moving equipment having been purchased by a certain less-developed country, with no spare parts! I am sometimes asked how you can reconcile individual initiative and national economic planning. Fortunately this is not difficult. If a private company wants to build a factory to weave natural silk, and is determined to finance the plant entirely on its own, my Government

will offer no objection. But we happen to know that the man-made synthetics are gradually crowding natural silk out of the textile field, and also that Iran needs other things, such as sugar, much more than she needs silk textiles, which are primarily luxury items. So we would decline to provide Government finance for a silk plant. Instead we are channelling Government financial and technical assistance into the making of tilings that are urgently needed.

Without difficulty wc are thus encouraging private interests to concentrate infields where they can contribute most to the country as well as to themselves. I have already mentioned the formulation and launching of the First Seven-Year Plan, its failure because of political circumstances, and the initiation and more successful prosecution of the Second Seven- Year Plan. Most of the projects described in the preceding chapter are the result of work under the second plan. Yet much as we have accomplished, I am not satisfied, because I know that, as we improve our methods, we can achieve still more in less time. One thing we have been working towards is better machinery for economic planning and for co-ordinating and expediting the execution of plans. In 1955 I established the High Economic Council as the top authority in this field. Composing the council are the Prime Minister as chairman, a number of other ministers whose work directly involves economic development, the head of the Plan Organization, and the governor of the National Bank. The staff of the council is headed by an executive secretary who in 1958 was raised to the rank of deputy Prime Minister. The council often carries on its deliberations in my presence. It reviews plans for economic development, apportions projects among the ministries and agencies, and follows up to see that plans are executed. The council has helped speed up

our development programme and its co-ordination. Meanwhile, we set up an Economic Bureau within the Plan Organization. This office, which is staffed by Iranian and foreign experts, is making a number of economic studies which are helping to improve the execution of the Second Seven- Year Plan. Still more important, it has started to formulate our third development plan. While our present Second Seven- Year Plan has many virtues, there is one fundamental respect in which I am determined to improve upon it. The Second Seven-Year Development Law, like the first one, set out the general features of the plan and allocated funds according to broad categories (agriculture and related works, transportation and communications, industry and niining, and social services). The law implied that within the seven-year period expenditures would be made in each sector up to the specified limit. But nowhere within the second law (or the first one), or within any subsidiary decrees, can you find any firm targets or goals showing completion times for particular projects or groups of projects. The absence of specific time-targets was excusable when we were just getting our development programme organized and under way. But now that we have acquired real momentum, I consider that it is essential for us to specify such targets within the present plan as well as future ones. In the first place, the citizens of a democracy find it easier to understand references to actual irrigation dams or diesel locomotives than to abstract development classifications or financial statements. Secondly, if you tell the ordinary intelligent man that your aim is to spend a lot of money—an expenditure connected, in some vague way, with the national welfare—he is much less likely to be impressed than if you tell him exactly what you will complete and when. Public money can conceivably be diverted into private

pockets, or it can be spent on ill-designed projects, or it can be poured into schemes that will materialize in the distant future or never. A wise citizen demands to know exactly what his money is buying and when the returns will come. Thirdly, and most important of all, intelligent time-targets can help us to mobilize all our people in support of national development. It is traditional in our culture that we have not been governed by the clock; but in our vital economic and social development programme it is important that we should be. I look forward to the time when our political parties, our Government agencies, our entire educational system, and our citizens will all be focusing their attention on national development. The parties will in their platforms stress development plans and policies. Government officials and employees will strive to set new records in the completion of projects for the country's economic and social betterment. Students, beginning even in the elementary years, will become familiar with projects such as I have described in the previous chapter, and will learn how they can apply their training to promoting their own and their country's advance. Citizens throughout the land will realize that they have a personal stake in constructive national development and that, no matter what their walk of life, they can contribute. If all this sounds visionary, remember that as a people we are much more development-conscious than we were even a few years ago. In the best sense we are also more time-conscious. Some of our projects still take much longer to finish than they should, but the rate of progress on others has often amazed Western economists and engineers. In Teheran a street may be repaved almost overnight. One of our largest orphanages, designed to accommodate two thousand children plus a resident staff, was formally opened less than eleven months after

the initial drawing of plans began. In a capital city which, as I have said, has increased its population from a half-million to three times that figure in less than fifteen years' time, you have to learn to do things in a hurry; and we have. And more and more you see the same constructive energy at work in the provinces. In some countries a totalitarian regime tries to goad the people to ever-greater output. In my country I think we can do it in a different way. Within the democratic framework I want to see us devote ever more attention to setting up difficult goals and reaching them ahead of schedule. I want us to use lectures, films, television programmes, the radio, and every other possible device for hammering home the spirit and the methods of economic development by the people and for the people. I want us to pay particular attention to the rising generation, in whom as a nation we can so proudly place our faith. I want us to appeal to their patriotism, their sporting instinct, their sense of robust competition, and their capacity for cooperative striving towards a common goal. Thus we shall make better citizens of them, and they will in turn make their country more prosperous and a better place in which to live. Economic progress and democratic evolution go hand in hand, and this is the spirit of economic democracy. There is one final feature of economic democracy which my people have now become mature enough to adopt in earnest. I am speaking of free trade unions—which are of course unknown in totalitarian countries. I firmly believe in such unions as an instrument of democracy. They are necessary to ensure that economic democracy extends into the industrial system in the modern world. During and immediately after the Second World War, there was a mushroom growth of unions in Iran, but in several respects it took an undesirable turn. In some cases, as I have said, the

unions were sponsored or infiltrated by the Tudeh party; and at that time Iranian employers often adopted a most reactionary view of democratic as well as other trade unions. Unconsciously or not, they copied some of the worst anti-union practices of employers in Britain or America in the days before the legitimate role of unions was recognized in those countries. Instead of giving sympathetic consideration to the workers' requests for better wages and improved conditions, employers would place on their payrolls gangs of toughs hired just to intimidate the workers. These men received much higher wages than the regular employees, and employers chose to pay good money to such characters instead of using it to meet the workers' rightful demands. Our unions in those days also resembled our political parties in their preoccupation with personalities rather than policies. A union boss would become temporarily popular, and a union would grow around him. Later, when he became too weak or too powerful, or when the workers tired of his lack of programme, they would desert him and turn to somebody else who might deserve their faith no more than the previous man. Strong, responsible unions cannot grow in that fashion. Trade unions should wisely be kept quite separate from political parties. Trade unions should concern themselves primarily with improving the economic situation of their members, while parties have a much broader role to play. Some of the members of a given trade union may prefer one political party, others another; and the union should not be weakened by internal political partisanship. On the other hand, in the internal conduct of their affairs, well-run trade unions and parties possess important features in common. Both should have clear-cut programmes known to all the members, reliable leaders democratically elected by the rank and file, and practise

responsible democracy in their internal management. In 1958, at one of our southern ports, the dock workers called a strike and won a substantial wage increase. During the strike they demonstrated their patriotism by unloading some important military cargoes completely free of charge. I am gratified that their wages, which I know for a fact had been too low, have now risen because of their collective action. Responsible unionism is still in its infancy in Iran, but that shows what can be done. I now turn to my philosophy of social democracy. When as a young man I returned from my studies in Switzerland, I became acutely aware of the plight of our less fortunate citizens. In spite of the great progress my father had achieved, you could still find people literally starving to death or dying of exposure because they had no roof over their heads and scarcely any clothes to wear. Such sights made a deep impression upon me. Although my course of studies at the Military College had little to do with social welfare, my thoughts increasingly dwelt upon the plight of those unfortunate people. It was fair neither to them nor to the future of my country that their lives should be wretched and futile. The thought that anyone should condone or acquiesce in such conditions—as some of our more self-centred citizens still do—made me angry. I remember that one cold winter evening soon after I assumed the throne, a group of our National Assembly deputies, responding to my summons, came for an audience. Bluntly I told them that I couldn't stand the sight of privileged persons growing rich and sleek and fat, as some of them were, while others of my people remained in dire want. The next day some of the same deputies were spreading rumours that I was a Communist. If what I said was Communism, then I am one! Those deputies were flouting the long-run interests of themselves as well as

their motherland. It is now more than fifteen years since I introduced what I call my five principles of social justice. According to my philosophy, every man, woman, and child in this nation is entitled to a decent minimum of these five things: food, clothing, housing, medical care, and education. If anybody can by honest means earn more than the minimum, good for him; and of course many do. But, come what may, a man's income should be sufficient for him to secure these things for himself and his family. If it is not, then the Government or voluntary charitable organizations, or both, must step in and help him. I become very angry when I sometimes hear pompous, over-fed, over-privileged people advance the out-of-date argument that Iran's needy families are in want because they are lazy. For example, I have in mind a boy who grew up in a village where there was no school. He taught himself to read and write Persian, much as my father did before him. Then he taught himself to read and write English. I grant that he showed exceptional initiative, but I am proud to find that most Persians are industrious and hard-working. If you are looking for laziness, you can find it more readily among the idle rich than among our ordinary citizens. I never hesitate to invest my personal funds in charitable activities, because I know that the vast majority even of our humblest citizens help themselves when given half a chance. In the next chapter I shall describe the measures we are taking especially for the villagers who form such a large proportion of our population, include so many of our best people, and yet in general receive among the lowest incomes in the country. Chapter 11 will portray our efforts to provide education for all my people, rich or poor. Here I must describe a few other things we are doing in aid of social democracy. For example, it may sound unbelievable that before my father's reign

vaccination was almost unknown in Iran except among a few of the well-to-do. My father first began mass vaccinations, but even his strenuous efforts could not bring protection to all the people. Yet in the years 1955-58 the Ministry of Health vaccinated over eight million of our citizens. During the same period the ministry routed the malaria scourge by spraying with D.D.T. over ten million homes. By stern measures we halted the cultivation of the poppy plant from which opium is produced; and we set up centres for treating the addicts who were formerly common. Over 50,000 people were examined for trachoma, over 19,000 being treated, and of the nearly 370,000 persons examined for the so-called social diseases, some 20,000 received treatment. Hospitals were completed in a number of cities and towns, and construction went ahead on scores of other hospitals and clinics, maternity homes, orphanages, and tuberculosis sanatoria. Since in Iran many diseases are transmitted through impure water, it is especially important to provide modern supply systems. This is no easy task in a country where for thousands of years villages have relied on easily-contaminated streams and shallow wells, and municipalities have distributed water through open ditches or *jubes* running along the streets of our cities and towns. Most of our major cities now have modern central supply systems, and our smaller cities and towns are beginning to get them.

The Ministry of the Interior runs orphanages and almshouses, licenses private orphanages and gives some aid to needy families. The Police Department of the ministry administers prisons and reform schools and tries to rehabilitate prisoners, especially the younger ones. In the next chapter I shall refer to the ministry's important community development work; and its centre at Karaj, near Teheran, where

beggars are rehabilitated by the hundred, is an inspiring sight. The men are taught a trade, such as cabinet-making, weaving, or silversmithing; and in addition to a small wage while in training, they are given help in estabhshing their own shops on completing the course. It has often been proved at the centre that we can turn seemingly hopeless parasites into useful, self-respecting citizens who contribute to the nation's productivity. A social research worker could profitably make a lengthy study of the techniques developed there for the bringing out of human qualities. The Ministry of Labour enforces the laws governing conditions of factory work, including the special provisions for women and children. It encourages the formation of trade unions and operates workers' centres such as the handsome one in Isfahan equipped with a library, an auditorium where talks are given and films are shown, and sports facilities. The ministry-affiliated Workers' Social Insurance Organization protects workers against loss of income due to old age, ill-health, industrial accidents, and premature death of the family breadwinner.

The Ministry of Justice renders various services to mothers and children and helps reduce divorce and juvenile delinquency. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture operates a nation-wide scheme for school lunches. The foregoing are only a few examples of what the Government is doing to assure minimum social standards. Members of my family and I have also retained our concern with social welfare matters. We have expressed our interest largely through five organizations, all of them affiliated to the Crown and most of them receiving funds from Government sources and from private citizens as well as from the Crown: the Red Lion and Sun Society, equivalent to the Red Cross in other countries;

the Pahlavi Foundation; the Imperial Social Services Organization; the Society for the Protection of Mothers and Children; and the Imperial co-ordinating Council for Charitable Institutions. The Queen represents me as general head of all these programmes; and my sisters, the Princesses Shams and Ashraf, devote much of their time to promoting various phases of the work. I shall not go into much detail about the activities of these organizations, because the last thing I wish to do is to boast about them, and I have encouraged them to avoid self-advertisement in carrying out their work. As all Persians know, our official flag includes the insignia of a golden Lion (holding a sword in one raised paw) and the sun. The same Lion and sun, but this time in red, provide both the emblem and the name of our 'Red Cross', which is under the patronage of Princess Shams. It is particularly renowned for its achievements in earthquake relief, for in recent years we have known a series of these tragic disasters, which have levelled dozens of villages and killed hundreds. The Red Lion and Sun, as well as other agencies including foreign ones, have given dramatic relief on a scale impossible thirty years ago, when our communications were hopelessly primitive and we had no organized social services. The Red Lion and Sun also provides flood and fire relief, trains nurses, and operates hospitals and clinics. Over a hundred branches are maintained in the provinces, most of them supporting clinics, and in Teheran it runs a hospital and thirteen clinics, including one for tuberculosis and one for cancer. I established the Pahlavi Foundation in 1958 as a non-profit-making organization to co-ordinate a group of social services in winch I was interested. An outgrowth of my former Pahlavi Estates Office, its assets include shares or interests in a number of hotels (mostly constructed bymy father), cement factories, sugar fac-

tories, our Iranian National Insurance Company, a bank, merchant ships, and various other industrial and commercial undertakings. An especially interesting example of a foundation-financed project is the new road bridge between Abadan and Khorramshahr, which I dedicated early in 1960. Until it was opened, cars and lorries travelling between the two cities, which are directly opposite each other on the Karun River, had to make a 150-mile detour to cross the river at the city of Ahwaz. Following American practice, the cost of the bridge will be covered by tolls on vehicles. The foundation's income from all these sources is used for charitable purposes. Yet some people have wondered why such a foundation should conduct commercial and industrial enterprises. Why, they ask, does the Pahlavi Foundation continue to operate hotels instead of selling them? Why has it promoted the establishment of the new Iranian merchant marine by purchasing and operating the ships previously mentioned? Why does it invest in cement and sugar factories? The answer is twofold. In the first place, since I am rapidly distributing my lands, the foundation must find new sources of revenue. In the next chapter I shall describe in some detail my distribution programme; and I need only point out here that every time a peasant receives a plot of royal land, the rents accruing to the Pahlavi Foundation decrease accordingly. Nothing gives me more satisfaction than to distribute my land to worthy peasants; at the same time I do not want my other important schemes, such as scholarships for university students, to suffer from lack of funds. So I encourage the foundation to seek other sources of revenue in investments comparable with those of such overseas organizations as the Rockefeller and Ford foundations of America or the Nuffield Foundation in Britain. Secondly, the Pahlavi Foundation engages

in commercial and industrial undertakings not merely to finance its charitable endeavours, but also as demonstration projects designed to inspire and encourage private enterprise. For example, the foundation's maritime enterprise enabled merchant ships to ply the high seas under the Iranian flag for the first time in recent history. The country possesses a number of cement plants, but the foundation-affiliated ones are particularly modern and well-designed and set a pattern for others to come. The foundation-operated hotels are encouraging tourism in Iran. To ease the acute shortage of low-cost housing in Teheran and also as a demonstration of the feasibility of mass building of houses for low-income groups, the foundation (actually its predecessor office) constructed one hundred houses in a suburb of the capital. In the city's poorer districts, it runs low-cost restaurants where, every day during the winter months when manual work is scarcer, thousands obtain substantial meals priced at about sixpence. The foundation's Queen Farah Society operates orphanages and day nurseries, places children for adoption, and gives direct aid to poor families. In 1960 the society had altogether forty orphanages either completed or under construction throughout the country, which accommodated from about 100 to 2,000 children plus resident staff. Here the children receive food, shelter, medical care, and education; but most important of all, they obtain the love and understanding without which no child can develop properly. I think the happiness and feeling of well-being of the children of the orphanages testifies to the soundness of our ways of helping them. When they leave they do so possessed of good health, knowledge of a skill or trade, their own savings accounts, a sense of citizenship, and the confidence to face the world. Private Persian philanthropists have generously helped

construct or equip certain of the homes, and I think we can count upon further such aid. Some of our finest young women are devoting themselves unstintingly to paid or volunteer work in them—more I am sure will do so in the future—and many couples, including some from abroad, adopt children. I am proud of this kind of character we are building in the orphanages; and I wish that as a tonic to his or her faith in human nature, every visitor to my country, as well as every Persian, could spend a little time in them and become acquainted with the children and those who care enough to help them. I have been much concerned about making modern medicines available at low prices to my people. Through the Pahlavi Foundation and the Imperial Social Services Organization, I have arranged for the construction, on the outskirts of Teheran, of a pharmaceutical factory which will cost about £1.5 million or $4 million. Since the manufacturing techniques are complex and highly exacting, a foreign firm will manage the plant for the first ten years and meanwhile train Persian managers and technicians. In 1951 I decreed the inauguration of an annual congress of Iranian medical practitioners and research workers, so that they could exchange views and plan fresh assaults on our formidable problems, particularly in matters of public health. The Queen opened the first congress, held in September 1952 in Ramsar, and one has met in every subsequent year. A number of recommendations have been adopted by the Government, which now requires the issue of medical certificates before a marriage can be performed, X-Rays children and teachers to detect tubercular conditions, and keeps on full salary Government employees (including teachers) who are being treated for tuberculosis. The Pahlavi Foundation provides the congress with a permanent secretariat and also prints technical pa-

pers delivered at its sessions, making them available free to physicians and others. To stimulate cultural development as well as to promote international understanding, the Foundation's Institute for Publication and Translation of Books has already published in translation a number of great literary classics of the East and the West, making them available at moderate prices. The foundation also awards substantial annual prizes for original works and translations in literary, historical, scientific, and other fields. To increase the availability of good film shows, the foundation has given financial assistance to the production of Iranian films and the construction of new cinemas, has arranged for reduced cinema taxes, and has promoted special film shows at reduced rates for teachers and workers. I have decreed that all my royalties from this present book will go to help support the work of the Institute for Publication and Translation.

The foundation-affiliated Shahnaz Youth Clubs have pioneered in establishing summer camps and girls' clubs and in promoting other youth activities, such as the flourishing Boy Scout movement. In 1956 the foundation organized Iran's first international student camp, held near Ramsar on the shores of the Caspian and attended by university students from some thirteen Middle Eastern and other countries, including America, and in the following year facilities were provided for the first University of Teheran student camp. The foundation operates a tourist bureau designed to help both Persians and visitors from abroad learn more about my country and its great culture. It has also done much to improve agriculture and village life, as I shall describe in the next chapter. I am hopeful that the Pahlavi Foundation will develop into one of the great charitable institutions of the world. While it is less wealthy than the larger ones of Europe and

America, it is steadily expanding the scale and scope of its activities. I have mentioned the Imperial Social Services Organization as the third of my five principal charitable undertakings. It has contributed much to better health conditions; and supplementing the efforts of the Government, it has established more than sixty-five clinics and hospitals, situated in virtually every province in the country. These provide free treatment and medicines for the needy. In 1949 the ISSO initiated, in the city of Dizful near Ahwaz in southwestern Iran, a demonstration campaign against trachoma. In three years and nine months, patients received more than a million treatments at the special clinics established. Before these were opened, 95 per cent of Dizful's people were suffering from trachoma, and 25 per cent had lost their eyesight as a result. After the first two years of treatment, the disease had decreased by 90 per cent among students and by 35 per cent among the rest of the inhabitants, and it has since continued to decline. Pioneer work has been done in the training of the blind. At the ISSO school in Teheran, blind students publish their own text-books in Braille, and a blind student conductor leads their symphony orchestra as it plays Western classics and jazz. Through its radiology department the ISSO has also led the fight against the dreaded scalp disease, favus, a fungus infection which commonly leaves disfiguring scars. X-Rays have proved effective, and 35,000 treatments have been given. In 1960 tests were under way in Iran of a new British-developed medicine for favus; taken orally in convenient tablet form, it is yielding promising results. The ISSO has been paying particular attention to making medicines more widely available and at lower prices. For several years it has been manufacturing drugs, which it distributes free through hospitals, clinics, and authorized physicians; it also sells drugs on the

open market at a fraction of the usual prices, and bulk purchases of medicines from abroad are either distributed free or at low prices. Throughout the year at ISSO headquarters in Teheran, you can watch the latest types of medicines being prepared and packed to be rushed by air, rail, and lorry to the most remote parts. This never-ceasing work gives me much satisfaction. And the new pharmaceutical plant mentioned previously will, when completed, greatly increase the availability of medicines to people who otherwise couldn't afford them. The ISSO arranges free transport of poor patients to all of its hospitals and clinics, and provides financial aid for families of the ill or disabled. It sends doctors on free calls to patients' homes, provides medical care for poor children, and has established the first nurses' training school in Iran, where an intensive three-year course leading to a certificate is offered. The ISSO helps the Government enforce the child labour regulations in such industries as rug making and textile manufacturing. It operates vocational training schools where beggars (including children) and disabled persons are fed, housed, and taught useful trades such as carpentry, plumbing, blacksmithing, tinsmithing, mechanics, electrical work, and shoe repair. The ISSO does social work among poor people, particularly mothers, and provides clothing, housing, and other aid for poor students. At the University of Teheran the organization built a dormitory for students of modest means coming from the provinces. It helps to rehabilitate prisoners, runs sanatoria for opium addicts and alcoholics, and not only gives direct aid to many thousands of such people as I have mentioned, but guides additional thousands to other agencies, including those of the Government, where they can get assistance. Similarly, the ISSO helps develop popular interest in social welfare matters by

producing radio programmes, films, and plays. Affiliated with the ISSO is the Princess Ashraf Charity Organization; this group operates a milk supply centre, a kindergarten, a primaryschool, a secondary school, an arts school, a textile factory, and a clinic. It has been especially helpful to needy children and to mothers without means. Another affiliated organization is the Iranian National Committee for UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund). This body distributes free milk, aids the Government's school lunch scheme, and trains health assistants. Finally the ISSO provides financial and moral support for a number of other welfare agencies. These work with orphans and with deaf and dumb children, combat tuberculosis and venereal diseases, promote mental health, foster humane treatment of animals, and the like. I am proud to find that more civic-minded Persian individuals and companies are devoting time and money to these causes and setting an example for those of my people, including many wealthy ones, who have yet to realize their full potentialities as citizens. Such people have overlooked one of the underlying truths not only of democracy but of personal life: the certainty that you derive more satisfaction from your own life by helping your fellow-citizens, especially the humbler of them, derive more satisfaction from theirs. The fourth major social service organization of the Crown is the Society for the Protection of Mothers and Children. Its functions include provision of maternity care, the running of foundling homes, and placing children for adoption. In administering welfare services for the people, I believe in vigorous experimentation and in a certain amount of healthy competition between agencies. I have no patience with the argument, which you sometimes hear, that you should have unlimited competition in private business but none in governmental

or quasi-governmental affairs. If several of my Crown agencies are helping babies, I say so much the better, so long as they don't get in each other's way or impede each other's efforts; for the goal is to help as many babies as possible. Put yourself in the position of a poor mother whose baby needs attention; I like to give her some degree of choice. If one official shows her no sympathy, maybe another will. Nevertheless, with so many charitable and welfare activities going on at the same time, there must be some means of keeping them in step. That is why I have the fifth organization, the Imperial Coordinating Council for Charitable Institutions. It meets fortnightly under the chairmanship of my Minister of the Imperial Court. It not only keeps the programme of the Crown welfare agencies in proper relationship with each other, but also with those of the Government, of private Persian groups, and of the foreign assistance agencies whose generous contributions to our welfare I shall discuss later. In addition the Imperial Co-ordinating Council helps allocate Crown funds among the various kinds of work, and gives sympathetic consideration to ideas for new kinds of welfare programmes. The council helped organize and largely finances the Teheran School of Social Work, established in 1959 as our first graduate school in this field, and I hope the council will in future devote much attention to ways and means of recruiting dedicated people, especially young women, to the cause of social service. In this chapter I have tried to make clear that modern democracy, as I see it, is a very broad concept. But democracy is not a series of activities alone; above all it is a philosophy of life, never easy, either for an individual or a nation to acquire. Real democratic government is indeed the most intricate and difficult kind to achieve, but it is also the best form discovered by man. So, as we Persians travel the road

towards it, I think we should keep ever in our minds and hearts the conviction that the goal is worth all the trouble required to reach it. Already we have marched far enough along that road for most of us to visualize clearly what democracy can mean to us. As a nation we must demand steady progress, but we must also realize that the achievement of political, economic, and social democracy perforce takes time. It requires education and psychological development, the reconciliation of individual wishes with social responsibility, the rethinking of moral values and individual and social loyalties, and learning to work in cooperation more than ever before. There is a limit to the speed with which men and nations can develop in freedom. If we try to rush the process too fast, or if we become impatient or cynical, we shall defeat our own good intentions. But if we combine patience with remorseless pressure for reform and advancement, our efforts will be rewarded. We are travelling in the right direction, and I am sure we can reach our goal if we keep trying.

Chapter 9

New Hope for the Farmer

Right at the outset of this chapter I must emphasize its serious nature. If you want descriptions of our villages and the quaint customs of our tribes, you can find them in a number of books, mostly written by foreigners. Sometimes I think these books, enjoyable though they are to read, divert attention from our real problems! But we Persians are more to blame than the foreigners for glossing over the needs of our agriculture. In the past we have often excelled in negative thinking. We have indulged in veritable wailing sessions in which everybody present has lamented the plight of the peasant. But if somebody has tactlessly asked for positive, constructive recommendations, we have either become tongue-tied or have made a few fragmentary, ill-co-ordinated proposals. As a nation we have done far too little sound, comprehensive planning of rural reconstruction. Today I am thrilled by the upsurge of enthusiasm for agrarian reform, and I here offer some personal observations that may help in its achievement. Because of our huge petroleum output people commonly think of Iran as being primarily an oil-producing country. But that is a mistake. For

thousands of years we have been primarily an agricultural country, and we still are. Even today agriculture yields a gross annual revenue some four times that of our entire oil industry. Some three-quarters of my subjects work on the land, and, except in the big desert areas, are well spaced in rural towns and villages throughout the country. Many foreigners are surprised to learn that we have some 50,000 villages, ranging in size from perhaps twenty to three hundred families. Farming not only yields us rich harvests but provides, for most of us, a way of life. Notwithstanding our oil and other natural resources, our chief wealth resides in our people themselves, especially our rural folk. From these villages come sturdy citizens whose customs and habits are of equal importance with their agricultural productivity in giving my country its character. As Iran modernizes and industrializes, she will need ever more good workmen. The larger numbers will come from the villages, and at the same time our country-dwellers will be increasing their output to serve our growing population and to expand agricultural exports. The villages will also continue to furnish men of high basic intelligence and amazing endurance for our armed forces. Only about 10 per cent of the area of my large country is cultivated, though much more could be, as I shall explain later. Another 40 per cent is essential for grazing, some 15 per cent is forested, and the remaining 35 per cent is desert and waste. In my first chapter I mentioned the amazing variety of crops we produce. Among the grains, wheat, barley, corn, and millet are grown virtually throughout the country. Quantitatively the most important is wheat, most of which goes into the excellent Persian bread which forms a staple article of diet for rich and poor alike. Almost all of it is made in private bakeries which the Government supplies with cheap grain to assure an ample

supply of inexpensive bread for the lowincome groups. Total wheat output normally covers our existing needs, and through price incentives we can readily increase production to keep up with population growth. Barley is also grown in most parts of Iran, mainly as animal feed and for export. It is an especially valuable crop in my country's dry regions because its roots penetrate the soil deeply in their search for moisture. In the wet Caspian provinces we grow enough rice to meet our own needs and to export. As Iran's standard of living has improved, we have rapidly increased our sugar consumption; and although we produce more than 100,000 tons a year of refined beet sugar, it meets only about a third of our needs and we must import the rest. But we are expanding output and are resuming, after a lapse of centuries, the large-scale cultivation of sugar cane in Khuzistan. Before long we expect to be self-sufficient, and it is estimated that ultimately we could produce a million tons of cane sugar annually in Khuzistan alone. Tea is grown along much of our western Caspian littoral. The crop amounts to scarcely more than a third of our annual consumption; but we can easily expand tea production and are taking steps to do so. We raise enough tobacco, mostly in Azerbaijan and in the valleys running down to the Caspian to meet our entire domestic needs and to allow some for export, mainly in the form of cigarettes. Cotton is grown in many parts, and we still export a great deal after filling our own requirements. Fruits and nuts are grown in tremendous quantities, since they thrive almost everywhere in my country, and the harvests are so prolific that large quantities can be exported, especially grapes, raisins, shelled almonds and pistachio nuts. We also export considerable quantities of vegetable gums, especially gum tragacanth, important for pharmaceutical and other products.

Livestock are of tremendous importance in Iran's economy. We have more than half as many sheep as in the entire United States, and millions of goats and cattle. These provide the country's meat and milk together with hides and wool for our industries, including, of course, the making of Persian carpets. We export not only many of these but also much raw wool; hides, including the famous Persian lambskins; and animal intestines, used for sausage casings and other purposes. In spite of the inroads of motor transport and railways, all over the country you still see the faithful donkeys carrying big loads, and there are horses and mules, too. Camels are a common sight nearly everywhere, and we still employ thousands of them in Khorasan province in the north-east and Baluchistan in the south-east. The camel is by general consent an improbable sort of beast; his face, I notice, always wears a thoroughly disdainful and supercilious look, and his general construction confirms the opinion that he must have been put together by a committee. However, he can subsist on the sparse desert vegetation or on almost anything else that comes his way. Before a long trip, his driver will make him thirsty with salt, thus inducing him to drink and store enough water at one session to last for ten days or more. Camels provide valuable milk, meat, and hides, especially for our nomadic tribes; and camel's hair is well known as a choice textile material. Our forests extend over an area about the size of Missouri. They blanket the northern slopes of the Elburz Mountains, facing the Caspian, and some also lie along the Zagros range in the south. Near the Persian Gulf are small forests of tropical type. Also, in villages throughout the country you can see poplar, willow, and plane trees, the last often growing to huge size, along the lanes and water-courses and in gardens and small plantations. They furnish not

only shade but also fuel and house timber for local needs. Our forest trees include oak, walnut, ash, elm, beechwood, ironwood, boxwood, cypress, maple, and honey locust. I have mentioned our manufacture of railway sleepers and matches, and we produce some lumber and timber for building and other construction. In addition we export some timber, mainly in the form of oak for barrel staves and walnut for furniture, but most of our annual timber harvest goes into firewood and charcoal. The truth is that over the centuries we have shamefully misused our forests, which once covered a major part of my country. Indiscriminate grazing, especially by goats, has destroyed millions of young saplings. Improper methods of cutting firewood, and of preparing charcoal, have wasted vast quantities of valuable timber and denuded great areas. But although we have over-exploited many of our forests, others have remained under-utilized, primarily for lack of transport. Now there are signs of improvement, and with the aid of foreign experts we have reorganized the Ministry of Agriculture's Forestry Department, which is actively promoting efficient production of charcoal and other forest products. Both the Government and private interests are manufacturing inexpensive kerosene space heaters and cooking stoves which are superseding the ancient charcoal brazier. We are dipping or pressure-impregnating railway sleepers and other timber products with chemical preservatives to lengthen their life. The Forestry Department forbids the export of timber manufactures if they are made by wasteful methods. And transport improvements are gradually easing the load on the over-worked forests by opening up new ones. Both in the Caspian and along our extensive Persian Gulf coastline we possess important marine resources. As early as 1867, Nasir ed-Din Shah granted a concession to a Russian subject

who established a chain of fishing stations at our principal Caspian ports. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Persian Government switched the concession to another private Russian firm, but a deadlock soon ensued when the Soviet Government desired to take over the enterprise. Eventually a joint Irano-Russian fishing company was established, with ownership equally divided between the two governments. But the agreement worked to our disadvantage, and upon its expiration in 1952 we refused to extend it. In that year we nationalized our Caspian fishing industry. Production, internal sales, and exports are now all in the hands of the nationalized company, which has greatly increased the output of sturgeon and caviare. The major part is exported, two thirds of the sturgeon and half the caviare going to Russia and the rest chiefly to America and Europe. From the Caspian we also obtain other excellent lands of fish, especially white fish, which most Persians prefer to sturgeon; and the streams running into it yield delicious salmon and trout. The warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the adjacent Gulf of Oman abound in fish and other marine wealth, which we have scarcely begun to exploit. A canning factory for sardines and other fish was established at Bandar Abbas during my father's reign, and a more modern cannery was completed there in 1959. Recently a quickfreezing plant and an ice factory have been commissioned at the same port, both specially designed for the needs of the fishing industry. We are planning the modernization of our southern fishing fleets and the establishment of additional inland facilities for transporting and distributing fresh and quick-frozen seafood. As the railway network expands, we shall be able to use large numbers of refrigerated wagons as well as refrigerated motor lorries, and at all major population centres we must build cold-storage plants

for seafood and other perishable commodities. Later we may be able to make the seas yield other spoils, such as seaweed for conversion to animal feed, the offshore oil that I shall discuss later, and pearls. I am especially intrigued by the possibilities in a new high-protein fish flour which has been approved by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and by UNESCO. Made at very low cost from small fish of sardine type, the flour is completely devoid of fishy taste, can easily be transported long distances and stored for long periods, and is a valuable addition to the diet of low-income groups. But though we can do much to develop the resources of our forests and our seas, it is our agriculture that has the biggest potentialities. And here the first big need is land reform. Persia's agricultural land is held by private landlords, by religious and charitable trusts, by the Government, by myself, and by individual farmers who cultivate their own holdings. I find a dangerous tendency to generalize too much about our private landlords. They own about half the arable land but vary greatly in the size of their holdings and in their degree of civic consciousness. A small number of big landlords—no more than a few dozen—own from several to forty or more villages each, and some of the largest are tribal chieftains.

Much of the worst-managed land in Iran is in the hands of the biggest landlords. Typically they are absentees who give little thought to improvement or the welfare of the peasants, and entrust management to professional overseers who may ruthlessly exercise their power over the peasants while the landlords enjoy themselves in Teheran or Europe or America. It is true that among our largest land-holders are exceptional men who display notable social consciousness; but as a class the big private landlords are parasites and, as I shall indicate in a

moment, their days of feudal control are numbered. Quite different are many of the smaller landlords, who may own one or a few villages and not infrequently live in close association with their tenants. While some of them are selfish and self-centred, many take a lively interest in the welfare of the families who live on their land. Often they freely give land for schools, clinics, or mosques, and many of the best-managed villages in Iran are run by them. Although estimates vary, perhaps 20 per cent of our cultivable land has been dedicated in perpetuity for charitable or religious purposes. Its administration is largely in the hands of the clerical hierarchy, but the State reserves the right of control and supervision. The clergy generally appoint lay managers and though many are very conscientious, others sometimes abuse their prerogatives. Taken together, the Government and the Crown own about 10 per cent of the arable land. The Government holdings were acquired, often many centuries ago, through conquest, confiscation, unclaimed tracts, gifts, and purchases. It is cultivated by the peasants, the State playing the role of landlord. Such land is inefficiently administered, and the tenants may fare no better than those who work for private landlords. Through its own agents the Government collects about the same share of the produce as do the private landlords; or in other instances the Government may sub-let land to a private contractor who in turn collects from the peasants. The latter practice is highly detrimental to the peasants, as the contractors have no interest in the land beyond making as much profit as possible. It is in the best interests of the peasants and the Government to dispose of most of this land to individual small proprietors.

The Crown lands are those which belong to me. They were acquired and developed by my father and are now administered by my

Pahlavi Foundation, the revenue supporting charitable and philanthropic projects such as I have described. On the Crown estates a far-reaching programme of land reform is taking place which I shall describe in a moment. Peasant proprietors own the remaining 20 per cent or so of cultivable land. In some cases you find a few peasant holdings in or around a village, while in other instances all the land belongs to individual peasant proprietors. The proportion of peasant proprietors is steadily increasing as land distribution proceeds. In an earlier chapter I explained that, when I was still a student in Switzerland, I became seriously concerned about the plight of Persia's peasants. My ideas continued to develop, and after my father left, I issued a decree handing over all my farm lands to the Government. I intended that they should be administered with the welfare of the peasants in mind, and I stipulated that all revenues be devoted to helping them and others of the common people of my country. But I soon began to receive reports that the Government was using the money to help meet its ordinary expenditure. Not a penny—or, as we say, not a rial—was left over for charitable enterprises. So, after further reflection, I decided to take back the lands and to sell them on easy terms to the peasants who were cultivating them. But good intentions are not enough. I realized that merely to distribute land to the peasants might actually worsen their plight, and that in order to survive as freeholders, they would need credit and technical advice. It was then that I had the idea of using the money from the sale of the lands to form a bank which could in turn provide the new owner-cultivators with loans and other services. I issued in 1951 a decree calling for the division into ownership plots of the more than two thousand villages which I then owned, and followed this in 1952 by the

establishment of the Bank of Development and Rural Cooperatives, usually known simply as the Development Bank. In the same year the distribution actually started in the Pahlavi Domain villages in the Varamin Plain, not far south of Teheran. Soon afterwards, as I have already mentioned, Mossadegh put a stop to the project, but upon his overthrow I was able to resume it. By mid-1960, over 500,000 acres of agricultural land had been divided among some 25,000 villagers. So far as I know, this was the first time in any country that the proceeds from the sale of land have all been ploughed back through a development bank in order to strengthen the position of the cultivators on the distributed land. Perhaps because the programme was unprecedented, some misunderstandings arose. Was it a means for getting rid of unwanted land at a fancy price? Did I profit from the operations of the bank? With maybe too cynical a view of human nature, some thought that the plan must have hidden features, or that there must be an ulterior motive somewhere. In view of its novelty, it is important to understand exactly how the programme works. First the land is divided into parcels of economic size to maintain the farmer and his family, and each is valued by a team of skilled appraisers, their estimate being usually well below the market price. The land is then sold to peasants actually engaged in agriculture in the area: sales to landlords or speculators are strictly forbidden. Let me stress that mine is not a 'give-away' programme, for this would be psychologically the wrong approach. Instead, the land is sold at a discount of 20 per cent below the appraised price, and paid for in twenty-five annual instalments. To help defray administrative costs there is also a nominal one per cent annual service charge for the first fifteen years. Typically the farmer's total monthly payment as an owner is scarcely more than

half the normal rental figure. The Development Bank is non-profit making, with a capital of some £460,000 or $1-3 million of which one-half is paid-in. Although I have contributed to the bank's capital, neither I nor anyone else receives any interest or profits or dividends from the investment. The instalment and service payments augment the funds of the bank and can be used as capital or for services to the new owner-cultivators. Since I intended that the Development Bank should be a service agency rather than a bank in the usual sense, it was natural that considerable losses were incurred in the first few years. To offset these and increase its usefulness, the bank began to engage in 1957 in commercial transactions in Teheran. It now receives deposits in both savings and current accounts, and also makes ordinary commercial loans. These activities have proved so profitable that the bank has wiped out its deficit in spite of its steadily expanding aid to farmers. By mid-1960, about one-third of the immediately-cultivable land in the Pahlavi Domain had been distributed to small farmers. It will take perhaps two more years to distribute the remaining half now ready for use; meanwhile, we shall be developing thousands of additional acres of my lands to the point where they are fit to be turned over. The speed of distribution must be guided primarily by the pace at which supporting services can be developed. I cannot stress too strongly that land distribution can only bring grief to our new farmers unless they are helped to make the best use of their holdings. Of these supporting services, supervised loans are the most important. The Development Bank has made many small operating loans, and has indirectly extended much additional credit, by helping to finance rural cooperatives which in turn aid farmers with loans as well as other services. The Development Bank has purchased many

tractors and combines, and has drilled numerous deep wells. More than a hundred young farmers have been sent to West Germany to study modern agricultural practices. With financial support from the Pahlavi Foundation the entirely new village of Shah Abad, a short distance south-east of Teheran, was created largely through the efforts of the farmers and their families who subsequently received homes there. The Development Bank has constructed some 120 other small homes and extended credit for others. Hundreds of adult education classes have been organized in distributed villages. The Community Development Department of the Ministry of the Interior has sent its trained village workers or dehyars into many of the distributed villages to foster improvements such as schools, roads, and health facilities, and to teach such subjects as hygiene and improved farming practices. All this constitutes only a beginning, but I think a promising one. Primarily because of their improved outlook, but also because of better tools and knowledge, the new farmers on the distributed lands have already increased their output by an average of some 20 per cent. This shows the basic soundness of the programme, which I like to think has provided a demonstration of much more than the mere distribution of land or expanded production. It has shown that in Iran we can create for our farmers a new way of life that brings more satisfaction for themselves and their families, and makes for a stronger and more self-reliant nation. The next step in Iran's land reform is the division of Government-owned agricultural land and the provision of supporting services for the owner-cultivators thus created. In 1955 Parliament passed, and I signed, a law providing for the distribution of these lands. But inevitable delays occurred, primarily because the lands had never been properly surveyed. In 1958, to speed up preparations, I ordered

the army to help in the surveying, and at the end of that year the distribution finally began. As in the case of my own lands, landlords and speculators are barred, only small cultivators being eligible, and the sales are on easy terms with payments spread over twenty-five years. The Government's Agriculture Bank helps the new owner-cultivators with loans and fosters the establishment of rural cooperatives. It is hoped that the Government lands will eventually provide tracts for some 100,000 farm families. But since, as I have said, about half of our total agricultural land is in private hands, it is here that there are the greatest opportunities for reform. Only a few years ago these landlords became very bitter when anybody broached the idea that their vast holdings should be divided, but many have now come to realize that in terms of social justice their position is untenable. Moreover, with the expansion of alternative investment opportunities, land-owning as such no longer commands quite so much profit or prestige-value as formerly. Obsolete production methods are commonly in use on the great estates, and the introduction of modern techniques would require heavy investments, so that many landlords are finding that they can get quicker returns from investing in Persia's expanding industry and commerce. My programme of land distribution was intended not only to benefit the peasants on the Crown lands, but also to set an example for the big private landlords, some of whom have already decided to sell their holdings. But I am under no illusion that they will be moved merely by the power of example. We shall use stronger measures. Specifically, in 1960 I signed a bill designed to reform private land tenure in Iran. The law clearly defines and limits the amount of agricultural land which any private individual or group may hold; the maximum is in general 400 hectares (about 1,000 acres) of irrigated

land or 800 hectares (about 2,000 acres) of non-irrigated land, with certain qualifications such as for mechanized farms or farms irrigated as a unit from a single private water supply. All excess land is to be privately disposed of under standard procedures stipulated by the Government; otherwise the Government will purchase the land at reasonable prices and then sell it in small economic parcels to owner-cultivators. The Government is also to provide the new small owners with credit and services analogous to those extended to the cultivators who have received distributed Crown land. The act likewise contains a number of provisions for improving landlord-tenant relations on farms which do not exceed the specified acreage limits. Certainly the act is not perfect, and experience will no doubt show the need for supplementary legislation and for tightening up the arrangements for administering the law; but at least one can say that as a comprehensive effort to solve the problem of private landlordism, our Land Reform Act of 1960 is absolutely without precedent in Persian history. Persia is making striking progress, politically, economically, and socially. My people refuse to tolerate any longer a situation in which a few great land barons control the lives and destinies of thousands of peasants, many of whom live in utter poverty. So, in addition to distributing the Crown and Government holdings, we are going to divide up the large private estates. While we shall give just compensation, we shall not be deflected from the task of breaking up the big holdings. Those landlords, though rich, are few in number; they know that they cannot stand against the will of the great majority of my people. To improve agriculture and rural life in Persia, our second big need is for better training. I shall later discuss education in general, but here I want to concentrate on the special requirements of agriculture. It is

all very well to talk about freeing the Persian peasant from the grip of the landlord, but once he is independent he must know how to manage his own affairs, to apply the latest techniques, and increasingly to operate and maintain machines. In short our farmers must to some extent become both managers and technicians. We already have considerable training schemes. At Karaj Agricultural Faculty, affiliated with the University of Teheran, we have some 500 students taking a modern four-year course. It is situated in beautiful grounds, about thirty miles west of Teheran, and we are enlarging the staff and buildings, so that the number of students may be doubled and its research programme broadened. We also have a progressive agricultural department affiliated to the University of Shiraz. There are about a dozen agricultural vocational schools at secondary level, and in some 200 rural primary schools we are conducting agricultural training courses in the fifth and sixth years—the longest most of our rural youngsters stay at school. I hope we can increase the amount of agricultural education at both secondary and primary levels, and at the same time start practical farm schools where the latest techniques can be demonstrated to farmers regardless of their age or previous schooling. These schools should teach both elementary principles of farm management and the rudiments of modern agricultural technology. Even illiterate farmers can in this way learn to improve their methods, and later we may also be able to use television. But this is still not enough. The Persian farmer must learn to join with his neighbours in the establishment and operation of community projects such as local public works and rural cooperatives. And this in turn involves leadership, and a willingness on the part of the rank and file to be led and to surrender some degree of individual action for the greater

benefit of all. There is tremendous scope for those with technical and civic training to further local self-help schemes and cooperatives. In 1956 Parliament passed a law establishing village councils as legal entities with substantial borrowing powers, and requiring 5 per cent of every landlord's revenue to be paid over to them. Some of our biggest landlords unfortunately have shirked their responsibilities under this law, just as they have evaded their income tax liabilities, but most have adhered to its provisions; and many, especially those who live in their villages, eagerly support the law and the improvements it makes possible. The main initiative for carrying out the law rests with our Community Development Department. The department has established some 20,000 village councils, trained hundreds of village leaders, sponsored the carrying out of thousands of local improvement projects, and helped set up hundreds of rural cooperatives. But in spite of the department's energetic and widespread efforts, the surface has barely been scratched. I can think of no better investment in my country's future than to triple or quadruple the department's present modest budget. In every one of our villages you see solid, hard-working citizens who respond to democratic leadership. In thousands of Persian villages you find promising local leaders, but they are largely untrained. Development of their capacities depends upon a broad-scale expansion of our leadership-training programme. To carry out local improvement projects, the villagers also need some technical advice, which the Government can give them or they can sometimes find locally. Likewise the villagers need money for certain materials and equipment, and here they can tap the funds available (although still in amounts much too small) under the village council law. Experience has shown that, with these aids, the villagers are perfectly able to

construct roads, bridges, bath-houses, schools, clinics, mosques, wells, dams, or workshops. Furthermore, they can do these jobs during slack seasons when they would otherwise be underemployed. In 1960 we exceeded our target of 500 active rural cooperatives, each with from 200 to 600 members. Most give credit only, but quite a few handle their members' savings accounts, distribute to them fertilizers and other farm necessities, help market their produce, and so on. Some of the cooperatives are very well run, greatly benefiting their members, but others are only fair or worse. In general the success of each can be measured by the initiative and efficiency of its officials, and this again emphasizes the over-riding importance of training. I think I have good reason for my conviction that in Iran, just as in India and other democratic countries, the idea of self-help can make a tremendous difference in the life of the ordinary villager. It enables him to feel that he has a part to play and can help to build his own future, and at the same time he can watch living conditions improve before his eyes. We must always remember that big dams, railways, ports and other spectacular developments touch the life of the ordinary country-dweller only indirectly and belatedly. Essential though the big projects are, it is the village-centred ones which can bring more and earlier benefits to those who most deserve help. The third big need of our agriculture is for more credit on reasonable terms. In the past the villager has had to rely mainly upon the landlord to tide him over to the next harvest. Payment was usually made in kind when harvest time came, and the effective interest rate ran as high as 50 per cent per annum. It is no wonder, with such fantastic terms, that the peasant found himself in perpetual debt; and if by chance he possessed any small bit of land or any draft animals, he was likely to lose them. The Development Bank

and the Agriculture Bank have greatly changed this situation. On the distributed Crown lands, the former set a precedent for supervised credit (that is, credit coupled with technical assistance to safeguard the farmer's solvency and the bank's investment) at reasonable rates. Charges are 6 per cent per annum for direct loans or 9 per cent for loans made through the cooperative credit societies. The Agriculture Bank has in many parts of the country set up branches empowered to make small loans without the red tape of referring them to Teheran; and it has lent large sums through the credit societies it has fostered. Moreover, both the Development Bank and the Agriculture Bank have supplied a yardstick which has influenced the whole pattern of agricultural credit in Iran. Landlords and peasants throughout the country are becoming aware that these two banks are making agricultural loans at reasonable rates, and this competition is gradually forcing changes in our more antiquated and exploitative credit practices. But so far we are providing only a fraction of the amount of credit needed if our small farmers are to stand on their own feet. As more of my lands are distributed, the Development Bank must steadily expand its volume of the loans which are indispensable to successful farm ownership. And as Government lands and private holdings are divided up, the Agriculture Bank must tremendously enlarge its services. Although numerically it has made a great many small loans, too much of its funds have in the past gone into big loans to landlords who have little real need of Government credit assistance, and who sometimes use the loans for purposes having nothing to do with farming. Affecting our whole banking picture is the gratifying growth of private banks. I see no reason why here, as in America and other countries, they should not invade the field of agricultural credit

on a large scale. But for small agricultural loans, the Government must always provide the main initiative. And if these loans are to achieve their social objectives, we must get over the idea that they should be self-liquidating. It costs almost as much to handle a small loan as a big one; and in lending small amounts at reasonable rates to thousands of farmer applicants the Government can never make a profit or even completely avoid loss. I do not for a moment propose that we should condone failure to repay, but even if all loans are repaid at the due date the Government will have to subsidize the programme if it is to achieve its social objectives. America and other countries have learned the same lesson. The fourth big need of our agriculture is water, for Persia is usually defined as an arid country, and the water question is ever present in our minds. Mountain snow provides our main source—paradoxical though this may sound, the supply is greater than we ever use—but, in addition, the plains and lower mountain slopes also have some snow or rain. Our rivers are mostly snow- fed and originate in our own mountains, a situation very different, for example, from that of Egypt, which must import practically all of its water by way of the Nile. Two factors combine to reduce the value of our water supplies for agriculture. One is erosion, which is both a cause and a result of lack of water at the times when it is needed.



I visit a sports club in Teheran.



An Isfahan silversmith at work side by side with a fellow craftsman.



Carpet weaving, Tabriz.

Since our mountains are mostly barren of vegetation, the water runs off them too fast in the spring. This in turn causes more erosion, both in the mountains and on the plains. Over-grazing and deforestation have also, as I stated, aggravated the problem of erosion and therefore of irregular water supplies. The other factor is salinization of our water. Irrigation water, unlike virgin rainwater, usually contains a certain percentage of dissolved salts which the water has picked up on its way to the fields. Also, salt deposits often underlie the fields themselves; and if the land is overirrigated (many people do not realize that it is just as easy to overirrigate land as to under-irrigate it), or if soil drainage is poor, salts may be brought to the surface by a sort of percolating action. Thus salts may accumulate in the upper soil in concentrations dangerous to plants. In the United States and various other countries as well as here, such salt accumulations have caused many irrigated farms to be abandoned. But full rehabilitation is often possible. Controlled amounts of irrigation water may be applied to leach the salts out of the upper soil and carry them out of reach of the growing crops, though for this to be successful, drainage may first have to be improved by tiling or other means. To drain a farm well may cost as much as to irrigate it well, but may be entirely worth it. Actually many of our soils are so porous that natural drainage suffices if irrigation water is properly applied, and scientific methods can commonly prevent crop damage from salts or cure conditions arising from previous abuse. Essentially what I have been saying means that our problem is not lack of water, but lack of water of the right kind at the right times and places. A number of remedies are at hand. Firstly, we can reduce erosion by planting forests and other vegetation and protecting the growth against the depredations of man and ani-

mals. Secondly, we can build dams to cancel out seasonal variations in river flow; this prevents floods, stores water for irrigation, and further reduces erosion. Thirdly, we can improve and extend our unique system of *qanats* which convey water underground from its mountain sources to outlets near the fields where it is used; about 80 per cent of all our irrigated land is supplied from underground sources, mostly by way of the *qanats*. Fourthly, we can drill wells, especially deep wells with pumps driven by diesel engines or electric motors. Fifthly, we can improve irrigation to reduce evaporation, seepage, and over-irrigation. Sixthly, we can remedy poor soil drainage and can wash away objectionable salt concentrations and prevent their formation in the future. Seventhly, we can plant crops which tolerate salty water and soil; for example, lucerne, cotton, sugar beet, asparagus, celery, spinach, various grasses, and certain of our famous melons are comparatively resistant to salts. Eighthly, we can find ways of processing salty water to make it fit both for agriculture and for human consumption. Ninthly, as I shall explain below, we can increase output per cultivated acre and thus greatly expand the average crop productivity per unit of water. In practice we are applying all nine of these remedies, although to varying extent and in no case as fully as I anticipate for the future. The Ministry of Agriculture's Forestry Department is engaged in extensive reafforestation; and, particularly in areas where mechanized equipment is coming into use, our farmers are learning the value and the methods of soil-conservation practices. I described in Chapter 7 some of our larger irrigation projects. The Development Bank, the Agriculture Bank, and the Plan Organization are all making funds available for building and repairing *qanats* and for drilling wells and installing pumps; and both these agencies and

the Ministry of Agriculture are assisting the work with technical advice. The Ministry of Agriculture is teaching improved irrigation and drainage practices and the growing of salt-tolerant crops; and both it and the Karaj Agricultural Faculty are conducting research on these subjects. The question of freshening large quantities of salt water is engaging the attention of many countries, and in 1958 an international conference, meeting at the University of Teheran, discussed this and other problems of arid lands. Some good-sized cities (for example Al Kuwait, capital of Kuwait, and Doha, capital of Qatar, both of which countries are washed by the Persian Gulf) now depend upon fresh water manufactured from sea water, and by means of the vacuum-flask evaporation process, hundreds of thousands of gallons of fresh water can be efficiently produced each day with a purity so great that salt has to be added to it to give it a natural taste! I think major scientific advances are inevitable in this field; and I have no doubt that within a few decades industrially processed water will in countries like Iran be serving certain agricultural as well as domestic needs. But what is the most important single means of solving our problem of agricultural water, and at the same time increasing national agricultural output? My answer is the introduction of improved cropping and husbandry practices. Here, then, is the fifth big need of Persia's agriculture. Through comparatively simple changes in methods, we can achieve wonderful increases in our total production. At present only about one out of every three acres of our farmland is actually under cultivation in any given year. Animal and chemical fertilizers are commonly lacking and, as in a number of other Asian countries, animal manure is used mainly as fuel. Farming tools are poor handmade articles of wood and iron. Inefficient wooden ploughs, with

either an iron-tipped wooden ploughshare or a simple iron spike for a ploughshare, are pulled by oxen or occasionally other draft animals including water buffaloes in our moister regions. Sowing and reaping are generally done by hand, and animals are usually used to trample the grain on a village threshing floor of packed mud. Major changes are needed, but exactly what new methods should be introduced, and how can we persuade millions of farmers, most of whom are still illiterate, to change their time-honoured ways? The answer lies in vigorous agricultural research and extension work. For example, why do we allow so much of our cultivated land to lie idle? It is only partly a question of water, and is due mainly to lack of nitrogen. The farmer allows the soil to lie fallow for two to four years—about three years on the average—to give time for vegetable matter to decay, thus providing nitrogen in a form plants can assimilate. This tradition is especially wasteful because the land is generally left unattended so that moisture is lost through evaporation and weed growth, the weeds also taking much of the scarce nitrogen. The best way to break this production-retarding cycle is by the use of fertilizers. These, especially chemical ones, not only quickly replace the nitrogen in the soil but also provide other needed elements, particularly phosphorous. In the past our farmers have not understood the advantages of fertilizers; and they have lacked the money to purchase them or to buy kerosene for use instead of manure as domestic fuel. Fertilizers, together with wise crop rotation, can virtually eliminate the need for letting land lie fallow, and greatly increase the average annual yield per unit of land and of water. Preliminary tests under Iranian conditions indicate that in rice cultivation, for example, proper fertilization can easily yield a 50 per cent increase in output per acre. We are beginning to manufacture fer-

tilizers and distribute them at a price even small cultivators can afford to pay in cash or through loans obtained on reasonable terms from their cooperative credit societies. I am sure our farmers can be educated to appreciate such advantages. We can also achieve big advances in production through better soil preparation and seeding. Yields increase about 25 per cent on row crops, especially cotton and sugar beet, when a simple animal-drawn mouldboard plough of modern design is used rather than our obsolete ones. Yields rise even further with better seed-bed preparation after ploughing. Moreover, the present practice of hand seeding on poorly-prepared land requires about three times as much seed as would a simple mechanical seeder employed on well-prepared land. Better planting methods alone would save around 200,000 tons of seed wheat and 75,000 tons of seed barley annually. Studies by Japanese experts indicate that if in our rice fields we combine better soil preparation and seeding practices with proper fertilization, we can easily double output. Improved methods of soil preparation also stretch available water supplies—in two ways. Firstly, well-prepared soil loses less water through evaporation and at the same time yields richer harvests. Thus with less water you get more crops, and with the saved water you can irrigate additional acres. Secondly, the modern techniques of mechanized dry farming save water. For thousands of years our farmers have practised dry farming, but mechanized dry farming is another story. In many parts of Iran mechanized equipment can now cultivate large tracts using practically the same dry-farming techniques employed in comparatively arid parts of America, Australia, and other countries. Mechanized dry farming can be applied to thousands of acres of our land which until recently was believed to need irrigation if it was to be cultivated at all. Actually,

our farmers are using more and more mechanical equipment for conventional and irrigated agriculture as well as for dry farming. We now have around 5,000 farm tractors at work, and the number is increasing every day. Particularly as you travel through Azerbaijan province in the north-west, the Caspian provinces, Khuzistan province in the south, and the fertile plains around Teheran, you see many large tractors, multiple deep ploughs, self-propelled combines, and other such equipment at work in the fields. In fact the old conception of the Middle Eastern peasant with the wooden plough is rapidly becoming dated: hand methods still predominate in my country, but the march toward mechanization is on. We still suffer a tremendous annual loss of crops due to weeds, pests, and disease. In some parts of Azerbaijan province, for example, farmers may lose as much as 80 per cent of their crops because of noxious perennial weeds; and locusts and other insect pests and plant diseases take their toll of grains, cotton, vegetables, fruits, and nuts. Some control work is being done, but much more is needed. Our farmers still plant many of their crops with obsolete and inferior strains of seed which they save from previous harvests. This is another cause of low productivity. The limited work that has been done on seed improvement, however, has given excellent results. Our farmers have already shown much interest in new and better seeds and varieties of crops, for when demonstration plots of old and new are planted side by side, they can see with their own eyes the dramatic difference in yield. We must do much more of this kind of demonstration. Some of the principles I have been describing apply equally to the growing of fruits and nuts; although we have for many centuries been famous for these crops, we have not kept up with recent methods. For example, we have been slow to adopt the most

improved varieties, we rarely fertilize the trees, and each year we forfeit thousands of tons of harvests through failure to spray properly. We produce lavish quantities of wonderful fruits and nuts, but the fact remains that you occasionally see apples and other foreign fruit on sale here—surely a ridiculous example of carrying coals to Newcastle. We have some excellent livestock breeds; for instance, our indigenous fat-tailed sheep give superior meat and wool (including wool especially suited for our fine carpets), and contrive to live well under conditions in which some foreign breeds would starve to death. Yet we can do much more to introduce new varieties of animals and birds. Already we are building up some excellent herds of brown Swiss dairy cattle; and 'American' chickens (especially of the New Hampshire Red variety) and 'American' eggs (much larger than our traditional Persian eggs) are more and more popular, and our farmers find that they make better profits from them. Our livestock and poultry need to be more scientifically fed; and Persian farmers, like those abroad, are learning to plant cover crops such as rye, barley, and clover that yield valuable animal feed and at the same time help prevent erosion. We have an excellent veterinary service that reaches all parts of the country, but we must do still more to control animal parasites and diseases. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education, the faculties of agriculture and of veterinary science at the University of Teheran, the Pahlavi Foundation, the Development Bank, the Agriculture Bank, the Community Development Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Bureau of Standards of the Ministry of Commerce—all are among the organizations that are working in Iran on agricultural research or extension or both. To their efforts must be added those of foreign groups that I shall mention later. But we must face the

fact that even these combined endeavours will not change Persia's agriculture overnight. For without tyranny you need time in order to alter old habits, and nowhere is this more true than in our agriculture. Much research remains to be done to adapt the principles of modern agricultural science to Persia's particular conditions. And when we possess so many thousands of villages, it is no small task to carry the latest agricultural findings to them all. Yet year by year the work is expanding. In addition to turning out better agricultural produce more efficiently, we must adopt better ways of processing and storage, especially in the villages. Here, then, is our agriculture's sixth big need. Important in this sphere are the grain elevators and the canneries that I mentioned previously, and the work of the Bureau of Standards in raising the quality of our exports; but we can do much more. Our agriculture's seventh big need concerns improved communications between our 50,000 villages and the outside world. Suppose in a certain village, which is producing little more than it requires for its own subsistence, you manage to double output through improved techniques. What is the use if you cannot get the crops to market? Should our farmers apply the latest methods only to see their harvests rot for want of transport? Earlier I described some of the steps we are taking to improve internal and external communications, and in passing I have touched on the subject again in this chapter; but its importance can hardly be over-stressed. This leads me to the eighth big need of agriculture in Iran—namely, to bring up to date the life of the village itself. Here we must not overlook the fact that our villages already possess many attractive features; the mere mention of a Persian village conjures up in my mind peaceful tree-lined lanes, a stream flowing through the centre, patterns of sun and shade, colourful carpets and

hangings, utensils of burnished copper and brass, orchards, piles of grain and dried fruit, donkeys in their trappings, old men resting, women chattering, and children at play. In spite of my concern about the poverty, ill health, and illiteracy of many of our villagers, I must admit that they rarely go hungry and that the simplicity of their lives has great value. There is something natural and organic about the pattern of their existence, where the family unit provides the sturdy basis of society and where social relations are more informal than in our towns. Throughout their lives our villagers are mainly concerned with growth, whether of crops or animals or children. Many people would no doubt find the routine of village life much too slow and uneventful. During most of the year the men spend their days working the land. Towards evening they come back and maybe drink a cup of tea in the local tea-house. Then they go to bed early and rise when the cock crows. On Friday, the day of rest, they may go to the mosque or sit and smoke a pipe in the sun or, if it is too hot, in the shade. Every ten or twenty minutes a man may say a word or exchange some simple idea about the weather, or his crop, or his troubles, or a visit a friend has paid to one of the holy places. The women may go to the fields with their men, or they may attend to nursing their babies or washing or cooking or carpet-making. During the winter, when in many parts of the country the land is not worked, the cycle of life becomes slower. The men visit the tea-houses more often, and families stay most of the time inside their small houses. While such a life breeds solid character, I want to see our villagers enjoy more amenities and more intellectual stimulus. Only thus can they be equipped to play their role as modern agriculturalists and progressive citizens of a democracy. I have already mentioned the need for more village pub-

lic works such as electric power systems, roads, schools, and health facilities. These are important not only economically in increasing agricultural output, but also culturally in improving the life of the village. Foreign precedents, and our own more limited experience, show that electrification can virtually transform rural life. Roads not only help in moving crops to market, but also they broaden social contacts. Schools directly increase productivity, but also they broaden intellectual horizons. Health facilities enable men to work longer and harder, but also they give a sense of security and well-being. The great majority of our villages have at least one community radio set, and nowadays many have more; of this fact I have obtained direct evidence, because as I pilot my planes around the country I can readily discern the radio aerials of each village I fly over. The spread of electrification will further encourage farmers to acquire their own radios. Electricity will also lighten many tasks for villagers and their womenfolk; for example, electric motors can power small machines for mining flour, pressing oilseeds, spinning and weaving cotton and wool, and woodworking. Electricity will foster these and other small industries that will improve the villagers' productivity and standard of living.

As literacy becomes more general, I want all our villages, or at least all those of any size, to establish reading rooms where villagers can read good books and periodicals on both practical and literary subjects. In addition travelling libraries should circulate throughout the country. The larger villages should be encouraged to establish permanent cinemas, while travelling cinemas, such as already reach many places in Persia, should penetrate every section of the country on appointed rounds. Every sizable village should have its Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and other clubs. In all these programmes I expect our

village councils and community development workers to play a leading role. Our millions of rural folk possess wonderful qualities, not the least of which is their patriotism. All observers agree that they are basically intelligent, mechanically adept, able to assimilate practical knowledge quickly, and eager to learn. A true test of the patriotism and selflessness of our more sophisticated city people is the extent to which they are prepared to help our villagers learn to help themselves. In this chapter I have spoken of the eight big needs of Persia's agriculture: reform in land tenure; more and better training and technical advice; ample agricultural credit at reasonable rates; more water of the right kind at the right times and places; progressive cropping and husbandry practices; improved means of storing and processing our agricultural produce; easier rural communications; and better physical and intellectual conditions in our villages. Thus I hope I have demonstrated that Iran's agricultural problem is not just a great loose abstraction: it is divided into discernible parts, and all of our citizens, and indeed everybody interested in the Middle East, should know what those parts are. I am delighted at the ever-growing enthusiasm for agrarian reform in my country; but vague sentimental emotion is not enough. What we need is action, and action must be based upon precise knowledge and wise planning. My heart is with our village people, and as I think of their future I believe I see a magnificent vista lying ahead.

Chapter 10

The Eternal Question of Women

Not so long ago we sent an attractive young Persian woman as a delegate to the meetings of the Afro-Asian Women's Conference being held in Colombo, Ceylon. When she returned she reported that one of the Colombo newspapers, in its coverage of the meetings, had given its female readers this exhortation: 'Women of the world unite you have nothing to lose but your husbands!' According to another newspaper article on the conference, 'Women are seen everywhere, in parliaments, in governments, on scooters, on television, everywhere except where they should really be, in their homes, scrubbing floors, taking care of their beloved husbands and children.' Perhaps because women are such paradoxical creatures, the question of their proper place everywhere gives rise to lively discussion. This is especially so in a country like mine, where woman's role is changing so fast. In this chapter I want to speak of the women in my own life and then go on to a more general treatment of woman. Now I know I shall be forgiven

if I assert that a king is as much entitled as a peasant to a degree of family privacy. All of my readers know of regimes which refuse even to recognize the privacy of man and wife; but civilized countries happily regard the intimate relations of married couples as their business alone. I apply the same principle to my own married life. During my studies in Switzerland I had little chance to become acquainted with girls, for, as I have mentioned earlier, my guardian limited my contacts with the gentler sex. But following my return from Europe, and towards the end of my studies at the Military College, Reza Shah decided to provide for me a suitable bride. In doing so I think he had a double motive: he wanted to find a princess of good descent to marry his son; and at the same time he sought, through a marriage link with another royal family, to cement relations with a nearby state. My father had evidently seen pictures of the lovely Princess Fawzia of Egypt. With his characteristic forthrightness—perhaps better adapted to engineering projects than to affairs of the heart -he started an investigation. First he had the girl's pedigree checked. Then he had his legation in Cairo contact the Egyptian Government who in turn got in touch with Egypt's royal family. My father officially inquired whether the princess would be available as a wife for his son. Negotiations rapidly progressed, and the first thing I knew I was betrothed. That was in 1938. Up to that point I had never laid eyes on the girl. So it was arranged that I should go to Cairo to see her. There we had about two weeks to become acquainted with each other. Meanwhile certain legal and constitutional matters had to be attended to, and the marriage was officially registered both in Teheran and in Cairo. My father next took care of the difficulty that, under our Constitution, the parents of any future crown prince must both

be of Persian origin. My father had our Parliament pass a law granting the young lady this status. The marriage ceremony was conducted in Cairo by an eminent cleric. None of my immediate family was present, but a mission of Persian dignitaries had come from Teheran for the occasion and were on hand for the wedding. I then brought my bride home. I should explain that in Islamic countries the formal steps in entering into a marriage are in principle much the same as in the West, although timing differs in part. In Persia, for instance, it has long been common to have a period of engagement that serves much the same purpose as in the West, although here the engaged couple seldom spend much time alone together. The engagement frequently lasts for a few months but, again as in the West, may go on for two or three years or more. Then come the civil registration of the marriage and the religious ceremony; these generally, but not necessarily, take place on the same day. Finally, there are the wedding festivities, comparable with the wedding reception after a Western marriage.

However in Persia the festivities, instead of occurring on the same day as the formal wedding ceremony, are usually postponed for a respectable period of time that may run into weeks or even months; during this interval it is considered improper for the couple to live together. But when at last it comes, the wedding celebration is often really spectacular. Especially in our villages, it may go on for ten days or more! Musicians play, food and non-alcoholic drinks abound, and the fortunate newly-weds receive presents of rice, young lambs, chickens, and much else. Then the happy couple start their intimate life together, usually either in the house of the groom's parents or, if fortune shines upon them, in a home of their own. My bride and I had

our main wedding ceremony in Teheran. In spite of the pomp and glitter, the festivities were similar in spirit to those in a Persian village, although (such is the pressure of modern life even in my country) somewhat more hurried. After the wedding celebrations we lived for a time in the Marble Palace, that beautiful structure which my father had constructed of translucent greenish stone from Yezd. Later we stayed for awhile in one of my father's summer residential villas in the Teheran suburbs, until my present town palace was completed. The war years had now come, and Teheran was turned into a giant military camp occupied by alien powers. My father was forced to abdicate, and I assumed his heavy responsibilities. Needless to say I had little time for normal family life, nor was the atmosphere of the capital or the country in those years exactly conducive to pleasure trips or recreation. My wife took part in certain welfare activities, but one must remember that in those years such services were still in their infancy. Perhaps the happiest point in that marriage was the birth in 1940, of my beloved daughter the Princess Shahnaz. She in turn gave birth, in 1959, to Princess Mahnaz, who is my only grandchild. For reasons still obscure to medical science, Queen Fawzia bore only one child; thus unfortunately no male heir issued from our marriage. Under the Persian Constitution the crown must pass by direct line of descent to a male heir. This rules out not only my daughter but also my three sisters. The Constitution further stipulates that no one descended from the previous Qajar dynasty is eligible to become king. Since two of my father's wives were of Qajar blood, my half-brothers who are their sons are ineligible. In fact I had only one brother not related to the Qajar line, and to my sorrow he was to die in an aeroplane crash in 1954. With these limitations it is no wonder

that my advisers felt it important for my wife to bear a son. It is true that the Constitution might have been amended, but the climate of opinion seemed opposed to tampering with the provisions relating to the royal succession. Besides, I was young and, quite apart from the constitutional factor, I wanted more children. When Queen Fawzia went to Egypt on an extended stay, we decided on a divorce. After the divorce more than two years went by before I acquired another wife. As in any country many people, especially women, were interested in match-making; and the names and endowments of numerous candidates were mentioned to me. In 1950 I heard of a girl named Soraya Esfandiari, and I was much impressed by what I learned of her. In due course I sent my sister Princess Shams to visit Miss Esfandiari, who was then staying in England. My sister sent back a glowing account, and around the end of the year the future Queen Soraya and I became engaged.

My fiancee's father was a Bakhtiari tribesman, and her mother was German. The father came from what had been a line of chieftains in the great Bakhtiari tribe, one of Persia's largest. Because of depredations of the tribes, my father had disarmed them and placed them under the control of the central Government, thus depriving the chiefs of much of their former power. Some of the more rebellious chiefs in fact spent considerable time in Teheran jails as guests of my father. But they still exercised influence in the internal government of the tribes, and many owned numerous villages and huge flocks and herds. Many of the chieftains (and also some of their women) were highly educated, and it was usual for them to send their sons to study in Europe. Young Mr. Esfandiari studied in Germany, where he met, fell in love with, and married Soraya's mother. As I recall it, his father-

in-law, although a German citizen, had lived for some years in Czarist Russia as a factory manager, but had returned to Germany at about the time of the First World War. Mr. Esfandiari brought his wife back to Persia, where they lived in Isfahan, the capital of the province which the Bakhtiaris have traditionally considered their main home. It was in Isfahan that their first child, my future wife, was born in 1931. Their other child, a son, arrived some years later. Although Soraya at first went to a German school in Isfahan, and German as well as Persian was spoken in her home, hers was a real Persian girlhood. Of our larger cities, Isfahan is perhaps most representative of old Persia; and there, in an atmosphere steeped in so many centuries of history, the young girl went about her daily life. Presently her parents transferred her to a Persian school, where she continued through the tenth grade. It is true that while she was still quite young her parents took her on occasional trips to Europe, but her main impressions were formed in the Persian provincial capital and on journeys with her father to his villages and to encampments of the migratory members of his tribe. For her further schooling the parents decided to send their daughter to Switzerland, just as my father had sent me, and there she lived a happy school life for two years. In addition to Persian and German, Soraya now spoke excellent French and a little English; but she wanted to improve the latter. It was arranged that she should spend the summer of 1950 in England. After my sister's visit, however, Soraya came directly back to Persia, where our engagement was soon announced. We hoped to be married without delay, but now a sad thing happened. My lovely young fiancee was gravely stricken with typhoid fever. As the disease worsened, her very survival seemed in doubt. For weeks I kept an anxious vigil, but at length Soraya recovered. Yet the disease

left her very weak. So much time had gone by that we decided to have the civil and religious ceremonies and a brief wedding celebration all on the same day. The poor girl was so weak she could hardly carry her wedding dress and train, and she almost fainted during the festivities in our honour. It was in January 1951 that I brought my bride to my winter residential palace in Teheran. The honeymoon in the Western sense has not been traditional in Persia; instead, the relatives of the bride and groom commonly escort them into the place where they will live, and they begin their conjugal life there. Soraya and I were sufficiently Westernized to have looked forward to starting our life together with a honeymoon trip; but that plan had been cut short by the rising political tension in the country. A few days after our marriage, Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated, as I have related earlier. Mossadegh came to power, and alien forces began to threaten my country's future. I have described how eventually I found it wise to go abroad to Baghdad and Rome with my wife, but that was in the very special circumstances I have already mentioned; it could hardly be called a honeymoon trip! But perhaps I could say that that trip presaged the final shattering of Mossadegh's political honeymoon with his followers.

All of our patriots now knew where his policies were leading us; and as you recall, it was during my trip that Mossadegh and his strange bedfellows were overthrown. But this was six months after our second wedding anniversary. What about all those intervening days and their effect upon our married life? Certainly those were not very happy times, either for my country or for my wife or me. At first we all had hopes that Mossadegh would develop a positive policy. But as the months went by I received more and more disquieting

reports of the fruits of negativism. The country's economic and social development was coming to a halt. The people were upset and afraid. And dangerous subversive organizations were infiltrating into our national affairs and almost taking over the country. But worst of all, from my personal point of view, was the strain and suspense of waiting for the proper time to take counter-action. I had detailed reports on every phase of our critical situation; all necessary information was at hand for me to perceive the exact dimensions of the horrible dangers that faced us as a nation. But my father had bequeathed to me at least a little of his marvellous sense of timing, and I knew that premature action might be worse than none at all. To strike too soon might merely seal the doom of a country that was already heading towards disaster. I could not act alone or with only a few followers; I had to feel that the country as a whole was behind me and ready to rally for national regeneration. The rank and file of my people needed time to perceive the danger and to search their own hearts as to what should be done. As the months went by I perceived one powerful trend more and more counter-balanced by another. It was as if the scales of justice were weighing our national destiny. On the one hand the condition of my country went down, down, down. But on the other, my people began to mobilize their energies and their allegiances. It gave me a strange and exhilarating sensation. At the same time that things were reaching their worst they were also getting better. The lowest point was yet to come, but recovery was already on the way. It made me think of my young wife as she had marshalled her courage to pass the critical point in her struggle with typhoid. And it reinforced my faith that a force stronger than mere mankind was helping to shape our destiny. I concluded that my destiny had already been designed and

ordered by God, and that I must carry it out. But to carry out anything you must do something. You must act. You must take decisions.

Some kings and statesmen have wined and dined while waiting for God to act on their behalf. But for me at least, that won't work. In the first place it would give me indigestion. But beyond that, according to my philosophy no man is entitled to, or receives, divine support unless he exerts himself faithfully and energetically enough to deserve it. It is not sufficient to believe that in the cosmic universe there exists God's grand design; one must link one's self with the divine plan and do one's utmost to help carry it out. For me that meant political action, economic reconstruction, social change. My wife thought less of politics than of our being together. As the country began to get back on its feet, Soraya and I found it possible to travel. I have already mentioned that among our trips was the state visit to Russia in 1956, when Mr. Krushchev and other Soviet leaders gave us a most cordial welcome. Likewise our travels took us to the United States, India, Turkey, Spain, the Lebanon, and other countries. While these journeys were primarily for the purpose of cultivating neighbourly relations with other countries, they also provided a sort of delayed honeymoon for my wife and me. As with wives everywhere, Soraya had many ideas about fixing up our home. I had thought that my winter residential palace was in pretty good condition, but she was forever having various parts of it renovated. She didn't want to waste money on expensive luxuries, but only to have everything scrubbed and tidy and freshly painted. She repeated the process at my summer palace. During the seven years that Queen Soraya and I were married, she became ever more active in our developing social services. For example, I well remember her charming indignation after

she had visited one of our older orphanages which had been under corrupt and inefficient management. With eyes flashing she spoke of the plight of the children in that orphanage, and of how much she wished I would do something to improve their lot immediately. At once I had my Pahlavi Foundation take over the orphanage and reconstruct it, after which the Foundation-affiliated Soraya Society supervised its operation. Rarely have I seen a more dramatic human transformation than among the children of that orphanage. You can therefore imagine the grief which came to both of us when, for reasons of state, I found it necessary to divorce Queen Soraya. As the years went by, no child was born, and increasingly I realized that the high interests of the nation required an heir. Although some people from a sense of sympathy and kindness suggested that our marriage should come first, I knew that my chief responsibility must take precedence. My advisers concurred with me, and the inevitable result was the divorce action of March 1958. After that I lived alone in Teheran. I realized that the divorce would have been senseless unless I took steps to acquire a new Queen, but somehow I was in no mood to rush the matter. The names of a great variety of young ladies were put forward as candidates, and the world Press carried many rumours of my purported marriage plans. My intention was to find a bride who, in addition to producing children, would at all times share what I hope is my enduring social consciousness. She should understand the condition and the emotions and aspirations of the least fortunate of our citizens, and as a woman she should devote herself tirelessly to helping them toward a better future. One day my daughter, the Princess Shahnaz, her eyes even brighter than usual, told me that she and her husband had become acquainted with a young lady who,

they thought, was qualified for the responsibilities of a queen. My son-in-law had for some time been interesting himself in the problems of our students abroad, and it seems that he had met the young lady in question when she came to his office to discuss the continuation of her studies in France. Her name, said my daughter, was Miss Farah Diba, and she was twenty-one years old. Naturally I wanted to know something of the young lady's family background, her upbringing, her education, and her personality. On her father's side her people came from a famous old family of Tabriz in our province of Azerbaijan, and her ancestors on her mother's side were of a respectable religious family from our Caspian province of Gilan. In Persian the name 'Diba' literally means silk. Miss Diba's paternal grandfather had attended military school in Czarist Russia and had served as an officer in our army in Qajar times. Her father had some education in Russia and then went to France, where he studied law and received the Bachelor of Law degree. Then, deciding to prepare for a military career, he completed the officers' training course at St. Cyr. After his return to Iran, Miss Diba's father was commissioned in our army, which assigned him to legal duties in Teheran. Here he met his future wife, whose parents had moved with her to the capital. Queen Farah was born in 1938. She was an only child; but living in the same house with her was another only child, the son born to her uncle and his wife; and the two youngsters grew up much as a brother and sister.



Talking with children at an orphanage near Teheran.



The launching of an oil tanker named after my father, Amsterdam, 1959.



A view of the Great Square, Isfahan.



The Shah Goli Lake at Tabriz.

The little girl had great affection for her father, and much sadness came to her upon his death from cancer when she was only ten years old. Her distraught mother succeeded for a time in concealing the father's death from their daughter by telling her that he had gone to Paris for medical treatment; but the girl's grief knew no bounds when she realized that the family were wearing mourning costumes and the servants told her the truth. Farah's first schooling was in the Italian School in Teheran, where she remained until she was ten years of age. Then her mother enrolled her in the Jeanne d'Arc School, another girls' school in Teheran, which she attended until she was sixteen. At the latter school she captained the basketball team, which managed to win in most of the inter-school competitions. But Farah's most important experiences at the Jeanne d'Arc School had to do with art. One of her teachers influenced her to begin painting, especially in water-colours. She perceived new vistas and gained a new ability to express herself artistically. She also acquired new poise. Previously Farah had been a very bashful and shy girl, but her teachers helped her to find herself. She assisted in the care of the school laboratories, she went on school picnics, and she began to feel at ease in her school activities and her social contacts. She benefited from the strict discipline maintained in the school, and she acquired added respect for such values as honesty, reliability, and punctuality. Farah completed her secondary schooling at the Razi School, a private co-educational Persian school in which most of the teachers are French and all instruction—except naturally in Persian language and literature—is given in French. She ranked at the top of her class and she enjoyed all her subjects; especially she liked mathematics and science. At the school she was Scout leader for a group of small boys from another

French-language school. Farah had a great love of the outdoors and of outdoor scenes mountains, villages, farm life, and the sea—that inspired her sketching and painting. Her artistic propensities fitted in naturally with those of her architect uncle, and he inspired in her an interest in his field. Although she had been thinking of studying bacteriology or medicine, she decided upon architecture. So off she went to the Ecole Speciale d' Architecture, where she studied for two years. In the first year her work included much charcoal and other sketching, with special stress on good proportions; and she took other courses, including the study of mathematics and the strength of materials. In the second year she studied perspective drawing and did many water-colour paintings and bas-reliefs of classical architectural masterpieces and modern structures. She also designed some buildings, especially little houses. The school had about 250 students, many of whom lived in hostels; but Farah had lodgings in the 'College Neerlandais'. Discipline in the school was strict; she and the other students had to sign in every morning except Sunday and, apart from Thursday afternoons and the daily lunch periods, to remain all day until five o'clock; indeed, Farah often stayed until six or seven in the evening. Her own interest and the constructive influence of her teachers motivated her to work hard. Yet the atmosphere of the school was pleasant and informal, especially in the drawing classes. Farah mixed well socially, and she was also able to pursue her music. For eight years she had studied piano in Teheran, and it was her great joy to go to many concerts in Paris. In 1959 Farah returned to Teheran for her summer vacation. It was then that my son-in-law and my daughter met her. They invited her for dinner, and she and Princess Shahnaz soon found that they had many mutual friends and common interests. Farah was asked

to come again, and my daughter arranged that I should be present. Actually I had met Farah a few months earlier at a Paris reception for our Persian students; the reception was crowded and I must admit that I didn't remember her! I cannot object when she makes fun of me for this! But it was at my son-in-law's house that I had my first good discussion with her. It was only about a week later that I proposed to Farah. Journalists love to invent things, and in many countries the Press carried statements to the effect that I did my proposing up in the air while taking her on a plane ride. I suppose some reporters were trying to tie together my fondness for aircraft with my fondness for a girl. Actually it was in my son-in-law's home that I proposed to her. Of course, we then had a number of further meetings. Farah wanted to buy her trousseau in Paris, and to avoid elaborate protocol we decided that she would go in a private capacity and that we would defer announcing our engagement until after her return. Some of her relatives accompanied her on her journey. Two days after Farah arrived back in Teheran, we announced our engagement. About three weeks later, on 21 December, 1959, we were married according to the solemn Moslem ritual. In accordance with Persian wedding tradition, during the ceremony Farah twice remained silent when she was asked if she would become my wife; only when the question was put a third time did she consent. We were joined in wedlock on the afternoon of the 21st, and that same evening my Queen and I presided at a large banquet and reception in the Oriental splendour of the old Golestan palace. Affairs of state delayed our honeymoon for a few days, but then we had a long-awaited time together on the Caspian. Even before our engagement I had explained to Farah that as Queen she would face responsibilities strikingly different from those she had known

as a student of architecture. After our marriage she wholeheartedly devoted herself to carrying her royal burdens; and I found much inspiration in the deep interest she took in social welfare problems. But at the same time she in no way neglected her role as wife. Only a few months after our marriage, Farah's doctors informed us that she was to have a baby; and glad tidings to this effect soon spread everywhere. How delighted I was when God blessed my wife and me with our fust son, a bouncing, husky baby who weighed eight pounds and eleven ounces when he arrived on the morning of 31 October, 1960. And I thanked God that my young wife was safe and supremely happy. I think my matrimonial experiences and my general observation have taught me a little about women and their ways, and about how our wonderful Persian women can best realize themselves. My country has seen many startling social changes in the thirty-five years since my father assumed the throne, but seasoned observers declare that the most sweeping advances of all concern the emergence of our women. Now it seems to me the time is opportune for Iran's women to reappraise their needs and potentialities if they are most fully to enrich their own lives and those of their husbands, their children and their fellow countrymen. According to ancient Persian tradition, man and woman had a vegetable origin and were created equal. After creation the first thought that entered their minds was that each should contribute equally to the happiness of the other. It seems that the feminine half of our population has always exerted considerable influence upon us. For example, according to Plutarch, when Cyrus's Persian army had been defeated in a battle with the Medes, it retreated and decided to take refuge in a nearby city. As the soldiers approached the city gates with the enemy in hot pursuit, they came face-to-face with a crowd of

the city's women who shamed them by calling out, 'Oh cowards and defeatists where are you going, you shall never be able to come to us!' Thereupon the troops rushed back to the battlefield and defeated the enemy.

Later Cyrus decreed that whenever he travelled to that city each of its women should receive a gold coin. Shortly before the Arab conquest, we actually had two Persian queens who ruled for brief periods. After the advent of Islam in Persia, women's influence by no means disappeared. Much depended upon the personality of the particular woman. Both in past centuries and more recently, women have often dominated the family scene, as I can illustrate from personal experience. Nobody could hope to meet a more strong-willed individual than my father, but it was amazing that my mother's influence so often prevailed in our family life. The Persian household has in fact often become a kind of matriarchy. The mother is especially influential with her sons, who almost invariably look to her for advice. Writing in the 1930s an English woman said, 'Everywhere in Persia I noticed that grown-ups were charming, unselfish, and devoted to their mothers.' This is no exaggeration. Needless to say I personally owe an incalculable debt to my mother. I spoke earlier of my grave childhood illnesses; she then maintained a constant vigil over me, and I can still clearly see her as she walked to and fro holding a Koran above her head and praying for my rapid recovery. In so many ways she helped to set me upon the right path and to give me the determination to stay on it. Depending again upon their personalities, our women have always wielded authority and influence—sometimes too much for their own good and that of their families. I think it is nonsense to say that they have had no rights. In fact they have enjoyed some rights often denied

to their Western sisters. For example, Persian women may and regularly do own property in their own name and exercise sole control over its disposition. The family unit, including not only the woman's husband but her children and relatives, feel a stronger obligation to support her than one finds in the West. Concubines, as I shall explain later, are becoming a rarity in Iran; but even they must be given a contract guaranteeing them a degree of financial security—something rarely assured to Western-style mistresses. The children of such legally acquired concubines, as distinguished from the illegitimate children of the West, enjoy fully family and inheritance rights. But the trouble is that the horizons of our women have in the past been much too limited. And here one finds an odd paradox: the higher the woman's social status, the more was her life restricted by living conditions and conventions. For example, tribal women have in Persia never worn the veil, and many of our village women (especially in the northern and western parts of the country) have traditionally spurned it; but upper-class Persian city women in the past never set foot outside their homes unless they were veiled, and even at home they often wore the veil except when they were in their own part of the house. Village women in their small homes mingled with the other male and female members of their immediate family; but in wealthier homes a wall surrounded the garden and an inner wall closed off the anderun or women's quarters, access to which was the privilege only of the head of the house. The wife or wives of a villager could circulate more or less freely outside their homes while doing their daily work; but though the wives and concubines of a well-to-do citizen might live in considerable comfort or luxury, they had little to occupy themselves (apart from their purely feminine responsibilities) except gossip and

intrigue. And to make things worse, the children, both boys and girls, spent their most formative years in the confining atmosphere of the anderun. Contemporary European travellers often remarked upon the exquisite manners of such children, but their training hardly developed their full abilities or social consciousness. Even in matters of marriage there were marked differences according to class. In spite of the system of arranged marriages (that is, marriages arranged by the respective parents or families), village girls often became well acquainted with their future husbands before they married. For example, I have in mind a girl of a remote tradition-oriented village who, in the course of normal village life, associated with her husband for over five years before they were married. But in upper-class marriages it was common for the bride literally not to catch sight of her future husband until the engagement ceremony, and for her to have virtually no contact with him until after the final marriage celebration. Yet, I must not omit to mention the remark of a happily married friend of mine when his wife playfully reminded him that they had scarcely seen each other prior to their marriage. 'Ah,' said he, 'but afterwards, my dear!'

When my father assumed the throne, he was determined to emancipate our women from the heavy weight of certain traditions which fettered both them and, therefore, the nation as a whole. He wanted to help them to broaden their outlook, to become better mothers and citizens, and thereby in turn to nurture children of better moral and civic quality. When Reza Shah came to power, few of our girls and women were even literate, let alone educated in any complete sense. Some had received elementary instruction at the hands of the mullahs or in foreign mission schools or from private governesses; but altogether these fortunate ones constituted a minute proportion of

our feminine population, probably well below 1 per cent. My father vigorously set about establishing our first Government schools for girls. Since so few girls had been educated before, finding women teachers for the new schools was an immediate problem, so my father created teachers' training colleges to meet the need. As Reza Shah set about widening the opportunities of our women, he naturally encountered opposition. My father's characteristic courage and forthrightness carried the day. For example, when my mother made a visit in 1928 to the mosque at the holy city of Qum, some fanatics subjected her to taunts and insults. Although the Queen and the women of her entourage were veiled, they were blamed for not shrouding themselves completely. As soon as he got word of this in Teheran, my father loaded some of his troops into lorries and descended with them upon the city, which is about ninety miles south of the capital. Then he strode into the mosque and personally punished the priest in charge for having allowed such behaviour. My father now began to attack the tradition of the veil. By 1930, thanks largely to his encouragement, many upper-class Persian women adopted European dress for indoor wear in their own homes, when visiting women friends, and occasionally even at mixed parties; and a few of them had ventured to be seen unveiled on the streets. By teachers and schoolgirls were forbidden to go veiled, and army officers could not be seen in the company of a veiled woman. Finally, on 8 January, 1936, my father took the decisive step. He requested my mother and two of my sisters to go unveiled with him to attend an important official ceremony. The occasion was an appropriate one—the awarding of diplomas at a training college for women teachers. My father never engaged in lengthy orations; here are a few words from the brief speech he then

made: 'I am extremely pleased to see women who as the result of knowledge and study have come to know their true position and to understand their rights and privileges . . . The women of our country, because of their exclusion from society, have been unable to display their talent and ability—indeed I might say that they have been unable to do their duty towards their beloved country and people or to show their service and devotion as they should; but now, in addition to their distinctive privilege as mothers, they are going to enjoy the other advantages of society. We must not imagine indefinitely that one-half of the community of our nation need not be taken into account.

So far as I know this was the first instance in Persia's modern history when women went unveiled at an official public function. As you can imagine, it took considerable initiative on my father's part, and no little courage on the part of my mother and sisters, to carry off such an experiment. They were flying straight in the face of a centuries-old tradition backed by strong opinion including that of many of the country's most respectable religious and other dignitaries. But Reza Shah knew that he had on his side many progressive people, including the more educated priests and those of our citizens who had studied abroad or in foreign-run schools. The experiment was a complete success, and my father then issued a general ban. He strictly forbade any woman or girl to be seen veiled; if she were, the nearest policeman would request her to remove her veil, and if she refused he would forcibly take it from her. Throughout Persia the wearing of the veil was abolished and remained so as long as my father reigned. Persia thus became the second Moslem country (preceded only by Turkey) officially to outlaw the veil. Every year the seventeenth of Dey—the Persian month roughly corresponding to January—is celebrated by

our women in grateful remembrance of my father's work on their behalf. One of our women's organizations is named the Seventeenth Dey Society; its programme is somewhat like that of the Y.W.C.A. in America, Britain, and other countries. When, in 1935, my father established the University of Teheran, he stipulated that girls should be admitted as students. Our girls also began to go abroad to study. With my father's encouragement, many girls took clerical or other jobs in our Government ministries and agencies and in private offices. They also showed a growing interest in civic affairs. Reza Shah never advocated a complete break with the past, for always he assumed that our girls could find their best fulfilment in marriage and in the nurture of superior children. But he was convinced that a girl could be a better wife and mother, as well as a better citizen, if she received an education and perhaps worked outside the home long enough to gain a sense of civic functions and responsibilities. The military occupation of my country during the Second World War, and my father's abdication, naturally interrupted the great work he had been carrying forward on behalf of Persia's women. But beyond that a change had taken place in the climate of progressive opinion. Reza Shah had forcibly pioneered many reforms of benefit to our women, but now it seemed wise for further gains to be made through more democratic processes. The matter of the veil illustrates the point. After my father left and during the war-time dislocations, some women resumed wearing the veil. Strictly it was still illegal for them to do so, but my Government and I decided to overlook it. We preferred to see a natural evolution, rather than to force the pace. Today, both in our cities and our rural areas, you still see it worn by some girls and women, but gradually the practice is dying out. Contrary to what many foreigners assume,

those of our women who nowadays wear the veil do it not so much because of tradition as for utility and convenience. Especially among our lower-income families, a woman may have a very limited number of dresses. Some of her clothes may be ragged, and she will want to avoid wearing out any good ones she may possess. When, for example, she wants to go out shopping, she finds it easy and practical to put on her veil. I personally object to the veil on aesthetic as well as other grounds; but I must admit that, for instance in the suburbs of American cities, I have often seen women attired more sloppily than our Persian women normally are. Throughout history women have shown artistry in their dress, and one may trust that the veil, along with the characterless female clothing that one finds in some so-called developed countries, will in due course pass out of favour. Perhaps the men of each country can help. The practice of polygamy is also steadily diminishing in Persia. This point recalls to my mind an incident that occurred during the oil crisis, when a large British mission arrived to negotiate on the subject. The mission included a number of English girls who were serving as secretaries and typists. The young ladies were housed in several small cottages surrounding the palace of one of our former Kings; the cottages had in earlier days been inhabited by members of the King's harem. After their first night in Teheran, the English girls were asked by one of our officials if they had rested well. No, they said, they hadn't slept a wink, because they kept expecting the ghost of the former King to appear, summoning the women of his harem.

Close to my summer palace there lives a civil servant who has two wives of roughly the same age. One can often see him out walking with a wife on each arm. I am told that the husband and his two wives

live a most congenial life together. Each wife has children, and when one wife wishes to go out shopping or visiting, her children are looked after by the other wife. The husband is well educated and takes a great interest in civic affairs, in winch his two wives also enthusiastically participate. I understand that when the American wife of a Point Four official was to meet this happy family, she was first taken aside and tactfully informed that the household included two wives. 'Oh that's nothing,' she replied. 'My grandfather had seven!' It seems that her people were from Utah. Many Westerners forget that when the Prophet spoke of four wives as the maximum allowable number, he had in mind a reduction to four as compared to the number then often prevailing; moreover, Mohammed specified that a man should acquire more than one wife only if he could treat them all with equal justice—obviously a difficult feat for even the most diligent man to achieve. In effect, then, the Prophet curtailed the number of wives. You still occasionally find men who possess several wives and a corresponding number of children; for example, one well-known Teheran family includes some thirty-four children, nearly all of whom (sons and daughters alike) have had a university education. But nowadays, for economic as well as other reasons, more than a single wife has become the exception in my country. In a typical recent month in the great city of Teheran, with its more than 1,500,000 souls, only seventy-six men who already had one wife acquired a second, six who had two wives added a third, and no man summoned the courage to take legal possession of a fourth. In the provinces the proportion of multiple wives may be somewhat higher, but throughout Persia the trend seems to be steadily downward. In the same way it is becoming less customary nowadays to acquire concubines or, as we call

them, sighehs. The oldest profession of course existed in the time of the Prophet Mohammad, who frowned upon it. To help eliminate prostitution was perhaps a chief reason why he allowed a man to take concubines as well as up to four wives; in a situation of a surplus of women, caused largely by war casualties among the men, he thought it better that a man should keep a woman as concubine than that she should be walking the streets. Centuries ago in Persia, the concubine system was made subject to the rule of law under the clerical authorities who then adjudicated all law. If a man desired a sigheh, he would first have to obtain the approval of the local cleric or mullah. As time went by the clergy came to require a written contract to regularize every sigheh relationship. If a man wanted a girl, and she were willing to be his sigheh, the mullah arranged a contract under which she consented to be his mistress for a stated period of a day, a month, a year, or whatever they might agree. The contract also provided some financial security for the girl, although the sum was often very small. Even today a man can obtain a sigheh in this way, although now, just as with an ordinary marriage, the contract to be legal must be registered with the civil authorities. If it is so registered, then the girl's children by law carry the father's name and enjoy full inheritance rights. Not infrequently a man becomes so much enamoured of his sigheh that he keeps her permanently. Although the sigheh system has obvious attractions, it is also subject to abuse. So I am not dissatisfied to find that the number of registered sigheh marriages has diminished to the point where, in a recent representative month in Teheran, there were according to official figures only fourteen such marriages. Practically all of these were for a period of one year or more, and several of the couples agreed to live together for up to eighteen

years, subject, no doubt, to a possible further arrangement. Just as with plural ordinary marriages, the proportion of sigheh marriages may be somewhat higher in the provinces than in Teheran, and then of course the so-called common-law marriages of the West are not completely unknown to us. The horizons of our Persian women have continued to broaden through a sort of natural democratic evolution. The number of girls in our primary and secondary schools has steadily increased. There are now some 2,000 girls studying at the University of Teheran as well as hundreds more at our provincial universities. All of our universities are co-educational, and there you increasingly see our young men and women associating with easy informality. In 1958 the University of Teheran for the first time installed a dean of women as well as a dean of men. The Girl Guides are active in Iran, and we operate a number of summer camps for high-school and college girls. More and more of our women are entering such fields as secretarial work, teaching, and nursing. In Persia you find a number of women physicians and a few women lawyers, as well as women writers, poets, and musicians. Our women have become extremely active in welfare activities such as I described earlier. Both in Teheran and in our provincial cities and towns you find a great many women's clubs. In 1959 my sister the Princess Ashraf organized a Supreme Council of Women to co-ordinate the activities of the multifarious women's organizations in Persia. I should personally like to see still further advances in broadening the opportunities of our women, my aim being that our women should enjoy the same basic rights as men. On the question of votes for women, remember that the French did not adopt woman suffrage until 1944. Yet nobody who knows anything of the women of France could say they lacked political or other influence

until that year! The women of Switzerland still do not vote, but that is scarcely a sign that they have no rights. This brings me to what is I think the crux of the problem of the women of Persia and the Middle East. Such terms as 'emancipation' and 'equality' have sometimes been used much too loosely and in ways that harm women's own cause. Just what constitutes the emancipation of a woman? To hear some so-called feminists talk, you would think it meant freedom not to marry, freedom not to have children, freedom not to devote themselves to their children's welfare if they have any, freedom not to shoulder any civic responsibilities. The women of Persia can enjoy all those freedoms if they want to—there is nothing in either law or binding custom which prevents it—but our enlightened women reject them all. They know that women possess certain unique endowments, and that with those go unique responsibilities. It is woman's peculiar gifts, as well as man's, which make nonsense of any literal-minded notion of 'equality' of the sexes. Nobody could do greater harm to woman's real progress than to confuse 'equality' on the one hand with 'equality of opportunity' on the other. The Moslem religion and all the other great world faiths teach the complementary relationship of man and woman. They all reject the idea of their being 'equal' in the sense of identical or synonymous. Observation and common sense teach the same truths.

I realize that some psychologists and sociologists have argued that much of the apparent difference between the sexes arises from the fact that they are socially conditioned to play different roles; but at most that is only part of the story. One need only observe the behaviour of little girls and boys of two or three years of age to obtain illuminating evidence. And when a young girl—be her family rich

or poor, of high station or low—is in the process of turning into a woman, no observant person could fail to perceive the development of her unique feminine loveliness. In fact, much of the beauty of life arises from the fact that men and women are different; as the French say, 'Vive la difference!' Those who preach the literal equality of men and women are confusing terms and setting up false obstacles to woman's fulfilment. Quite different, of course, is the idea of equal opportunity. If, for example, a girl wants to become a physicist, she should have the opportunity to do so regardless of her sex. I know of a charming young Persian woman who studied physics in the United States. While there she met a young Persian man who was studying journalism. In due course they returned to Iran and were married, and she is now a fulltime wife. But the point is that she had the opportunity to enter the field of her choice. Our modern labour law, as passed in its present form in 1959, provides among other things for equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. More and more of our Government positions are open to both men and women on an equal basis; for example, at the Teheran central post office practically all the stamps are now sold by girls, and I am told that the proportion of girl clerks there is higher than in most American post offices. Our private businesses are also employing more and more girls. Of course the principle of equal opportunity can be carried too far. For example, in most civilized nations women are not employed in heavy construction work; some people might term that a denial of the concept of equal opportunity, but most would call it an enlightened modification of the concept. Our labour law adopts the same philosophy when it imposes special limitations on the conditions of work of women and children in industry. Such notions as 'emancipation' and 'equality'

must also be carefully interpreted inside the family. Some people claim that in husband-wife relations the American woman is the most 'emancipated' in the world. But, while I have the highest regard for America's women, I have noticed the signs of strain and tension that you so often find written on their faces. And the fact remains that America has the highest divorce rate of any major nation in the world, with an over-all average of about one divorce for each three marriages. There are many things we can learn from America, but I doubt if the secret of successful marriage is one of them. 'Equality' is in truth an almost meaningless notion when applied to two such different kinds of beings as a man and a woman joined together in marriage. Such a man and woman complement each other, and if the marriage is successful they do so in a happy and beautiful way. In most countries the husband is regarded as in general charge of the family; and in my experience that is the way most happily married couples, both in the East and in the West, tend to think of proper family orgamzation. In any event I hope we shall never blindly copy 'advanced' Western nations in regard to marriage and family patterns and the role of women; I want to see us borrow from the West, but never in such a way or to such an extent as to weaken the strong fabric of the Persian family. Some misguided women in this and other lands think of emancipation as a sort of licence to gratify their own whims and selfish desires. The blunt truth is that each new right exercised by woman imposes upon her new responsibilities. If she cannot evade them while she is single, even less can she do so after her marriage. In the old days in my country, the woman of the anderum had few and simple obligations. Her husband and her numerous servants kept her in comfort, and she had few serious matters to bother her head about.

The educated Persian woman of today faces a much more difficult challenge. First she must be a good wife, not only in the sense of mistress but also, more than ever before, as her husband's intellectual companion. Her next major task is the proper training of her children during their most formative years; somehow she must provide for them the love, inspiration, ethical principles, and modern ideas they need to take their place in our fast-changing Persian society. Finally she must contribute to the modernization of her country by taking part in welfare and other civic functions; she must forget prestige and social position in her desire to help the common people of her country, especially those in our thousands of villages and small towns. I have the greatest faith in our wonderful women, so many of whom are by common consent among the loveliest in the world. I think they can remain as thoroughly feminine as in the past and yet rise to the challenge of their new role in modern Persian society.

Chapter 11

Education for My Country's Future

All good Moslems know that in the perilous early days of the new faith, the Prophet Mohammed was obliged to depart with his disciples from Mecca, in south-western Arabia, and go to nearby Medina. In the former city the Prophet and his small band had been persecuted and lived in mortal danger. Mohammed correctly foresaw that in Medina he could reorganize his followers, gain new adherents, and launch the crusade that was to carry the faith to distant lands. But in planning the migration to Medina, which was to take place in AD 622, the question was how the Prophet himself could depart undetected. Most of his followers could easily travel incognito, but Mohammed was well known to the authorities. The story goes that Mohammed told one of his disciples to conceal him in a large sack and carry him out of the city on his back. But, at the city gates, the sentries challenged the disciple and demanded to know what he had in the sack. The disciple replied, 'In this sack I am carrying the Prophet

Mohammed.' The sentries, laughing at this stupid answer, told him to proceed. By telling the truth the disciple had outwitted his master's would-be oppressors. I tell this story to illustrate my conviction that education encompasses so much more than the mere accumulation of formal information. The Koran says that a man who amasses much knowledge without understanding how to apply it resembles a donkey burdened with a heavy load of books the meaning of which he is totally ignorant. Certainly in the modern world nobody need prove the point that education of the wrong sort has often done more harm than good. One need only think of Hitler with his scientific system of concentration camps, and of the extermination chambers he used for the coldblooded murder of literally millions of men, women, and children. I shall not bother to mention other examples, since we all know that education, to be socially justified, must instil principles of right conduct as well as merely imparting knowledge. In ancient Iran, the priestly vocation was held in highest esteem, and the profession of soldiering came next. We were first and foremost a nation of warriors, but our martial spirit was tempered by our Zoroastrian religion. Military instruction was naturally conducted by soldiers; but the Zoroastrian priests had charge of other education as well as of purely religious matters. Young boys were taught to uphold three cardinal virtues: right thinking, right speaking and right acting. They had to learn to ride and to shoot straight with the bow, but equally essential, they were taught to appreciate the importance of truth and to know how to distinguish between good and evil. The old Zoroastrian system unfortunately made education an upperclass prerogative. Normally the priests taught only the sons of princes, feudal chiefs, military officers, and civil servants. The common people received no

education. The merchant community must have been literate to a certain extent, but the ancient Persians frowned on commerce; they regarded the market place as a breeding-ground for lies and took care that no school was situated in its vicinity. It seems that women, regardless of class, received no formal education. In Zoroastrian times the senior priests, military officers, and civil administrators gave advanced instruction to their younger colleagues. Apart from that we had not much higher education, but there were some interesting exceptions. Nestorian Christians had established a thriving medical school and university in what is now the Lebanon; but persecution by the Eastern Roman Empire forced them first to move to Syria and then, about AD 489, to take refuge in Persia. Shah Khosro Nushirwan welcomed the fugitive professors with their books; and in Jundi Shapur, a town in south-western Iran, they re-established their medical school, which was destined to continue for several centuries. The welcome we gave this Christian university illustrates both our tradition of religious toleration and our respect for education. These traits were further evidenced when in AD 541 Nushirwan convened a council to consider ways and means for the spread of medical science in his empire; to preside over the conclave he chose a Christian physician named Gabriel Durustwayh. Nushirwan also encouraged writing in the field of medicine and enlarged the medical school at Jundi Shapur. He sponsored the translation into Persian of the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek authors, as well as of well-known Indian writers. After the Arab invasion of Persia beginning in AD 633, the Moslem clergy took over the administration of education and justice as well as of religious affairs. All over the country they established *maktabs* or primary schools for boys (the girls ordinarily received no formal

education). At the age of eight a boy would normally be separated from his mother and sisters, and cared for by the men of the family or, in wealthier households, by male servants. Every boy whose family could afford the small tuition fee went to the *maktab*, where he would memorize the Koran and learn to read and write Persian and do simple arithmetic. The Koran is written in Arabic, a language which the children did not know; and often no explanation was given as to the meaning of the text. The young schoolboys would sit cross-legged on the floor grouped around their teacher, their bodies swaying back and forth as they recited in unison verses which they did not understand and which often were beyond the comprehension of the teacher himself. Lazy students were severely punished by the bastinado. When they had finished the maktab, boys might go on to the madresseh or secondary school, for training as priests, magistrates, or medical doctors. When a young man left the madresseh, he received a certificate or diploma. Gradually our educational system began to be affected by Western example. In 1836 American Presbyterian missionaries opened a school in Rezaieh, in north-western Iran, followed by a number of others in various parts of the country. British, German, French, and Russian schools were over the years also established in Iran. Altogether many hundreds of Persian boys and girls benefited from the primary, secondary, and introductory college work offered by these schools. The most famous of the schools was Alborz College of Teheran. Here were trained many of our present-day government and business leaders, who universally acclaim the wonderful personality of Dr. Samuel Jordan, the American educator who headed the college for many years. Associated with Alborz College was the Sage College for Women. In 1848, five years after Nasir ed-Din Shah ascended

the throne, Persia founded her first Government-operated secular school. Called the Royal College, it was established by one Mirza Taqi Khan, the Shah's wise and progressive Grand Vizier, and was primarily intended to train civil servants, army officers, doctors, and engineers. In the college's first few years all teaching was in the hands of European instructors; and French officers who had been sent to reorganize our army were among the first to be engaged. The curriculum included Latin, French, mathematics, chemistry, pharmacology, medicine, mining, and military science; later other subjects such as Persian, Arabic, theology, and law were added. As early as 1857, 160 students were enrolled in the college, including 110 on Government scholarships.

I have spoken of Nasir ed-Din Shah's travels in Europe; his journeys abroad did much to awaken his countrymen to the need for modernizing our educational system. The Shah sent a number of young Persians to study in Europe, and in 1897 these and others established a society for fostering a programme of Government primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges. In 1901 a college of political science was established in Teheran. Our Constitution of 1906 emphasized that education was a Government responsibility; and in 1910 and 1911 Parliament passed bills for creating a Ministry of Education and organizing a system of public education. But in 1922, just after my father staged his coup d'etat, there were in all Iran only about 440 Government primary schools with some 43,000 students, 46 Government secondary schools with 9,300 students, and one college with 91 students. My father, who regarded these numbers as insignificant in comparison with our needs, put great energy into expanding the network of Government primary and secondary schools. By 1932 there

were over three times as many Government schools as in 1922, and by 1942 there were six times as many, the number of students increasing by about the same ratio. Although in 1932 Iran possessed only three Government institutions of higher learning, by 1942 there were twelve. These included agricultural and technical schools, a military academy, teachers' training schools (including the pioneering one for girls), and the University of Teheran. The military academy was an important part of Reza Shah's endeavour to create an officer corps with high morale and true patriotism. Also, my father greatly increased the number of students going abroad for study; at Government expense about a hundred Persian students were sent each year to Europe and America to acquire skills and knowledge needed by the nation, while many others went on their own. But Reza Shah did more for Persian education than to construct buildings, train teachers, and send people abroad for study. He transformed the whole spirit and philosophy of our educational system. As he saw it, education must first of all serve to create the patriotic devotion to Iran that was essential if his dream of a modern nationstate was to be realized. He understood that the country's genuine Westernization and modernization required much more than factories and paved streets; of far greater importance were changes in the basic Persian culture and psychology. My father had the highest admiration for our cultural tradition, yet he sensed that it needed far-reaching adaptations to meet modern requirements. At the same time that he was vigorously restoring the architectural monuments of our ancient grandeur, he was energetically reshaping our thinking and action to meet the challenge of the present and the future. It was this philosophy which led my father to institute courses, radically new for the Iran of his time, in such subjects as civics, per-

sonal hygiene, and home-making. He enthusiastically embraced the idea of the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides. He used radio and other means of communications to bring to adults as well as children the twin messages of civic and personal betterment, and he organized a broad programme of adult classes which served the same purposes. When I ascended the throne in 1941, I espoused the same general philosophy of education that Reza Shah had. In 1943 Parliament passed a law providing for free, compulsory education for every one of my country's children. In a way the law was premature, for we still possessed far too few schools and teachers to carry it out; but it provided a good goal for our efforts. The work of expanding our educational system has gone on ever since, and it absorbs about one-fifth of the Government's entire regular budget; this compares rather favourably, I think, with the percentage allocated to education even in some of the economically advanced countries. By 1959 we had well over 8,000 Government primary schools, an eighteen-fold increase compared to 1922, and nearly 1,100 Government secondary schools, an increase of some twenty-three-fold. Am I exaggerating if I suggest that these are impressive records for a period of less than forty years? In our Government primary schools well over a million pupils were enrolled, while some 225,000 students were attending the Government secondary schools. The latter included technical schools, agricultural schools, teachers' training schools, schools of art and music, and secretarial schools. To teach these young people we employed about 45,000 teachers; significantly, about a third of them were women. In the field of higher education, in addition to the 11,000 students in the University of Teheran, several thousand more were attending our younger provincial universities, and hundreds were enrolled in

university-level military courses. The University of Teheran included faculties of natural science and mathematics; engineering; medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy; agriculture; veterinary medicine; law, political science, and economics; letters; fine arts; education; and theology. The provincial universities were located at Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Ahwaz. Although the range of courses they offered was more restricted than that found at the University of Teheran (the University of Shiraz, for instance, had faculties of letters, agriculture, and medicine), they were growing rapidly and some of them showed a pronounced pioneering spirit. Attached to the University of Teheran was an Institute for Public and Business Administration, established with American aid in and offering training in the administrative skills which are so important to a newly developing country like mine. The university also included other institutes or centres such as those for Middle Eastern studies, archaeology, psychological research and testing, social research, malariology, and nuclear research. In addition we possessed other Government-supported higher educational facilities outside of the university system. For example, the Teheran Institute of Technology offered a four-year course leading to a master's degree in technical education; the Abadan Institute of Technology, run by our National Iranian Oil Company, provided excellent instruction in engineering subjects; the Teheran School of Social Work taught students in that important field; and the Ministry of Health's school of nursing trained young women to contribute to that further aspect of humanitarian endeavour. Besides all the foregoing kinds of education, we operated an extensive programme of literacy and vocational training for the army and gendarmerie. I have in earlier chapters described the educational work sponsored by my philanthropic orga-

nizations and my Development Bank, and by the Government under its extensive community development programme; in addition the Government operated far-reaching schemes of literacy training and fundamental education. In villages, towns, and cities the literacy classes have reached tens of thousands of people, mostly adults who have never had the advantage of any schooling. But the ability to read and write is merely a tool and can easily do more harm than good if not used in the right way. This has led us to broaden our outlook on the literacy question and to institute a programme of fundamental education which stresses the application of literacy skills to real life situations. I see marvellous prospects here, of which we must take full advantage. The Ministry of Education has trained scores of teachers, including a number of man-and-wife teams, to conduct fundamental education work in the villages. Generally they use the existing village schoolhouses, where there are any, for their classes, generally held in the evening; and with characteristic dedication the teachers often turn their own homes into village social and educational centres. The teachers instruct in reading, writing, and arithmetic, with constant reference to the villagers' everyday practical problems. I can illustrate this point by mentioning the names of some of the admirably simple text-books which the Ministry of Education has prepared in cooperation with other agencies. The first one is called We Learn to Read and Write, while others bear such titles as The Home and Health, Poultry and Livestock, General Village Health, Trees—Forest and Orchard, and We Work Together. Practical demonstrations accompany the class work; for example, in addition to reading about how to take care of his pistachio trees a villager may observe the actual work of proper pruning and spraying, and after reading about bee-keeping he

may watch construction of a better hive. His wife may not only read of hygienic methods of making bread or drying fruit, or of ways to protect her baby from eye infections, but also see actual demonstrations. Such education can certainly enhance the lives of our villagers. In spite of the rapid spread of so many kinds of secular education, more than 200 Moslem religious schools and colleges still survived in 1959. These were partly supported by the Government but entirely managed by the clergy. Most of their students were prospective priests. The best known of these institutions was the famous theological college at Qum, the holy city which even today retains its atmosphere of a centre of learning removed from this secular world. Besides our Government educational institutions and those run by the Moslem clergy, we had a growing array of private ones, all licensed as required by the Ministry of Education. Especially well regarded was the school of nursing of the Shiraz Medical Centre, where our young women could train in a really modern hospital. Among other private Persian-owned schools were many kindergartens and primary schools and an increasing number of small schools for shop work, secretarial training, languages, music, and the like. In 1940, largely to curb the spread of foreign influence in Iran, my father had decreed that the Government should take over all foreign-run schools in which Persian students were enrolled. But during the Second World War the order was relaxed, and soon a number of foreign schools reopened or were started afresh. The best-known of them, the Community School of Teheran, is run by the American Presbyterian mission. Many of the student body are Persians, the school has excellent standards, and it prepares students for American colleges and universities. The Armenians, the Jews, and other native religious minorities in Iran also run their own schools,

which commonly do very good work. In recent years my countrymen, young and old, have shown a seemingly insatiable desire to learn English. In part this is because they or their parents realize that English is the language of many of the world's greatest nations and of much of the world's greatest literature; but their desire appears to me to have a still broader base. I think they increasingly sense that English has become the major one-world language; even the books which the Russians export for propaganda purposes are largely printed in English! Persians, by nature good linguists, show considerable interest in other foreign languages, particularly French; and many take the excellent courses offered by the Franco-Iranian Institute in Teheran or study French in our schools or universities. But it seems that no matter how much English instruction is offered in Iran, it is never enough to meet the demand. Most of our Government primary schools and all of our Government secondary schools offer instruction in English, and all of our Government universities offer extensive English programmes. The Presbyterian mission has several hundred students in its English classes. The British Council gives English instruction to many hundreds of people enrolled in classes in Teheran, Tabriz, Meshed and Isfahan: it is of especially high quality and is largely for teachers of English. The Iran-America Society has several thousand students in a parallel programme carried on in Teheran, Meshed, Kermanshah, Isfahan, and Shiraz. Some thousands of Persians study English in Abadan and in the oil fields. English lessons are being disseminated both by radio and television. Private schools of English have sprung up by the score in Teheran and the provinces. Everywhere, in Teheran and in leading provincial towns and cities, one sees English lesson-books and publications for sale. And still people keep asking for more

English! From what I have said it should be apparent that Persia has made a certain amount of educational progress in recent years. But nobody knows better than I do that we still have far to go. Millions of my people (especially among the older generation and among young people in the remoter villages) are without any formal schooling; and the battle to educate them is one that we must not fail to win. I hope that each year we can increase total enrolment in both our primary and secondary schools by about 12 per cent. This compares with an annual population increase of about 3.5 per cent. Especially since a 12 per cent enrolment increase will be compounded annually, it will represent a formidable financial drain; but it will constitute the best kind of national investment we can make. However, a mere quantitative increase in educational facilities is by no means enough. At the same time that we are striving mightily to increase the number of schools, teachers, and students, we must rediscover the meaning of education in its broadest sense. This leads me back to the theme with which I began this chapter; and in discussing it I want to be very frank.

Foreign travellers in Iran, not only recently but in previous generations, have observed that some of our citizens habitually lie. Why should some Persians lie whenever it suits their convenience?

Although the vast majority of my people are Moslems, some of them forget that the Koran ranks mendacity as a cardinal sin. The landlord who lies to his tenant, the merchant who lies to his customer, or the citizen who lies to the tax collector or the customs inspector can find in the Holy Book no excuse for his deception. For example, the Prophet devotes a separate chapter—Chapter LXXXIII of the Koran—to those who give short measure or weight. Bluntly he says, 'Woe be unto those who give short measure or weight; who, when

they receive by measure from other men take the full; but when they measure unto them, or weigh unto them, defraud!' The Koran agrees with King Darius's dictum about 'telling the truth and shunning the lie'. The Koran not only recognizes Moses and Jesus as among the great prophets; it also confirms the Old Testament commandment, 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.'

In our culture, steeped in history as we are, some liars actually try to explain and justify their behaviour by referring back to past national catastrophes. For example, they will tell you, when Mongol hordes overran the country, lying was the price of personal survival; and that gave us the habit of mendacity. Whatever its merits as an historical explanation, his point of view certainly offers a pitifully weak justification for today's liars. Some of our citizens try to justify mendacity by extending the Western conception of the white He. I am sorry to say that one of our most popular literary works, the poet Saadi's Gulistan, extols the white lie. According to Saadi,

Words which beguile thee,
But thy heart make glad,
Outvalue truth
Which makes thy temper sad.

I am afraid that in this passage Saadi was out of tune with some of the facts of life. A policy of mendacity not only flies against our religion; it simply doesn't pay. Lying is morally wrong and tactically stupid. One untruth usually requires others to try to cover up the first one; soon one is caught in a web of one's own making. On the other hand, as the Prophet's disciple showed at the gates of Mecca, telling the truth disarms one's opponents. It makes one's life more effec-

tive and less fraught with uneasiness. It increases national efficiency, which must rest upon a foundation of mutual trust. Persian families have many strong and wonderful qualities. For example, foreigners have often remarked upon the closely knit structure of the Persian family, encompassing not only the immediate members but extending outward into a great circle of uncles and aunts, cousins and in-laws. In Persia family life centres very much in one's own home and the homes of relatives; but somehow the needs of children are often slighted. The mother is likely to spoil the sons and the father the daughters; at the same time true understanding may be lacking between parents and children. I find that in many Persian homes no effort is made to instil in the children a sense of personal and civic responsibility. The children are not taught to plan ahead, to develop their minds and hands, to cultivate hobbies, or to appreciate the wonders of nature. In the absence of a sense of mutual confidence between parents and children, the child may feel insecure; unconsciously he may say to himself, if nobody cares about me, why should I care about anybody? If the child accidentally breaks something, he may lie about it rather than face up to his responsibility. Paradoxically, a peasant child, because of his sense of participation in responsible work in the fields, may fare better than a child of higher social and economic status. Only because of my love for my people am I entitled to speak so frankly about needed improvements in the nurture of our young children. Here the parents, and especially the mothers, have a tremendously constructive role to play. Every Persian child should feel that he can count upon the love of his mother and find shelter and refuge in her arms. The young child must feel that his mother, along with at least a few other people in his small world, care intensely about him and his

welfare. He must be sure that he can always go to his mother and that he is never cut off from her. If some misfortune has taken his mother away, then somebody else must surround him in love; and that of course is a principal reason why I have laid so much stress upon the orphanages described in Chapter 8. But blind mother love will not lead a child towards responsible maturity. The child also needs fair but firm discipline. From the outset the mother must teach her child to tell the truth and to take responsibility for his actions. The child must learn to shun the alibi that you hear among Persian children and from the lips of immature adults: 'It's not my fault!' He must be taught to repudiate our common practice of holding another person guilty when the fault lies squarely with one's self. From the earliest age the child should gain courage to face up to the consequences of his own actions or of his failure to act. For it is in these initial years that the mother plants the seeds of responsible citizenship and statesmanship or, failing this, nurtures the irresponsibility which undermines our national development. From the beginning the mother should plan a definite programme for her child. Instead of merely trying to keep him happy, she should teach him to play constructively. I am a great believer in toys, and our children have suffered from a lack of those that can best develop their minds and hands. I hope the day is not far distant when we shall annually produce millions of simple and inexpensive infants' toys such as I have seen in America and Europe; and I am pleased that already we have the beginnings of a toy industry. As the young boy graduates from the infant stage, he should be put to work on simple mechanical construction toys. I shall always remember how much these meant to me when I was young. Not the least of their value to our culture is that they will help us to abolish the an-

cient Oriental curse of believing that manual work is undignified. We must learn the American's pride in getting his hands dirty in order to accomplish honest work. The scientist in his laboratory must possess both manual and mental dexterity; and he is the symbol of the new age to which we as a people must adjust. Here, as in other parts of the world, little girls instinctively like to play with dolls, with themselves in the role of mother; and that too has definite educational value. We still have far to go in teaching our children to love the mysteries of nature; for example, our famous Persian gardens can be put to good use for teaching young children the first principles of botany and horticulture, and our children should be entrusted with the care of birds, fish, and four-legged pets. When a child learns kindness and tenderness towards animals, he is more sensitive to the need to treat his fellow human beings with justice and charity. We should do much more than heretofore in the field of hobbies; for instance, the entire country abounds in minerals, as well as in easily uncovered archaeological specimens that record our history, and even very young boys can be encouraged to collect them. At the same time our children should at an early age take up sports, especially team games that can temper our individualism with the spirit of working together and can teach us how to play fair and win or lose gracefully. To help children of pre-school age, we have established several hundred Government kindergartens and many private ones. Work and play in groups is invaluable for character training and teaching manual dexterity. But in our democracy kindergartens should add to, not take the place of, home life. Now I want to speak of needed improvements in Iran's primary education. In our primary schools, just as much as at home, we must change the prevailing outlook. Many of their teachers have

themselves never had the advantage of a proper education, either in subject-matter or in methods, so how can we expect them to excel? Learning by rote is still stressed, rather than training the child to think for himself, to take responsibility, and to tell the truth. Our teachers, loyal and devoted as most of them are, find themselves handicapped by poor equipment. Their salaries are low, and often they have housing problems. In 1958 we established in the Ministry of Education a separate primary department designed to focus energies on problems such as these. We have also set up a department of home economics, staffed entirely by women, which has introduced a programme of home and family education for girls at both the primary and secondary levels. We have established agricultural courses in our ordinary primary and secondary schools. One reason why less developed countries find such difficulty in sound planning is they usually have no accurate statistics to base it on; so with UNESCO help, we have created an educational statistics division that has helped provide the first clear picture of education here. A tough problem faced by newly developing countries is that of getting enough good teachers. We must expand our present teachers' training schools and build scores of new ones, especially for girls. In 1959 we had fifty, of which twenty-seven were of the ordinary type, twelve specialised in agriculture, three in physical education, and eight were tribal, intended to prepare teachers for the travelling tent schools that move with our migrating tribes. In the first group, only six were for girls, and very few of these attended any of the specialized schools; yet teaching is obviously a good field for our girls to enter, and if we give them a real chance they will do so. It is my aim that the proportion of girls in the primary schools should rise to half as soon as possible, and this means many more women teachers. In my

country girls are not necessarily taught by women; both at the primary and university levels (but so far not much in secondary schools) one often finds boys and girls in mixed classes under either men or women teachers, and about a quarter of all our Government primary schools are mixed. Nevertheless, a rapid rise in the proportion of girl primary pupils should be accompanied by a comparable increase in feminine teaching staff. So I think we must as quickly as possible expand the number of girls' secondary schools until it approaches half of the total. Meanwhile, I should like to see us experiment with mixed teachers' training schools where young men and women would study together. One of the advantages might be that they would lead to husband-wife teams who would be especially adapted to living and teaching in remote villages, where the couples could share each other's cultural interests.

We face a big task in tightening up the standards of teachers' training. In the present stage of our mushrooming educational development, most of our primary teachers have themselves received no more than twelve years' schooling, and many have not even had that. For the moment I think everybody agrees that incompletely prepared teachers can help our children incomparably more than no teachers at all; but only through drastic action will all our children be taught as they deserve. One remedy is to help our present primary teachers modernize their outlook and methods through summer courses and in-service training programmes during the school year; although we have done a good deal here, we can do much more. But the really acute need is for an ever-growing stream of better-prepared new teachers. And we can get them only through better staffing of the teachers' training schools—in other words, through better teachers to teach the

teachers. The instructors in our teachers' training schools have often had plenty of experience, but few of them possess any sort of college or university degree. To remedy this, we must rapidly expand the National Teachers' College of the University of Teheran; and I think we should establish similar colleges at each of our provincial universities. Also, as experience in many foreign countries shows, good training-school teachers don't necessarily come from teachers' colleges; we must get them on a big scale from among those of our young people who have studied other subjects at home or abroad and have acquired some knowledge of teaching methods. To help speed the growth of primary education in Iran, I want to see us place much more stress upon local self-help and initiative by parents and pupils. In the past our Government education system has been over-centralized, with almost everything controlled from Teheran; we have largely failed to enlist local interest. Yet everywhere in Iran one finds an amazing awareness of the value of education; many an ordinary villager would gladly go short of food himself if it meant that his children could go to school. It is that kind of enthusiasm that we have only begun to harness. In many communities we now have Family and School Associations similar to the Parent-Teacher Associations of America and Britain; but in a newly developing country such as Iran, we must go much further. Earlier, I suggested more community self-help in constructing schools as well as other local public works. To build a village primary school, the Ministry of Education should supply standard plans and specifications (capable of variation according to climatic and other conditions), materials and equipment not locally obtainable, and some engineering supervision. The villagers (and the landlord, if it is a landlord-owned village) can supply the land, the

locally available materials, and the labour. With the cooperation of the people, as we have proved, it is amazing how fast a new school can rise from what was previously an idle plot of land. I look forward to the time when all of our primary schools, except large ones in towns and cities, will be built in this manner. But who should maintain the school and school-grounds after they are completed? My answer is the children themselves. Let me illustrate. At a small village near Teheran, there is an attractive modern Government mixed primary school. It is tastefully designed, with several classrooms, workshops where the boys and girls learn such skills as carpentry and weaving, a volleyball court, and a playground. Although there is a caretaker, it is primarily the children who keep its buildings and grounds neat and clean. But that is not all; one immediately notices the surrounding flower beds and the well-kept vegetable garden at the rear. These, too, are mostly the work of the children. The grounds contain simple but attractive houses for the teachers, and this solves the problem that plagues so many teachers who are assigned to village schools. The improvements are due to the interest of a former Minister of Education living in the village; but the same plan can be followed anywhere. The money saved through the children's efforts can be used to build other schools for less fortunate children; moreover, their share in the work provides an invaluable educational experience. I now turn to problems of secondary schooling in my country. I have already remarked on our tremendous expansion in this field in recent years; particularly spectacular has been the growth of technical and agricultural secondary schools in Teheran and in most of the provinces. By 1959 our technical secondary schools were training nearly 5,000 boys in skills such as carpentry, plumbing, electricity, and metal-working, while several

hundred girls were studying subjects such as sewing and typing. At the same time our agricultural secondary schools were teaching modern farm management to some 2,000 boys. Yet I know that this is only a start; these numbers must be multiplied many fold. It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of such technical training in a newly developing country like Iran. Foreigners, and even many Persians, are likely to assume that our chief need must be for engineers, managers, and other high-level specialists. It is true that we have an ever-increasing demand for such staff, but our main human bottleneck lies elsewhere. Over the years we have trained many of these specialists both at home and abroad, their work is supplemented by the staffs of the various aid programmes and by other foreign specialists hired by our Government. At the other end of the scale, we have an almost unlimited supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Our biggest human shortage lies in the category of foremen, leadmen (those who partly perform skilled work and partly supervise), and skilled workers. We need them for industrial production, construction, agriculture, and other purposes. The key point is that while we require thousands of top-level people, the intermediate ones I have just mentioned must be found by the hundreds of thousands. If necessary we could import for temporary jobs a large percentage of our high-level-specialist needs, but we could never afford to import more than a minute proportion of the middle group or train enough middle-group workers abroad. We must prepare them at home, in our own technical and agricultural secondary schools. To staff these schools, as well as to man the rest of our burgeoning educational system, we come back to the old dilemma: you cannot run schools without teachers, and you cannot run good schools without good

teachers. The system of technical and agricultural secondary schools has been growing so fast that teaching standards have inevitably taken second place. To obtain more and better teachers we must give further training to the ones we have; we must expand the Teheran Institute of Technology; we must induce more graduates of the University of Teheran's engineering college and of the Abadan Institute of Technology to enter secondary teaching; we must attract into the same field more Persians who have taken engineering and technical studies abroad; as soon as possible we must establish engineering faculties at all our provincial universities; and to accelerate the growth of these faculties, we must hire more foreign technical teachers. As an essential preliminary to all this, we must offer better salaries to our secondary teachers, especially those in technical fields, and provide modern, low-cost housing for them. Working with young people can be one of the most rewarding experiences in life, but less so if you are worrying about shoes and shelter for your own children. To make a complete success of our programme of technical and agricultural secondary education, we must remove the curse that I mentioned; as a nation we must realize the dignity of creative manual work. I know of children in the most junior forms who feel ashamed of their fathers who work with a shovel. Many get the impression that to wear a business suit and carry a briefcase (no matter what it may contain) is the highest aim in life. They are determined not to get their hands dirty through honest labour, and they think their lives depend upon their obtaining some sort of office job with the all-important element of prestige. Our children absorb such notions mainly from the older generation, and especially our intellectuals and so-called men of substance, some of whom entertain ideas completely out of tune with the age of science

and technology. By the time a child is ready to enter secondary school, he may detest the thought of learning a skill entailing the use of both head and hands, thus depriving us of the capabilities needed by the country. To my mind the most important educational contribution of the Americans has been in the sphere of ethics, but the next has been their instillation of respect for manual labour, which I am sure is one thing that has made America such a dynamic country. I am happy to see that when Point Four advisers come here, they both preach and practise this principle, and their example helps the readjustment of our young people and the leaders of public opinion to the thought of the modern age. We must also establish more schools for secretarial training. I think many of the newly developing countries face an acute shortage of skilled secretarial and clerical staff; this is certainly so in Iran. I am especially proud of our Demonstration School of Business, organized in Teheran by our Ministry of Education. Here some 500 young men and women take either day or evening classes in such subjects as Persian typing, English typing, shorthand, business English, filing, office machines, office management, and the writing of reports. Some students take only one or a few subjects but others complete a three-year degree course. A number are preparing to teach secretarial and business subjects in the high schools. Their morale is high, and they have established their own cooperative restaurant and their own recreation programme. The high schools in several of our larger cities already offer secretarial and business training, and we are extending the scheme to other cities. Our Plan Organization and our National Iranian Oil Company are among the agencies that also operate effective secretarial-training courses. But so big is the task that all our public and private secretarial and business schools combined scarcely

begin to meet the need for secretaries, especially the good bilingual ones, who can so greatly enhance the efficiency of our Government agencies and private businesses. This is an excellent field for our Persian girls. The American private foundations, or other aid agencies, many wish to help us more here. But vital though such specialized training is in Iran today, our secondary schools must give us much more. Especially they must develop each student's ethical character. The home and the primary school should prepare the foundations; but the secondary schools must tirelessly build from there to enhance each individual's sense of personal and civic integrity. Each student should learn to love the truth and search for the truth and tell the truth. In the past the curricula and methods of our secondary schools have been very poorly adapted to this end. As in their earlier training, students learned mainly by rote; they were regarded as foolish or impertinent if they asked questions or challenged statements or thought for themselves. Amazing though it may sound, the Shahname, the book-length epic poem completed by our poet Ferdowsi about AD 999, was until only a few decades ago taught in our schools as if it were authentic history! Though the work is justly renowned as one of the world's great literary masterpieces, it can hardly stand against modern historical research. But students were taught to accept as truth even the outright legends of the poem. In the Persian language we have a word, dastan, which commonly implies something that is neither fact nor fiction but lies somewhere in between. In the past much of our teaching of history and other subjects was in that spirit, and the student learned nothing of modern natural or social science. To combat this tradition, we have continued the vigorous reform programme inaugurated by my father. For example, a group of our scholars recently

prepared a complete course in social studies, which the Ministry of Education has published in five paperback volumes and distributed to secondary schools throughout the country. Increasingly the curricula of our secondary schools resemble those in America or elsewhere in the West. But too much of the old dastan spirit lingers on even today; furthermore, we still over-emphasize uncritical memorization and we underemphasize helping the student to think for himself. For these defects a number of remedies lie at hand, of which I shall mention but three. One of these is the provision of school libraries and instruction in their use. Modern libraries are important for our primary schools, but are vital for the secondary schools and beyond; for through these each student can best make his own independent search for objective knowledge. Yet, few of our secondary schools have adequate libraries, and fewer still make library investigation an integral part of the curriculum. Since most of the students in our secondary schools are studying English or another foreign language, the libraries can include books and magazines in those tongues as well as in Persian. For philanthropical foundations anxious to find new ways to help Persia's march forward, demonstration school libraries would provide a small project worthy of their consideration. The second remedy would be a revised examination system, for examinations largely determine the tone and content of the teaching anywhere; and this is particularly true where, as in Persia, major examinations are centrally administered by the Ministry of Education. I am glad to say that we are gradually decentralizing the administration of education here; at the same time, we must devise examinations that emphasize memorization much less and analysis far more. Modern examinations will certainly encourage better teaching, designed to help the student to think creatively and

in the democratic spirit. The third and most important improvement involves better training of teachers. It is literally true that in Persia many regular secondary teachers have had no more than a secondary education! This is not quite so shocking as it might sound because often they have broadened their backgrounds through experience and private study. Many, too, have benefited from in-service training or from summer courses or conferences; for example about 1,500 secondary teachers attended a conference in Teheran in the summer of 1959. While on the whole our secondary teachers are rendering laudable service to the country, we must take energetic action to raise the standards. The National Teachers' College needs expansion to train teachers not only for the secondary normal schools but also for the ordinary secondary schools. Another source we can tap is the hundreds of Persians who have finished university work at home or abroad in such subjects as science, art, literature, and social studies; we should have a well-publicized system for coaching these graduates in methods of teaching and enabling them to qualify as secondary teachers. We can also step up the flow of teachers into the ordinary secondary schools by establishing teachers' training faculties at each of the provincial universities, as recommended earlier in this chapter. We must make a special effort to attract a larger proportion of young women into secondary as well as primary teaching.

Community and student self-help can aid in speeding the growth of secondary as well as primary education in Iran. Secondary schools are generally larger and more complicated structures than are primary schools, and you cannot build them so easily with volunteer labour. But to accelerate this construction, we can and should encourage local contributions, with no strings attached, of land, building

materials, money, housing for teachers, and general civic support. When they are completed, the students can perfectly well maintain them with a minimum of paid custodial help. Thus the education budget will stretch further and the students will gain in experience and the development of civic responsibility. I think it would be a great mistake if the learning of manual skills were restricted to students enrolled in the technical and agricultural secondary schools. Such skills should be acquired by all our secondary students. The girls may want to study drawing or painting or the playing of Persian or Western musical instruments; but all should in addition receive training in home-making. In the West a girl usually receives domestic training partly from her school but chiefly from her mother; but in a newly developing country like Iran the situation is quite different. Many Persian families, even those of considerable culture or financial means, still know little of modern principles of nutrition, hygiene, and infant care. In preparing to raise her own family, a Persian girl may be much handicapped, unless she can obtain such knowledge at school. So with us courses in home-making are by no means an unnecessary luxury; they are vitally important. I think all boys in our ordinary secondary schools should learn the rudiments not only of the natural sciences but also of practical shop work. We should as fast as possible establish workshops for this. As they learn, the boys can produce useful articles; for example, they can readily turn out thousands of the simple infants' and children's toys that are in short supply here. It should also be feasible for the boys, in Iran as in America and elsewhere, to print their own school newspaper. Before I leave the subject of secondary education, I must suggest one other idea. I should like to see an increase in the number of private secondary

boarding schools in Iran. I remember from my own school days that in the shared life of a boarding school you can better develop such values as camaraderie, friendship, and sportsmanship; and wise and good teachers can more readily mould the student. Turning to higher education, I naturally think first of the amazing growth and change to be seen at the University of Teheran, now unquestionably one of the leading educational institutions in the Middle East. Foreign scholars frequently compliment us on the beauty of the university's grounds, the spaciousness and modernity of its buildings, and the rapid expansion of its activities. In addition to its main site, the university owns a number of other facilities and tracts of land. A few blocks to the north we have completed the first few of a number of well-laid-out hostels. These are typical of the social as well as physical changes in the university, which until recently had few residential students. A social development that particularly gratifies me is the invasion of the university by our charming young Persian women, as well as by some foreign girls. A few years ago almost no girls were to be seen, but now, as I said, some 2,000 of them are enrolled; and though formerly men students made out that our really pretty girls didn't attend the university, even casual inspection shows all that has changed. In its academic standards the university has steadily improved, although less rapidly than in other respects. I recognize the important recent advances in academic and related programmes, but I wish to indicate six avenues along which further steps are needed. Progress here will really affect our future for it applies not only to the University of Teheran but more or less generally to our entire university system. In the first place, some of our professors still regard themselves as little gods whose opinions must not be disputed and whose time must not be wasted

upon the students. Such a professor may march into his classroom, deliver his lecture, and march out again. He may believe a student is disrespectful if he asks for supporting evidence for one of the professor's statements or presumes to suggest an alternative interpretation. Without any advance notification the professor may repeatedly fail to come to his class. He may neglect to establish office hours for student consultation, and except for lecture she may spend virtually no time in the precincts. Happily our better professors scrupulously avoid such behaviour; but as our universities develop we must make certain that no staff member evades his elementary obligations as a teacher. A second point has to do with research. A great university professor is essentially research-minded. He possesses an attitude of deep humility towards the wonders of nature, of philosophy, of social organization, and of literary and artistic expression. He is a modest man of almost childlike curiosity and thirst for knowledge. Constantly he nourishes

his teaching with fresh research. To him, the subject-matter that he is teaching is never a dead body of knowledge, to be repeated parrot-fashion year after year; instead it is something living and constantly growing through his own research and that of others, including his students, whose contributions he gladly acknowledges. But upon the slightest provocation certain of our professors will tell you what distinguished men they are and how many important positions they hold. Their intellectual arrogance betrays their lack of the scientific spirit. Some of them conduct no real research of their own but copy their lectures from foreign works, with or without credit being given to the original authors; or they originate some writing which they support with no scientific evidence; or they deliver the same lectures year after year without ever bothering to bring them up to date. If a

university professor knows nothing of scientific method, how can he teach it to his students? I recall the story of an argument between a Chinese and a Persian scholar as to which of their respective cultures was the greater pioneer in science. The Chinese said that archaeological excavations showed that the ancient Chinese had wires; therefore they had invented the telephone. The Persian retorted that in similar excavations in his country no wires were found; therefore the ancient Persians had invented wireless. That kind of reasoning scarcely fits the scientific age; yet what faculty members sometimes offer the student is scarcely better. For example, a student may go through an entire social science course without being required to write a single documented paper with supporting bibliography. Yet you do find in our universities men who are thoroughly imbued with the scientific spirit and are doing highly original research. For example, one of our professors at the University of Teheran has synthesized new organic compounds which, tested at a leading German laboratory, were found to be unique. Faculty members have done valuable research in malariology, agriculture, Persian language and literature, and other fields. Higher faculty salaries are helping to stimulate research; and the university is considering new regulations which will require every faculty member to choose between serving either as part-time lecturer or as a full-time member of the staff with substantial research commitments. My third point concerns library facilities. One of the research scholar's principal tools is of course an adequate library; and at the University of Teheran, as well as elsewhere in the capital city and in some provincial centres, we are fortunate in having thousands of rare and valuable manuscripts, as well as large collections of modern books and journals in many fields. But these are not properly organized for

maximum service to the professors, still less to the students. Each of the separate university faculties has its own library, and a number of these are administered along antiquated lines; for example, in some of them books are actually shelved according to the size of the volume or the date it arrived! But the worst feature is limitation of the students' right to borrow books. In Teheran we now urgently need a large central university library and central administration of all the university's library resources, utilizing the services of some of the young Persians who have studied library administration. This is still another project with which one of the philanthropic foundations may wish to help us. As a fourth point I must mention better staff-student relations. A graduate of an American or British university is likely to tell you that much of the inspiration and knowledge he gained during his student days was in the course of personal, informal discussion with his teachers. He may add that some of his most cherished memories concern occasions when he was invited to professors' homes and became acquainted with their families. In these matters I should like to see rapid change at our great University of Teheran and at our newer universities. Each of our faculty members should hold frequent informal discussions and consultations with his students, either individually or in small groups. He should share his students' academic and personal problems. He should invite them to his home. If a professor is too pompous to take steps like these, he should not be a professor. My fifth point relates to organized vocational and employment services in the university. Besides receiving help and encouragement from his professors, every student should be able to turn to university specialists who can advise him on the planning of his career and other personal problems. I have remarked

on the beginning made in 1958, when the University of Teheran appointed a dean of men and a dean of women; but in addition to these each faculty of the university needs a well-trained professional student adviser. Picture the challenge of our dynamic national economic and social development programme in its relation to hundreds of career-planning students! Here is really a chance for creative student guidance! Wise vocational guidance can bring incalculable benefits to individual students and at the same time serve the needs of the country as a whole. In Persia as elsewhere, there is a natural tendency for students to choose careers according to impulse, or parental precedent, or chance advice, or the assumed prestige or glamour of certain professions; but a student will help both himself and his country if he makes his decision on the basis of scientific information such as our Ministry of Labour is accumulating. The university should also operate an employment service to help students finance their academic work. I know of a young Persian who, one summer while he was studying in America, worked in an automobile factory in Detroit. His job on the assembly line was to put on the nut and bolt which secured the car's muffler tail-pipe. As a byproduct of his work, he learned much about modern industry which now serves him in good stead in his responsible position in our Plan Organization. When he first returned to Iran and recounted his manufacturing experience, some friends told him he shouldn't mention it because he might lose prestige. But he enjoyed making people squirm by proudly proclaiming that he had worked with his hands! In Iran as elsewhere, many students have the problem of earning money for board, room, and other expenses. Outside work, including term-time and summer jobs offered by the university itself, can both help them make ends meet

and afford valuable experience. I also like the idea, which you find so often in America, of the marriage of young people while they are still engaged in university work. Frequently both man and girl have paying jobs until they graduate, after which the wife may work while the husband does postgraduate study. Incidentally, my Pahlavi Foundation makes annual awards of thirty scholarships to top-ranking students of the University of Teheran and our several provincial universities. Each year the foundation also makes it financially possible for over a hundred young Persians resident in Iraq to come here for high school or university study. In addition I award scholarships every year on an individual basis to a number of our talented young people to help them meet expenses during their studies. I hope these scholarship programmes will set a precedent for much larger ones to come. My final point concerns university extracurricular activities. On my visits to American campuses, some of the pleasantest sights I have come across are the student unions or centres. Here the students meet for good fellowship, refreshments, reading, games, music, panel discussions, and the like. Here, too, are often located the university's counselling and employment services. With good reason the students commonly consider the union and the library as focal points of their university life.

I should very much like to see us establish such student headquarters at each of our universities. I should also like to see us re-invigorate university religious life. Several years ago, with this in mind, I gave encouragement to the building of a magnificent new mosque in the centre of the grounds of the University of Teheran. It is designed in modern style and will possess extensive gardens and shaded porticos that should provide a congenial gathering place for the students. I

have great hopes for our young provincial universities, some of which are showing a splendid spirit of innovation and experimentation. I utterly reject the often-repeated view that for prestige purposes Persian professors can afford to teach only at the University of Teheran instead of in the provincial centres; the youth and vigour of the latter suggest that many attractive opportunities will develop there for those enterprising enough to leave the capital. Moreover, I am a firm believer in competition in higher education. I think we should do everything possible to promote a spirit of competitive improvement—in teaching, in research, in student affairs, in religion, and much else. There is one particularly dramatic form of such competition which we need in Iran. To stimulate our entire educational system, I should like us to establish here a university modelled strictly on American lines and with a primarily American staff. I think the beautiful and centrally located city of Shiraz would provide an ideal setting for such a university, which could be an outgrowth of the present one or an entirely new institution. An American-style university would help meet the needs of the thousands of our young people who at present go abroad to study. In 1960 some 14,000 Persians were studying outside Iran; they ranged from kindergarten pupils to post-graduate university students, but most of them were at the college or university level. Of the total, about 4,000 were enrolled in America and most of the remainder in West Germany, Britain, France, Austria, and other European countries. In that year nearly one- third of all Middle Eastern students studying in U.S. colleges and universities were from Iran. This is truly a remarkable phenomenon, although, as I shall indicate in a moment, it had its negative as well as positive aspects. Especially gratifying was the heavy student enrolment in fields serving our de-

velopment programme. More than half of the Persians enrolled in American colleges and universities were studying science and engineering, including agricultural engineering; and many of the remainder had chosen education, business, and other subjects directly applicable to our economic and social progress. For helping these young people select their fields of study and enter the appropriate colleges and universities, much credit goes to the non-profit-making organization called the American Friends of the Middle East, which through its Teheran office counsels hundreds of Persian students each year and also renders other services that I shall mention later. I have said that my father was a strong believer in sending our young people abroad for study; and my policy is and will continue to be the same. However, many of those who do go become ill-adjusted to their own society. Some of these Persians may not return to their motherland, or they may return only to leave again. It has become commonplace to refer to the so-called cultural shock sometimes experienced by Americans and other citizens of the more developed countries when they go to live and work in the less developed lands; but the same sort of malady may afflict young people from countries like mine who, after living and studying for a period of years abroad, return to their homeland or even contemplate returning. Since America is one of the richest and most advanced of countries, Persians who spend a period of years there seem specially susceptible to cultural shock. They may marry American girls who do not wish to go to Persia. (On the other hand, a number of Persians have brought back American wives who have adapted themselves wonderfully here.) They may be offered teaching, business, or other positions in America at better salaries than are as yet available here. But perhaps most important, they may rebel

emotionally against the delays, the administrative inefficiencies and slothfulness, and the comparative lack of amenities that inevitably characterize a newly developing society. They may fail to realize that America, highly developed though she is, has her private and public red tape and inefficiencies, gangsters and blackmailers, and urban jungles. I know of one young man who, after several years of study in America, felt so frustrated upon his return to Teheran that for months he refused to go out of his house. As he later candidly explained it, even in our cosmopolitan and spectacularly growing capital city things just looked too primitive to him. In due course he began to write letters to friends abroad, and as a pretext to overcome his aversion to leaving his home, he would force himself to take the letters to the post. Gradually he became friends again with the culture of his mother country, and today he holds a highly responsible Government position in the

field of social welfare. Many of our young people who go abroad experience no cultural shock, and many others overcome it; but each year we suffer the grievous loss of trained young Persians who are unable to readjust themselves. Patriotic people have of course pondered ways to overcome this problem. One proposal is to encourage more of our young people to choose places—especially European countries such as Britain, France, and Germany—which possess excellent educational facilities but are less flamboyantly wealthy than America. I think this suggestion has considerable merit, as such students have less difficulty in re-orienting themselves here and their educational costs are lower. But America holds a natural attraction for our young people and has much to offer them. Another proposal, therefore, is to find means of reducing the incidence of cultural shock among

Persians who study in America or, for that matter, in any country abroad. In 1959 I appointed Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, the husband of my daughter the Princess Shahnaz, to look into this problem. My son-in-law is young, was trained in America as an agricultural engineer, and has a conscientious interest in reducing the number of casualties from cultural shock. Advising him was a committee composed chiefly of a cross-section of young Persians who have among them lived and studied in most of the countries to which our students go. In 1960 Mr. Zahedi became our ambassador to America, and in that post he hoped to be able to instil new life into our student liaison work there. The Ministry of Labour also launched an ambitious scheme for keeping in touch with our students abroad and helping them, even before their return, to establish themselves in satisfactory jobs here. The ministry holds the view, which I endorse, that cultural shock must be prevented before it starts. If, for example, a young agricultural engineer studying abroad is informed of Iran's nation-building programme and knows of specific job opportunities awaiting him here, he probably will not desert his country for softer living abroad. We can fully appeal to the latent pioneering fervour of our young people and to the spirit of positive Persian nationalism that I described in Chapter 6. We are a proud race, and we can count upon our young people's Persian patriotism if we provide proper outlets through which it can express itself constructively. A third proposal, which makes obvious sense from the long-term viewpoint, is for us as rapidly as possible to broaden our student's chances to pursue advanced studies within our own borders. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although excellent undergraduate training was available in the United States, any American who wanted to do higher work in, let us say, organic

chemistry was obliged to go to Europe to get it. But later on it became possible to take advanced courses in virtually any field in America. Iran is undergoing a comparable evolution. Already our institutions of higher learning attract a certain number of foreign students each year, and I see ample signs that the number will steadily increase. At the same time a decreasing proportion of our students will find it necessary to go abroad for training. And the cultural shock problem will diminish accordingly. I want us always to send students as well as teaching staff abroad for advanced study. But I plan that more and more this will become a reciprocal process; our scholars will go abroad to be enriched and perhaps to enrich others, and at the same time foreign professors and students will impart to us some of their treasures and perhaps take some back in return. The American-style university I have suggested would be but one manifestation of a movement that I expect to permeate our whole system of higher education. I am so enthusiastic about my country's educational advancement that there is much more that I could say about it. In Persian education the air is charged with a sense of swift change and rapid progress. I draw constant inspiration from this fact, for I know that the stakes are so great for our young people, for Iran, and for this whole region of the world.

Chapter 12

Pioneering in Oil

The modern petroleum industry's first home in the world was America; its first home in the Middle East was Iran. The crude oil reserves of the U.S. are estimated at nearly 35,000 million barrels; by a curious coincidence those of Iran are thought to be almost the same. Today most people sense the importance of petroleum and its products to modern life, but fewer realize that 70 per cent of the Free World's estimated oil reserves lie in the Middle East, of which we in Iran own about one-fifth. In fact you can say that, in spite of the oil resources of Canada, Venezuela, and other countries outside the Iron Curtain, the vast bulk—over 80 per cent—of the Free Worlds's oil reserves lie in the United States and the Middle East. Of course future prospecting may alter that picture; but remember that the oil explorers have been working for a long time now.

If the rest of the Free World were to be deprived of the Middle East's oil, economic calamity would follow for many countries which consume oil and many which produce it. But I prefer to put it another way: millions of years ago, when Nature built up such lavish

oil resources in this region, she laid the foundations for the intimate economic interdependence which now exists between the Middle East and the rest of the Free World. Nature laid the foundations, but man found the ways to produce petroleum and to use it for all of the many purposes of today; it was man's scientific and technological ingenuity that made the Middle East and the remainder of the Free World economically inseparable. When the modern oil industry started just about a century ago, petroleum seepages had already been known and used for thousands of years. The Persians employed oil for illumination and for symbolic fires in the Zoroastrian temples, the Egyptians used it to mummify their dead, the Greeks to fuel their Olympic torches, the American Indians for ceremonial fire dances. In Persia and other countries, surface deposits of petroleum-based asphalt or bitumen were employed as mortar, flooring material, and fuel, not to mention a variety of other uses such as caulking ships, lining water-channels, building dams, and providing flares for lighting. Even natural gas was not entirely neglected; in our Khuzistan region the Zoroastrians built temples at the sites of the natural illuminations (probably ignited by lightning aeons before) which were fed by natural gas seepages. Gradually oil became industrialized. In Burma a commercial oil industry, based on hand-dug wells, was established towards the end of the eighteenth century. But it was in America that modern technology was first applied to the production of oil. By the time Colonel Edwin L. Drake struck oil in his pioneer well in Pennsylvania, he had nearly bankrupted his company and many people thought he was half crazy; but as soon as profits started flowing in he was regarded as eminently sane. Drake's first well was less than seventy feet deep, as against the depths of 10,000 or more feet which have become routine

in the oilfields of Iran and other countries today; and his well pumped only thirty-five barrels a day compared with the 30,000 or more barrels per day yielded year after year by some of our more productive Persian wells. But Drake possessed the priceless spirit of innovation, and he really established the world oil industry on its present basis. That spirit showed men not only how to produce oil but also how to use it. Drake's own company made from petroleum a good liniment, which Drake himself used to fight the crippling rheumatism which afflicted him. The company also exploited a process for refining oil which, as coal oil or kerosene, soon displaced scarce whale oil for use in lamps and lanterns. As kerosene consumption grew by leaps and bounds, Henry Ford developed his horseless carriage with its internal combustion engine that was presently to swallow fantastic amounts of petrol every year. The work of the Wright brothers and others created the aeroplane with its great thirst for petroleum products. Meanwhile oil-fired marine and other boilers, the improved diesel engine, and the growing petrochemicals industry added still further to the demand for oil. Natural gas, usually found in association with oil, was used for producing heat and power and as an industrial raw material. Asphalt was employed for a multitude of purposes including making streets and highways for the new petroleum-burning vehicles. When once the potentialities of petroleum were grasped, the quest for new oil supplies led to the Middle East. Here European technicians and capital led the way. I told in Chapter 2 of the concession granted in 1872 to de Reuter, subsequently cancelled, and in 1889 replaced by another more limited one. Under the second concession, he established in 1890 a company called the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation to work Iran's mineral deposits, including petroleum.

The company unsuccessfully explored for oil in southern Iran. A few years later the Persian Government declared the minerals part of de Reuter's concession invalid, and in 1901 the company was liquidated. Even before de Reuter gave up his search, the governor of our western province of Kermanshah had become convinced that there was oil in his area; and in 1891 he asked Jacques de Morgan, the head of a French archaeological expedition then working in Persia, to prospect there. De Morgan's findings, published in a French technical journal and later in a book, probably constituted the first systematic examination ever made of the oil resources of Persia. In the next few years several other European investigators came to examine my country's geological anatomy. The work of de Morgan and others caught the eye of one William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman who had made a fortune in Australian gold-mining. In 1900 D'Arcy assembled a small team of associates and set them to work in Teheran to obtain an oil concession. In spite of some Russian opposition, D'Arcy was in 1901 granted a sixty-year concession to search for and exploit oil, natural gas, asphalt, and other materials. The agreement provided that D'Arcy should within two years form a company in which the Persian Government would own 20,000 £1 shares and receive £20,000 in cash and 16 per cent of the net profits. The area of the concession included all of Persia except the five northern provinces, which were omitted out of deference to or fear of the Russians.

Amid great hardships D'Arcy's courageous chief engineer, G.B. Reynolds, started drilling in a remote and sun-scorched area in southern Iran. The first well, completed in 1902, yielded nothing. Finally, in January 1904, a second well struck oil, which gushed out at the rate of 120 barrels per day. D'Arcy, by now in deep financial trouble, at last

saw a ray of hope. But within a few months the well ran completely dry.

By this time the British Admiralty had become convinced that oil rather than coal was the naval fuel of the future. Sir Jolin Fisher, later Lord Fisher, who had recently been appointed First Sea Lord, and whom unimaginative people had dubbed 'the oil maniac' because of his enthusiasm for oil-fired ships, now set up an Oil Committee to look into the question of assuring petroleum supplies for the Royal Navy. The committee, intrigued with the possibilities of Persian oil, introduced D'Arcy to the well-established Burmah Oil Company. In the following year the company and D'Arcy formed a joint Concessions Syndicate to finance a further search for Persian oil. The work in Persia continued under the new syndicate. But at the end of 1907, after more than five years of unremitting effort and with five wells completed, only trifling amounts of oil had been recovered. After so much work and so many hardships, the prospects seemed hopeless. Reynolds, the chief engineer, decided upon one last attempt. For many months he and his men had been working on an access road to the area, some 150 miles north-east of Abadan, known as Masjid-i-Sulaiman or 'Mosque of Solomon', after a ruined temple in the middle of it. There they began again. Early on the morning of 26 May, 1908, oil was struck; and out it gushed with such force as to carry it fifty feet above the top of the derrick. That day really marked the beginning of the oil industry in Iran and in the Middle East. Indeed it should be remembered as a landmark in Middle Eastern history. I have often reflected on the motives that inspired those oil pioneers to surmount so many difficulties and hardships and eventually win through. Partly, of course, they were driven on by the lure of financial

gain and the hope of prestige and power. But I doubt if that was their main driving force. I think those men, and especially the ones who worked within sight and sound of the derricks, were motivated primarily by the love of adventure. Dangers and frustrations merely spurred them on to new efforts. My country still holds vast opportunities for adventure, and those of our young men who have the spirit to become modern Persian pioneers will surely want to emulate the rugged characters who brought in that first successful oil well. Soon two more wells came into production at Masjid-i-Sulaiman. After all his years of frustration, Reynolds had found a rich oilfield, which today still yields quantities of oil. The success of the venture now inspired plans for a new and larger company. But first an agreement had to be made with the powerful Bakhtiari tribe, which in defiance of the central Government controlled the whole area around Masjid-i-Sulaiman. In those days, before my father assumed power, the Teheran Government was so weak that virtual anarchy reigned in southern Iran just as elsewhere in the country. Development of our oil resources was impossible without security, and by bitter experience the oil pioneers had found the Teheran authorities unable to maintain law and order. For several years the drilling teams had been paying protection money to the Bakhtiari chieftains; and now that oil had been found the chieftains became bolder in their demands. The result was the formation, in April 1909, of the Bakhtiari Oil Company, designed to give the Bakhtiari chieftains their private cut of the revenue from oil operations in their area; the company was also expected to further the old British divide-and-rule policy by strengthening the hand of the chieftains against the Teheran Government. In return the chieftains were supposed to keep their followers in line and in

general to maintain law and order. The oilfield security problem thus solved, the entrepreneurs on the very next day established the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later to be known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and then as the British Petroleum Company). The new company had immediate plans for processing the oil and moving it to world markets. But before they could build the necessary refinery and loading terminal, another security problem had to be solved. The Sheikh of Muhammara (the old name for Khorramshahr and the area around it) nominally owed allegiance to the Persian Government. But in effect he possessed within our borders an independent kingdom which he personally ruled without any effective hindrance from the Government at Teheran. Today, on the shore of the Shatt-al-Arab not far from the bustling city of Khorramshahr, you can still see the ruins of the sheikh's great palace, where he lived in Oriental splendour amidst his harem girls. The British Government now made a treaty with the sheikh which in effect recognized him as the ruler of a separate sovereign state! Under the treaty he agreed, for a financial consideration, to maintain an attitude of fatherly benevolence towards the company, and to make available a one-square-mile area on a virtually uninhabited mud flat known as Abadan Island, upon which the company hoped to construct a refinery. For their part the British Government guaranteed to maintain the sheikh's sovereign position. In spite of tremendous obstacles a pipeline was completed early in 1912 from the Masjid-i-Sulaiman field to Abadan. By the end of 1913 the Abadan refinery was in large-scale production and extensions had already been planned. Persia's booming oil industry produced a total of 43,000 tons of petroleum in 1912, 80,000 in 1913, and 273,000 in 1914. For better or worse, my country had become

a major factor in the economics and politics of oil. War clouds had been gathering in Europe, and as early as 1912 the British Government had become much concerned about petroleum supplies. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, recommended that to meet naval needs his Government should acquire a 51 per cent interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. A law to this effect was approved by the British Parliament only six days before the outbreak of war in August 1914. This legislation had the desired effect and helped to increase production in spite of serious difficulties created by the war. The Turks, then supporting the Germans, seized all the company's property and supplies at Baghdad and Basra, and Turkish troops threatened Abadan before they were pushed back by a British expeditionary force. The Germans hatched a plan to sink some boats in the Shatt-al-Arab in such a way as to block the channel to all shipping; but they were thwarted by the British. In 1915 tribesmen stirred up by German and Turkish agents cut the main pipeline between Masjid-i-Sulaiman and Abadan at several places, which stopped the flow of oil for over four months until repairs could be made. German attacks upon ocean shipping hampered the import of equipment and supplies for the industry and the export of its products. Output, the great bulk of which was exported, nevertheless went up to 376,000 tons in 1915, 449,000 tons in 1916, 650,000 tons in 1917, and 897,000 tons in the final year of the war. I think all experts are agreed that Persian oil made a major contribution to Allied victory in the First World War; as Britain's Lord Curzon put it, 'Truly posterity will say that the Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil'; and much of that oil was Persian. But political relationships were of course complicated by the fact that the British Government was, until the nationalization

of our oil industry, the major shareholder in it. After the war, production continued to increase and the company further improved living and working conditions at Abadan and in the fields. In 1920 a complex new agreement was worked out between the company and the Persian Government which on the whole represented a slight gain for the latter. Yet under the new agreement the Persian Government's share was still the same 16 per cent of net profits provided for in the original D'Arcy concession, although now the percentage was levied upon Anglo-Persian's subsidiary companies (such as the subsidiary which operated its tanker fleet) as well as upon the parent company. Even before he came to power, my father had become dissatisfied with the company's conduct. Almost immediately after his 1921 coup d'etat, he engaged Sir William McLintock, an independent London chartered accountant (at that time we possessed no well-qualified accountants of our own), to study the financial relations between the company and the Persian Government. Sir William assembled figures which my father was later to use in his encounters with the company. In 1922 and 1923 my father was leading field campaigns to place the tribes under central Government control. He subdued the Kurds in the west, the Lurs in central Iran and the Qashqai in the south, and he planned next to tackle the Bakhtiaris. At this point the British minister in Teheran delivered a warning that his Government could not stand idly by if my father's forces attacked Britain's friends the Bakhtiaris. My father ignored the threat and went ahead with his preparations, whereupon the Bakhtiari chieftains realistically decided to acknowledge the supremacy of the Government of their own country. Soon afterwards my father had a test of strength with the Sheikh of Muhammara. The sheikh, concerned about the growing

authority of my father's regime and confident that the British Government would support him, decided to defy Teheran. In spite of British protests my father in the autumn of 1924 marched south with some 22,000 troops, and within a month the revolt collapsed without a shot being fired. My father brought the sheikh to Teheran, where he was well treated but never allowed to return to his former domains. He died a few years later. I think my father's personal courage had much to do with his crushing the sheikh's defiance without bloodshed. For example, on one occasion Reza Shah told his troops to stay behind while he entered a town controlled by the sheikh. The sheikh had posted his armed followers on streets and rooftops all over the town, and in full view my father walked alone down the street to visit a public bath. He could have been shot with the greatest of ease, but nobody dared make a move. The noblest and the meanest of men alike find it difficult to ignore such courage.

It was after my father's abdication that Sir Reader Bullard, the then British minister in Teheran, one day frankly told me that his Government had learned a profound lesson with the sheikh's downfall. The sheikh was after all a sort of super-sized tribal chieftain; and Sir Reader said that after the overturn at Muhammara the British Government resolved never again to meddle in our tribal affairs. While he was campaigning in the south, my father, with his usual overpowering curiosity, acquired further knowledge of Persia's oil industry. In 1932 he made a formal visit to Abadan, where he was well received but developed further doubts about the wisdom with which the company was conducting its affairs. For example, he learned that more than a fifth of the company's total personnel in Iran were foreigners, and that no very determined effort was being made to Persianize

the staff. He saw the great gap between the standard of living of the higher staff on the one hand and the ordinary employees on the other. He was bothered by instances of company interference in local governmental affairs, and even more by the way in which production levels were determined by the vagaries of international markets or of inter-company understandings, with little regard to the needs of the Persian economy. Some people insist that when in 1932 my father cancelled the company's concession, he did so suddenly and without any previous intimation. This is absolutely untrue. Even before his coronation my father had denounced the terms of the 1920 agreement, and relentlessly he continued to demand a better deal for Iran. In 1926 Reza Shah's Government formally notified the company of its dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements, and in 1928 our Government again communicated its objections. Negotiations dragged on inconclusively for two years, and meanwhile the world-wide economic depression set in, cutting the company's oil sales and the Government's royalties. In 1932 the company informed the Government that its royalty payments covering 1931 would be less than a quarter of those for the previous year. My father decided that it was time to act, and soon afterwards he cancelled the company's concession. His action, confirmed by Parliament, was followed by rejoicing throughout the country. My father had further awakened our spirit of nationalism. Naturally, there were loud outcries from the company and the British Government; and a few days later the case was referred to the League of Nations. Both sides presented their arguments, and eventually it was agreed that the Persian Government and the company would resume direct negotiations with each other. In April 1933 a new concession agreement was signed. The terms of

the concession were complicated, but in my own opinion they represented a decided improvement in our position. The duration of the concession was extended to 1993, which we regretted; but at that stage our bargaining power was low and we could not have obtained a shorter-term agreement. On the other hand, the concession area was tremendously reduced to 100,000 square miles; no longer could a single company claim the sole right to exploit the oil resources of my entire country save the northern provinces. The company's previous monopolistic right to transport and distribute petroleum within my country was also abolished. In respect to royalty payments we were no longer completely at the mercy of company policies and market conditions; and although the scale of payments was lower than we might have desired, at least the agreement guaranteed a minimum annual payment upon which we could count. This was to prove especially valuable during the remainder of the depression years. Among other important provisions in the agreement was one expediting the Persianization of the company's staff and another calling for rapid development of wells and establishment of a refinery in the Kermanshah area in western Iran. Relations between the Persian Government and the company improved considerably after the signing of the 1933 agreement. The company showed its good faith by making heavy new investments in Persia. Four major new oilfields and one new gas-field were brought into being in addition to the three oilfields that had been developed prior to the agreement. The company extended its system of conserving unneeded oilfield products by separating them out in so-called topping plants located in the fields and then pumping them back into the earth for storage against possible future use. The Abadan refinery was enlarged and improved. In keeping with the

1933 agreement the company created a subsidiary, the Kermanshah Oil Company, to work the Naft-i-Shah field in the Kermanshah area. A topping plant was built at the field, a pipeline over 150 miles long was laid from there to the vicinity of Kermanshah, a small refinery was constructed and put into operation at that site, and the plant's output was used mainly to supply consumers within Persia. But as the story of the Kermanshah refinery illustrates, relations with the company did not always go smoothly. My father asked the company to design the refinery for an initial capacity of 100,000 tons annually; but the company objected to erecting a plant of this size, claiming that Iran's domestic consumption of petroleum products didn't warrant it. Reza Shah insisted upon the full capacity he had specified and he promised to find a market within Iran for the entire output. So the company felt obliged to acquiesce. My father's judgement was amply vindicated, for today our domestic consumption runs about three millions tons per year, and it is rising at an average of better than 15 per cent annually. Incidentally, this lively increase provides an excellent indication of the pace of economic development in my country. By 1930 the company was producing at the rate of over ten million tons per year, more than double that often years before. It stepped up its efforts to Persianize the staff, and as a means to this end it established the Abadan Technical Institute and other training facilities. podern town-planning was stressed; housing and medical services were improved; and water, sewerage, and electricity systems extended. During the Second World War output fell for a time because of shipping and other difficulties. But even in 1941, when production reached its lowest level of 6.6 million tons, it was over seven times as high as in the peak year of the First World War. Moreover, we began to benefit from

a minimum-payment provision which my father had obtained from the company; under it the company guaranteed us annual royalties of £4 million, equivalent to the royalties of 1938, the best pre-war year. After the 1941 low point, output during the Second World War steadily expanded; in 1944 it was 13.2 million tons or well above the pre-war peak, and in 1945 it reached 16.8 million tons. After the war the company launched a large-scale modernization and expansion programme. The Abadan refinery had already become the world's largest, and in spite of developments in other countries it easily retained that position. Total output of Persian oil rose to 19.2 million tons in 1947, 24.9 in 1948, 26.8 in 1949, and in 1950 to the peak of 31.8 million tons, which for political reasons was not to be equalled for some years to come. In 1951 production fell to 16.7 million tons, or scarcely over half the record of the previous year. In 1952 output collapsed to less than one million tons, or less than *one-thirtieth* of the 1950 level. In the manner in which I explained in Chapter 5, Mossadegh's policies had overtaken not only the oil company but also the country to which he professed allegiance.

In the years before the collapse of our oil industry and our whole economy, the Government's revenues had been rising year by year as oil output increased. Apparently the company assumed that through these revenue increases they could anaesthetize me and my people. But the war-time military occupation and Russian behaviour towards us immediately after the war—to name but two factors—had given us a new sense of national unity. We were tired of being pushed around by foreigners, and the patronizing air of the company had become ever more galling to us. Some of their officials showed extreme arrogance towards their Persian subordinates and towards officials of the very

Government that was offering them hospitality. From the manners of some of the company people, you would have thought that they owned my country outright. Furthermore, to us and to others of the newly developing oil-producing countries, the old royalty scales had come to seem nonsensical. In return for a minor share of their profits, huge alien oil companies were depleting our God-given natural resources. I suppose one of the straws that broke the camel's back in Iran was the Saudi Arabian accomplishment in getting from the Arabian-American Oil Company (an American combine otherwise known as Aramco) a better deal than had theretofore been achieved by any Middle East Government. The new agreement, providing for a fifty-fifty sharing of profits, was announced in 1950, the year before we nationalized the Persian oil industry. I spoke in Chapter 5 of the cowardly murder of Prime Minister Razmara while he was attending a ceremony at a mosque. Just a few days before his death, the Prime Minister had received from the British a proposal for a fifty-fifty split of profits. One of Razmara's advisers suggested that, to reduce public tension, the Prime Minister should immediately read the proposal in Parliament; but Razmara replied that he would rather wait until passions had cooled and then submit the proposition. This decision may have cost Razmara his life. But the British proposal was in any event too late, for Persian nationalism had become thoroughly aroused and public sentiment overwhelmingly favoured nationalization. If wise statesmanship had followed the nationalization action, we might have expected an immediate increase in our annual oil revenues. Certainly that would have been a blessing, for we urgently needed funds for internal development. But I have already described how exactly the reverse happened. It is perhaps typical that, although my father several

times visited Abadan on personal inspections, and although I have done the same, Mossadegh never once deigned to travel to the centre of the industry he talked so much about. In retrospect how well were Iran's oil resources utilized during the Mossadegh regime? In 1949, well before Mossadegh came to power, the law which created the Plan Organization also set up the Iran Oil Company as an affiliated Government-owned organization for exploring and prospecting for oil. When we nationalized our oil industry in 1951, we established the National Iranian Oil Company. The Iran Oil Company was to become part of the NIOC in 1954. Thus when Mossadegh took office in 195 1, he inherited, in the shape of the NIOC and the Iran Oil Company, two going concerns. Together they were responsible for an industry which included eight oilfields, two refineries, two topping plants, pipelines, loading terminals for export, extensive facilities for distributing oil products within Iran, exploration equipment, some 50,000 employees, and all the service establishments provided for their welfare. Throughout the oil crisis the NIOC succeeded, against considerable odds, in maintaining the oilfields, the refineries, and the ancillary establishments in excellent condition, and in retaining practically all Iranian staff and workers in service. Likewise the NIOC was able to supply Iran's internal oil requirements without interruption; this was particularly important in a time when Mossadegh's policies had led to a desperate shortage of foreign exchange. In fact, although our economic plight forced the NIOC to economize in every possible way, it was actually able to expand its distribution facilities within the country. Beyond that the record was a dismal one. Picture a huge industry, which had become a major element in the world's total oil output, now virtually reduced to supplying the domestic needs of

one partially developed country. Picture the world's largest refinery consigned to almost complete idleness. Picture a resulting situation of such financial stringency that we even had to curtail the prospecting activities upon which the future of our oil industry depended. I have already related how, after Mossadegh was deposed, we set about to repair the damage. From a bare million tons (almost all of which we had to use internally) of total output in 1952 and 1.4 million tons in 1953, production rose to 3 million in 1954, 16 million in 1955, and 27 million in 1956. In 1957, output, at 36 million tons, for the first time surpassed the pre-nationalization record established in 1950. In 1958 production soared to 41 million and in 1959 to 45 million tons.

Output in 1959, in other words, was no less than forty-five times that of 1952. For 1960 we expect production to have expanded further to something in the neighbourhood of 50 million tons. Moreover, the new royalty scale of 50 per cent of net profits after taxes is of course vastly better than before. At the same time we were moving towards better utilization of our oil resources outside the territory worked by the new consortium—for its so-called agreement area after all includes only a small fraction of the potentially valuable oil sites in my country. As early as mid-1951 the Government's Iran Oil Company had started an exploratory well near the holy city of Qum. Drilling there was stepped up after the Mossadegh crisis, and in late 1956 oil gushed out 300 feet into the air from well No. 5. Those were exciting times, for during an 82-day period oil was spewing out of that well at the rate of 100,000 barrels a day—the greatest daily output from a single well ever known. A river of oil flowed from the well to a rapidly accumulating lake. Within a few days it resembled from a distance a good-sized lake of water; the breeze even kicked up waves that, glis-

tening in the sunlight, looked like small ocean waves. Something had to be done to harness the uncontrolled gusher. Myron Kinley, the famous American expert on oil fires, rushed by plane from Texas to Iran and led a gallant team against it. As they worked the men knew that a gas explosion could at any moment blow them to pieces. Then came the anticlimax, reminiscent of D'Arcy's first abortive gusher. Because of a subterranean cave-in the flow of oil petered out. If there ever was a case of coming in like a Lion and going out like a lamb, it was the great, the unprecedented gusher at well No. 5 at Qum! We sold the contents of the lake of oil to anybody who would come and take the stuff away. But experts agreed that the signs at the Qum field were auspicious, and drilling went on. By the end of 1958, wells to a total depth of over eighteen miles had been drilled. Intensive exploratory work was also under way at Sarajeh, a gas-field some thirty-seven miles south-east of the Qum field; and early in 1959 oil of good quality was discovered there. A little-heralded but important milestone in the history of our oil industry was the completion by the Iran Oil Company in the same year of the first national geophysical map of Iran. It is my policy to encourage private as well as public enterprise; and in 1957 we passed a bill which among other things authorized the NIOC to arrange with foreign groups to help us develop our oil resources. Whereas the 1954 agreement with the consortium was in the nature of a treaty, the new law gave the NIOC direct authority to negotiate contracts with foreign interests, subject in eacli case to ratification by Parliament. Soon after the new law was passed, the NIOC invited international bidding for the right to explore certain potentially oil-rich territories within our borders and to help produce any oil found in commercial quantities. The terms of bidding, as released by the

NIOC, caused an immediate furore in world oil circles—as indeed we had intended that they should. I was determined that we would apply a radically new philosophy to the subsequent development of our oil resources. In the first place, there would be no more oil concessions in the old sense; in keeping with the spirit in which we had nationalized our oil industry, any foreign groups who came here looking for black gold would either be mere agents working on behalf of the Iranian Government or would actually enter into partnership with us. The concept of agent had in fact been made clear in the 1954 agreement setting up the consortium to work the properties of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and the partnership idea was soon to be put into practice in agreements new in kind. Second, foreign companies who hoped to produce oil in Iran would have to show enough faith in my country and its resources to conduct detailed prospecting at their own risk and expense. Of course, the NIOC, on the strength of its geological and other explorations in many parts of the country, could give the foreign groups much help and advice; but, even at the risk of finding nothing and going away empty-handed, the foreigners would have to invest their own money. Third, if oil were found in commercial quantities, the Iranian Government would participate, both financially and managerially, in producing it. I attached great importance to this principle from the viewpoint of Persian nationalism. I was determined that never again would a huge foreign combine be given untrammelled managerial authority over a vital sector of our economy. My Government would constructively participate in the management; the foreign interests would have to assume that since our profits as well as theirs depended upon operational efficiency, we would do our best to help evolve and carry out sound policies. Fourth,

my mind was made up that we should receive a much better scale of royalties. As I saw it the fifty-fifty split had outlived its usefulness and was out of tune with out nationalist aspirations. I was sure we could improve upon it. Immediately certain powerful interests began to oppose our quest for a better deal. The international oil cartels argued that we would kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. Evidently they launched a lobbying campaign against us in Washington. I am sorry to have to say that the then American ambassador in Teheran tried to discourage us from entering into this new kind of agreement. Certain of the oil interests displayed the same unsympathetic attitude towards our nationalist aspirations that had led to the undoing of the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and for a time it seemed as if some U.S. officials might in Iran repeat the same blunders that had been committed by the British Government in the years prior to our nationalization of oil. But the arrangements we were proposing were logical, and the oil companies found themselves unable to maintain a united front against them. It seems that the U.S. State Department also began to change its tune. In August 1957 the NIOC signed, with the Italian company known as Agip Mineraria, the first of the new agreements; a second one followed in April 1958, with Pan American Petroleum Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company (Indiana); and a third with a Canadian company called Sapphire Petroleums Limited. The Italian and American concerns quickly set to work under their agreements, but at the time of writing the Canadian company had not progressed far. The three agreements are similar in principle, and the areas to be worked under them are located chiefly in southern Iran, including our Persian Gulf coastline and adjacent territorial waters. Since of the three concerns the Ameri-

can one has made the most initial progress, I take it here as an example. The areas to be worked by Pan American in collaboration with the NIOC are completely under water. The layman may wonder why any oil company in its right mind would try to establish an oilfield beneath the sea, but the truth is that in the United States, Venezuela, Indonesia, and other countries there are very productive submerged fields. Recent years have witnessed tremendous technical progress in methods of exploiting such offshore oil deposits. The agreement provides that if, within twelve years from the date of signature, no commercial production has been achieved, then the entire area will revert to my Government. Even if commercial production is attained, the area will be reduced in size by 25 per cent at the end of the first five years and another 25 per cent at the end of the second five years; and at the end of the twelfth year only those parts of the area in winch commercially exploitable oilfields have been discovered will remain available under the agreement. Think what a far cry these terms are from those of the old de Reuter and D'Arcy concessions!

Under the agreement a joint company, known as IPAC, is to be established and registered in Teheran. Its shares are to be owned equally by the NIOC and Pan American, and those organizations are each to nominate half of its board of directors. IPAC is to play a dual role: for exploration, to be carried on solely at Pan America's expense, it is to be responsible to Pan American, while for commercial oil production it is to be responsible to both the NIOC and Pan American. The agreement provides that within thirty days after signature Pan American is to put down a cash bonus of $25 million, and exploration operations are to commence. Within twelve years it must spend a minimum of $82 million of its own funds on exploration here—that

is, unless it succeeds in discovering commercial quantities of oil with less expenditure, in which case it must divide its savings with my Government. If Pan American does not manage to discover commercial quantities of oil by the end of the twelfth year, then it loses its $82 million as well as its right to continue operations under the agreement. On the other hand if Pan American does discover oil in commercial quantities (the agreement precisely defines what that means), then it officially notifies the NIOC of that fact. This is the signal for IPAC to start its work as a joint producing company. In the production phase how are the profits divided? On this as on other points this new-type agreement is clear and specific, and I urge anybody who is interested to get a copy of it and read it. Under the agreement we receive 75 per cent of the total profits and the company takes 25 per cent. The logic here is simple. The agreement stipulates that the NIOC and Pan American are equally to share the profits from all oil sales. But this is a fifty-fifty sharing of net profits before taxes. The agreement goes on to state that my Government has the right to apply a 50 per cent income tax on all Pan American's profits in Iran. The 50 per cent tax on Pan American's 50 per cent profits gives us an additional 25 per cent of the aggregate profits; thus our total share is 75 per cent. So far as I am aware, this agreement, and its predecessor signed with the Italian company, were the first in the world incorporating a 75-25 per cent profits split in favour of the host country. I am amused to find that some oil men still try to gloss over the differences between these pioneering agreements and the traditional fifty-fifty ones. They will tell you that the fifty-fifty agreements are not really fifty-fifty, that our new agreements are not really 75-25, and that actually there is very little difference between the two. In their hearts these men know that

such statements will not bear careful scrutiny. In their more candid moments the oil people also realize that the new yardstick we have established in Iran will inevitably be applied in other countries, as indeed it already has been. Those who still worship at the altar of the old fifty-fifty formula seem to fear that if they do not hang together in support of it, as far as profits go they will hang separately. But any magic the old formula may have had is gone for ever; my readers and I will not have to wait long to see it disappear as a governing standard in the world of oil. Perhaps mainly because of the newness of the agreements, some oil people seem fearful of them; but, at least so far as my country is concerned, such anxieties can be laid to rest. We do not want to kill any goose which lays golden eggs that benefit my country, but we intend to regulate each goose's behaviour in the public interest. This leads me back to the other provision in the new agreements which gives some oil men insomnia. I refer to the joint venture provisions. Those who are fearful of joint undertakings such as IPAC tend to forget two things. In the first place, we have as much interest in their profitable operation as our private foreign partners. Indeed, since our share of the profits is the larger, you might say that we have even more incentive than they to ensure that the joint venture is a success. And secondly, the private participants can be reassured by the share our people have in the management. The world has seen plenty of examples to show that an alien enterprise easily arouses the antagonism of a host Government and people, but shared management means that the enterprise has much more chance of needed governmental and popular support. The Government representatives, being human, will certainly make mistakes; but they will probably help the company's progress much more than they hinder

it. Such at least, is my conclusion based on our experience in Iran.

What followed the signing of the Pan American agreement? The $25 million cash bonus was paid, the IPAC was established and registered as an Iranian corporation, and heavy equipment, such as I shall describe in a moment, was ordered from America. A seismographic survey of the agreement area (using sensitive microphones and recording instruments to pick up and chart the pattern of sound waves caused by under-watcr dynamite explosions, thus furnishing clues to the location of oil-bearing sedimentary beds) was completed at a cost of some $2.5 million. A gravity meter survey of the area (using delicate ship-borne instruments to record minute variations in the force of gravity, providing further information on the nature of the underlying geological structures) was accomplished with an outlay of about $750,000. Using the data from these surveys a site was selected for an initial exploratory well. The heavy equipment was delivered and, in October 1959, exploratory drilling began. The equipment for this offshore work is really spectacular. One item is a mobile drilling platform, a large steel barge 200 feet long by 104 feet wide by 15 feet deep and weighing some 6,000 tons fully equipped. This is fitted with eight hydraulically operated legs, each 225 feet long, which can be lowered to the floor of the Persian Gulf, so enabling this ponderous barge to raise itself above the water to a sufficient height to clear all waves even in heavy storms. On the barge is an oil-well derrick 140 feet high, a helicopter landing deck, cranes, pumps, motors, and other equipment. Below decks are air-conditioned living-quarters for sixty men, three locomotive-type diesel engines for the main power supply, smaller power units, a distillation unit which can convert 1,000 gallons an hour of fresh water from sea water, a machine shop, and

extensive storage facilities. The world's largest ocean-going tug towed the barge 11,000 miles from the Gulf of Mexico, where it was built, to the Persian Gulf, where it started round-the-clock drilling operations. Another item is a large ship called a drilling tender, with a wide range of equipment including generators, pumps, pipe racks for drill pipe, tanks for the mud used in drilling, storage areas for many kinds of supplies, and living-quarters for the crew. Using the drilling tender as a base, man-made islands known as drilling platforms can be constructed upon long piles driven into the sea floor. An oil-well derrick and associated equipment are installed on each of these artificial islands. The drilling barge is especially suited for exploratory drilling, since it can readily be moved from site to site. The island drilling platforms, designed mainly for actual oil production, are serviced not only by the drilling tender but also by a variety of smaller craft as well as helicopters. If and when oil is struck, pipelines will probably be laid along the floor of the Persian Gulf to carry it to shore.

To drill a single offshore exploratory well costs about $15,000 per day, and since ten months of twenty-four-hours-a-day operation are typically required to complete such a well, the total cost for each runs about $4.5 million. The American company knows, and we know, that drilling may continue for years without positive result. But everywhere the oil business is notoriously risky. One must have the same faith as the original oil pioneers in Iran who overcame all frustrations tobring in that first producing well in 1908. We are prepared to keep trying. But while we are expanding our oil industry in virgin areas of Iran, we continue the mighty undertaking based on Abadan. As an oil centre it is unique. It is more than the biggest refinery in the world and the largest industrial complex in Iran; Abadan is a community

with a distinctive atmosphere found, so far as I am aware, nowhere else. Visitors from abroad who come to my country to learn more of our rich history and culture will certainly want to spend some days in Abadan, too, for no rounded view of Iran is possible without seeing it. From Teheran it can be reached in comfort by air-conditioned train or turbo-prop airliner; and while there the visitor can readily inspect some of the dramatic projects in our TVA-style Khuzistan development scheme described in Chapter 7. Patriotic Persians, as well as foreigners interested in new trends in the Middle East, owe it to themselves to become familiar with these works. Abadan is a city of tangible production; one feels there a sense of fruitfulness, of accomplishment. It is a fine example of town planning, with the great refinery in its midst, flanked by the busy river and by residential districts in orderly array. A cosmopolitan city, it has visible ties with all parts of the world. Ships from many nations line the wharves and jetties, loading for distant points while members of their crews relax on shore. In the streets one sees executives, technicians and workers, their wives and children, and office girls from Persia and Britain, America and France, Holland and other countries. Actually the Persianization programme has progressed to the point that only some 300 foreigners, out of a total labour force of about 25,000 are employed at the refinery; but they and their families add an international flavour to the scene.

Abadan's delightful winter season makes possible a wide variety of such outdoor sports as football, rugby, cricket, Softball, volleyball, golf, tennis, horse-racing, sail-boating, and flying. In the hot summer months people turn more to the air-conditioned clubs and theatres. I sometimes think Abadan's torrid summer weather helps inspire

a sense of unity and purpose among the diverse nationalities there; certainly operations continue at full blast day and night throughout the year. Administrators and technicians speak, too, of the intellectual stimulation Abadan holds for them; as one of them expressed it, 'When you have graduated from this university, you are prepared to work anywhere!' Abadan likes to do things in a big way. For example, the refinery includes ten large distillation plants for separating the crude oil into its basic components, ten cracking plants for producing high-octane petrol, and more than forty other refining plants. Merely to fuel its own operations the refinery consumes over 60 milhon cubic feet of natural gas daily. Its electric power station is one of the biggest in the Middle East, and its two pump houses, which supply water for all purposes, are among the largest ever built. The refinery pours out a ceaseless stream of petroleum products of which the main ones are aviation fuel, motor petrol, gas oil or road diesel oil, paraffin, fuel oil, lubrication oils, and asphalt or bitumen. The refinery even manufactures most of the chemicals needed to produce its end-products. To move its things and people around, the refinery runs some 2,300 cars, buses, and lorries; 30 diesel locomotives and 1,000 goods wagons; and 28 tugboats, 56 barges, and 42 motor launches. To maintain its communications there are 10 automatic and 15 manual telephone exchanges, and radio equipment for keeping in touch with aircraft and ships at sea. Trunk pipelines up to 160 miles long connect the refinery with the great oilfields, including the still-active original one at Masjid-i-Sulaiman and others that have since dwarfed it in size. Our Agha Jari field is indeed the most prolific in the entire world. Each of the oilfields contains one or more miniature replicas of the Abadan community, complete with its homes and shops, its clubs

and playing fields. While we find use within the country for some of the output of the oil industry centred on Abadan, most of it of course goes abroad to help provide the foreign exchange needed for our national development programme. In 1959, for example, no less than 762 tankers loaded at Abadan. A still more astonishing number of tankers—over 1,250 loaded at our rapidly expanding port of Bandar Mashur, some fiftyfive miles away. While at Abadan ships take on mainly refined products, Bandar Mashur loads crude oil. Recently completed at Kharg Island, about 150 miles down the Persian Gulf from Abadan, is a yet more ambitious oil terminal equipped to accommodate the largest supertankers afloat, whose tonnages range up to 100,000 and more. Who are the owners of the vast array of facilities that go to make up our oil industry? The people of Iran own them all. From this circumstance my countrymen and I derive much satisfaction; it gratifies our national pride to know that our entire oil industry belongs to us alone. Moreover, the industry is no longer, as a few years ago, in a state of coma; it is producing at a rate unprecedented in our history. I sometimes think that at the great refinery at Abadan, at the docks where the big tankers come to load, in the fields, and at our government distribution facilities and service stations all over the country we should install bilingual signs conveying this message: property of the Persian people. These signs would constitute good reminders for my compatriots young and old, for the thousands of Persians who work in our industry, and for the foreigners. It is psychologically desirable for us to keep ever in our minds that we own these facilities, and we can do it without conceit. Yet it is not enough for us to own our oil industry; we must also effectively manage it in the public interest. Everybody admits

that the production of petroleum and its products and derivatives is a tremendously complex business requiring highly advanced technical and administrative know-how; but having already Persianized our oil industry's assets we are now steadily marching towards Persianization of its operations. First, there is the question of personnel. We have persuaded the oil consortium to cut its foreign staff in Iran to the present comparative handful. Of course our National Iranian Oil Company employs some foreign advisers and technicians, and naturally some foreigners have been brought in under the new agreements for oil exploration and production; but in Iran's entire oil industry only a few hundred foreigners remain, and the number is steadily diminishing. Second, there is the control of functions. It is a sign of childish immaturity to bite off more than one can chew, so as we broaden our managerial control we are proceeding from the simpler to the more complex functions. I have already given some hint of the vast range of services that are needed to support the operations of the Abadan refinery. Our National Iranian Oil Company has been taking over those services from the consortium. For example, the NIOC now operates all the refinery's medical and health facilities. It manages the construction of all new housing for the refinery's staff and workers and the maintenance of the thousands of houses and flats that have already been built. It maintains and extends the roads and public utilities that serve the housing. The policing of the entire refinery area is in its hands, and it administers the Abadan Technical Institute as well as increasingly handling other training programmes. In fact by mid-1960 over one-third of all the consortium's Abadan personnel had come under the control of the NIOC. This is a notable accomplishment, for which much credit is due to both the NIOC

and the consortium. The same principle is being applied to the oilfields which feed the refinery; there too the NIOC is extending its control over many auxiliary services. But we have more ambitious plans. I mentioned earlier the steps we have taken towards the building of an oil pipeline to the Mediterranean, and towards establishing a tanker fleet flying the Iranian flag. Later we plan to establish our own agencies abroad to help market our oil with more profit to us and fuller acknowledgement of its origin in this ancient land. In scores of countries Persian oil is helping to meet human needs, and I want that oil to be identified with my country, not solely with the name of some cartel. The modern oil industry rests very much upon a foundation of scientific research and development; and for this reason I am particularly glad that we have begun creating our own NIOC Research Centre. We are starting with a petroleum engineering and drilling laboratory, the foundation stone of which was laid by Queen Farah early in 1960. Later we expect to add geological, geophysical, geochemical, petrophysical, and production engineering laboratories; and we intend that the centre should eventually rank with those of the most industrially advanced countries. I should add that the site of the research centre happens to be close to my father's tomb in the town of Rey, near Teheran; and were he alive today, Reza Shah would I am sure be among the first to applaud this further symbol of the new Iran. What I have said thus far helps explain my confidence that we Persians can progressively master the large-scale production and distribution of oil. But how about the world's long-term oil needs?

Momentous developments are now taking place in respect to mankind's energy sources. For example, Britain has assumed world leadership in nuclear power production, and many other countries

are building or contemplating nuclear power stations. America's longrange nuclear submarines roam the seven seas; Russia has commissioned a nuclear-powered ice-breaker; and in mid-1959 America launched the world's first nuclear-powered merchant vessel, designed to cruise for three and a half years without refuelling. As a sort of crowning indignity to oil, Germany, Britain, and other countries are planning nuclear powered oil tankers. In the more distant future oil may face competition from solar energy. And meanwhile, on the supply side, one must reckon with new oilfields such as those in Libya and the great installations being constructed by the French in the Sahara. Yet, in spite of the likelihood of temporary gluts, it seems to me that the prospects of oil and natural gas are today more auspicious than ever before. Fuel or energy requirements are increasing so fast that even the most spectacular growth of the newer sources will hardly begin to meet the need. Equally promising is the widening use of petroleum as a chemical raw material.

From the organic chemist's point of view, petroleum and natural gas are so intrinsically valuable that it is scandalous to burn them as fuel. Chemists look forward to a future of virtually unlimited possibilities for petrochemicals made from oil and gas. A few years ago some leading oil men claimed that petrochemicals would never use more than a comparative dribble of total oil and gas output. How wrong they were! Now the industry is growing by such leaps and bounds that by 1965 the value of its annual output is expected to reach ten thousand million dollars in America alone. The dynamic petrochemicals industry produces synthetic rubber, plastics, synthetic fibres such as nylon and dacron, fertilizers, insecticides, anti-freeze, drugs, building materials, safety glass, food containers, paints, and

literally hundreds of other items. In 1959 over 150 new petrochemical plants or plant expansions were planned or under way in various parts of the world. As a supplier of raw materials Iran will continue to support the growth of this giant industry abroad; in addition, as I noted earlier, we shall be making our own petrochemical finished products. A valuable stimulus to the growth of the industry in Iran will no doubt be our new petrochemicals research institute, which we established in 1959 with the help of French scientists and technicians.



Assisting Queen Elizabeth from her carriage during my State Visit to Britain.



With President Eisenhower in Teheran, December 1959.

Altogether I think it is not surprising to find experts conservatively predicting that within the next ten years the world will boost its consumption of oil by at least 75 per cent, and that world consumption of natural gas will rise even faster. The growing role of oil and gas presents us Persians with a great opportunity. As never before our efforts can help raise living standards both here and all over the globe; and at the same time, through steadily increasing control over the production and distribution of our oil, we shall be re-asserting our national sovereignty.



My fiancee and I on the day our engagement was announced.



Our wedding day.

Chapter 13

Iran and World Peace

Truly it can be said there is never a dull moment in the Middle East. Whenever you think things are calming down, you can be sure it is only the calm before another storm. For example, in May 1960, I went on a brief round of state visits in Europe. When I passed through Turkey on the way back I was greeted by an entirely different set of leaders from those I had met on my outward journey, for a coup d'etat had taken place in the meantime and had saved Turkey from civil war. The Middle East is so full of the unexpected and the seemingly unpredictable that many people despair of ever being able to formulate any settled principles of international relations for this part of the world. At the same time they sense that the area is becoming ever more interdependent with the rest of the globe, and this only seems to make more frustrating an already baffling task of analysis. The Middle East, they feel, is complex enough taken in isolation; if you add the variables of interaction with other parts of the world, the equation becomes insoluble. In my opinion you can approach the problems of Middle Eastern statecraft, and of peace in the Middle East, with much

more confidence than these remarks suggest. But first I must raise the question of the kind of peace desired. My question is by no means purely rhetorical, because those who love liberty do not want peace at any price. Confinement ina penitentiary may provide a certain kind of peace, and some prisoners have been known to lose all interest in returning to the outside world. In the same way, brain-washing can bring a sensation of peace to the victim. Countries, like individuals, may remain technically at peace while actually in a condition of morbid subservience to totalitarian control; and some of those who talk the most about easing international tensions and fostering world peace have in mind just that kind. What enlightened people really want, I think, is not peace but creative peace. In other words, they crave a kind of peace in which men and nations can realize their potentialities to the full. And I feel that two main conditions are required for the peoples and countries of the Middle East to achieve this. The first is political, economic, and social democracy such as I have already described. I am not preaching any rigid pattern of democracy, but I do urge the necessity of effective democracy, as contrasted, for example with systems known by such names as 'people's democracy', which in practice yield results exactly contrary to their appealing labels. The second condition is security from subversion, infiltration, and aggression; this, along with internal democracy, is necessary if men are to realize their capabilities and develop as I think God intended them to do. Given a world and a Middle East inhabited by mortal men, we can of course never perfectly achieve these conditions. But at least we should do the best we can, and in so far as we succeed, we shall all be happier. Look with me at some precedents of the past few years. At the close of the Second World War a number of nations in

Western Europe were economically prostrate and ripe for Communist subversion. Then came the Marshall Plan, which represented foreign aid on a scale never before known. It helped the nations of Western Europe to get back on their feet and in most cases to achieve a level of national output higher than they had known before the war. In spite of the progressive loss of her colonies, Britain marched towards a record of real income higher than she had known in her greatest days of empire. Notwithstanding initial political uncertainties, France achieved spectacular industrial development. Germany made rapid economic recovery and replaced the ghost of Hitler's tyranny with the first solid growth of democracy in her history as a nation. All the western European countries fared well. Fundamental to the progress of the countries of free Europe were of course the steps they took to mend their defences. The United Nations had been established in 1945, and soon afterwards the evil outlines of the Cold War could readily be discerned. Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter provided for collective self-defence through regional arrangements to maintain peace and security, and in 1949 most of the free nations of Europe joined with one another and with the United States and Canada to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO. Greece, Turkey, and West Germany subsequently joined, and now NATO ranges all the way from North America to Asia and includes the following fifteen countries: the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark (and Greenland), the United Kingdom, France, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. NATO represents far more than a military alliance in the older sense of that term. It has come to symbolize a brotherhood of likeminded, freedom-loving nations and

peoples. NATO has powerfully enhanced the morale of the citizens of free Europe, and has provided them with a secure shield behind which they have scored their amazing post-war economic development. It has set an example of regional teamwork and solidarity, and has helped inspire subsequent European regional programmes such as Euratom. Just as centuries from now historians will remember the Marshall Plan as an example of unprecedently generous international aid, so I feel sure they will write of NATO as a remarkably successful instance of what I should like to name cooperative international security. Now of course some cynics, following the Communist line, from the outset maintained that the Marshall Plan was but a thinly disguised scheme of American imperialism. In the same way they later claimed that America must be up to no good in participating in NATO; they said she was merely fishing in troubled waters and hoping eventually to place Europe under her domination. But I think those who make such charges completely misinterpret America's history and culture. They also misjudge the nature of American enlightened self-interest. Americans are wise enough to see that their welfare, even their survival, will depend upon their having strong and reliable friends. Now while conditions in the Middle East obviously diverged from those in Europe, in a more fundamental sense they were similar. It is true that Western Europe was composed mostly of economically developed countries, while practically all the countries of the Middle East were under-developed. It is true that Europe's post-war regeneration could proceed from an existing base of technical and managerial skills, while in the Middle East one had to lay new foundations. But both these major regions of the world felt a keen desire for political, economic, and social advancement and for adequate security so that such

progress could take place. President Truman had in mind the differences between more-developed and less-developed countries when in 1949 he first proposed the programme that soon became everywhere known as Point Four; and with my warm endorsement he and his advisers selected Iran as the site for the first project. As early as 1947 the United Nations had made some small beginnings in the field of co-ordinated technical assistance to newly developing countries, and in 1949 it established its expanded programme of technical assistance from which my country has benefited so much. In 1950 Britain and other Commonwealth countries started their remarkably successful Colombo Plan for technical aid, which later was expanded to include some non-Commonwealth countries as well. For the first time in history, the world had accepted technical aid as a major means of helping the emerging countries and indeed as a primary instrument of international relations. Today many governments are providing foreign technical aid either directly or through the United Nations or other international organizations or both. Among individual countries the United States, with its Point Four missions in over sixty of the newly developing lands, operates by far the largest programme. The United Nations has fully fledged technical assistance missions in more than thirty countries, and smaller teams of experts in many more. A number of powers, with America again far in the lead, have helped the newly developing countries with large-scale economic aid in the form of money, food, industrial equipment, and much else. I think it is no exaggeration to claim, then, that the noble conception of the Marshall Plan, which meant so much to Europe, was successfully adapted to bring incalculable benefits to the Middle East. Certainly we Persians have found it so; and it is well known that the various tech-

nical and economic assistance programmes have brought help and hope to millions of other people in this part of the world. But when it came to providing the Middle East with a security shield comparable with NATO, progress was slower. I have already said that the Cold War really began in Iran with the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. By the end of the 1940s Communist attempts at subversion and infiltration had appeared everywhere in the Middle East; but unfortunately we in this part of the world lagged behind Europe in banding together to meet the Communist threat. In 1951 Turkey joined NATO, and Pakistan became a charter member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, when it was established three years later. But only in 1955, or six years after the creation of NATO, was the Baghdad Pact set up to provide the Middle East with its first semblance of an effective post-war collective security organization. A natural geographical linkage connected NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO; and this was strengthened by the fact that Britain and Turkey were members of both NATO and the Baghdad Pact while Britain and Pakistan belonged to both the pact and SEATO. I explained earlier why my country joined the Baghdad Pact and also why, two years later, we entered into the bilateral security agreement with America. I am gratified that we took these actions. Incidentally, our obligations under CENTO and under our agreement with America in no way prevent us from establishing friendly, neighbourly relations with the Russians if and when they desire them. Indeed, the Russians have manifested a desire to be friendly with the other members of CENTO, who have also signed bilateral agreements with the United States. Now naturally some people, especially those of the extreme left, have excitedly attacked NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and all other such alliances against

Communist aggressive designs. With confirmed Communists there is obviously no use in discussing the matter, because they would automatically be antagonistic to any non-Communist pact. But I have noticed that some people who would be the first to deny they are pro-Communist nevertheless use arguments that strikingly resemble those of the Communists themselves. I would ask them to re-examine their position. It is my conviction that during the past fifteen years the free peoples of the earth have avoided the catastrophe of the Third World War only through the system of alliances and mutual aid which I call cooperative international security. I see no prospect that this system will become any the less indispensable during the next fifteen years. I grant that to this iron law there is one seeming qualification: the free peoples might be led into giving ground year after year, allowing the Communists to encroach gradually without effective opposition. But even such a perverted form of peaceful co-existence would not prevent the Third World War. Why? My answer is that the Communists would in due course so weaken the free peoples that they would attempt to deliver the coup de grace by force and violence. Or the free peoples themselves would finally decide to take decisive counter-action, war or no war. Whichever happened first, it would be impossible to avoid the Third World War. Now let me stress that the system of cooperative international security in no way by-passes the United Nations; on the contrary, it makes full and fundamental use of that organization. On the one hand the UN specialized agencies furnish vital technical assistance and funds for the national development programmes which are so essential to the system I am outlining; and on the other, the UN safeguards collective security. For example, who can forget the UN action to halt Communist aggression in Korea, or

its work in the troubled Arab-Israeli dispute? But in the matter of technical and economic assistance the United Nations has not sufficient resources to supply aid on the scale required for cooperative international security. Besides, on the principle of not having all your eggs in one basket, I prefer to see friendly competition among a variety of aid agencies, some of which can do one phase of the job better, some another. Naturally, one source of aid on which we are happy to rely is America's Point Four. Now some people deplore what they regard as the tendency to forget the original goal of the pioneering Point Four programme—namely, to help the citizens of the newly developing countries meet their basic human needs. For example, it is argued that America has in recent years watered down the Point Four ideal by using technical assistance in part as an instrument for checking Communism. But I think this criticism misinterprets the original philosophy of Point Four, which, as I have known it, has always numbered among its goals the curtailment of Communism and the bettering of democracy's prospects. I think I have good warrant for my views, because President Truman himself has this to say in his memoirs:

> The Point Four program was a practical expression of our attitude toward the countries threatened by Communist domination. It was consistent with our policies of preventing the expansion of Communism in the free world by helping to insure the proper development of those countries with adequate food, clothing, and living facilities. It was an effort to bring to such people, not the idealism of democracy alone, but the tangible benefits of better living through intelligent cooperation.

Is there anything improper in that? America today gives aid to countries of widely varying political beliefs; even Communist Yugoslavia receives much American help. But can the question of technical assistance be entirely divorced from that of the kind of political regime under which people live? If you really want to help the people of the emerging countries, can you ignore their political standards of living? Doesn't it show more humanity to try to assist one's fellow men towards the good life in the fullest political, economic and social sense? Another common view is that the aid programmes should not mix technical or economic help with military assistance. As far as administration goes I whole-heartedly agree, and I notice that the U.S. Government does too. In Iran, for example, the Point Four organization isentirely separate from the military aid group, both in Teheran and in the provinces. But the argument reaches the point of absurdity, I think, when it is claimed that foreign aid should never concern itself with building up military defences but only with meeting human needs. It then contradicts itself and begs the entire question. For one of the most basic of human needs is a peaceful, secure environment so that men can develop themselves and their country. In a sense this need is even more fundamental than that for food and shelter, for security constitutes the essential prerequisite for producing enough food and shelter. I look towards a future, maybe not so Utopian as we sometimes think, when individual countries need no longer maintain their own defence forces to resist aggression from outside, and when the United Nations or some other world authority will have sole responsibility for maintaining international law and order. Just as in most countries today the individual citizen relies upon his government for maintaining internal peace, so in the fu-

ture individual countries will confidently place their trust in a world government for keeping the international peace. Then, without recourse to national armies or navies or air forces, all men can feel secure against outside aggression. But that happy day has yet to arrive. Meanwhile, such countries as mine must strive for the security which is their first essential for advancement. Freedom-loving peoples sometimes forget—but the Communist powers never forget—that most of the world's economically undeveloped countries are also militarily undeveloped. Communism seeks to exploit not only the political, economic, and social weakness of the emerging lands, but also their military vulnerability. If a country fails to secure its defences, the Communists play with it as a cat does with a mouse. During the Azerbaijan crisis and again in Mossadegh's time, we Persians found ourselves in the unhappy role of the mouse. We resolved never again to be so unprotected. Remember that my father tried not only to espouse neutrality but to back it with all the strength we Iranians could muster. My country has never known a truer patriot than Reza Shah, but how far did that policy get him or us? We Persians have replaced neutralism with the policy of positive nationalism which I described earlier. Perhaps I need not comment further on the stark contrast between our policy and Mossadegh's tired and sterile negativism in international as well as domestic affairs. Our new policy rewards courage with hope. Our positive nationalism leads to three fundamental principles of action in promoting international peace and stability: The first is that we, who were among the first to join the United Nations, continue whole-heartedly to support it. We help foster the work of its specialized agencies, a number of which are operating here in Iran, and we enthusiastically back all UN efforts

to reduce international tensions and to keep the peace. The second is that we pursue the philosophy stated in Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51, as you may recall, enshrines the general right of individual and collective self-defence on the part of UN members. According to Article 52, 'Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.' We not only endorse these as well as the other articles of the Charter; we act accordingly to build regional collective security for the Middle East. The third is that we enthusiastically join in programmes of collective political, economic, and social security. Instead of resisting the growing interdependence among nations, we welcome it as fostering peace. From a variety of sources we receive economic and technical assistance with no strings attached; and through cooperation with our friends all of us become politically, economically, and socially stronger. The fourth is that we energetically seek to strengthen our defence establishment with these particular aims in view: to help ourselves and our friends by honouring our collective security agreements; to safeguard my country's sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to maintain internal security for the protection of our citizens. Now what is the practical justification of these four principles? I think it can be expressed quite simply. By deeds as well as words my people have shown that they can create the kind of full-bodied and living democracy that I set forth earlier in this book. But from experience they know that we must be ever on our guard against foreign enemies and their domestic

agents who would ruin our democracy-building efforts much as a mentally deranged villager might set about felling the healthy young fruit trees of his neighbours. My people can realize their wonderful potentialities only if they can protect themselves from the evil designs of foreign and domestic saboteurs; only thus can they concentrate upon nation-building. Bandits often travel together, but so should men of goodwill. Our advance can be swifter and safer if we work with reliable friends abroad as well as within our borders. These, then, are principles of of mutual aid and security that I believe fit Iran and the Middle East. Now some people, admitting that the world is growing more interdependent, nevertheless object to our developing any firm friendships with other countries. They say that casual acquaintances in the community of nations are fine, but that closer friendships may lead us down the primrose path to the fate of the jilted lover. And particularly, they argue, it is dangerous to develop intimate alliances with far-off and alien peoples such, as those of America or Britain, Canada or France. I shall comment on the latter point first. I have explained elsewhere in this book that our cultural relations with the Western democracies go back many centuries; our ties with those people are no sudden growth. Culturally the West has borrowed extensively from us, and by choice we have absorbed much that is Western. Today we have the same basic goals, and of this both we and they can be proud. The free Western peoples have also shown a willingness to extend to us much economic and technical aid, and at the same time they have in recent years rarely meddled in our affairs. For example, in proportion to her population Britain now provides more foreign assistance than any other country in the world, and we are happy to be among the recipients. The United States, France, West Germany, and Austria are

only a few of the other free nations that extend us aid in one form or another, and this not only helps us but further cements the cordial relations between them and us. But I think the most decisive factor in our growing intimacy with the Western democracies lies in the scientific and technological developments that have effectively shrunk the world. Our almost instantaneous radio-telephone and telephoto communications with Western as well as other peoples has suddenly brought them closer. Perhaps even more dramatic is the constant stream of international air travellers who pass across my country, often lingering here for a week or a month or much longer. If, on any day of the year, you spend a little time at the Teheran airport, the ceaseless coming and going of these citizens of so many nations gives you the impression of watching a kind of international cultural exchange centre at work. As at any big airport, whenever a plane arrives, you can see a swarm of motorized vehicles rushing up to service it. One genial soul has suggested that when, in the old days, a long-distance caravan arrived, similar vehicles would dash up to service each camel. Some sceptics dispute this statement. Early in 1960, when we were holding a CENTO meeting in Teheran, a U.S. military plane bearing the American delegation flew non-stop from Washington to my capital in just over twelve hours. But the supersonic transports now on American and European drawing-boards will soon make that historic flight seem slow. Such scientific changes carry obvious implications for defence as well as for cultural interchange. For example, we cannot forget the speed with which American and British forces landed in the Lebanon and Jordan when those countries called for help in 1958. And as we advance into the space age we shall soon reach the point where the missiles of our most distant ally can be trained with preci-

sion on any centres of potential aggression in this part of the world. It is with all these things in mind that we rely upon both Western and Eastern friends to help us contribute to progress and security in this restless region. And now again I must speak of my astonishment at the limited awareness and understanding of some American news commentators. In 1959 a well-known American produced a lengthy television programme on Iran; I understand that millions of his countrymen saw it. Among other mis-statements was one to the effect that Iran is the world's largest producer of aviation fuel; actually, in this particular category, we are far behind the United States. But what brings this strange television performance back to my mind is that from start to finish scarcely any mention was made of America's wonderful Point Four programme and what it has meant to my country, or of the highly beneficial United Nations technical assistance efforts here. In truth the Point Four programme in Iran is not only the oldest but also one of the largest in the world, with around 300 direct employees in 1960. Incidentally, it is worthwhile comparing our recent history with that of one of the other countries that has been receiving technical aid—namely, the Republic of Korea. Under Mossadegh, Iran came to the brink of Communism only about two years after the Communists nearly succeeded in subjugating South Korea. As all my readers know, the South Koreans saved their country only with the help of the United States and then of the United Nations, and a high price in bloodshed and devastation had to be paid before the Communist invaders could be driven back. In Iran, on the other hand, we were able to salvage the country with far less armed conflict and far fewer lives lost. In Teheran you can still see occasional vestiges of the 'Yankee Go Home!' slogans that in Mossadegh's time

the Communists scrawled on walls and buildings. This reminds me of the cartoon in an American journal in 1958, when U.S. troops were in Beirut in response to the call for assistance. Again someone could be seen painting 'Yankee Go Home!' on the side of a building, but the man with the brush was a homesick American soldier!

In the heyday of Mossadegh most of the anti-American animus here was directed against Point Four personnel, whose constructive work the Communists had good reason to fear. It took considerable courage for the aid staff and their families to remain in the face of such efforts at intimidation, but they stuck to their posts. From the beginning to the present day, the U.S. advisers and technicians in Iran have been giving us most effective assistance. In earlier chapters I have not hesitated to criticize certain aspects of American behaviour towards my country, and I shall do it again whenever I feel that a rebuke is justified. Naturally some of the technical assistance directors in Iran have been less imaginative and effective than others, and the same has applied to their subordinates, a few of whom have had to be sent home. Inevitably some of the projects have been less wisely conceived than others, and a few have had to be abandoned as ill-advised. But, taken as a whole, the work in Iran has provided us with never-failing aid and inspiration in our successful efforts to build a better nation. I think it is no accident that Point Four has won the affection of the common people of my country, for so many of the projects in Iran have directly benefited them. The original aid project concerned rural improvement; and the programme in my country has always stressed agriculture, education, and public health as they relate to the needs of rural people. Armchair critics sometimes allege that the work hasn't touched ordinary people directly enough; but

I think the experience of the common man all across my country proves otherwise. Naturally the U.S. aid programme does not confine itself purely to village problems as such, for what we need is balanced development. Large-scale irrigation schemes, better transport and communications, and more efficient government agencies all help the farmer; moreover, industrial development is vital to our rural people, because with increasing farm mechanization many of them will no longer be needed to cultivate the land. As Western countries have mechanized their farms, thousands of people have moved into industrial production, and the same thing is bound to happen here. In Iran, with our increasing population and our determination to give the common man a better deal, it is imperative that we industrialize; and the technical assistance programme, which follows the pattern of our requests, adjusts itself accordingly. I am continually amused by the Communist argument that the United States tries to prevent the less-developed countries from industrializing in order to keep them subservient to herself. In our extended dealings with the American aid authorities, we have never found this to be the case; on the contrary, they have helped us with a wide variety of industrial projects, including those that compete directly with American industries. The Americans have enough sense to prefer strong and prosperous friends, and they realize that their most lucrative international trade is with other highly industrialized countries, not with weak and backward ones. Now technical assistance is essentially a quiet process whose significance many people totally fail to grasp. As somebody has said, technical assistance doesn't make headlines but it does make news—news, that is, which is often far more important than the headlines. Some people yearn for sensationalism just as much

as the addict craves his drug; and it is next to impossible for them to appreciate the meaning of technical aid. For example, a most undramatic and yet highly significant form of U.S. aid is that in improving public administration. I mentioned earlier a lucid little manual on tax administration—a manual that would bore so many of those who enjoy complaining about inefficiency in the collection of our taxes. This is just one instance of the important but nevertheless quiet and inconspicuous technical help we have received in many fields. Psychologically it is sometimes more difficult to receive than to give, and I have noticed instances of newly independent countries in winch there is extreme sensitivity about acknowledging contributions of foreign aid. I grant that during the Mossadegh period we went through a spate of infantile xenophobia; but on the whole the long continuity of our history has given us a certain maturity of outlook which you find lacking in some other countries. It is perhaps no accident that we Persians have in cultural terms been called 'the aristocrats of the Middle East'. When it comes to foreign aid, I think we have shown that we can receive it gracefully, use it with reasonable intelligence, and remain appreciative of it. On the other hand, I think I should give a reminder of just who is helping whom. My father employed many foreign specialists, but always he made them understand that they were merely assisting the work of an on-going, essentially Persian administration; in no way should the foreigners imagine that they were in charge of any of our regular Government agencies here, either in an executive capacity or as advisers who fancied that they were directing things from behind the scenes. In those rare cases when he entrusted foreigners with any executive direction within the Government, he soon tired of the arrangement and repudiated it. Today our

outlook in this respect is similar to that of Reza Shah, only we carry the principle further since we are now so much more developed a nation than we were then. When applied to a land as far advanced as Iran, the standard jargon about under-developed countries—which of course we Persians also employ about ourselves—may give false impressions as to just where we stand in the scale of progress. It is we who are primarily responsible for our own rapid development; we take full charge of our own destinies; and I am glad to say that the foreign technicians here are generally aware that it is we alone who must and will give the real orders. I am happy to recognize that Point Four has helped us towards the achievements that I described in the chapters on agriculture and education. In the field of public health, their medical and nursing technicians have joined hands with our own experts to work with missionary zeal in the most far-away places. This reminds me of the story of a technical assistance team which was trying to combat bubonic plague in another of the newly developing countries. Since rats harbour lice which transmit the plague, the team offered a bounty on every rat brought in dead or alive by the populace. But as time went by the team noticed that the rat population seemed to be growing rather than diminishing. Some enterprising citizens had started a lucrative business as rat breeders! But our public health efforts in Iran have met with far more success. For example, in the Caspian area the aid technicians have helped my Ministry of Health fight malaria so effectively as to achieve a revolution in the manpower situation. Until a few years ago the great majority of the people there had chronic malaria; now it is virtually wiped out. The increase in working efficiency has been so spectacular that a labour shortage has given way to a labour surplus available for industrial pursuits. These

few illustrations of Point Four assistance by no means exhaust the list, nor do they fully convey what the work has meant to us. For example, the programme has helped us expand our industry and improve our transport and communications. It has sent hundreds of Persians abroad for study and observation in their chosen fields. It has financed the production of over a hundred technical assistance films for teaching first principles in such fields as agriculture and public health; and these have had a tremendous popular impact, especially in the villages. In earlier chapters I have tried to make clear that we Persians have plenty of national pride. But we are not inhibited from extending thanks for aid given with true sincerity and with no strings attached. Indeed, we would like the level of American technical aid to Iran to be raised, and we think that this would be in the interests of both the donor and the recipient. I should not close this brief account of U.S. aid in my country without reminding my readers that in the shadow of the mighty Elburz Mountains close to Teheran lies a simple monument to Dr. Henry G. Bennett, the first director of what came to be the world-wide American technical assistance programme. Dr. Bennett, who was killed near that spot when his plane crashed in a blinding snowstorm in December 1951, was a true internationalist; and I often think that for his life to have been given here in Iran added still another bond between our two countries. The United Nations technical assistance work in Iran has also brought us incalculable aid and encouragement. Just as in the case of Point Four, the UN programme here is one of the largest in the world, with a staff of well over a hundred in 1960. Altogether the UN has extended us much less financial and material aid than has Point Four, but it has brought the same desirable emphasis upon applying modern technology to


meet the needs of the people.

The UN programme here also resembles that of Point Four in that from its inception it has given first priority to agriculture. Over a quarter of all the UN experts in Iran are working on matters such as soil fertility, water supply, seed and plant improvement, production of cereals and cotton, animal husbandry, dairy development, forestry, and agricultural statistics and marketing. Again as with Point Four, the UN in Iran devotes much attention to education and public health. It has made useful studies of our educational system, has helped us with many of our training programmes, and grants about fifty fellowships a year under which Persians study abroad. The UN contributes to better health here by making available specialists in such fields as nursing and midwifery education, food and drug analysis, malaria and trachoma eradication, and the elimination of certain disease-carrying snails that are found especially in the southern part of the country. But again in keeping with our desire for balanced development, the UN has supplied experts in such spheres as clerical training, manpower problems, small industries, ceramics, cotton knitting and weaving, machine tool production, geological surveying, analysis of minerals and metals, mining engineering, ore dressing, iron and steel manufacturing, photogrammetry, railway signalling, economic and social statistics, and highway construction and maintenance. Each one of these experts is here at our specific request, and I think their specialist range suggests how diversified is our development programme. Incidentally, especially in the industrial and agricultural fields, many of the experts work with private enterprises as well as with public and quasi-public undertakings. Another foreign-aid organization that is helping us tremendously is the Cooperative for American Relief

Everywhere, Inc., or CARE, which operates in more than twenty-five countries around the world. CARE assistance to Iran started at the time of the severe earthquakes in the Kermanshah area in late 1957, when urgently needed relief was given. A permanent CARE mission was established here in the following year, and already it has rendered most valuable service, especially in the rural areas which are my chief concern. CARE has been assisting us mainly by making available flour, milk powder, and sometimes other foods to our low-income groups; for example, in 1960 CARE distributed, mostly through other existing charitable agencies, about 10 million pounds of flour.



Another wedding day picture.



The presentation of a new style of package from our government tea factories.



The Queen and I with Boy Scouts and their leaders.

CARE has also been planning a programme of nutritional aid to students, which I hope will materialize. But perhaps the most novel part of CARE's work is its self-help programme, which we welcome as complementing our community-development efforts. In many parts of Iran CARE is establishing tool and equipment centres functioning as 'libraries' from which villagers can borrow as necessary. Each centre will stock more than 100 implements plus heavier equipment, including a modern CARE plough especially designed for Iranian conditions and manufactured here. CARE has also provided small but useful amounts of text-books and equipment for various of our education programmes. And in emergencies such as the disastrous Lar earthquake of 1960, CARE has dispatched fast relief of the sort that first gave the programme its reputation here. Under the well-known Fulbright Act and related legislation, the American Government has been giving us educational technical assistance through an interchange of people in academic circles. Under this programme Iranian research scholars, secondary-school teachers, and post-graduate students have gone to the United States, while American university lecturers, secondary-school teachers, and students have enriched the academic atmosphere here. The British Council, the Franco-Iranian Institute, and other cultural organizations of the Free-World countries have been conducting with us similar interchanges; and you can also regard their language courses and other cultural activities here as forms of foreign aid. Earlier I spoke of the work of the American Friends of the Middle East in advising Persians who wish to go to the United States for study. It also assists them when they come back, by counselling them on personal-adjustment problems, directing them to suitable employment, and otherwise helping them to

re-establish themselves. In this book I cannot possibly describe all the other foreign-aid programmes that are benefiting my country and my people. But by way of further example I should mention that the Ford Foundation is putting at our disposal some technicians needed to help prepare our third development plan; and it is also carrying on other valuable projects in such fields as vocational education and village development, not to mention the translation of a standard American encyclopaedia into Persian. The Austrian Government is giving us most useful aid in building up technical education in Iran. Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany are providing us with valuable technical assistance in a variety of fields. British, American, and German groups are conducting humanitarian work in aid of the blind in my country. The British Government's Middle East development organization has advised us in a number of fields including statistics, forestry, soil conservation and range management, rural cooperatives, land tenure, and control of the desert locust. The Governments of many countries have given us aid and comfort in such catastrophes as the Lar earthquake. And private foreign business concerns have frequently extended us credits and valuable technical advice in their particular fields. After my 1956 visit to Moscow, and the friendly discussions that I had there with Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues, we accepted Russian aid in such matters as locust control and the dredging of one of our Caspian harbours. Subsequent strained relations unhappily marred the prospects for such technical cooperation. Notwithstanding all the tirades that have poured out over the Russian radio against Iran's leaders and institutions, I still have only the kindliest regard for the Russian people as a whole. Perhaps the ordinary citizens of Russia realize better than do their

rulers that no freedom-loving country can accept aid from a regime that shows clear signs of wanting to dictate its neighbours' foreign policy. I have already explained that the Central Treaty Organization is one of the means for protecting us against the new imperialism. But, although CENTO has an important military aspect, it contributes in a much broader sense to cooperative international security. I can readily illustrate this point by the CENTO-sponsored railway link between my country and Turkey. Anybody with a knowledge of modern war realizes that in time of conflict such a railway could readily be destroyed. Then why did Iran and her CENTO partners decide that it should be constructed? The answer is that we are interested in nation-building, not in preparations for war. The same point applies to the CENTO-sponsored road-links which, as with highways anywhere, are vulnerable to the shocks of modern war. As the CENTO partners know, roads are not only themselves a form of economic development; they are in turn great stimulators of further development. And that is what all the CENTO countries and their peoples want. Again I can illustrate the purposes of CENTO by the regional microwave communications system that it has sponsored. With the aid of a map or globe perhaps you can visualize receiving-transmitting stations placed at average intervals of twenty-eight miles throughout the entire overland distance from Ankara to Karachi. Nobody in his right mind would claim that this modern system, which will be completed towards the end of 1961, would be invulnerable to military attack. But again the point is that we are building for a future of prosperity and peace, not of war and devastation. We who are joined together in CENTO know that a major war might come in spite of all our hopes and intentions, but we do not propose to let

any such morbid assumption restrain our general progress. I think our philosophy is well expressed by the CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science, which is devoted entirely to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Institute, which I opened in mid-1959, is part of the Faculty of Science of the University of Teheran. It was equipped by the United Kingdom; is staffed by British, Turkish, Pakistani, and Iranian scientists; and draws students from the CENTO region. The first part of the standard one-year course focuses on techniques for using radioisotopes—the short term for unstable, radiation-emitting forms of various elements. The students then go on to apply what they have learned to particular problems of the CENTO region. The academic work compares in quality with that of similar courses given in Britain and the United States. Radioisotopes can in a multitude of ways foster progress in this part of the world. In the field of medicine, for example, if a patient drinks a small, harmless amount of radioactive iodine, most of it collects in his thyroid gland; and with nuclear detectors any malfunction of the gland can be observed and treatment can be prescribed. Similarly, if radioarsenic is introduced into the body it collects in any tumour, whether in the brain or elsewhere. The tumour can be readily located, and during its surgical removal the nuclear counters tell the surgeon if he has dislodged every last vestige of cancerous tissue. Again, radiophosphorous provides a ready means of studying the body's metabolism and of treating over-production of red blood cells. In agriculture, radioisotopes can determine with amazing precision how much fertilizer is taken up by plants and how it is assimilated. Such knowledge can greatly assist Iran and the other CENTO-region countries in making scientific use of chemical fertilizers. Likewise, radioisotopes can reveal the precise action of weed-killers and insecti-

cides upon weeds and insect pests in the region. As an aid to studying their life cycles and migratory habits, insects can easily be 'tagged' with radioactive materials. It may even be possible to reduce insect populations through the procedure—perhaps unfair!—of encouraging the females to mate with males who have radioactively been rendered sterile. American scientists have in selected areas entirely eliminated certain insect pests by this means. The countries of the CENTO region have only begun to exploit the applications of radioisotopes to industry and commerce. For example, with radioisotopes one can readily check the gauge of very thin sheets or platings or coatings, determine the rate of wear of bearings, and detect faults in all kinds of welds and castings. Radioisotopes can measure the flow of water and other liquids, find leaks in dams and pipelines, and reveal the density of silt and the movement of mud in harbours and rivers. Radioisotope tracers can even mark the progress of successive batches of oil passing through long pipelines. So promising are these peaceful possibilities of nuclear energy that the CENTO partners may establish additional radioisotope centres in each country in the region. The Teheran establishment would then be used mainly for basic research. But technical cooperation in the CENTO region extends much farther than the nuclear field. Under CENTO auspices many technical assistance projects have been started, chiefly in agriculture, education and public health, but also in other fields such as trade and tourism. Some of the projects take the form of aid from our Western CENTO partners; for example, America has furnished an adviser on livestock disease control for the CENTO region, and Britain has generously offered thirty-three fellowships for advanced veterinary students from the region. But I am particularly intrigued with the projects which

afford an opportunity for the Middle Eastern CENTO partners to help one another. For instance, my country responded favourably to a Turkish request to train two of their people in our techniques for pistachio growing and disease control, while under another project the Turks are imparting to us their knowledge of grading dried fruits and nuts. Pakistan is showing us improved techniques for jute production, a field in which she has had long experience; and we are giving our partners advice on coping with the soun pest, a destructive insect which causes much damage to crops in the region. I hope that as the Middle Eastern partners come of age scientifically and technically, we shall see ever more of this sort of cooperation, which will in turn speed us along the road towards maturity. Besides these peaceful purposes and programmes of CENTO, the organization also concerns itself more directly with defence. This is not something we are ashamed to have to admit; on the contrary, we are proud to be joined in the cause of freedom, we have registered our organization with the United Nations, and we keep that body and the world informed of our work in support of peace. Even our Communist friends are beginning to find it hard to argue that CENTO represents an aggressive, militaristic conspiracy which threatens Middle Eastern peace and tranquillity. Under the general direction of its top Council of the Central Treaty Organization, three main sub-organizations handle CENTO 's functions relating to defence and security. The first is the Permanent Military Deputies Group, which since the beginning of 1960 has been continuously on duty in Ankara. This body is composed of high-level military representatives of all the participating countries, including the United States. It gives detailed consideration to military planning within CENTO and reviews studies and plans

that are constantly being prepared by a Combined Military Planning Staff. The Permanent Military Deputies Group provides, so far as I am aware, the first really close and continuing cooperation in defence and security matters that has been achieved in the entire history of the countries that are today joined together in CENTO. CENTO's second sub-organization concerned with defence and security is its Counter-Subversion Committee. I have already spoken of some of the strange and sinister performances the Middle East has witnessed in the field of radio warfare, and the Counter-Subversion Committee interests itself in these as well as with other forms of attempted subversion. The third sub-organization is the Liaison Committee. It facilitates effective and fast interchange of information between member countries on questions relating to the security of the region. Although CENTO has not progressed so far as NATO it has still made commendable headway, especially in the last couple of years; and in some ways its functions are broader than NATO's. CENTO has stimulated co-ordinated regional economic development; and through its programme of scientific and technical cooperation it has solved many practical regional problems, has nurtured the region's technical skills, and has thus laid further foundations for our rapid future progress. In the security field CENTO has done much careful planning on how to meet the round-the-clock subversion attempts that the Communist mind considers to be a part of 'peaceful co-existence'. CENTO has also done detailed planning on how to cope with potential overt aggression in this part of the world; and portions of these plans have been tested in practice through a number of field manoeuvres on land, sea, and in the air. Both in the planning at headquarters and in the field exercises, the CENTO partners

have on the whole worked harmoniously together as brothers-in-arms who share a love of human liberty and a contempt for any who endanger the peace. Our army has taken remarkable strides in the past few years; the fire-power of our troops has literally been multiplied several-fold, and everything is conducted much more efficiently than it was before. We have stressed education in the army, and many a village recruit, who was illiterate and possessed no vocational skill when he enlisted, has been discharged well equipped as a citizen in a modern democracy. In order to build public understanding of our army and its methods, we have lately begun to have 'at home' days at army posts and depots all over the country. Thousands of Persian families have come to see their sons in training, and the response has been most gratifying. Closely associated with the army is our gendarmerie or rural police, which in my father's time did so much to rid the countryside of lawlessness. Today it has a strength of about 1,000 officers and 30,000 men dispersed in over 2,000 separate locations. In remote mountain passes, trail junctions, and other far-off and improbable places, you find posts each billeting anywhere from six to eighteen men. These gendarmes provide the real day-to-day support for law and order throughout the country. They give general police protection; pursue bandits, smugglers, murderers, evaders of military service, and other wrongdoers; they implement warrants for arrest and other judicial decrees of the Government; and they are responsible for other assorted functions, such as suppressing opium cultivation and supervising tribal migrations. Their jurisdiction extends over some 80 per cent of our territory and includes about three-fourths of our 20 million people. They have an admirable radio communication system, using both fixed and mobile stations, and allowing

instantaneous contact between Teheran and even the most remote outposts throughout the country. We are busy outfitting them, too, with modern small arms and other equipment, presently to include helicopters. The gendarmerie commonly provides the principal direct contact between villagers and the central Government; thus there is real basis for the Persian proverb that 'a good gendarme means a good Government and a bad gendarme means a bad Government'. Most of the officers and men of the gendarmerie are both brave and honest, and I only wish their armchair critics could be required to serve alongside them for a few months at some outpost. But the fact remains that in the past they often abused their powers, and even my father's vigorous efforts did not entirely stamp out corruption. Reza Shah, who was never easily fooled, was under no illusions on this point. I remember an occasion when he and his Cabinet were visiting several gendarmerie posts. As they entered one of them, my father clapped his hands over his pockets and called out to his retinue, 'Watch your money!' Since then, and especially over the past two years, we have made real progress in improving the conduct and efficiency of the gendarmerie, which is now widely respected among informed people. We have fought corruption both through internal investigation within the service and through carefully following up citizens' complaints that are received by the Government and by my Imperial Investigation Organization. Land distribution is also proving of much help, because abuses in the past often arose from pressure exerted by big landlords. More and more the gendarmerie is setting standards of ethics, of public service, and of hygiene noticeably above those of the surrounding communities; thus the force not only helps the villagers but provides a good example for them to follow. Our

city dwellers, as well as visitors from overseas, can find considerable interest in recent developments in the Persian gendarmerie. Besides our ground forces we have a small navy which operates both in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Nobody could pretend that our navy constitutes a formidable force, even in comparison with those of some of the medium-sized powers; but it does render effective service in guarding our coasts, fighting piracy and smuggling, and helping mariners in distress; and if we should against our will become involved in any small war our navy could cooperate effectively with those of our allies. But since we are the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, we must rapidly strengthen our navy. We also have a small air force which is designed mainly for providing support to our ground forces in limited actions. In our air force, as in our navy, the last few years have seen a great improvement in training standards; and as one indication of prowess, our jet fighter pilots have put on aerial acrobatic shows that have impressed experienced observers. At the same time nobody in his senses could possibly maintain that our air force, or indeed our entire military establishment, could offer a threat to any neighbouring big power. Our air force in particular is ridiculously weak and must be greatly augmented. For help in bringing about many improvements in our armed services we are indebted to the Americans. As early as 1943 a small mission began to advise us on the gendarmerie, and in 1951 a fully-hedged military assistance and advisory group was set up. This mission has given us valuable advice on such matters as military organization and training; and through it we have received much free military equipment and supplies, thus easing the financial problems faced by us as a newly developing nation. Moreover, it has from the start been clear to both sides that

the Americans would serve purely as advisers, with no operational control. There is no doubt that American assistance has helped us to increase the efficiency of our hmited armed forces and has contributed to the security of my country and its people. But I think we must also bear in mind the incidental advantages of the military aid we have received. With or without American help we would for our own protection require an adequate military establishment; and in effect the American military aid programme has released large amounts of our own funds for building the other kinds of security of which I spoke early in this chapter. For example, without American military assistance, how could we have been devoting a fifth of our total regular Government budget to the cause of education? Since American military and other aid has brought my country such important direct and indirect benefits, I hope I shall not sound ungrateful if I state my conviction that we have been receiving glaringly inadequate amounts of it. Before explaining further, however, I must quickly note my country's strategic importance as I see it. Potential aggressors already know everything I am about to say, so I am giving away no secrets. There is a joke that today every country in the world is strategically placed. There is much truth in it; for example, seemingly remote Australia is now within easy reach of Russian rockets, and the same is true of missiles fired in the reverse direction. Moreover missiles and planes in flight, surface ships and submarines, and presently earth satellites, will in the nuclear age all be able to locate themselves strategically; and at the same time they, like the beggars of the city, will be the more difficult to apprehend because they have no fixed address. It is true these satellites will travel in established orbits, but the strategic status of a satellite is very different from that of a country which sits

unabashedly on the surface of the earth, remaining year after year in the same place. And in terms of geographical fundamentals, I think the fact must be faced that Iran has always been a commercial and strategic crossroads, and today this is more true than ever. It is no accident that, during the many centuries when the caravans dominated overland travel in the Middle East and the Far East, the famous intercontinental Silk Route passed through my country. And the same applies to intercontinental air routes today, as witness the astonishing number of airlines that schedule services through Teheran. It is more than coincidence that throughout recorded history most of the important Middle Eastern military campaigns have either originated in my country or have directly affected her. Today, speaking geographically and strategically, it is no exaggeration to dub Iran 'the centre of CENTO'. And since CENTO is the centre of NATO-CENTO-SEATO, my country is in a way the keystone of the whole structure. To render Iran impotent would be to provide one of the handiest ways of outflanking both NATO and SEATO, not to mention the other countries of CENTO. And I need not labour the point that an invasion of my country from the north—or an invasion from another direction inspired from the north—would, if not thrown back, offer vast rewards to the aggressors. Our own warm-water ports and our oilfields and other rich resources would fall prey to the violators of international peace; and the way would lie open for them to stage a two-pronged advance down the Arabian peninsula on the one side and into Africa by way of the Suez Canal on the other. What more alluring temptation can one give to whose who perpetually talk peace but, judged by our own experience, do not necessarily believe in it or practise it? Now if I may vary the figure of speech, you can call

Iran not only in a way the keystone of the NATO-CENTO-SEATO structure but also the weakest link in the NATO-CENTO-SEATO chain. Why? We have a proud tradition, we are stable and unified and rapidly advancing, and we know from direct personal experience the dangers of Communist aggression. But our armed forces—and especially our air force—are weak and suffer from lack of the most modern equipment. By way of comparison, consider Iraq, a country with whom we desire to have only the most cordial relations. Iraq has only about a quarter of our population and a fifth of our land area, yet her air force is more powerful than ours. It includes many of the latest jet fighters that easily out-perform our earlier American ones, and unlike us she also possesses modern jet bombers. Moreover, Iraq's armed forces as a whole are better-equipped than ours. How does this happen? Iraq relies upon both the British and the Russians for her military equipment, while since the Second World War ours has come almost entirely from the Americans. And although we are deeply grateful for what we have received, I must in candour point out that it fully meets neither our own needs nor those of the Free World in this crucial sector. Indeed I must go further by suggesting that although my country has been a major recipient of American technical, economic, and military aid, you find some curious anomalies when you compare the amount of American aid that has come our way with that given to certain other countries. Since the end of the Second World War, according to official American statistics on grants and credits, the U.S. Government has actually given substantially more aid to the Soviet Union than she has to Iran. Now admittedly this is a topsyturvy world, and it is true that the aid to Russia was provided immediately after the end of the war when she was almost prostrate

and when the political honeymoon with America was not yet over. But a number of years have elapsed since then, and it seems curious that we, a loyal ally of America and the Free World, should during that period have received less than the Russians themselves. Moreover, in the same period Communist Yugoslavia has received more than twice as much military and non-military aid from the Americans as we have. In no way am I arguing against U.S. aid for Yugoslavia; but am I wrong when I suggest that it seems a little odd for a Communist country to be receiving so much larger a total of American aid than are we who are allied with the West? According to official figures, Spain has since the Second World War been granted a total of about a third more U.S. aid than Iran has. Our good friends the Turks have received over three times as much aid as we have. I shall make just one more comparison. Taiwan has in the same period obtained about four times as much American military and nonmilitary aid from America as has Iran. Admittedly Taiwan's situation in the Far East is strategic, but I maintain that in the Middle East ours is no less so. I am not suggesting that Yugoslavia or Spain or Turkey or Taiwan—or, for that matter, maybe even the Soviet Union—should necessarily have received less American aid; I am only proposing that American leaders study a little further the role of Iran in the defence of the Free World. I think that if they do so they will be inclined to accord us a higher rank in the scale of assistance priorities. But more American bilateral aid to Iran—not to mention to our CENTO regional partners—is only one of the measures needed to strengthen peace and security in this part of the world. We have become accustomed to thinking of a general Western deterrent, of nuclear and other weapons, to Communist aggression; but I think we should also learn to conceive more

specifically of a Middle Eastern deterrent. To be effective such a deterrent must have real power; and it can have if we construct it in the right way. Very briefly I shall mention three immediate steps to this end. In the first place, the United States should become a full member of CENTO. I have long advocated this move, and I see no valid reason for American bashfulness here, especially since the U.S. is already a member of all of CENTO's principal committees. Second, CENTO's whole programme of non-military and military progress and security deserves expansion. In spite of their other commitments, the Western CENTO partners would I think find it in their own and the Free World's interest greatly to expand their financial support of CENTO. And third, building from its Permanent Military Deputies Group that I have already mentioned, CENTO should create a truly unified command representing all the partners. The Third World War could easily begin in the Middle East, and certain groups might wish the explosion to be set off in strategic Iran; but a new world conflict must not be allowed to start here or anywhere else. Today millions of Communists read Marx, Engels, and Lenin in such a way as to believe that war with the non-Communist world is inevitable; but many other Communists have begun to perceive, even if dimly, that modern science and technology and the advent of nuclear weapons have undermined the Communists' own formed party line on how to interpret the original high priests of Communist theory. From my knowledge of Mr. Khrushchev, I believe that he is somewhat less caught in the intellectual strait-jacket of Marxism than are some others of his faith. Even if he is a temporary phenomenon for the very saints of Marxism are mortal along with the rest of mankind—there are deeper forces for peace at work in the Soviet Union. In the best sense the Russians

are year by year becoming more conservative. Russian bureaucrats, bacteriologists, bus-drivers, and bricklayers are turning out to have desires and hopes very similar to those of their opposite numbers in non-Communist countries. Russian intellectuals and theoreticians are slowly becoming more flexible than in the past. And gradually it is dawning upon the Russians that the ultimate danger is not the much-abused capitalist powers but the vast, sprawling, fast-breeding Giant of the Far East lying at their back door. Only imperceptibly will Russia's internal evolution be reflected in genuine changes in her relations with the Free World. The transitional period will see ever-present dangers of Communist nuclear attacks, nuclear blackmail, infiltration and subversion, and other aggression or threat of aggression. Strong deterrents will be needed to keep Communist imperialism in check. But I venture to predict that in due course the Russians will see the handwriting on the wall. The Chinese already overwhelmingly outnumber their Russian colleagues, and the population gap between the two nations will steadily increase. To the public applause and secret distress of the Russians, the Chinese will acquire nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. They will seek to impose ideological as well as military leadership upon the entire Communist world; and, even if covertly, the clash of ideas between the two powers will become exacerbated. New ideological competition will arise as the Western powers modernize their own idea-systems into something more palatable to the newly developing societies. While continuing to preach eternal affection for their Chinese comrades, the Russians will gradually be driven to an understanding with the non-Communist powers. Warm friendship with the Russians will become possible. The new concert of nations will apply itself mainly to containing China and

helping her to abandon fanaticism in favour of moderation. These changes will require many years. In the meantime the freedom-loving peoples must practise firmness and resolve. And always they must remember that vague, undefined peace signifies nothing; it implies anything from the loftiest of human conditions to the stupor and resignation of the brain-washed.

Chapter 14

King and Country

What is the everyday life of a king? Is His job very different from that of other men? Does he feel lonely in his work? My readers may wish me to answer such questions as these and then to explain the role, as I see it, of the monarchy in this land that is so old and yet so new. In my daily life I follow a definite routine, varied somewhat to suit the mood or the occasion. I arise about seven-thirty each morning. While bathing and shaving I am likely to meditate a little on some affair of state or rapidly go over my plans for the day. Invariably I arrive at the breakfast table fully dressed. My breakfast, which I usually take alone, is light indeed; typically I have only some fruit juice, a cup of black coffee, and one piece of toast. Although it takes me only two or three minutes to consume such a small meal, I commonly remain at the table for forty-five minutes, reading a stack of newspapers. Each morning I read or scan all our major Persian journals, together with papers from America, Britain, and France. I read translations of German and Italian papers. About nine o'clock I start work in my office. First I receive my Minister of the Imperial Court. We go

over a variety of matters, including requests for me to grant audiences, forthcoming visits of foreign dignitaries, letters seeking assistance of one kind or another, and the like. Then for two or three hours I generally hold a more or less uninterrupted succession of audiences with a variety of people of high and low station. My Prime Minister and my Foreign Minister can come to see me whenever they wish, and I also frequently receive other ministers and heads of agencies. In keeping with my role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, I set aside two mornings a week mainly for meetings with the chiefs of the military establishment and with other officers who bring first-hand reports from all parts of the country. To encourage them to speak freely and frankly, I usually receive such officers individually.

I also give audiences to many other people, including numerous private citizens from the provinces as well as Teheran. Some of these meetings are in a sense a waste of time, because the person has nothing really important to say; but partly because rumours flow so freely in my country, it is my policy to cultivate a wide variety of viewpoints and sources of information. Fortunately I like to meet people; I find it stimulating rather than tiring, and temperamentally I prefer holding audiences to doing paper-work. But there is plenty of paper-work that I must accomplish. Later in the morning I summon the head of my special secretariat and instruct him in the handling of piles of letters, memoranda, and reports. In most cases I merely indicate the gist of what I want said or done, but sometimes I dictate an entire letter or memorandum. The written Persian language is already a kind of shorthand, and I neither use a dictating machine nor employ a stenographer in the Western sense. Occasionally, as in responding to a letter from Queen Elizabeth, I may myself write out a reply. Although

I attend to so many official letters, the press of State affairs unhappily prevents me from carrying on any purely personal correspondence. Around one-thirty I leave my office and go to have lunch with the Queen or, occasionally, with relatives or with Persian or foreign dignitaries. The menu may consist either of traditional Persian dishes, of European cuisine, or of a combination of both. But unlike many of my countrymen, I prefer a light midday meal. At luncheon and indeed all the time I avoid alcoholic drinks. After lunch I generally read more newspapers for about threequarters of an hour, and then if time permits I may take a nap of perhaps the same duration. On most days I then return to my desk and read reports for maybe two or three hours. But on Monday afternoons my High Economic Council and then my Council of Ministers meet in my presence for most of the afternoon. Once a month I hold my press conference, attended by numerous Iranian journalists. On several occasions each month I may inspect military units or dedicate new factories or hospitals or orphanages in the Teheran area. Then, of course, I often make trips into the provinces to keep in touch with conditions and to foster national development. And occasionally I go abroad, mostly on State visits. If nothing intervenes I like to set aside an hour or an hour and a half towards the end of each afternoon for exercise and sport. Then the Queen and I usually dine alone together. In the evening we may listen to some recorded music or see a film at our residential palace. We generally retire early. On Fridays—the Persian day of rest—and holidays, friends may come over and I may engage in some game such as volleyball. But usually I read reports or do other office work or hold conferences for at least half of the day. Now some might feel that the routine I have described must be rather dull. But actually I like

my job tremendously. I spoke earlier of the stimulation I derive from tackling tough economic and other problems. But that is not all. I enjoy dealing with all kinds of people, and considering the number of audiences I must hold, it is lucky that I do. I find real interest in the field trips I make to observe progress in all parts of the country. And I obtain tremendous satisfaction from opening new facilities, especially those having to do with production or social welfare. Suppose, as so often happens, that I am giving out land deeds to new owner-farmers, or laying the corner-stone of a new factory, or switching on the power at a new generating station, or cutting the ribbon to inaugurate a new clinic. Some might consider those acts to be mere formalities, to me they are exciting symbols of creative activity in the new Iran. I suppose I resemble my father in that my head is always full of visions of facilities and amenities for Iran and her people. Quite honestly I derive terrific intellectual stimulation just from thinking about such things, and still more when they become clothed with reality. So you can see why, in spite of the frustrations of my work, I never find it dull. But I must hasten to add that I doubt if I could have lasted in my job if I had not learned to relax. In my early years as King, and especially during the Mossadegh period, I went through acute anxieties; and it is perhaps no wonder that my hair is prematurely white. Without the ability to relax I would surely have disintegrated physically, emotionally, even mentally. My fondness for sport is well known; I enjoy swimming, tennis, volleyball, riding, hunting, walking, snow-skiing, water-skiing, golf, flying, and driving sports cars. But these provide only part of my mode of relaxation. For example, I enjoy light, easy conversation. I find diversion in chess. I like to read fiction, especially in French, although lately I have had little time for light reading. I

find a change of mood and pace in the commercial films that we have at home. I especially like historical and the better detective films, but I am not averse to comedies and musicals. Although I think the American films on the whole excel in production techniques, I see superb acting and direction in some of the British, French, and Italian films. Our own movie industry is rather new, but we are turning out some good tilings now. I am myself in no way a musician, but one of my chief loves is music. I like our Persian music, but I must admit that the Western product shows more variety. I find waltzes and other light classical pieces agreeable and jazz diverting; but what I really care for are the great classics, especially those by Chopin, Beethoven, Schubert, Liszt, Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, and Borodin. I often reflect that ours is an age in which the writing of such music has become impossible. But—who knows?—maybe the world will one day return to a golden age of music and of culture. I find relaxation in still other ways. For example, at my summer residential palace at Saadabad we have cows and chickens, and several times each season I visit them and commune with them. I also take a rather child-like delight in electric trains, and every so often I operate a set I bought in Switzerland only a couple of years ago. In secondary-school days I had a year of instruction in carpentry and woodworking, and I am sometimes tempted to revive that interest. And always I find genuine peace and pleasure in conversation with modest, unassuming people in ordinary walks of life. Politically, economically, and socially we have in recent years been advancing so fast that I am plagued by few of my old anxieties. But I still face plenty of frustrations. I suppose what irritates me most is inefficiency and slothfulness and the lack of enough trained and highprincipled personnel. That is our only

serious problem today, for as that bottleneck is broken everything else is solved. So you can see why I place so much stress upon the points I took up in Chapter 11, and why I look to Iran's youth as the key to our future. I have often emphasized that as part of our ceaseless and successful fight against corruption we must see to it that every civil servant has enough to live on; only then can we be sure that financial need will not force him into dishonest practices. But I candidly recognize that some of our most corrupt individuals are men of wealth who stoop so low as to accept gifts and bribes when they have no conceivable need of them. Such men add to my frustrations; and were I not careful I could easily dissipate my energies through mere emotional antagonism to these scoundrels. But perhaps it is fair to say that instead I proceed more scientifically against them. In the same way I could easily multiply my frustrations and waste my energies by reacting emotionally to the abusive and scurrilous radio broadcasts that emanate from a neighbouring country. But instead I listen to them or read about them with a sort of relaxed disdain. So far in this chapter I have told you a little about my daily routine and about my methods of coping with the anxieties and frustrations that would otherwise long since have maimed or killed me. Now I shall explain a few of my administrative techniques, which I think help account for whatever success I have had in my role as King. Somebody with a sense of humour has invented the notion of the coefficient of frustration. I can say that my coefficient of frustration is inversely proportional to our rate of advance; and I think the same point applies generally to my countrymen. Partly because my administrative methods are patterned after the needs and peculiarities of our particular culture, you will find them somewhat unconventional. Experience has shown me that my

administrative devices actually work, and that they lead to the kind of progress which lowers our national coefficient of frustration. For example, I am a great believer in a plurality of administrative channels and in having alternative channels always available. If through ignorance, laziness, or self-interest one official refuses to bestir himself to vigorous action, then I turn to somebody else. Thus I get what I want done, and at the same time I deliberately diminish the all-precious prestige of those who decline to put themselves out in the national interest. Often I order minor officials to tell their superiors what I want done and when. Sometimes this is merely a matter of convenience; for instance, if I am inspecting a new airport and decide it would be well to have some green grass around the terminal, I may tell the handiest person so to inform his boss. But at other times I use the same technique deliberately to undercut pompous and immobile officials. I have spoken of my habit of getting the viewpoints of a variety of people, and I consciously develop this propensity into a system of multiple channels for administrative intelligence. If I visit a factory, I ask the man at a lathe or punch-press how he feels about his working conditions or the education of his daughter. If I open a new school, I ask the teachers about their living accommodation. I ask farmers if they are getting help from their extension agents or how the gendarmes are treating them. I inquire of minor civil servants how the cost of living is affecting them and whether morale in their office is high. I do not employ any advisers in the usual sense of that term. To do so is, I think, dangerous for any head of State. One of the few mistakes my father made was to rely upon a narrowing circle of advisers. Fearing Reza Shah, they flattered him rather than telling him the truth; and I am sorry to say they were by no means always

incorruptible. My system is entirely different. I know that advisers, no matter how technically competent they may be, sometimes make the national interest subservient to their own. Furthermore, they are prone to try to funnel all information through themselves and to seal off independent intelligence channels. So in lieu of advisers I obtain information from many quarters and then try to strike my own balance sincerely and solely in the light of the public interest. Let me add that in no way do I regard myself as the one true repository of knowledge and enlightenment. On the contrary I use my multiple intelligence channels to draw upon the judgement of many wise men. Furthermore, if I see that the problem is unusually serious or complex, I instantly start enlarging my network of information channels; thus I marshal additional resources to solve the question at hand. Most such cases then go before an appropriate body of responsible officials. Thanks largely to the contribution of other people under my system, the decisions usually turn out to be right for Iran and especially for her ordinary people whose welfare must come first. Once I have established a policy I ask my Prime Minister or one of my other ministers or organization heads to put it into action. Often the agency to whom the task is entrusted acts swiftly and surely, but sometimes it falters. In case of non-performance I demand an explanation. don't I accept the oft-repeated refrain, 'It's not my fault.' I rarely lose my temper, but from my eyes and my voice the official in question knows how I regard his conduct. He may be dismissed through proper channels, and the Government will then be asked to look for somebody better. If organizational as well as personality changes are needed to improve performance, I have the Government attend to those too. Although for gathering information and conducting business I largely

rely upon informal contacts or audiences granted to one or a few people, I also make important use of the two more formal bodies I have mentioned—namely, the High Economic Council and the Council of Ministers. I think it will help give the flavour of my methods if I briefly describe the workings of the latter group, which, as I have said, is our Cabinet. It is composed of the Prime Minister and all the other ministers. The council meets in the Marble Palace. The Prime Minister and his ministers have taken their places before my arrival. Since the members of the council are waiting for me to speak, there is no need for me to bring the meeting to order; and during the proceedings I never use a gavel, but control things merely by the look in my eyes and by my facial expression and tone of voice. Depending upon my preference I may start by speaking on some topic to the group as a whole, or I may ask the Prime Minister or any of his Cabinet to deliver a previously requested report or to give me impromptu comments on a current problem. I allow and encourage free discussion of every matter coming before the group, but I keep pressing towards some definite conclusion. I may express a general guiding principle, or I may issue specific orders. For example, at one meeting I explained the great importance of documentary films for informing the people of progress on our development programme. Pointing out the importance of toys in moulding the minds of children, I sharply criticized a proposal to ban their import into Iran. In regard to an investigation of the affairs of one of our leading department stores, I stated that my chief desire in this field was to bring down retail prices. I urged the importance of raising the salaries of civil servants so that they could support themselves in the face of cumulative price increases. I asked that a definite target date be set for the completion of another

railway link, and I demanded speedier action on plans for a steel plant. At another meeting I took up the budget for the forthcoming year and expressed the guiding considerations for the allocation of oil revenues for our development programme. I emphasized the urgency of salary increases for civil servants and members of the gendarmerie, and larger expenditures for health and education and for the national security agency. To help meet these increases I stated that we must have better collection of customs revenues and tighter control over general expenditures. I spoke on progress in giving municipalities more authority over primary education; and I asked the Minister of Education to study ways of increasing available funds in his field. I gave instructions on guiding the production of tea and sugar more in accordance with the public interest. I told several members of the council that they should look into the possibility of selling certain lands belonging to their ministries in order to raise funds for building houses for civil servants on some of the remainder. At a third meeting I spoke of reports I had received of opium smuggling in one of our northern provinces, and I demanded an immediate stop to this illicit traffic. I told the appropriate minister that the state of a certain centre for distributing free milk was terrible, and I asked for instant action to improve it. I again affirmed my intention of seeing to it that our civil servants received salary increases, and I told all the members of the council to make sure that their budget forecasts allowed for this. I asked for early study of tax policies that would increase the Government's revenues and at the same time meet the requirements of social justice. I could give many other examples to illustrate the effort to inject the test of social justice into all the council's policy-making decisions. For instance at council meetings I have more than once

referred to my five principles of social justice that I describe in Chapter 8 of this book; and these and related guide lines find many expressions in our discussions and in the actions to which they lead. Thus I have demanded better enforcement of a law requiring industrialists who employ more than a hundred workers to provide them with housing conforming to approved standards. I have stipulated that in our industrialization programme priority must be given to establishing factories whose output is needed by our low-income groups and will contribute to reducing the cost of living. For example, to this end we are building new mechanized Government bread factories as well as the new pharmaceutical factory of which I spoke earlier. I asked that the council expedite plans for establishing further vocational schools throughout the country. These, I pointed out, would provide fresh opportunities for our young people regardless of their financial means or family background or influence; and at the same time the schools would help meet our national shortage of technicians. I asked the council to welcome foreign contributions to our technical education programme. Similarly I ordered an expansion in the number of Government and royal scholarships available to poor students who wish to continue their technical or other studies abroad. I requested decisive action to encourage more of our doctors to practise in outlying regions of the country; for in Iran, just as in some of the highly developed countries, physicians tend to congregate in the big cities. I urged the Government to provide more amenities and facilities for doctors who volunteer for service in the smaller towns. The appropriate minister heard my request to expand Government purchases of wheat to aid the farmers and to augment our food reserves. To help the farmers enlarge their output and income I urged an increase in

the number of agricultural banks in our small towns and villages.

I asked the Minister of Agriculture to expand the amount of irrigated land near Teheran in order to help ensure plentiful supplies of low-cost produce for our fast-growing capital city. I stipulated that a national tree-planting day should be set aside each year in my country; and I demanded other steps to grow more forests in order to provide villagers with their own fuel and timber, to conserve soil and water, and to moderate the weather. I requested a study of the possibilities of artificial rain-making in Iran, following the pattern of successful experiments in Australia, the United States, and other countries. These, then, are examples of the kinds of guidance and instructions that I am constantly giving. But it is one thing to issue an order and another to see that it is carried out. Better education and the discipline of the factory system will eventually eradicate the curse of procrastination in my country; but meanwhile I and others must constantly push and prod and goad to get things done. Remorseless following-up is required, and this alone demands many personal contacts. Some Western administrators talk blandly of a limited span of control under which the leader or executive regularly sees no more than eight or a dozen key aides; but such a system in no sense fits our cultural situation, and furthermore it would be dangerous in its limitation of the channels of information and intelligence upon which I regularly depend. A tremendous range of contacts is required for me to keep fully informed of the needs and problems of my people, and the same principle applies if I am to fulfill my obligation of perpetually expediting and accelerating my country's progress. Now I should explain that the framers of our Constitution wisely stipulated that 'the King is free of responsibility'. By this they meant that the King

is beyond or above responsibility in the sense that it is his ministers, not the Sovereign himself, who is directly accountable to Parliament. But when the Constitution says the King is not responsible, in no way does that imply that he is irresponsible. To the contrary, he has the obligation to exercise wisely the important royal powers I have summarized in Chapter 8. Furthermore, if he is properly concerned about his people and their welfare, duty requires him to demonstrate real leadership in making and carrying out national policies. Naturally there are intrinsic limits to how fast the King can lead the country along the path of progress. I have already made clear that as a newly developing nation we face serious shortages, especially of the kind of personnel we need for optimum development. Likewise we never have enough money or equipment or facilities to satisfy our ambitious plans. But the point is that I and all my patriotic countrymen keep trying to speed our advance; and I think there is ample evidence of our cumulative and accelerating success. Abraham Lincoln and many other leaders and heads of State have spoken of the essential loneliness of their position; and in Iran the whole tradition surrounding the Shah accentuates the same tendency. Although I am much more accessible and much less forbidding in demeanour than was Reza Shah, inevitably my role keeps me at arm's length from other people. During meetings of the Council of Ministers or in the course of private audiences I may laugh and joke, but everybody knows that such mutual understanding is in a true sense purely superficial. My isolation is accentuated by my reluctance to employ advisers and by my habit—which indeed is common among heads of State—of bearing the final decision-making burden. Except in trivial terms I do not even discuss affairs of State with my closest relatives. Am I then

lonely? I think not. My affection for my wife and children, for my people as a whole, and for nature helps prevent that. Furthermore, really I love my work, the challenge it offers, and the satisfactions it brings. Visible signs of progress greet me wherever I go in my country and these tell me we are on the right road. I don't want to seem sentimental, but the sight of our pretty schoolgirls trooping along the streets, chattering and laughing, drives away loneliness and brings me a more cosmic sense of rapport. Thus inspired, it is no wonder that I look towards the days when I can institute a Government dowry for every Persian girl when she is married at the legal age. The marriage of many of our girls is delayed for economic reasons, and I consider that unjust. In the same way I cherish a plan for creating really spacious and beautiful Government homes for all our older people who wish to live in them. The twilight of life should be a time of happiness and peace, and we can make it so. But there is still another reason why my role as King does not leave me lonely. I spoke earlier of my conviction that God is guiding me and that I can rely upon God's support. I think my assurance of His direction in no way makes me arrogant or fanatical; instead it gives me the quiet confidence of somehow being in tune with the universe. Besides saying my daily prayers, I sometimes call on God to help me. Without claiming any sort of telepathic communication with the divine, I can simply say that these calls do not go unheeded. And I find it difficult ever to be lonely.

In this chapter I don't want to talk a lot about myself as King or about the great tradition in which I serve; and besides, in most of the preceding chapters I have dwelt upon my philosophy and programme and the steps I am taking and shall continue to take to implement them. So now I think I shall conclude by saying just a few words about

our Persian monarchy as an institution. I have learned to look with some detachment at my own position and at the role of our ancient monarchy; and if ever I felt that Persia's monarchy had outlived its usefulness, I would be happy to resign as king and would even join in helping to abolish our monarchical institution. But in the cold grey light of the dawn, I find that the monarchy has served us well—as well in the nuclear age as it did in the days of our first great empire. Already I have mentioned that our monarchy has reached some 2,500 years of age. I do not intend this to be an exact figure, because it depends upon how you do your arithmetic. Cyrus the Great became king about 2,506 years ago, but it took him a few years to unify the country and to consolidate our first empire. During the many centuries since Cyrus's day, we have suffered invasions as well as having ourselves invaded other lands and controlled vast territories; but the continuity of our monarchy has remained essentially unbroken. Over this great time-span, the monarchy has brought unity out of diversity. We have always had differences of race, colour, creed, and economic and political situation and conviction; but under the monarchy the divergencies have been sublimated into one larger whole symbolized in the person of the Shah. Now I maintain that in the history of my country I am the first Shah who ever fully used his constitutional powers. A moment's reflection will make this statement less startling than it at first seems. Not until 1906 did we possess a written constitution, and so only in a loose and vague sense can you speak of the constitutional authority of the earlier Shahs. Those of the Qajars who ruled in the brief period from 1906 to my father's seizure of power made a joke of our Constitution and at the same time failed in the proper use of the powers it conferred upon them. Notwithstanding his momentous

contributions to Iran, Reza Shah subordinated Parliament and by the same process denied himself certain constitutional powers relating to the legislature; moreover the Senate, although provided for in the original Constitution, was not created until my time. Altogether, then, I think the facts support me when I say that I am the first Persian monarch to use his powers in the full sense intended by the writers of our Constitution. In addition as I have pointed out, my people have seen fit to expand my constitutional powers through amendments to the original document of 1906. Now some itinerant foreign correspondents have suggested that I am a constitutional monarch with dictatorial tendencies. At the same time some of my own countrymen as well as foreigners have wished that I would be tougher and more arbitrary, in the style set by my father. I think this book provides a chronicle of the kind of balance I have tried to strike. And especially with the emergence of our political parties I think I shall be able to apply our monarchical tradition in a new way. In the past we have had many great kings, but we have also had some who have abused their powers or have otherwise failed to serve the common people. But the latter situation is becoming impossible. With the growth of education and of political parties in Iran, a good king will be able to serve his country more effectively than ever before; but a mediocre or bad king would no longer have the means to cause damage, for the enlightened people of this country would not tolerate it. They would oblige him to reform or to relinquish his throne in favour of his constitutional successor. Persian public sentiment, am I convinced, will ever be alert to the country's needs. Under the party system, the Shah must serve as a focal point for a unity that transcends all lesser interests. We Persians are among the most individualistic people on earth, but throughout

the centuries we have shown that we can respond to the need for a higher loyalty. In this respect I think we shall not be found wanting in the years to come. So precipitate is the world's metamorphosis that it has become easy for any society to lose its moorings. I think the dramatic recent advances in my country testify that we welcome constructive change. But at the same time we stand fast in support of certain superior values that I believe to be characteristically ours. We cherish the gardens and the poetry and the family life and the hospitality of Persia. We acclaim this land of deserts and snow-capped mountains, of cedars and plane trees, of rivers and fountains and tiled water-courses, of roses and orange-blossom and nightingales. And we are proud of our political and social institutions.